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Abstract:
D uring the period o f  this study, digital media comprised an increasingly pervasive but 
still emergent medium in society. M ost formal academic, industrial and governmental 
research into the emergence o f  digital media industries and innovations focused on 
technological and software artefacts, to the neglect o f content. Such studies 
subscribed to a distinctly determinist conception o f emergence and innovation, 
regarding them as essentially linear, closed processes, with digital media emerging 
under an autonomous momentum and causing dramatic changes to society and 
people's lives. The studies were, in the main, conducted at macro and meso-Ievel, 
based largely on statistical analysis, and they measured the value o f  scientific and 
technical knowledge to innovation.
This thesis argues that such approaches are unsuited to the study o f  the content 
industry, which remains a distinct domain within the overall digital media sector. 
Content innovation is marked by important qualitative differences compared to 
technological innovation, e.g. it is dependent on competencies less tangible than 
scientific and technical knowledge. A conceptual framework sensitive to such 
differences is required to form a deeper understanding o f the emergence o f  the digital 
content industry and the development dynamics o f  the innovation processes shaping 
its development.
In response to conceptions o f closed, linear emergence o f both industries and 
innovations, this thesis argues that emergence and innovation have been multi­
dimensional, multi-directional processes, influenced by many factors (social, 
economic, organisational, technical) at many levels.
The conceptual framework for this study draws on theories and concepts from a 
number o f  disciplinary fields. It draws on those traditionally applied to the study o f 
technological innovation within mature industries, and adapted them to the study o f  
content innovation within an early emerging industry. The study seeks to draw on and 
integrate insights drawn from: a) recent systems o f innovation literature, b) 
science/technology and society studies field (e.g., debates over social shaping and 
technological determinist theories), as well as c) those drawn from the more familiar 
communication and media studies field.
The empirical aspects o f the research have aimed to monitor, describe and analyse 
rapidly changing developments in this emergent industry since the late 1990s. The 
study addresses the key trends in the emerging industry at macro, meso and micro­
levels. Part o f  the study involves an industrial-level analysis in an attempt to better 
map and understand the unfolding strategies and trends with particular attention to the 
Irish context. This research project also comprised detailed case studies o f  the 
dynamics o f innovation within a number o f individual digital media companies.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
2Chapter 1: Introduction
1.0: Introduction
The aim o f this thesis is to examine the emergence o f Ireland’s innovative new digital 
media content industiy. The empirical research into the emergent industry was 
undertaken at three levels: macro-level (national system o f innovation), meso-level 
(industrial system o f  innovation), and micro-level (individual digital media content 
com panies)1. This multi-level approach allows me to map and measure the dynamics 
o f  innovation at the various levels, and assess the influences on the emergence o f the 
industry and the development o f digital media content. The thesis adopts a holistic 
approach to its conceptual framework: that the emergence o f the industry and 
innovations within it are essentially open processes, subject to many influences at 
many levels. The approach allows the research to be sensitive to how the dynamics o f 
innovation at the micro-level (within companies) influence trends at the meso and 
macro-levels. It also examines how trends at the meso and macro-levels influence 
innovation at the micro-level.
This thesis regards innovation and the emergence o f  the digital media content 
industry as multi-dimensional, multi-directional processes. This contrasts to the 
dominant, technology-centred theories o f innovative development, which regard 
innovation as a closed, linear process (Toffler, 1970, 1990a; McLuhan, 1962, 1967, 
1987; Negroponte, 1995; Kelly, 1999). The literature review chapters will contain an 
elaborated description o f how the conceptual framework differs from technology- 
centred accounts o f  innovation.
1 The concepts o f national and industrial system  o f innovations w ill be exam ined in  greater detail in  tlie 
literature review  chapters.
3W hen I began my research in late 1999, digital media was an emerging medium 
which was becoming increasingly pervasive in Irish society2. A lot o f hype has 
surrounded the emergence o f digital media, with a number o f commentators 
pronouncing its potential to transform society for the better (Negroponte, 1995, Kelly, 
1999). M ost o f these pronouncements are made from a technological determinist 
perspective, and are subjected to little critical analysis, especially in the mainstream 
media. They argue that digital media technologies (or information communications 
technologies (ICTs), as they are conceptualised in such works) are emerging under an 
autonomous momentum and having significant impacts on society. However, little 
attention has been directed to how the content o f digital media is emerging and what 
are the influences on it.
This thesis moves towards an understanding o f  how the digital media content 
industry, in an Irish context, is emerging, what are the influences on it, and the brakes 
and accelerators to its emergence. It also examines how digital media content is 
developed, and what influences or shapes what is delivered to end-users as content. 
The research is focused primarily on the production o f content, but it does 
acknowledge the importance o f  the social context o f  consumption.
Digital media, as both an industry and a content form, is at an early stage o f its 
emergence. Future development is uncertain, and unlike in more mature industries, 
digital media has yet to lock into the mass o f  conventions, practices or legal and 
industrial standards that can close off development paths or innovative options. 
Although, as my empirical research will demonstrate, there are early, tentative traces 
that this is beginning to happen, such as the propensity o f  certain forms o f content to 
emerge from the Irish industry. (My research also offers a valuable insight into the 
early, unresolved conflicts o f  the industry’s emergence.) Industrial structure, business 
models, institutional support, content production infrastructures and competencies 
w ere all emerging and changing during the course o f the research, between 1999 and 
2002. Often, as will be outlined in the literature review, the industry displays similar 
patterns o f  emergence to  technological and traditional media industries, but also
2 As an exam ple o f the increasing use of digital m edia in  Ireland, the Central Statistics Office estim ated 
in  2000 that 262,700 (or 20.4 percent of) Irish households had a com puter connected to the Internet. 
Two years earlier, the figure w as 5 percent.
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4displays differences. The thesis will argue that innovation and the emergence o f a new 
innovative industry is a risk-laden and uncertain process. Even within the three years 
o f  the research, the industry did not emerge along a progressive, linear path: my 
quantitative research indicates that the industry contracted between 2001 and 20 0 2 , 
that unsuccessful innovators were eliminated, business models were changed, and 
unsuccessful forms o f content innovations or artefacts were revised or withdrawn 
from the market. This project offers a valuable, real-time opportunity to study the 
early emergent industry at an economic and innovative level, and to gauge the 
frictional dynamics at play as actors vie with each other to influence the innovation 
process.
1.2: Delimitations of scope
The thesis focuses on digital media as an emergent industry and a content form, and 
not as a technology. I f  I were to draw an analogy with television, the thesis is less 
concerned w ith the development o f the technological innovations o f  television -  such 
as satellite and digital broadcasting, and widescreen television -  than with the 
development o f content for the medium. This includes the rules, codes and grammars 
that are emerging for good programming production: editing techniques, optimum 
camera angles, and script writing. However, the thesis does not ignore the 
technological innovations o f  digital media, because they have the ability to give 
content creators the freedom to  experiment with more ambitious forms o f content. 
Also, the technologies o f production, as well as delivery infrastructures, place certain 
restrictions on the development o f digital media content, as will be outlined in the 
empirical case-studies.
From an early stage o f  my work, I believed it was important to keep a sharp focus 
on my areas o f research interest. I didn’t want to stretch my theoretical or empirical 
scope too wide, lest I produced a loose thesis that had little o f value to say about a 
num ber o f subjects. Digital media content is a broad area, and I believed it was best to 
find a core research interest within it. In trying to keep a focus on my research 
interests, I excluded concerns that, in another context, would be closely related to the 
area o f  digital media content.
For instance, an area related to digital media content, but which falls outside my 
scope, is consumption -  how users pattern their consumption o f  content, how they 
interpret the content, how they appropriate digital media technologies, and are 
influenced by social factors such as age, gender, education and occupation.
I focus on the production o f digital media content, not its consumption. That said, 
consumption is a wide and important area, and it is the subject o f valuable doctoral 
w ork being carried out in the STEM research centre, in Dublin City University 
(Hynes, 2002).
1.3: Key questions
M ost formal research into the Irish digital media industry has been undertaken by 
government and industry, often together if  one looks at the boards o f many published 
reports (Forfas, 1996; M cGovern/Enterprise Ireland, 1997; Forfas and IBEC, 1998; 
Forfas and IBEC, 1999; Enterprise Ireland/Digital Dividends Conference, 2001). In 
the main, the reports marry a progressive, radical vision o f the industry’s emergence 
to a conservative set o f business and investment models, and are focused on supply 
side economics -  that production will create markets. Their concern is mainly o f  
digital media as a material, technological artefact, and so they do not address many o f 
the concerns o f  this thesis. Therefore, I try to answer the following two key questions. 
Each key question has a number o f subsidiary questions emanating from it. The first 
key question is applied to the meso-level empirical research. The second is applied to 
the micro-level research, although there is overlap between the two.
Key question:
1: H ow did Irish digital media content develop as an emergent new innovative 
industry between 1999 and 2002?
Subsidiary questions:
A: W hat is the optimum conceptual framework for examining the emergence o f the 
industry and accounting for innovation within it?
B : W hat are the main influences on the emergence o f the industry (at macro, meso, 
and micro levels)?
6C: W hat are the main characteristics o f the industry, such as company size, innovative 
activities, and the styles o f innovation that emerge from it?
D: W hat was the level o f innovative activity within the industry between 1999 and 
20 0 2 , and did the innovative activities o f companies rise, fall or change in those 
years?
Key question:
2: H ow  do individual digital media content companies operate as actors within a 
system o f innovation, and what are the dynamics and processes o f innovation within 
those companies?
Subsidiary questions:
A: W hat are the influences (macro, meso, micro) on content produced within digital 
media companies?
B: W hat are the emerging organisational structures o f  the companies, how do the 
structures influence content production, and how do the origins o f the companies 
influence their structures?
C: W hat are the emerging production competencies and infrastructures for digital 
m edia content? H ow  do companies accumulate the requisite competencies and 
infrastructures?
D: W hat are the emerging business models for generating revenues from digital media 
content?
The first key question, and its four subsidiary questions, focuses on the meso- 
level o f  the research, the purpose o f  which is to gauge in general terms the emergence 
o f  the industry. I conducted the meso-level research using quantitative methodologies. 
A  flaw com mon to many quantitative research studies is their tendency to make 
specific claims from general information. The general trends o f an emerging or 
m ature industry are not always reflected in individual companies, or the research can
7be so generalised -  or distant from its object o f study -  that important processes are 
missed at lower, micro-levels o f  the industry. Therefore, it is important to balance the 
general research with more focused, qualitative research.
The second key question, and its four subsidiaries, are addressed through three 
qualitative case-studies, all o f which are companies that produce or had produced 
content within the industry, but have markedly different origins: one is a start-up, one 
has emerged from a traditional media company, and one has emerged from a 
telecommunications company. The key question, and its subsidiaries, are designed to 
tease out the particular processes o f innovation within the companies, and the 
influences on content production and innovation within them. The traditional focus o f 
the literature on systems o f innovation and social shaping theory has been on the 
emergence o f  material, technological artefacts in mature industries. The purpose o f 
my case-studies is to give a grounded understanding o f  the processes o f  innovation 
surrounding the emergence o f symbolic content artefacts in an emerging industry.
1.4: Methodology and research techniques for years 1, 2 and 3
Because much o f my thesis is based on empirical work, the research methodology is 
crucial to the quality o f  the results. Here, I give only a brief outline o f my 
methodology, because it w ill be discussed in greater depth in chapter four. My 
methodology chapter will assess the strengths and weaknesses o f  the tw o main 
traditions in academic research: quantitative and qualitative analysis. The chapter will 
argue that, for my research purposes, a methodology that combines both traditions 
will produce the most accurate results. This will allow my work to benefit from the 
strengths o f  both approaches, and using them in combination will counter-balance 
many o f their weaknesses.
Breakdown of research over the three years:
Year 1. October 1999 to October 2000: Literature review o f social shaping theory, 
technological determinism and systems o f innovation. Also some readings on the 
Information Society, the history o f the emergence o f traditional media, and numerous 
government and industry reports on the digital media industry. I began to develop the 
core o f  my conceptual framework from this early reading. I also reviewed some
literature on quantitative research methodologies before I conducted the first section 
o f the quantitative study o f the Irish digital media content industry.
Y ear 2. October 2000 to October 2001: I deepened my understanding o f  core 
concepts, such as systems o f  innovation, I refined my conceptual framework and key 
questions. I began my empirical work on the case-studies. I updated my quantitative 
study o f the Irish digital media content industry, to accommodate any changes in the 
year since the original study was conducted. Towards the end o f  the year, I conducted 
my empirical research on the first o f my qualitative case-studies, Ireland.com
Y ear 3. October 2001 to October 2002: I began the year by completing the case-study 
chapter on Ireland.com. I also completed my qualitative case-studies o f  Enter and 
Rondomondo. I updated my quantitative study o f the Irish digital media content 
industry, for the third and final time. I wrote up my final draft o f  the thesis, redrafting 
chapters as my understanding deepened o f the processes o f innovation within the 
industry. I gained a better sense o f how the traditional literature could account for 
such processes, what were the limitations o f  the literature, and how the conceptual 
fram ework o f this thesis had to adapt accordingly.
1.5: Definition of key terms
A number o f  terms recur throughout the thesis. Some o f them have precise meanings 
that might be misinterpreted by an ‘understood’ meaning. Therefore, to avoid 
confusion, it is necessary to define some o f them in this section. Some terms, such as 
systems o f  innovation, are defined within the body o f the thesis as they become 
relevant to the text. Other terms are not explicitly defined within the body o f the 
thesis, or may needed to be understood before reading it, and so will be outlined here:
1: Digital media: The term multimedia emerged to describe interactive content that 
combined text, audio and video. However, in academic, governmental and industrial 
research, the conceptualisation o f multimedia has become increasingly technology- 
based (Pavlik, 1999), and focuses more on hardware and software capabilities than on 
the form  o f content. This thesis, attending to content production, moves beyond such a
9technology-based conception o f  multimedia. Also, the term ‘m ultim edia’ retains 
certain connotations from the time it emerged into popular use, in the early 1990s, o f  
being associated with early (often pre-Internet) personal computers and CD-ROMs. In 
modern times, interactive content that combines text, audio and video is delivered 
across a wide variety o f platforms: Internet, CD-ROM, television, mobile phones, 
PDAs and games consoles. The content is delivered in digital form, an advance from, 
for example, the analogue delivery o f traditional television content. To move beyond 
technology-based conceptions, and to recognise the wide variety o f  platforms to 
which content is delivered, this thesis employs the term ‘digital m edia’ instead o f 
‘m ultim edia’. It is taken as a given that digital media can combine ‘m ulti’ forms o f 
text, video and audio, so defining this form o f media by its ability to combine 
different forms o f content is too restrictive for this thesis.
Instances where I use the general term ‘digital media’ encompasses both the 
technology (hardware, software, delivery infrastructures) and content. The term 
‘digital media content’ applies to  the content o f the medium; ‘digital media 
technology’ applies to the technology. Only in instances where an original author, 
book or report refers to multimedia will the term be used.
2: Content form : This is a broad term that stresses how digital media is a new and 
distinct (but emerging) medium, in the sense that newspapers, television and radio are 
each distinct forms o f  media. (Distinct from each other, although in the early stages o f 
their emergence they may borrow techniques, codes and grammars from older media, 
but adapt them to suit the particular needs o f the format.) Such a term is necessary 
because o f  my interest in examining digital media not only as an emerging industry 
but also as an emerging content form.
3: Content innovation: Whereas content form is a general term to refer to digital 
media as a medium, content innovation is more specific. For example, if  a newspaper 
is a content form, then tabloid or broadsheet newspapers are content innovations. 
They are variations on the theme, specialised adaptations o f  the general medium. 
Digital media, in general, is a content form, but more specialised adaptations, such as 
interactive games or interactive encyclopaedias on CD-ROM, are content innovations.
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4: Digital media artefact: I could use the term digital media product here, considering 
the prevalence o f  market forces in the emerging industry. But that might give the 
impression that everything produced as digital media content should have commercial 
intent. Rather, I prefer the term artefact to describe an individual piece o f digital 
m edia work. For instance, the general concept o f Enter as an interactive magazine is a 
content innovation. An individual edition o f  Enter, which is sold in newsagents, is a 
digital media artefact.
5: Innovation: A fuller definition o f innovation will be given in the literature review 
on systems o f innovation, in chapter three. However, I believe the reader needs some 
sense o f the term before beginning to read the main body o f the thesis. Broadly 
speaking, innovation refers to something new -  either the development o f  a new 
technology, or a new content innovation, or a new way o f structuring an organisation 
(organisational innovation). In this thesis, there are two main degrees o f innovation: 
radical innovation or incremental (process or product) innovation. Radical innovation 
refers to a significant advancement o f an innovation. Incremental innovation, as the 
term  suggests, involves improvements to an innovation in increments, small 
improvements, small steps forward. The thesis argues that, in the Irish digital media 
content industry, incremental innovations are the norm.
6 : Traditional media -  Often, the thesis compares digital media w ith more mature, 
established media forms, to highlight commonalities or differences between them, or 
shared patterns in their emergence. Therefore, a term is needed to distinguish the 
older media from digital media. I decided on the term traditional media. Tradition 
refers to a practice o f long standing. This contrasts nicely with digital media, which I 
regard as an emerging practice o f relatively short standing.
1.6: Outline of the thesis and chapter breakdown
Chapter 1: Introduction: The chapter sets out the what, why and how o f my thesis. It 
explains that I intend to examine the emergent, innovative Irish digital media content 
industry, why I believe it is a topic worthy o f study, and how I intend to study it.
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Chapter 2 : Literature review 1 : social shaping theory and technological determinism. 
This is the first literature review chapter. It sets out and critiques two broad schools o f 
thought that inform the conceptual framework o f the research, and sets out the reasons 
why I selected these theories as the main informants.
Chapter 3: Literature review 2 : systems o f innovation and the diaital media sector. 
This is the second literature review chapter. It deals with systems o f innovation 
theory, which demonstrates how innovation is a social and cumulative process by 
highlighting the linkages between various social actors. It examines the co-operative 
and frictional dynamics at work in the innovation process. For example, research 
undertaken in a university could provide the information necessary for a company to 
develop an innovation; therefore, the work o f both organisations is linked. But the 
university could not have undertaken the work without funding, perhaps from 
government. So another actor is involved in the process. The end o f chapter three will 
contain a summary o f my conceptual framework.
Chapter 4: Methodology. I gave a brief outline o f my methodological approach in a 
previous section o f  this chapter, so I shall not repeat it here.
Chapter 5 : Case-studv: the Irish digital media content industry. This is the first o f the 
empirical research chapters and is a quantitative analysis o f the emerging Irish digital 
media content industry. The aim is to map the landscape o f the industry, to illustrate 
trends in and characteristics o f its emergence, and to place into context the workings 
o f  individual digital media content companies. It examines the factors that are 
influencing the emergence o f the industry and the interplay o f  various actors within it. 
Later, in the qualitative case-studies, I assess how general characteristics o f  and trends 
in the industry influence individual companies on a micro-level.
Chapter 6 : Case-studv: Ireland.com. Ireland.com  is a digital media content venture 
that emerged out o f a traditional media organisation, The Irish Times Group. I 
examine the main influences on the emergence o f Ireland.com, such as how its 
emergence from a larger, non-digital media organisation influences its organisational 
structure and content production practices. I examine the mix o f  competencies within
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the organisation (content, technical, production, managerial), and how it interactes 
with other actors within the system o f innovation.
Chapter 7: Case-studv: Enter CD-ROM magazine. This is a retrospective case-study 
o f  an interactive entertainment CD-ROM  magazine that used to be published by a 
company called Pure Communications. The magazine, Enter, contained many o f the 
traditional elements o f a print entertainment magazine -  celebrity interviews, features, 
film and music reviews -  but the content was presented in an interactive form more 
suited to the PC platform to which it was delivered. For instance, interviews 
incorporated significant amounts o f  audio, video and text, arranged around the central 
concept o f a virtual city. The case-study examines how Pure Comm unications’s origin 
as a start-up influenced the organisation o f the company and the content produced for 
Enter. I assess the competencies that were brought into the company or developed 
within it to produce content.
Chapter 8 : Case-study: Rondomondo. When the research for this project began in 
October 1999, a number o f companies w ith backgrounds in technology were trying to 
break into digital media content. The majority o f  them had, by 2002, proved 
unsuccessful. An early hypothesis o f this thesis was that companies w ith technology 
backgrounds would encounter more difficulties trying to establish themselves in the 
digital media content industry than companies with backgrounds in content, such as 
traditional media companies. The hypothesis further supposed that content 
competencies were more crucial to content production than technical competencies, 
and also were harder to become proficient in. In general, this hypothesis held true, 
w ith the majority o f  technology companies that were trying to establish themselves in 
the content industry in 1999 having left it by 2002.
Rondomondo was one such digital media content venture. It was the digital media 
publishing division o f  Eircom, Ireland’s largest telecommunications company. The 
case-study examines how Rondom ondo’s origins within a telecommunications 
company influenced its organisational structure and the content it produced. I assess 
the mix o f  competencies that were developed within the Rondomondo organisation, 
how it interacted with outside actors within the system o f innovation, the vision it had 
for its content production and w hether this ‘vision’ was content or technology-led. 
The stated ambition o f the organisation on its launch was to become a major player in
13
the digital media content industry. It failed to do so. Failures are inherent in systems 
o f  innovation, and it is important to document them when studying an emerging 
industry, especially if  it is at an early stage o f its emergence. There is much to be 
learned from unsuccessful innovation as well as successful innovation.
Chapter 9: Summary o f  main findings and conclusions. As well as summarising the 
main findings, I intend to assess whether the results o f my research justify my 
theoretical framework, and outline the contribution o f  my research
1.7: Conclusion
Digital media is emerging as both an industry and a content form, and is becoming 
increasingly pervasive in society. M ost accounts o f  the emergence o f digital media are 
dominated by technology-centred theories. This thesis argues that such theories 
provide an inadequate explanation o f the emergence o f digital media, both as an 
industry and a content form. A new conceptual framework, which recognises the 
crucial influence o f  social actors and cultural factors, is necessary. The thesis forms 
such a conceptual framework and applies it to quantitative and qualitative case- 
studies.
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Chapter 2: Literature review 1: social shaping theory and 
technological determinism
2.0: Overview
This thesis is concerned with the emergence o f the digital media content industry in 
Ireland. The empirical research is undertaken at tw o levels. The first is a meso-level 
quantitative study, to document general trends and patterns in the emerging industry, 
and to assess the value o f  employing an adapted systems o f innovation model to 
account for its emergence. The second level employs qualitative research 
methodologies to  conduct an in-depth examination o f  three individual companies in 
the industry. It examines how individual companies contribute to and act within an 
industrial system o f innovation, and how other actors within the system interact with 
and influence them. A facet o f the qualitative studies is to  examine the processes of 
innovation within the companies, and how they develop and produce digital media 
content innovations: within a particular organisation, what are the factors that shape 
and influence the final form o f an innovation? Like the quantitative study, the 
research at this level incorporates elements o f  a systems o f  innovation approach 
(discussed in chapter three). It is also heavily informed by a social shaping model, to 
examine the social factors that influence the development o f digital media content.
M uch o f the industrial, governmental and academic research into the emergence 
o f digital media focuses on it as a cluster o f inter-related technological innovations. 
Little attention is paid to the emergence o f digital media content innovations; also, 
little in the way o f  coherent analysis is presented to  account for the emergence o f  the 
digital media content industry in this country. The three main schools o f thought on 
the emergence o f  innovations -  technological determinism, social shaping theory and 
systems o f  innovation -  concentrate their research efforts on examining the 
development o f  material (technological) artefacts. This thesis adopts a broader 
conception o f innovation -  it includes organisational and content innovations -  and so 
has to adapt many o f  the main concepts presented in the literature. The purpose o f  this 
chapter is to gain a broad theoretical understanding o f how new innovations -  whether 
technological, organisational or content -  emerge, and to build a greater awareness of
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the factors that influence or shape them. The chapter outlines the main features o f 
technological determinism and social shaping theory, and argues that the dominant 
theory, technological determinism, is fundamentally flawed in its conception o f 
technological development (and, by extension in this thesis, the development o f 
content innovations). It argues that the crucial factors in shaping the development and 
emergence o f  digital media content innovations are social, not technological.
2.1: Technological determinism
Technological determinism is a wide-ranging theory, with a number o f different 
intellectual traditions sheltering under the label. It is difficult to offer a concise 
definition that accurately sums up the position. But a simplified explanation o f its 
basic principle would state that technology is an autonomous force driving change in 
society -  new technologies emerge and initiate profound changes in social structure, 
and in the social practices, routines and patterns o f people’s lives. Proponents o f the 
theory often describe these changes as revolutions, such as the modern vogue to claim 
that the new inform ation and communication technologies (ICTs) are heralding a 
‘digital revolution’ (Negroponte, 1995; Kelly, 1999). Others, such as the futurist 
Alvin Toffler (1990), conceptualise the changes in terms o f waves. He argues that the 
advanced societies o f  the world have passed the first and second waves of 
development (agricultural and industrial, respectively) and have now entered the third 
wave, which is the inform ation age.
Theories that advocate the power o f technology to change society are regarded as 
transformative. Some o f the most influential transformative theorists include Toffler 
him self (Future shock, 1970; The third wave, 1990), Marshall M cLuhan 
( Understanding media: the extensions o f  man: 1964; The medium is the message, 
1967), Daniel Bell (The coming o f  the post-industrial society, 1973), Nicholas 
N egroponte (Being digital, 1995) and Kevin Kelly (New rides fo r  the new economy, 
1999). In keeping w ith the trend among technological determinist writers, they focus 
on technology as a material artefact, although they have a greater awareness than 
systems o f innovation theorists o f the social implications o f technology, and a greater 
emphasis than social shaping theorists on the macro-level social changes associated 
with the emergence o f  new technologies.
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Although the work o f  determinist theorists shares much common ground, there are 
also marked differences in their analyses o f the impacts and origins o f  new 
technologies. (For example, the degree o f autonomy accorded to technology varies 
from theorist to theorist. Nicholas Negroponte regards technology as fully 
autonomous. Daniel Bell acknowledges the influence o f social factors, and in so doing 
lessens the degree o f  autonomy.) Collectively, however, their work provides the most 
cohesive and complete body o f writing on technological determinism. Therefore, I 
believe it is worthwhile to analyse their w ork individually in sections later in the 
chapter.
Technological determinism is based on a number o f assumptions that close off the 
innovation process from examination. Hard technological determinists try to create a 
mystic around the origins, emergence and impacts o f  technologies, which make the 
innovation process esoteric and, essentially, unknowable. The principle assumptions 
are that technological development is autonomous, outside o f society; technology 
develops along a linear, rational, goal-orientated path, and it works according to a 
principle o f efficiency (the best, most efficient technologies are developed). 
Determ inism also assumes that society changes or adapts to incorporate the emerging 
new technologies; in this conception, technology is regarded as active (the driver) and 
society as passive (the passenger). The assumption that technology develops along a 
linear, predictable, efficient path is heavily criticised by social shaping theory, which 
highlights, for example, how the most efficient technology is not always the 
successful one. Social shaping theory regards the innovation process as multi-faceted, 
w ith many possible paths to development. Also, it shows how many actors, often with 
opposing goals, are involved in the innovation process. There is seldom a single, 
harmonious, rational philosophy underlying the development o f a technology.
O f course, technological determinism is not a monolithic theory -  there are a 
number o f schools o f thought within it. W hat 1 have presented so far could be termed 
as hard-determinism, w hich is characteristic o f  theorists such as Alvin Toffler and 
N icholas Negroponte. Another variant is soft-determinism, which acknowledges that 
social factors exert some influence on the emergence o f  a technology. As stated 
earlier, certain elements o f  soft-determinism will be incorporated into the conceptual 
fram ework o f this thesis. However, even soft determinists (such as Daniel Bell) regard 
technology as an autonomous driver o f change, which this thesis argues against,
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believing that technological and social change is a complex process o f negotiation 
between many actors at many levels.
2.2: Alvin Toffler: a seminal technological determinist theorist
Technological determinism, more so than most schools o f thought, is associated with 
personalities who enjoy high levels o f public recognition and, from certain quarters, 
acclaim. Such people include Marshall M cLuhan and Alvin Toffler, and in more 
recent years, Kevin Kelly and Nicholas Negroponte. In technological determinism, 
ideas and theories -  or visionary insights, as they are often proclaimed -  become 
closely identified with individuals, even though they may be common to  the work o f 
many writers. This trait o f technological determinism, to personalise ideas, filters 
through to its analysis o f  innovation and technological development. It personalises 
them, often reducing a complex process involving the actions o f numerous social 
actors to the efforts o f just one person. An example o f  this is crediting Thomas Edison 
with the invention o f  the electric light. Thomas P. Hughes (1985) demonstrates that, 
although Edison was an important actor in the development o f  the electric light, he 
w asn’t solely responsible -  he depended on the competencies and knowledge o f the 
staff in his laboratory, and on previous innovations in electricity. Hughes shows how 
much o f  Edison’s progress, or invention, involved incremental modifications to 
previously existing technologies. It simplifies and distorts the process o f  innovation to 
attribute the emergence o f  the electric light solely to Edison. But such personalisation 
o f  both theory and technological development is a recurring theme in technological 
determinism.
Alvin Toffler came to prominence in the 1970s, with the publication o f  Future 
Shock. He has written voluminously since then, often co-authoring works with his 
wife, Heidi Toffler (Toffler, 1985, 1990a, 1990b; Toffler and Toffler, 1994). Future 
Shock  is concerned with the rapid emergence o f new technologies, which he regards 
as initiating profound changes in society. He believes that many people are 
experiencing great difficulties in trying to adapt their lives to the new set o f socio­
economic and political relations. These difficulties, he argues, are caused by the 
transition from an old form o f society to a new one, or as the inevitable friction 
caused by society’s “break w ith the past” (Toffler, 1970: 21). He uses the term  future 
shock to describe the condition. In his own words, future shock is caused by “the
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shattering stress and disorientation that we induce in individuals by subjecting them to 
too much change in too short a time” (1970: 12). He warns that future shock is not to 
be regarded as an abstract condition, or simply a pithy literary device to label the 
friction caused by the transition to a new set o f socio-economic and political relations. 
Rather, he claims that future shock is very real and has actual psycho-biological 
effects on its sufferers. He labels it the “disease o f change” (1970: 12).
However, this disease o f  change is not caused by the new technologies 
themselves, but by people’s inability to adapt their lives to them. The principal 
sufferers are those who clung onto the old ways and refuse to embrace the new. This 
is a pillar o f Toffler’s theory: that technology is the driver o f  change, and it is the role 
o f  society to adapt to the new technologies. It is a classic determinist belief, and one 
that, in the opinion o f the author, has been discredited by social shaping critiques. 
Social shaping models -  especially domestication models that examine the 
consumption o f technologies -  suggest that people incorporate technologies into the 
patterns o f their lives, or form social practice around them, through a complex series 
o f  negotiations which are influenced by a number o f factors, including age, gender, 
occupation and cultural capital (Silverstone, 1989). It shows how the social context 
o f  consumption can re-shape a technology. For this thesis, however, the broader term 
‘innovation’ is preferable to technology, because it can be applied to both a material 
artefact (technology) and a symbolic artefact (content innovation). Technological 
determinism has a weak conception o f the social context o f consumption, because it 
regards technology as being uninfluenced by society; rather, it is technology that 
changes society, and therefore the context o f consumption.
The practices or uses o f  the technologies that emerge from these negotiations are 
not inscribed in the technology at the determinist ‘moment o f invention’. The 
technological artefact does not arrive as a closed black-box, which can only be 
interpreted in the manner inscribed by the producers. One o f the flaws that runs 
through the majority o f  technological determinist theory is that it continually fails to 
recognise that a technology can be open to different interpretations and 
appropriations.
Early in Future shock , Toffler states that he is a futurist. But he claims that he errs 
on the side o f caution w hen making predictions about the future. He advises his 
readers to be concerned w ith the “general theme rather than the detail” o f  the future 
development o f technology and society (1970: 14). This becomes very important in
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his later works, especially The third wave, which was published in 1980. Whereas 
Future shock  is deeply rooted in the present, The third wave is more concerned with 
the past and the future. Unlike many o f the more recent technological determinist 
writers, such as Negroponte and Kelly, Toffler in The third wave tries to place 
technological and social change into an historical context. This is commendable, but 
the value o f  his w ork is diminished by his adoption o f the simplistic model o f 
autonomous new technologies changing society.
In the book, he argues that the social changes being wrought by the new 
inform ation technologies are as fundamental and profound as those induced by the 
agricultural revolution 10,000 years ago and the industrial revolution 250 years ago. 
H e claims that society is entering a third wave o f technological and social 
development, driven by the new emerging information technologies and resulting in 
the formation o f  a new set o f  socio-economic and political relations. In Future shock, 
his main concern is people’s inability to adapt to the new set o f relations. In The third  
wave, he is less concerned w ith people’s inability to adapt to changes than with the 
nature and direction o f the changes themselves.
In Future shock , he describes the changes as a “break with the past” (1970: 14). 
Yet, in The third wave, he contradicts that statement. He divides social and 
technological development into three waves. He then analyses the first and second 
waves to account for the nature and origins o f the third. By sinking the foundation o f 
his theory in the past, he unwittingly acknowledges the continuities with the past -  a 
trait o f  social shaping theory, which emphasises the continuities with the past.
In Toffler’s model, the first wave began w ith the agricultural revolution, between 
8,000BC and 1650/1750. During this period, the majority o f  the people worked and 
lived on the land, and this w as the basis o f  the dominant set o f socio-economic and 
political relations. He claims that the power o f this wave has been spent, apart from a 
few small pockets o f the world that remained unindustrialised (Toffler, 1990a).
The second wave came w ith the industrial revolution, and was at its peak between 
1650 and 1955. M anufacturing was the dominant mode o f employment, and this was 
the crux around which socio-economic and political relations formed.
The third wave is the current one. It is characterised by a move away from 
m anufacturing to the provision o f services and information. The third wave is still in 
its early phase and there is an overlap o f socio-economic and political relations from 
the previous, industrial wave. Toffler claims that most frictions in the modern world
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are caused by a clash o f these two sets o f relations, between those who want to 
modernise and those who wish to cling onto the old industrialised ways. Class and 
imperial conquest are diminishing as roots o f conflict in the third wave, because they 
are characteristics o f  the second wave, He predicts that the power o f the second wave 
will diminish relatively quickly, and third wave socio-economic and political relations 
will dominate.
Apart from the previously highlighted flaws o f technological determinism, 
Toffler’s main weakness as a theorist is that he is too caught up in the “general 
theme” -  his division o f the main periods o f technological and social development are 
too wide, too general. (Social shaping is more concerned with the particular, and it is 
a weakness o f the school that in extreme cases it becomes too focused on the 
particular, ignoring general trends.) Also, he offers little to explain why different 
regions or countries industrialise faster than others, or what are the factors that 
stimulate the emergence o f  a new wave. He suggests that a static set o f  socio­
economic relations were in place for the duration o f the first wave -  over 9,500 years 
in the case o f the agricultural revolution. This takes little account o f development and 
change in technology and society during that period, in which better methods for 
growing crops and breeding animals were developed. His writings suggest that the 
only times o f change are at the end o f a wave, when a new wave is washing over an 
old one.
Toffler was an early proponent o f  many o f  the ideas that have become almost the 
clichés o f technological determinism. (As most o f  the ideas will be dealt with in 
greater depth elsewhere in the thesis, they shall be outlined only briefly here.) 
Cairncross, in 1998, published his writings on the “death o f  distance”, but in 1970, 
Toffler was already writing about the “demise o f geography” (1970: 90).
In The third wave, Toffler espouses the idea that the third wave would require 
demassified production, customisation and specialisation, an idea echoed by 
N egroponte in 1995 when he wrote about the “daily me” o f information consumption 
through the new ICTs.
Toffler, too, was an early exponent o f globalisation -  the belief that national 
borders, cultures and identities are being eroded as new technologies create one 
“global village”, to borrow a phrase from Marshall M cLuhan (1989). This thesis will 
argue that, in many instances, national borders, cultures and identities offer strong
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resistance to the adoption o f  technologies, innovations and content, or greatly 
influence the manner in which they were adopted.
Toffler argues that the old relations o f industrial capitalism no longer apply in the 
information driven economy o f the third wave, and new rules and relations are 
required. Kevin Kelly echoed the sentiment in his 1999 book New rules fo r  the new 
economy: 10 ways the network is changing everything.
It is im portant to note, even briefly, such ideas espoused by Toffler, because they 
reappear in much o f the later writings on technological determinism. It is ironic that a 
theory that advocates a “break with the past” should have so many intellectual 
continuities with it.
2.3: Marshall McLuhan: the medium is the message?
M arshall M cLuhan has a sharper focus than Toffler on media and its transformative 
effects on society. He regards media (and technologies) as an extension o f  man, 
introducing into society new possibilities and social practices. He sums up his 
position in the famous phrase: the medium is the message. By this he means a new 
medium or technology introduces a new pattern into human life. The electric light, for 
instance, allows sports events to be held at night. The sports event and the social 
practices formed around it are the content or the message o f  the medium o f electric 
light, because without it the new patterns could not take place in society. Therefore, 
argues McLuhan, the medium “shapes and controls the scale and form o f human 
association and action” (McLuhan, 1987: 9). He regards technology or media as the 
drivers o f  social change, leading him at one point to claim that “print created 
individualism and nationalism in the sixteenth century” (1987: 20), an argument he 
first aired in The gutenberg galaxy (1962).
Contrary to his claims, communal reading o f texts was common in the sixteenth 
century, because books were expensive and literacy rates were low. Similar to the 
story-telling o f  the oral tradition, literate people read aloud to groups, and there was a 
cross-over from the communal oral tradition to the individual reading o f later years. 
Reading is not necessarily an individual activity, but in later centuries was 
appropriated in a way that encouraged individual reading. Also, print did not create 
nationalistic ideas, but allowed people to spread them to a w ider audience. It was the 
surrounding social and cultural influences that shaped what was printed, not the
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printing presses themselves. However, McLuhan dismisses the content o f  a medium -  
the words, programmes, images -  as “ineffectual in shaping human form and 
association”(1987: 9). It is the medium itself that achieves this. In M cLuhan’s 
conception, the creation o f individualism and nationalism is how the media shapes 
and controls human association and action, and is, in effect, the message o f  the print 
medium.
Moving to the twentieth century, M cLuhan distinguishes between ‘ho t’ and ‘cold’ 
media. He divides them depending on their definition, which refers to the amount o f 
inform ation they contain, and the level o f participation they allow the user, so there is 
an element o f the sensory in the medium. Hot media contain a lot o f information but 
allow little participation; people consume the medium passively. Cool media contain 
little information but allow greater participation, such as a telephone, which requires 
people to speak for information to be transmitted. Hot media include radio, cinema 
and the photograph; cool media include the telephone and cartoons. He extends his 
conception to hot and cold countries, with well-developed first-world nations being 
hot (having access to  greater levels o f information, which is consumed passively), and 
poorer, under-developed nations being cool (less information, but people are more 
active in generating it because mass media structures are under-developed). Again, he 
applies his idea o f  the transformative effect o f media, claiming that the introduction of 
a hot medium to a cool society has “a violent effect” (McLuhan, 1987: 30-31), as had 
the introduction o f print to the cool sixteenth century society.
Digital media seems to pose a contradiction to M cLuhan’s division -  he doesn’t 
countenance an intermediate between hot and cool media. Digital media has a high 
definition -  it contains a lot o f  information -  which is a characteristic o f hot media, 
but through interactivity it promotes high sensory participation o f users, a 
characteristic o f  cool media. Also, it is most deeply embedded in the richer, hot 
nations, which seems to lower its transformative effects. This, however, is not 
consistent with later determinist writings o f Kelly and Negroponte, who strongly 
espouse the transformative abilities o f digital media technologies.
2.4: Kevin Kelly: the obsession with the new
M ore recent technological determinist writers included Nicholas Negroponte and 
Kevin Kelly. Although they have not achieved the same levels o f  public recognition
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as M cLuhan and Toffler, they enjoy a higher status than social shaping theorists with 
government and corporate elites, who are powerful actors in the innovation process. 
Their thinking often informs the policy and investment directions o f  government and 
industry. Negroponte, especially, has close links to government and industry.
Kevin Kelly is associate editor o f  the influential high-tech magazine Wired, as 
well as author o f  a book called New rules fo r  the new economy: 10 ways the network 
is changing everything. The sleeve o f  his book describes him as the “chief guru o f the 
information age”, and that is how he and Nicholas Negroponte -  a professor at M IT 1 - 
are popularly perceived.
The majority o f  Kelly’s work is underpinned by the classic determinist philosophy 
o f technology as a driver o f  change. New  rules are needed for the new  network 
economy that is being created by the new  technologies, which are changing 
everything. In New rules fo r  the new economy, he writes:
“Technology) creates an opportunity fo r  a dem and and then fi lls  it...Supply  
and dem and are no longer driven by resource scarcity and human desire. Now  
both are driven by one, single exploding force: technology” (Kelly, 1999: 55).
“Hum an desire” is blown away in the blast radius o f the “one, single exploding 
force: technology” . The passive role assigned to human beings is incredible. In the 
course o f  one paragraph, Kelly manages to infuse life into technology and snatch it 
away from  humans. Technology, with the life-like qualities o f a rational, cognitive 
being, decides what we want, and people, like mechanical automatons, simply accept 
what technology offers. It is a preposterous premise on which to base a theory o f  
social and technological change, but that is what Kelly and Negroponte and many 
others do, with great success. Although technological determinism is sharply 
criticised by academic commentators, it still informs most industrial, governmental 
and media accounts o f  technological change.
One o f  K elly’s key beliefs is that technology is everywhere, changing everything. 
He believes that technology is becoming so pervasive in our lives -  so natural to us -  
that we will soon begin not to notice it. He preaches:
1 M assachusetts Institute of Technology, w hich was based in the United States o f  Am erica, was a 
h ighly prestig ious college w ith  strong interests in the research and developm ent o f new  technologies
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“M ove technology to invisibility. A s technology becomes ubiquitous it also
becomes invisible. The more chips proliferate, the less we w ill notice them.
The more networking succeeds, the less we '11 be aware o f  it. ” (1999: 19)
I have already outlined Toffler’s work, and although it is flawed, I commend him 
for trying to offer a historically grounded account o f  technological and social change. 
He looks at what has gone before, and tries to trace through history a pattern o f  social 
and technological change on which he can base his theory. One o f  his biggest failings 
is historicism -  he believes he can predict the development o f technology in the future 
based on its pattern o f development in the past. Such an endeavour is consistent with 
the determinist idea that technology develops along a linear, rational and predictable 
path. But, in trying to do so, he recognises the social and cumulative characteristics 
o f  the innovation process. His historical analysis demonstrates that the efforts and 
discoveries o f  the past feed into the innovation processes o f  the present, so the new 
technologies can not be seen as a break with the past. Rather, they build upon and, 
often, are a continuation o f work that has gone before. Social shaping theory is 
similarly historically grounded. It rejects much o f the talk about the ‘new ’; it draws 
upon the past to analyse the present, but stops short o f making pronouncements on 
future development. With so many social actors interacting, no one can confidently 
predict the emergence or nature o f future technologies or societies.
Kelly, in contrast, makes no attempt to historically ground his work. He is too 
narrowly focused on the ‘new ’ to divert his attention to the ‘o ld’. His blinkered vision 
o f the present means he makes the mistake o f continually referring to the ‘new ’ 
network economy. He writes: “ Since the network economy is so new, we as a society 
have paid little attention to how standards are created and how they grow ” (1999: 70). 
Paschal Preston (2001) argues that to speak o f a ‘new ’ network economy is a 
misnomer. He writes that the idea o f a network economy goes back as far as Adam 
Sm ith’s writings in the 18th century, when Smith was emphasising the importance o f 
networks for economic growth. In Smith’s understanding, a marketplace is a network 
-  to w ork efficiently, it requires relationships and links between various actors, 
organisations and institutions. Similarly, an economy encompasses the links between 
the various bodies and groups operating within it. Otherwise, everyone would be 
w orking in isolation, and there would be no economy. Kelly seems fixated with the 
notion o f  a ‘netw ork’ involving computers linked by telephone lines and modems.
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One could argue that his ‘new ’ network economy is just a large com puter network 
(the Internet). Although the Internet is new, the concept o f a ‘netw ork’ is not. The 
Internet, as a series o f links enabling trade and communication, is comparable to the 
networks that have been in place in economies and societies for centuries.
2.5: Nicholas Negroponte: a virtual digital being
Nicholas Negroponte is regarded as the other great guru o f the information age. He is 
the founder o f  M IT ’s prestigious M edia Lab, author o f the best selling book Being  
digital', and a regular columnist for Wired magazine. His contribution to Wived is 
revealing, because it highlights his association with Kevin Kelly. Negroponte and 
Kelly are peers, not only professionally but also intellectually. Technological 
determinism underpins both their work, although Negroponte demonstrates in Being  
digital that he is more aware than Kelly o f  the historical dimension to innovation. 
However, he is not as historically grounded as Alvin Toffler.
Being digital is based on a series o f columns Negroponte wrote for Wired, in 
which he traces the history o f  media technology development. He describes the 
emergence o f  CD-ROMs, digital media and hypermedia, among others. While this 
historical analysis could be interpreted as a leaning towards social shaping theory, 
Negroponte betrays his determinist inclinations when he claims that the emergence of 
technologies can be explained through “purely technological imperatives” 
(Negroponte, 1995: 81). In classic determinist tradition, he argues that technology 
emerges out o f scientific and technological endeavour, and then diffuses out to 
society, which adapts to accommodate it. Thus it is the technology that initiates a new 
set o f socio-economic and political relations.
In the book, he offers his vision o f what ‘being digital’ means. For him, it means a 
life lived immersed in the new technologies, especially ICTs. He claims o f  him self 
that he lives “a 100 percent electronic life” and that the “physical presence [of a 
person] is not im portant” in the electronic age (Irish Times, 10 December 1999). Here 
he touches on the determinist idea o f  the “death o f  distance” (Cairncross, 1998) -  that 
spatiality as a factor in communication and trade is becoming irrelevant, a position 
which holds little regard to the resistance posed by national and regional cultural 
variances.
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Also, studies show that proximity is still important for personal interaction, even 
in instances o f trade where no material artefacts require movement. Shauna G. Brail 
and M eric S. Gertler write that locality is often the crucial factor when deciding to 
commission a firm to develop a digital media artefact (Brail and Gertler, 1999). 
Although it is technically possible to arrange and co-ordinate a project over great 
distances via the Internet, they claim the perception remains that it is easier and 
cheaper to work with a locally-based firm. They use the example o f a Toronto based 
company called 2D Art Systems, which was looking for a distributor for a children’s 
CD-ROM  it had developed. The company w as in negotiation with an international 
company and a local one, and in the end chose the local. The president o f the 
company, Harold Feist, outlined his reasons as follows:
“So far, physica l geography has been the main thing. Proximity. Despite how 
easy it w ould be, theoretically, to collaborate long distance, I  f in d  there's a 
need to m eet face-to-face throughout the process. ” (Brail and  Gertler, 1999: 
114)
The findings o f  my own research also dispute Negroponte’s claim that physical 
presence is not important. In my qualitative case-studies, the majority o f external 
linkages are to firms also within the Irish national system o f innovation.
In addition, a study by Aphra Kerr (1999) highlights the resistance posed by 
cultural factors to the introduction o f an unsuitable innovation to a society. The study 
is outlined in more detail elsewhere in the thesis, and here it is important to note only 
that culture continues to ensure that distance ‘lives’. A successful form o f innovation 
‘here’ w on’t necessarily be successful or acceptable ‘there’. M uch depends on the 
cultural values and traditions o f the society into which the innovation is being 
introduced.
In a way, Negroponte contradicts his own statement that his physical presence is 
not important when his physique was very much present at the launch o f M IT Lab 
Europe (M LE) in Dublin in Decem ber 1999. First, if physical presence is not 
important, why bother to have a lab in Europe at all? Second, why did he come in 
person to the opening? At the opening, he stated that he travelled widely and was 
pledged to  be somewhere “between 30 and 50 percent o f [the] time” (Irish Times, 10 
Decem ber 1999). For a man who believes physical presence is not important, he 
devotes a lot o f  his time to being present, physically.
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That might seem a trivial point, but its importance is lodged in its triviality. 
Technological determinists such as Negroponte are renowned for making rash, 
sweeping pronouncements without fully considering the implications o f  what they 
have said. The danger o f such ill-considered and flawed pronouncements is that they 
are often made by people who have access to and influence over powerful 
businesspeople and politicians.
W hen negotiating the establishment o f MLE, Negroponte had close contact with 
former Esat Telecom chairman Denis O ’Brien and the Taoiseach Bertie Ahern. At the 
press conference to  announce the establishment o f MLE, he spoke o f his relationship 
w ith both men. H e said: “W hen a prime minister encourages you and you have 
entrepreneurs like Denis encouraging you, it becomes very attractive [to establish 
M LE in Ireland]” ( The Irish Times, 10 December 1999). It was implied at the 
conference that O ’Brien and Ahern had done much to woo MIT and Negroponte to 
Ireland. Ahern w ent as far as to announce that M IT and Negroponte were “bringing 
the future to Ireland” (The Irish Times, 4 December 1999). A little over a year later, it 
emerged through media reports that senior civil servants and advisors to the Irish 
governm ent had expressed doubts about the MLE project and had questioned the 
w isdom  o f committing substantial amounts o f public money to it. However, such 
dissent was not aired at the press conference, which received a high degree o f 
publicity in the national media. A united front was presented by N egroponte, MIT 
representatives, government and industry spokespeople. The documents containing 
the dissenting views came into the public sphere only after a journalist was granted 
access to them under the Freedom of Information Act (The Irish Times, 4 January 
2001).
It was also revealed at the conference that Negroponte and M IT had held top-level 
negotiations w ith five other countries, including Sweden and Germany, before settling 
on Ireland. In B eing  Digital, Negroponte boasts o f time he spent in the company o f 
political leaders such as François M itterand in France, Kiichi M iyazawa in Japan, and 
M argaret Thatcher in Britain. Such relationships suggest heavily that Negroponte 
represents an institution that has gained a premium status in the esteem o f industrial 
and political elites, who are willing to vie with each other to be associated with it. 
M IT and N egroponte represent a certain ideology o f technology, and clearly it is one 
that appeals to governments and industry. In this way, Negroponte, like Kelly, is an
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influential opinion former. W hat he claims is the way forward will be given serious 
consideration by the policy forming institutions o f  state and industry.
MLE will cost £130 million to establish and run for the first 10 years. O f this, £28 
million will come from the Irish government, and the rest will be raised from industry. 
M L E ’s parent institution, MIT, receives over 90 percent o f its funding from over 170 
industry ‘sponsors’, as N egroponte is inclined to call them. This is another indication 
o f  the closeness o f  N egroponte’s philosophy to  industry.
2.6: Daniel Bell: the coming of the post-industrial society
In the 1970s, Daniel Bell ranked with Alvin Toffler and M arshall M cLuhan as one o f 
the most influential theorists on social and technological change. In The coming o f  the 
post-industrial society , Bell argues that the advanced societies o f the world are 
entering a phase o f  post-industrialism, in which the emphasis is no longer on the 
production o f material goods, but on the provision o f  services and processing o f 
information (Bell, 1999). From his perspective, advances in technology are allowing 
greater volumes o f  material production from fewer workers. Thus, many w orkers are 
being displaced from  manufacturing jobs and are shifting to  employment in the 
provision o f  services. This, in turn, is leading to a rise in the prominence o f  
information and knowledge in society. The post-industrial society (PIS), in B ell’s own 
words, represents “new principles o f  innovation, new modes o f social organisation, 
and new classes in society” (Bell, 1999: xi).
The PIS, however, w on’t be limited to simply a wider application o f previously 
existing forms o f  knowledge. The new social system, the new services and new 
technologies will give rise to new forms o f  knowledge. This part o f B ell’s theory 
allowed him to claim that the later term ‘Information Society’ and his own PIS 
amounted to the same thing. In his writings in the 1980s, he treats the terms as 
interchangeable. B ell’s evidence for the change to a post-industrial society is based 
largely on a quantitative analysis o f American economic statistics compiled in 
previous w orks by Fritz Machlup in the 1960s and M arc Porat in the 1970s. He uses 
their work to argue that production o f information is growing rapidly as a percentage 
o f  US GNP, and that employment in services is expanding while employment in 
manufacturing is contracting. A flaw in his approach is that the broad quantitative 
statistics give little indication o f the nature or quality o f the move to  information
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production, although he does argue that the result o f this transition will be an increase 
in the level o f  bureaucracy to run the post-industrial society (later information society) 
and increasing specialisation in the intellectual work conducted within it.
Bell outlines the main features o f  the PIS as follows (1999: xv-xviii):
1: A move away from manufacturing to service industries.
2: A corresponding move from manufacturing to service employment.
3: Education will become the main means o f social mobility and o f gaining wealth; in 
an industrialised society, the main means o f gaining status and wealth was through the 
inheritance o f property, business or occupation, such as the legal profession. Bell 
suggests that the PIS will be more meritocratic.
4: A  growth in the value o f human capital, with knowledge becoming the new source 
o f  power and wealth in society. The training and education invested in workers will 
become more o f an asset to companies. Bell predicts a relative decline in low and 
semi-skilled workers.
5: A  growth in what he calls “intellectual technology”. His explanation o f this is 
somewhat vague, but he claims that intellectual technology will use “algorithms, 
programming, models and simulations in the ainning o f the new ‘high technology’” 
(1999: xvii).
6 : A  change in infrastructure: in the old industrialised economy, the backbone o f  the 
infrastructure was ports, railways and airports, which were needed for the 
transportation o f material artefacts. In the PIS, the infrastructure will carry 
information and will be built o f  cable, broadband and satellite.
7: The PIS will rest on an information theory o f  value. Bell writes: “Knowledge is the 
source o f invention and innovation” (1999: xviii).
Although he claims that the PIS is not an inevitable outcome o f  history, he relies 
on past trends in social and economic change to justify his theory. In doing so, he is 
open to accusations o f  historicism, which is a common failing among technological 
determinist writers. Bell’s map o f social and technological development is as follows: 
pre-industrial -  industrial -  post-industrial.
In each type o f  society, the defining characteristic is the dominant mode o f 
employment. In pre-industrial, agriculture is the dominant mode; in industrial, it is 
manufacturing; and in post-industrial, it will be the service and information industries.
The emergence o f  new technologies is the catalyst for a new industrial phase. As 
technology advances, fewer workers are required in traditional industries; displaced
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workers move to new industries, such as service industries. These new industries 
eventually become the dominant mode o f employment, and a new industrial phase 
begins. For example, advances in animal breeding and crop growing techniques meant 
fewer workers were required on the land. This freed workers to move to 
manufacturing jobs, which eventually became the dominant mode o f  employment.
However, Bell argues against holistic theories o f  social change. He claims that: 
“Historical change is not unified” (1999: xix). He sees society as being divided into 
three realms, each o f  which has relative autonomy from the others. The realms are 
techno-economic, political and cultural, and a change in one realm does not 
necessarily initiate a change in the others.
This is at odds with his overall theory o f a PIS, which seems to suggest a unified 
whole. It would seem naive to proclaim the arrival o f a new type o f  society if  all the 
parts o f that society had not reached the same, or a similar, level.
However, according to Bell, each realm o f society is governed by a different axial 
principle. His model is as follows:
1: The techno-economic realm, which comprises the economic, technological and 
occupational systems. The axial principle here is economising, which strives to 
allocate resources according to principles o f  least cost and greatest efficiency.
2: The polity, which comprises the political and power structures o f  a society. The 
axial principle is participation, which aims to reduce conflicts within society.
3: The culture, which comprises the norms, values, beliefs and practices in a society. 
The axial principle is fulfilment and enhancement o f the self (Preston, 2001: 65-66). 
Bell predicts that the PIS will reduce worker alienation, because in an information 
economy, people will w ork with other people instead o f with things (material 
artefacts).
B ell’s theory is essentially a linear account o f technological and social 
development. Frank W ebster accuses him o f teleological thinking, which is the notion 
that society is changing towards some ultimate goal (Webster, 1995: 32). For these, 
and other reasons, W ebster accuses Bell o f being a technological determinist. 
However, Bell denies this. In the 1974 edition o f his text, he argues that, along an axis 
o f  technology, social and economic change can be observed on a progressive scale 
from pre-industrial to industrial and finally post-industry. That general pattern o f 
progression is com mon to all nations regardless o f  their individual histories, societies 
or environm ent (Bell: 1974). By the time an updated version o f his text was published
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in 1999, he had softened his position. Although he admits he still regards technology 
as a “lever o f social change”, he adds:
“I  am not a  technological determinist, fo r  all technology> operates in a context 
not. always o f  its m aking (such as politics and  culture); ye t technology! is the 
major instrument o f  change. ” (1999: xviii)
Bell is best described as a soft-determinist. Unlike Negroponte, he doesn’t believe 
technological and social change can be explained through “purely technological 
imperatives”, but he regards technology as the main imperative.
His work is underpinned by many o f the assumptions that are common to 
technological determinist work, such as the assumption that technological and social 
change proceeds along a linear and predictable path. H is division o f the development 
o f  society is too wide, and he assumes that innovation occurs along principles o f 
efficiency. (These assumptions o f technological determinism will be critiqued in 
greater depth in the sections on social shaping theory.) He also bases his theory on 
economic information for the US economy, yet argues that the progression and 
patterns discernible in the US are applicable to other nations, without making his 
overall theory sensitive to the particular conditions or cultures in other nations. Like 
many determinists, he believes in the benign effect o f  progress. In a later work, The 
cultural contradictions o f  capitalism  (1976), he focuses on how the norms required in 
the economic realm and social structure are not always consistent with the norms o f 
self-fulfilment in the cultural realm, and how this can lead to tension and alienation 
between social actors. However, he offers a more cohesive and cogent theory o f  social 
and technological change than the majority o f technological determinist writers. 
Toffler, for example, offers a third wave model, which contains phases o f social and 
technological development that are similar to those contained in Bell’s work. 
However, Bell is more grounded in his explanation o f  what constitutes each phase, 
and why one phase eventually gives way to the next one. He offers empirical 
information where Toffler offers speculation and opinion.
2.7: Social Shaping theory
Although social shaping theory avoids the transformative pronouncements o f 
technological determinism, it is fundamentally concerned with change, both
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technological and social. Social shaping o f technology challenges the assumptions put 
forward by technological determinism about the nature and direction o f technological 
change and its impacts on society. As with many schools o f  thought, the origins o f 
social shaping theory are ambiguous. Elements o f  the theory can be traced back as far 
as Lewis M um ford in the 1930s, who noted the role o f socio-cultural conditions in the 
development o f technologies (Preston, 2001: 113), through to Raymond W illiam s’s 
w ork in the 1970s, when he outlined the social influences on the development o f 
television as a technological artefact and a cultural content medium. Social shaping o f 
technology was first articulated as a unified and cogent concept for research in 1985, 
with the publication o f D onald M acKenzie’s and Judy W ajcm an’s book The social 
shaping o f  technolog)) (1985; 2nd edition, 1999). Previous to this volume, which 
outlined a basic concept o f  social shaping theory and applied it to a number o f case- 
studies to test its worth, the majority o f writings by social scientists about technology 
w ere concerned with its impact on society. MacKenzie and W ajcman wanted to shift 
the focus, to open an arena o f research that would consider the ‘effects’ o f society on 
technology. However, by their conception, ‘effects’ had too many deterministic 
connotations (especially as their work was an attempt to shift away from the 
deterministic thinking that was dominating analyses o f  technological development). 
Therefore, they put forward the concept o f technology as being socially shaped. A 
body o f  literature began to emerge, which refined and tightened the original 
definitions o f  the concept (Williams and Edge, 1996). As the model developed and 
matured, various approaches emerged towards studying technological development 
through a social shaping perspective. The Social Construction o f Technology (SCOT) 
approach was taken by writers such as Bijker, Hughes and Pinch (1987). The social 
factors shaping the consumption o f  technology was the concern o f writers such as 
Silverstone (1989, 1992, 1994), S0rensen (1996) and Livingstone (2002).
However, in practice, the various approaches within social shaping theory are not 
mutually exclusive, and there can be a high degree o f cross-over between them in 
research projects. Knut H. Sorensen argues that “the social shaping o f  technology 
should be used to  imply a generic approach to the study o f technology that is anti- 
deterministic and anti-linear” (1996: 4). Social factors influence and shape technology 
during both the production and the consumption phases o f  its life, so the work o f 
SCOT and the consumptions theorists are complimentary rather contradictory, or can 
be viewed as studying tw o ends o f  the same process. This thesis argues that there is
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not one specific arena in which a technology is socially shaped, and once it has left 
that arena can be considered to be finished and no further social shaping takes place. 
That would lead to the ‘black-box’ problems o f technological determinism -  that at 
some stage the technology becomes a closed artefact, no longer open to social 
influence or interpretation. Even in the domestic setting, after a technology has 
become domesticated and entrenched, its role is still open to further re-negotiation, as 
new technologies enter the domestic sphere or social conditions in the home change.
M ore recent social shaping research has examined the consumption or 
appropriation o f  new technologies on a much wider scale than the domestic setting. 
This thesis examines how the Irish national system o f innovation influences the 
emerging digital media content industry. As will be argued in later chapters, the 
particular characteristics o f the Irish national system -  the social and cultural 
attributes o f a small, open economy located on the periphery o f  Europe -  influence 
how the industry is developing and the content that it produces. M y interest is the 
influence o f  the national context or environment on production. Earlier w ork by the 
SLIM (Social Learning in Multimedia) project drew on the social shaping o f 
technology perspective to examine how national contexts and cultures influence the 
appropriation o f  multimedia (Williams and Slack, 1999; Williams, Slack and Stewart, 
2000). The project argues that, largely through processes o f innofusion and 
domestication, the end-use o f  multimedia often differs from the producers’ original 
intention. And although multimedia technologies are standardised from country to 
country, the content carried across the technologies are open to influence by national 
cultures. Therefore, the SLIM project argues, the social learning involved in 
appropriating multimedia is crucial to understanding the difference between original 
intention and end-use, and the differences in how countries appropriate multimedia.
SLIM examines the link between a country’s perception or dominant image o f 
multimedia, the strategies key players in a country adopt to promote multimedia, and 
how  multimedia is eventually appropriated on a national scale. The study argues that, 
although countries share common visions o f multimedia, there are also differences in 
how  they perceive it. This, for example, could be shaped by the presence o f strong 
m edia actors, such as in Germany where Deutsche Telecom, Kirch-Group and 
Bertelsm ann pushed digital television to the centre o f the country’s perception o f 
multimedia. Norway, which had no media groups o f comparable stature, held the 
Internet as its dominant image o f multimedia.
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The study, in highlighting the social processes involved in the appropriation o f 
multimedia, also reaffirms the importance o f the local. M uch debate about new 
emerging ICTs and digital media technologies has assessed them in terms o f  their 
global impacts. SLIM argues for a balance between the global and the local, writing: 
“M ultim edia technologies emerge as complex assemblages o f  global and local 
elements as generic ICT capabilities are appropriated and incorporated to particular 
purposes within particular social settings” (Williams, Slack and Stewart, 1999: 4). 
SLIM argues that its findings “underline the shortcomings o f accounts which see 
technology supply as a universalising force which cuts across and harmonises 
different social settings” (W illiams and Slack, 1999: 16). M y thesis offers a broadly 
similar argument, but with the emphasis on production. Although there are global 
elements to  the Irish digital media content industry, the national setting is influential 
and cannot be disregarded.
SLIM suggests that, nationally, there is interpretative flexibility o f technologies. 
Social shaping research on interpretative flexibility has traditionally been conducted 
on an individual level or with small groups o f people. Studies show that users who 
share common social characteristics (gender, class, occupation) are more likely to 
interpret technologies (or content) in similar ways than users who have dissimilar 
social characteristics (Haddon, 1992; Morley, 1986; Bijker, 1995; Kelly and 
O ’Connor, 1997; Berg, 1999). Examining and comparing national appropriation is, o f 
course, on a much grander scale. This is an appealing aspect o f  the SLIM project. As 
will be detailed, much social shaping research is narrowly focused on particular 
technologies in particular settings, such as the appropriation o f the television in the 
household. While such work is valuable, the wider scope o f the SLIM project adds 
another dimension to social shaping research. It compliments the research o f this 
thesis, which through drawing on the social shaping o f technology and the systems o f 
innovation perspectives also tries to gauge the shaping influence o f the national 
context.
In addition, SLIM argues that the time scale o f technological innovation is much 
shorter than for the processes o f domestication and appropriation. This can create 
tension between different parts o f the innovation system, particularly as technologies 
take a long time to establish themselves in markets, but in industrial production 
product life-cycles continue to shorten (Williams, Slack and Stewart, 1999).
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2.7.1: The SCOT approach
The SCOT approach is informed by the need to move away from determinist 
assumptions about a rational, predictable and linear path o f  technological 
development. Over the years, research into innovation and technological development 
has become more dialectical, and the conceptual frameworks o f projects such as this 
thesis incorporate elements o f  technological determinism and social shaping, 
(Although the balance o f influence exerted by each theory varies from project to 
project.) But in the early years especially, SCOT defined itself largely by being an 
anti-thesis to technological determinism. W here technological determinism claims 
that innovation is a closed process, outside the reach o f  social influence, SCOT argues 
that the process is open and constructed by the actions o f social actors. SCOT 
counters determinist assumptions that technology emerges under an autonomous 
m om entum  by arguing that the actions o f social actors act as brakes on or accelerators 
to technological development, which means there can be no inherent autonomy to a 
technology’s development. SCOT also rejects the notion that technology develops 
along a linear and predictable path. However, SCOT does recognise a rational 
underpinning to the construction o f technologies, in that the deliberate actions o f 
social actors can influence the development path through the selection o f  various 
options in the innovation process. However, the process isn’t entirely open and all 
options are not available. SCOT offers the concept o f variation and selection in the 
innovation process (similar to the variation and selection in Darwinian theory), in 
which social actors are presented with a number o f options, or development paths, and 
can choose which path to travel. Certain paths are closed as others are chosen, but the 
development path chosen is not the only available one. Social actors choose according 
to rational criteria -  the most efficient path, or out o f  self-interest -  and as the 
innovation travels a particular development path, the available options become fewer 
until the innovation becom es a successfully developed technology. This 
conceptualisation is based on the frail assumption that innovators know in advance all 
possible outcomes to the innovation process, and that all related factors are within the 
innovator’s control, allowing them to  pick the most efficient development path. My 
case-study research suggests that an innovator’s initial ‘vision’ o f  an innovation often
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differs greatly to its final form, and many influential factors are outside an innovator’s 
control.
Also, my conceptual framework argues that social actors do not act as one 
harmonious group, so the underpinning rational is not as coherent as SCOT suggests, 
and it de-emphasises the conflicts that are inherent in the emergence o f innovations. 
After the a-social theory o f technological determinism, SCOT represents an early 
move towards recognising that innovations have a social context o f  production -  that 
social factors and actors shape and influence an emerging innovation. But its 
emphasis on social actors rationally selecting the most efficient development path is 
too narrow  a conceptualisation o f the social context o f production, and it implies that 
all actors influential to  technological development are internal to  an organisation. 
SCOT has a narrow focus on technological development; this thesis takes a wider 
approach to innovation, which can be technological, organisational or content, and it 
argues that actors external to an organisation influence the innovation process, as do 
factors at a macro, meso and micro-level.
SCOT argues that the very success o f a technology masks the arbitrariness o f its 
development, seducing many thinkers into believing its emergence is an inevitable 
outcome o f history (historicism is a recurrent theme in determinist writing). 
Technological determinists tend to collapse a linear path on technological or social 
development. However, a number o f retrospective accounts o f technological 
innovation by social scientists fall into a similar trap. The SCOT literature introduces 
the term  underdetermination -  that technological factors alone can not account for the 
development o f  a technology. However, in outlining underdetermination, some SCOT 
theorists completely remove technological factors from the process and are guilty o f  
social reductionism. In trying to explain technological development through purely 
social factors, they replace a technologically determinist agenda with a socially 
determinist one, and introduce into their w ork many o f  the flaws o f  the former 
research.
SCOT accuses technological determinism o f shrouding technology in a 
hegemony, collapsing a linear path on development, ignoring that there are or were 
other possible development alternatives. In the SCOT conception, the actions o f social 
actors blend to ‘construct’ the technology at the various stages o f its development, 
until it is constructed in its final form. As Pinch and Bijker argue: “Technological 
artefacts are culturally constructed and interpreted” (1987: 28). (They imply that
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another process o f construction follows in the consumption phase o f a technology, but 
they do not articulate this in great depth, and instead focus on the production phase.)
SCOT notes that modern technology systems appear to evolve in accordance with 
a loosely defined pattern. The pattern has seven stages, dominated by the activity used 
to describe the phase: invention, development, innovation, transfer, growth, 
competition, and consolidation. The phases, however, do not always occur in 
sequence; there can be overlap or back-tracking, and they do not claim that this is a 
ubiquitous pattern. Langdon Winner, in an essay in M acK enzie’s and W ajcm an’s 
book, writes: “The sample [of innovations] is not big enough, however, to allow 
essentially quantitative statements such as ‘m ost’ or ‘the majority’ to be made” (1987: 
56). It is a flaw o f technological determinism that it continually makes such 
quantitative statements based on spurious assumptions. The technological bias o f the 
model is obvious, but is important in the sense that digital media content innovations 
show similar patterns o f emergence to other innovations, especially in the traditional 
media.
SCOT argues that the social construction o f technology involves loose linkages 
between various actors. These, often subtle, linkages can not be accounted for in the 
linear technological determinist analyses, which often rely heavily upon quantitative 
methods to examine the innovation process. SCOT proposes that up-close, qualitative 
study o f  individual innovative case-studies is more useful to establishing a broad 
understanding o f the entire, complex innovation process. The success o f  the final 
technology often has little to do with the intrinsic qualities in the technology itself, 
and often the difference between success and failure o f  a technological innovation 
depends on the amount o f  support it receives in the social environment. Success can 
depend on the amount o f  support or resources allocated to the project, according to 
the relative interests o f  the social actors involved. But even before then, a path may be 
abandoned even before someone has begun to follow it because, similar to self­
censorship in the media, they know it will not receive the necessary support. For 
example, the venture capitalist who wants realistic, conservative and cost-effective 
business proposals1.
1 At a speech delivered to Enterprise Ireland’s Digital Dividends conference in December 2001, Walter 
Hobbs, director of ACT Venture Capital, recommended that firms seeking venture capital investment 
should present business plans that were realistic, conservative, credible and cost conscious. ACT was 
one of the bigger venture capital companies in Ireland.
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The social context o f production is sensitive to the influences at macro, meso and 
micro-levels on innovation within a company. At the micro-level are the people 
within companies, who as cognitive beings actively shape and create content. Other 
micro-level influences are the finances and technological infrastructures o f a 
company, as well as its competency and knowledge base. At the meso-level, it can be 
how industrial trends, styles or performances affect the company and innovation 
within it. A t a macro-level, it can be national economic performance, government 
policies, national institutional set-up, and national cultural values.
The social context o f  consumption, as will be outlined, focuses more so on micro­
level influences; most consumption studies are conducted within the household 
setting, and consider influential factors such as age, gender, financial status, education 
and occupation. However, macro-level factors such as national culture and national 
economic performance (financial status, occupation) and government policies 
(regarding the education system) also set the social context o f  consumption.
SCOT refocuses technology studies, from the technology to society, although its 
conceptualisation is undermined by determinist connotations, such as technologies 
being ‘constructed’ by social actors. This thesis prefers the less determinist language 
o f  social actors shaping or influencing their emergence. A precise application of 
SCOT to a case-study would have been o f  little value to my research, being concerned 
with content and not technological development. But the value o f it, in broad 
theoretical terms, is that it opens up the innovation process to examination, recognises 
the influence o f  social actors (and it recognises the influence o f social and cultural 
factors), and that innovations have a social context o f production and consumption. It 
also allows for focused research on the emergence o f  individual innovations, in 
contrast to the macro-level focus o f technological determinist studies.
2.7.2 Consumption social shaping theory
SCOT research tends to be confined to the social shaping o f technologies during their 
production phase. Another process o f shaping begins when an innovation emerges 
into society and the consumption phase begins. SCOT counters technological 
determ inist assumptions that a technology is uninfluenced by social factors during its 
development, and that it emerges into society under an autonomous momentum.
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Consumption studies counter determinist assumptions that technology is the driver o f 
social change, and society adapts to accommodate new technologies. Consumption 
social shaping studies argue that society negotiates roles and uses for new 
technologies, in ways that are often different to the ones inscribed by the producers. 
And, contrary to the black-box conception o f technological determinism, people are 
capable o f appropriating and interpreting technologies (or, in this thesis, the wider 
concept o f innovations), and forming social practices around them that are influenced 
by their particular social circumstances, such as age, gender, education, occupation 
and family-size. This facet o f social shaping theory represents a significant theoretical 
shift tow ards recognising the importance o f a technology’s social context o f 
consumption.
It is im portant to include a section outlining the broad principles and findings o f 
the consumption literature, Although the thesis undertakes empirical work on how 
digital media content is produced and how innovations emerge, another social shaping 
process -  and another arena for original empirical work -  surrounds how it is 
consumed. M ost o f the research projects on consumption, as on production, attend to 
material, technological artefacts rather than to symbolic, content artefacts. Therefore, 
consumption research models such as domestication, like the production models 
employed in this thesis, have to be adapted to suit empirical research on content.
W hile the majority o f  production research is conducted in an industrial context, 
the m ajority o f  consumption research is conducted in the domestic sphere. In 1989, as 
a body o f literature was building around the social construction o f technologies, 
Roger Silverstone and Sonia Livingstone, among others, began w ork on the social 
shaping processes underlying the consumption o f technologies. Their w ork is located 
in a particular setting -  the domestic household. They describe the process o f 
integrating a new technology into the household as the domestication process, and it 
accounts for how  the people within the household actively negotiate a role for the new 
technology within the domestic arena and within their lives. Unlike technological 
determinist analyses, which regard important new technologies as ‘changing people’s 
lives’, consumption theorists argue that a more complex process is at play. The ways 
in w hich a family or a family member appropriate a technology into the household 
depends on many social factors such as age, gender, education, financial status, 
occupation and location. It is too simplistic to claim that the new technologies have 
caused changes in the patterns o f people’s domestic lives -  people engage with the
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technology and negotiate a role for it and form social practices around it. But this role 
is not fixed; it can change over time as circumstances within the household alter, or as 
different technologies are introduced to the domestic setting. In Silverstone’s 
conception (also, in his later, 1992, work with Hirsh and Morley), the technology is 
regarded as having a ‘symbolic currency’, which is part o f the ‘moral econom y’ o f the 
household. He writes: “To understand the household as a moral econom y...is to 
understand the household as part o f a transactional system, dynamically involved in 
the production and exchange o f commodities and meanings” (Silverstone et al, 1992: 
19). A technology is a text, open to many interpretations and malleable in the ways it 
can be integrated and used. The interpretation o f a technology does not necessarily 
correspond to the meanings and uses inscribed at the time o f its production.
Silverstone originally put forward a model o f domestication based on four 
phases: appropriation, objectification, incorporation and conversion. Appropriation  
involves the acquisition o f the technology and its introduction into the home. 
Objectification  sees the further integration o f  the technology into the domestic setting. 
How it is integrated is influenced by factors such as cultural capital, and the social and 
economic circumstances o f the family. This phase has a spatial element -  where a 
technology is physically located in the home is influenced by such factors. 
Incorporation  examines how the technology is used within the domestic setting, how 
it is integrated into the patterns o f people’s lives, and how families negotiate new 
patterns o f  domestic practice around it. Conversion is where the private technology 
again becomes a public technology. W hen the family integrates and negotiates a role 
for the technology, they present it to non-family members outside the domestic 
setting.
His model was not fixed. He refined it in later (1992) work, when he presented a 
three phase model for the study o f ICT consumption: commodification, appropriation 
and conversion. The first phase, not present in the original model, relates to how 
meanings are encoded by producers into technologies, and how users decode them. 
But users can decode them differently to how the producers intended. In this refined 
model, he addresses a weakness o f  the original, by acknowledging in the 
com modification phase the social processes involved in the production o f a 
technology.
In other models there are phases such as entrenchment (for example, where a 
technology is at first regarded as a novelty but comes to be regarded as essential, such
42
as a mobile phone, which is bought by parents as a toy for their child but comes to be 
regarded as an important security device).
Like most social shaping research, domestication suffers from the weakness o f 
drawing general conclusions from small-scale samples. It is difficult to quantify 
whether case-studies are representative o f  societies as a whole. Consumption studies 
often contain little information about macro or meso-level socio-economic conditions 
or trends. Silverstone, for example, conducts his study among mainly middle-class 
respondents, which is too narrow a sample to be representative. However, he claims 
his findings are applicable to society in general. If, as he claims, factors such as 
education, financial status, occupation and location affect how a technology is 
appropriated, the experiences o f  working-class and upper-class respondents should 
differ from those o f  middle-class respondents. Also, if  the social factors particular to 
each respondent influences their appropriation o f  technology, any general conclusions 
have to be tentative, and can not be stated as findings o f fact -  no two people lead 
exactly the same lives, and so in Silverstone’s conception could not expect to 
appropriate the same technology in exactly the same way.
However, domestication is more sensitive than technological determinism to how 
people interact with technology, and is more aware o f how consumption can be an 
individual, private process. Technological determinism often makes precise claims 
about individuals from general statistics, gathered from standardised questionnaires, 
which often do not reflect the reality on a personal level. The value o f consumption 
studies, through their application o f qualitative methodologies, is to close the distance 
between the researcher and the respondent, and allow a clearer insight into people as 
cognitive beings interacting with technologies or innovations.
2.8: Raymond Williams: technology and cultural form
The w ork o f  Raymond W illiams precedes by over a decade the articulation o f the 
social shaping o f  technology concept, but his study in the 1970s o f  the social origins 
and cultural form o f television -  then a relatively new, emerging technology and 
medium -  has taken on a seminal quality among modern social shaping theorists. 
M any o f  the tenets o f the social shaping approach can be traced to his work. Williams 
was writing when the status o f  determinists such as M cLuhan and Toffler was rising
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towards its peak, and he was pushing against popular opinion in advocating a social, 
rather than a technological, based account o f the development o f television.
His most famous work, Television: technology and  cultural form , was published 
in 1974. The opening line reads: “It is often said that television has altered our world” 
(Williams, 1974: 9). He spends the rest o f the book trying to prove that television 
hasn’t altered the world. Rather, it is the way in which society have adopted, 
appropriated and shaped the technology -  and the social practices people have 
negotiated around the technology -  that have led to changes in the world. But 
television as a technology has not acted as an autonomous force for change.
He suggests that television developed more so out o f social need than 
technological imperative, and therefore it is wrong to assume a direct line o f  causality: 
the technology enters society and changes the world. A complex process o f 
negotiation ensues as society appropriates the technology and people incorporate it 
into their lives. The development o f television is linked to changes in the patterns o f 
people’s lives -  leisure habits, information consumption -  but the ‘cultural form ’ o f 
television is socially shaped. The ‘cultural form ’ refers to the content carried on the 
medium, and how people have negotiated social practice around it. Although 
W illiams was not working within a social shaping or a SCOT framework, traces o f 
the approaches can be found in his work: he recognises the social influence on the 
development o f  television as a technology, and the social influences on how it was 
appropriated by society as a technology and cultural form.
He argues that the manner in which television as a technology was developed had 
not been the only way, or even the most efficient way. But as the conflicts over 
television’s development were resolved, a technological hegemony formed around it, 
and in modern times, few people realise that there had been alternative paths to its 
development.
But in the 1970s, and even today, his view was in the minority. He argues that one 
o f  the reasons why technological determinism -  and statements such as technology is 
changing the world -  have gained currency is because it promotes pithy phrases, 
which are repeated often and not subject to critical appraisal. He writes that: “We 
have got so used to statements o f this general kind, in our most ordinary discussions, 
that we can fail to realise their specific meanings” (1974: 9). I f  a statement is repeated 
continuously, it becomes a received wisdom, a truth, an assumption, and little thought 
is given to the “specific meaning” behind it. When Williams heard the statement that
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television has altered the world, he didn’t want to simply accept it as truth. He wanted 
to ask the simple, yet important question: has television really altered the world?
He also wanted to debunk the myth that television was a sudden breakthrough, 
invented purely through scientific inquiry and developed in isolation, outside the 
reach o f  social influences. He showed greater awareness than the majority o f his 
contemporaries o f  the social and cumulative aspects to innovation, how it does not 
occur in isolation, how it is an inter-disciplinary, inter-technological process. 
Technological determinism often tries to personalise the innovation process, and 
reduce it to the actions o f a single, identifiable person. This greatly simplifies on the 
surface a process that, underneath, is complex. As outlined earlier, Thomas Edison is 
usually credited with the invention o f the electric light, whereas social shaping 
analysis o f his w ork suggests that he was not solely responsible, and that the electric 
light did not have a single moment o f invention. W illiams is similarly wary o f 
allowing the development and emergence o f television to be credited to any individual 
or to any single moment o f invention. He writes:
“The invention o f  television was no single event or series o f  events. It 
depended on a  complex o f  inventions and developments in electricity, 
telegraphy, photography, and  motion pictures and radio. ” (1974: 18)
W illiams argues that television did not emerge from autonomous technological 
imperative, but from social need. However, he stresses that social need does not 
necessarily result in the development o f a corresponding technology to satisfy it -  
sometimes fulfilling a social need is beyond the ability o f available technological 
systems. H e also acknowledges that a socially useful technology might not be 
developed if  the “real decision-making groups” in society do not consider it a priority 
(1974: 18). These groups include the industrial and political elites who decide where 
to allocate money and resources. A technology deemed important by them w ill more 
easily attract resources and investment, and thus will stand a greater chance of 
successful development. But Williams touches on this topic only lightly. He does not 
articulate fully how the influence o f social actors can act as brakes on or accelerators 
to technological development, how important technologies might not survive, and how 
technological potential to fill a social need might not be realised because o f  a non- 
technological reason -  such as the cost o f bringing the innovation to market and 
stabilising it. Such influences on the success o f a technology, or the reasons behind its
45
development, are better articulated in the later social shaping, SCOT and systems of 
innovation literature.
However, in W illiam s’s conception, social need can account for certain 
technological development, and he attempts to outline his reasoning behind the 
development o f  television. His analysis, however, is guilty o f  social reductionism 
(purely social factors can account for the emergence o f  television). And similar to 
how technological determinists collapse a linear path on historical analyses o f 
technological development, Williams appears to collapse a linear path on the social 
changes preceding television’s emergence. He makes the development o f television 
seem almost the inevitable outcome o f social progress. He does state that there were 
many possible paths to its development, and that the way it was developed was not the 
most efficient2. His general point is very relevant to this thesis: that an emerging 
technology, or innovation, is not on a pre-destined path. However, he implies that a 
form o f technology similar to  television was almost an inevitable outcome o f  social 
progress, which is a socially determinist belief, and too close to hard social shaping 
for the conceptual framework o f this thesis.
In W illiam s’s view, the modern era is characterised by industrial revolution and 
large-scale urbanisation, w ith a social structure that is increasingly based on a home- 
centred family life. Entertainment and the consumption o f  information have became 
less o f a communal, social activity; such activities are increasingly conducted within 
the home, and thus a need has developed to deliver entertainment and information 
directly to the home. The first electronic medium to fill that role was radio; the second 
was television. Also, in societies in which people enjoy greater amounts o f  leisure 
time, new forms o f  entertainment and diversion are necessary, a role which television 
quickly assumed.
W illiams also notes that the centralisation o f  power created a need for 
information to flow from the centre to peripheral areas o f society. The development o f 
the printing press by Gutenberg allowed early newspapers to fulfil this need in a 
rudimentary fashion. Newspapers evolved into a more efficient means o f dispensing 
information, and w ere eventually aided by the development o f radio -  to dispense
2 In many ways, Williams showed how he was a product of his time when writing about the 
inefficiencies of television. He based his criticisms on a comparison of television’s relatively poor 
sound to the superior audio quality of radio, and its relatively poor picture definition to the superior one 
of cinema. Those concerns were rendered obsolete by modern television, which had very high
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audio messages -  and finally television, which took on the role o f dispensing 
audio/visual messages (1974: 21). His account o f television’s development is 
functionalist, and it echoes the determinist view that there is a neutral, rational logic 
underpinning the development o f such a technology. But in his schema, the 
development path is guided more so by social than technological imperative.
Brian Winston, too, argues that television emerged more out o f social than 
technological imperative, or out o f ‘supervening social necessities’ as he 
conceptualises them. The supervening social necessities he associates with the 
emergence o f television include the spare industrial capacity after W orld W ar 2, the 
rise o f consumerism, the nuclear family, home-centred entertainment, and the 
development o f  popular culture through radio and television. W inston argues that: 
“There was no limit on the forces that could act as supervening social necessities” 
(1998: 6). However, his concept o f supervening social necessities suffers from the 
functionalist and determinist weakness o f W illiams’s earlier work.
One o f  the central arguments o f  this thesis is that new innovations have 
continuities with the past -  but, as Carolyn M arvin would argue, new innovations is a 
historically relative term (1983: 3). When Williams was studying television, it was a 
relatively new medium; by 2002, it was an established, traditional medium. One o f 
my key arguments is that innovations share patterns o f emergence, and understanding 
these will grant us a deeper insight into the processes o f innovation. Digital media, 
which is at an early stage o f  its emergence, has strong continuities with traditional 
media, such as television and radio. In the early phase o f its emergence, television had 
a similar pattern o f emergence to digital media, in that it displayed strong continuities 
with previously existing media. This is similar to the social shaping argument that 
new technologies emerge out o f modifications to previously existing technologies. 
W illiams illustrates the point with television. He conducts a historical analysis o f  its 
emergence, although he doesn’t, in any depth, draw comparisons between television’s 
pattern o f  emergence and that o f any previously existing media. However, he does 
include a number o f instances to illustrate his argument. He writes:
“M any people have sa id  that television is essentially a combination and  
development o f  earlier form s: the newspaper, the public meeting, the 
educational class, the theatre, the cinema, the sports stadium, and  advertising
standards o f sound and definition and would improve upon them further with the introduction of digital 
television.
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columns and billboards... Yet it is clearly not only a question o f  combination 
and development. The adaptation o f  received form s to the new technology has 
led in a number o f  cases to significant changes and to some real qualitative 
differences. ” (1974: 44)
N ot only does television incorporate certain elements o f  traditional media, it 
modifies them. Williams backs his point by showing how radio and television news 
adapted the newspaper practice o f using headlines. Newspapers use headlines at the 
beginning o f a story, while radio and television employs headlines at the beginning o f 
bulletins. Also, television took from radio the practice o f having a newsreader with an 
authoritative voice -  one that conveys confidence, reassurance and knowledge. But 
television made a “qualitative” change to this by also seeking newsreaders who look 
authoritative, to suit the visual aspect o f  television as a medium.
This is an extremely important topic for my thesis. Digital media combine many 
elements o f  print, radio and television, but are more than just a combination o f the 
traditional media. It has resulted in some “real qualitative differences” to the 
techniques and practices it has borrowed. It has not simply grafted old techniques onto 
itself, but has moulded and adapted them to suit the new medium. My research 
chapters will show how traditional competencies in the production o f  print, radio and 
television have carried through to digital media, but not always intact. They are 
changed, either subtly or substantially, to suit the new medium. In this way, the thesis 
will highlight the continuities with the past and argue against the determinist notion 
that digital media is a “break with the past” (Toffler, 1970: 21).
2.9: Carolyn Marvin: the emergence of electricity and the relationship of old 
media to new
If, as Sorensen argues, the social shaping o f  technology should offer a generic 
approach to the study o f  technological development, the work o f Carolyn M arvin is 
one o f  the earliest to offer a bridge between the SCOT and the consumption
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approaches. M arvin’s research concentrates on the emergence o f  electricity in the 
early part o f  the twentieth century, and the ensuing struggle as people negotiated roles 
for electrical devices, forming social practice around the artefacts and incorporating 
them  into the patterns o f their lives. Marvin links the consumption and SCOT 
approaches by recognising how “groups perpetually negotiated power, authority and 
representation” during both the production phase (the electricians themselves) and the 
consumption phase (the public) (1988: 8). She argues that electricity, the devices 
developed around it, and the uses to which it is put, are not fixed or determined by 
qualities inherent in the technology itself, but are the outcomes o f  complex 
negotiations between various groups in society. She writes that electricians sought to 
preserve a myth around the creation o f electricity, to protect the status they enjoyed in 
society, as a result o f  being a small, privileged group with access to specialised 
knowledge. She writes:
“M astery o f  technical secrets [ o f  electricity] was both an indicator o f  status 
and a p a th  to it... because o f  the esteem conferred on technological literacy 
by a society that revered it as a high secret, professionals were anxious to 
guard it fro m  eager non-specialists who might dilute it. ” (1988: 39)
The patterns are similar to modern day, with information society gurus being 
accorded a privileged status for their perceived visionary insights into the nature o f 
technological and social change. For electricians, electricity was a transformative 
agent, which would change society and people’s lives for the better. The mass media 
o f  the early twentieth century made unrealistic predictions about the transformative 
powers o f  electricity. The situation is again similar today, with computer technicians 
and the mass media making pronouncements on the transformative potential o f  the 
new ICTs. In the early twentieth century, there was also a popular belief in the 
rational integrity o f  the electrician who “served no master but truth” (1988: 32). This 
alluded to  the perceived ‘neutrality’ o f technology, whereas social shaping holds that 
if  social actors are crucial to  the ‘construction’ o f  technologies, the interests and 
ideologies o f  powerful social actors will be built into the technologies. This follows 
on from earlier theoretical work by The Frankfurt School and Jurgen Habermas, who 
argue that technologies are highly ideological. This creates a technological hegemony 
(adapted from H aberm as’s concept o f cultural hegemony), which makes the 
successful technology seem so natural that people think there had been no alternatives
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to how it could have been developed. By infusing the technology with a ‘natural’ 
appearance, the hegemony presents the technology as neutral, and not designed to 
serve some social interests over others.
Marvin argues that technologies have “no natural edges”; they are social 
constructs, often fashioned out o f previously existing technologies, and new 
technological practices are often fashioned out o f older ones or adapted from older 
practices that do not work in the new setting. Indeed, she stresses the continuities with 
the old in this ‘new ’ world o f electricity. She writes:
“Experts and  publics greeted a new world o f  electricity by elaborating an 
old  one. New electrical inventions and ways o f  thinking about electricity 
were given shape and  meaning by being grafted onto existing rules and  
expectations about the structure o f  social relations. ” (Marvin, 1988: 232- 
233)
She writes that new technologies don’t change people’s lives. She warns against 
“the tem ptation to derive social practice from media artefact” (1988: 7).
The SCOT literature outlines how major technological systems seem to share 
similar patterns o f emergence. A later section o f this chapter will try to draw 
comparisons between the patterns o f emergence o f two content forms: the magazine 
and digital media. That is not to argue that all, or even most, content forms share 
similar patterns o f emergence, but the magazine and digital media seem to  offer an 
instance where this was so. The purpose is to try to place digital m edia’s emergence 
into a historical perspective. But one o f the patterns o f emergence that seems common 
to many new technologies -  including new ICTs -  is o f being “given shape and 
meaning by being grafted onto existing rules and expectations about the structure o f 
social relations” (1988: 233).
D igital media is still in its infancy, and digital media content creators are on a 
steep learning curve, drafting and re-drafting the techniques, codes and grammars for 
supplying content to their medium. But it would be hard to argue against M arvin’s 
point, that these techniques, codes and grammars are being fashioned out o f older ones 
used in older media; that the world o f  digital media is being greeted “by elaborating an 
old one” (1988: 232-233). All forms o f  media develop their own identity by drawing 
on what has gone before. They never develop in a vacuum, as technological 
determinists argue, where the medium and its content emerge independently o f  the
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culture and ideologies o f  society. M arvin notes how the practices that develop around 
new technologies are shaped out o f previously established social practices, and how, 
continuously, the past runs through the present. “New practices do not so much flow 
directly from technologies that inspire them as they are improvised out o f  old practices 
that no longer w ork in new settings” (1988: 5). As shall be outlined in greater depth 
later, content production practices for digital media are often fashioned out o f older 
practices that no longer work on the new medium.
M arvin argues that one o f  the greatest difficulties people experienced with the 
emergence o f  electricity was how to make sense o f  the new, unfamiliar technology. 
They did so by projecting onto it meanings, values and symbolisms derived from 
older, familiar technologies. A similar statement can be applied to digital media. Print 
media codes have been projected onto the new medium in an attempt to make it an 
object for consumption. However, with advances in technology and enhanced 
computing power, the codes o f audio and visual media are increasingly being 
projected onto digital media. In trying to make sense o f the unfamiliar medium and 
technology o f  digital media, we are constantly referring to  technologies and media 
that are familiar, such as print and broadcast. Marvin herself challenges the 
assumption that different forms o f media are independent o f each other. Rather, 
“ separate media [do not] embrace distinct, self-contained codes, or spheres o f 
interpretative activity” (1988: 7). This is evident in digital media, which draws on the 
technologies, codes and grammars o f  traditional media, even if  it has to adapt or 
abandon some o f them along the way.
E nter  CD-ROM, a case-study in a later chapter, is a case in point. It delivered 
digital media content to personal computers on a CD-ROM platform and described 
itself as a magazine -  the term magazine was employed as a metaphor to allow people 
to understand the concept o f  a digital CD-ROM  content artefact. However, the 
m etaphor was clumsy and imprecise on a number o f occasions, and was at times 
confusing, with elements o f the CD-ROM  attributed descriptions that were patently 
unsuitable and misleading. Producers use such metaphors to render familiar 
something that is unfamiliar. Academics also do so, but SCOT theorist John Law 
warns that use o f  such metaphors can, occasionally, be counter-productive and 
imprecise (1987: 140). He notes how technological development is often compared to 
biological evolution, but there is not always a tight connection between the two. 
Innovation in an innovation system is compared to mutations in a biological system.
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M utations survive according to the Darwinian principle o f  the survival o f  the fittest, 
or the best will win out. However, the ‘fittest’ innovation does not always survive in a 
technological system, so the metaphor is not wholly accurate. Furthermore, such 
imprecise m etaphors can give rise to misconceptions about the nature o f  innovation.
M arvin’s w ork makes a valuable contribution to the conceptual framework o f this 
thesis. Her research is rich in detail, and she demonstrates clearly the social influences 
on both the production and consumption o f technologies, and the conflicts inherent in 
the emergence o f a new technology system. (Technological determinism presents it as 
a harmonious process, which feeds into the technological hegemony once the 
technology has been established.) She demonstrates how electricity and electrical 
devices adopt and adapt the codes, grammars and techniques o f  previously existing 
technologies. However, like the majority o f social shaping writers, she concentrates 
her research on material technological artefacts. My conceptual framework applies to 
the quite different area o f content, so her concepts can not be carried through intact. 
But in a similar fashion, the production and consumption o f a content artefact is also 
not a harmonious, conflict-free process. Also, digital media, not just as a 
technological artefact but also as a content one, has adopted and adapted the codes, 
grammars and techniques o f previously existing media.
One o f  the weaknesses o f her historical w ork is that she relies exclusively on 
secondary documentation, such as articles and reviews, which are open to 
interpretation, especially if examined polemically. History isn’t just a neutral account 
o f  what happened, but an interpretation o f  what happened, and is vulnerable to the 
ideological biases o f those who write it. However, this is a potential weakness o f  most 
research projects that are historical or retrospective.
2.10: Historical case-study: the emergence of the magazine as a content form
The SCOT literature notes that many technologies share similar patterns o f 
emergence, although the researchers qualify their assertion by cautioning that their 
sample is too small to make generalisations that ‘all’ or even ‘m ost’ technologies 
share patterns o f  emergence (Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, 1987). Technologies, o f
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course, are not the primary concern o f this thesis. The section will draw parallels 
between the emergence o f a form o f the traditional media -  the magazine -  and the 
emergence o f  digital media as a content form. That is not to argue that all media 
forms share patterns o f emergence, but that the magazine and digital m edia provide an 
instance. This is to try to place the emergence o f digital media into historical 
perspective and to argue that it has continuities with the past. The magazine was 
selected as a subject o f  study because a later case-study, o f  Enter CD-ROM, was a 
digital media artefact that tried to frame itself in a traditional media form, as a type o f 
magazine. However, as will be outlined in chapter seven, the thesis is aware that 
Enter  also drew on other traditional media forms, such as television and radio. Such 
instances will be highlighted where appropriate.
It is beyond the scope o f this thesis to give a detailed history o f the magazine. In 
trying to relate the section to my overall research, I am interested in how the magazine 
emerged and evolved as a content form, not in details such as when the first 
magazines were published, where and by whom. Therefore, I shall concentrate on 
instances that illustrate the emergence o f the magazine as a content form, such as how 
(similar to digital media) the early magazine defined itself largely in term s o f older 
media (books and newspapers) until it had established its own distinct identity. Also, 
how it drew on the techniques and practices o f the older media, but in many cases 
adapted them  to suit the new magazine format; and how it evolved over the centuries 
into a content form that is very different today from what it was at the beginning. Its 
evolution was linked to, but not determined by, the emergence o f new technologies 
(printing-presses and photographic equipment) and to changes in society.
The magazine is a print medium and has its origins in other forms o f  print media, 
namely the book and the newspaper. As one journalist, W illiam Owen, commentates, 
the early centuries o f  the magazine were defined by a struggle to distinguish it from 
other print media, to find its own identity and niche, especially with regard to design 
and content (Owen, 1992).
The struggle to distinguish itself from other print media intensified as the 
magazine matured. Early magazines borrowed heavily from the techniques o f book 
publishing, just as, today, digital media is borrowing heavily from the techniques o f 
traditional forms o f media. This was, partly, because the magazine was widely 
regarded as a form o f book, and not as a distinct new medium. M any publishers were 
slow to break out o f the book mind-set and treat the magazine on its own terms. At the
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time, book publishing set the standards for typographical settings and page design, 
and these standards were followed closely by the magazine, partly for technological 
reasons. Printing-presses prior to the 1900s could, usually, only handle standard 
typefaces, laid out on hot-metal plates and arranged in symmetrical columns that were 
wrapped from the top to the bottom o f the page, in the manner o f books. There was 
little use o f  graphics, pictures or photographs before 1900, because printing 
technology was often unable to  accommodate them. Magazines, then, were largely a 
text-based medium, whereas today’s magazines are a symmetry o f  text and images. 
So overtly did early magazines replicate the book that William Owen claims: “The 
magazine was distinguished from the book only by its flimsy cover” (Owen, 1992: 
13).
When pictures and photographs began to creep into early magazines in the late 
1800s and early 1900s, the means o f displaying them was borrowed from an older 
means o f display -  the art gallery. Pictures and, later, photographs had decorative 
borders (similar to the frames o f  paintings), had perfect symmetry, and were usually 
shown whole, as in a gallery. (Cropping o f  pictures and photographs had yet to 
emerge as a common technique for magazines.) W illiam Owen describes this as the 
‘art’ treatment: “Photographs were hung on the page as if  on a gallery w all” (Owen, 
1992: 19).
Similar to  how the book had set the standards for typographical layout and design, 
the gallery set the standards for pictorial layout and display. Early magazine 
publishers, unsure o f  their own (new) medium and wary o f  straying too far from 
convention, followed the techniques o f the gallery. The magazine, partly due to 
technological limitations, had yet to set its own guidelines and styles for the display o f 
paintings and pictures, so it grafted the techniques o f  the gallery onto itself. But these 
techniques w ere adapted over time, as publishers slowly realised that the techniques 
o f the gallery didn’t suit the format o f the magazine.
Another reason why photographs and pictures were given the ‘a rt’ treatment was 
because the symmetry o f a gallery arrangement suited the symmetrical arrangement of 
the typographical (book) settings that the printing-presses before the 1900s allowed. 
The page design technology and printing technology made it difficult for designers to 
wrap text around irregular shaped photographs or pictures. It was only after the 1900s 
that magazines began cropping photographs and varying their scale, and many more
54
years before they were comfortably able to  wrap text around irregular shaped 
photographs or pictures.
Developments in technology allowed the magazine to evolve in different 
directions. However, the technology didn’t determine the evolution o f the magazine 
as a content form; rather, social factors (such as the creative role o f authoring and 
design professionals) were a more crucial influence, as shall be argued later in this 
section. Technology’s contribution to the evolution process was in giving magazines 
the freedom to experiment with new forms o f expression that, previously, w ouldn’t 
have been possible. Improvements to printing-presses and modern desk-top 
publishing allowed greater flexibility in page design. W ith the invention in the 1860s 
o f  a colour Lithnographic press, magazines could begin incorporating colour into their 
designs. W hen improvements to photographic technology followed, magazines began 
to make more dynamic and innovative use o f photographs, especially after the 
invention by Oskar Barnack in 1923 o f the first hand-held 35 milimetre camera 
(Owen, 1992). Journalist Anthony Davis links the emergence o f an easily portable 
camera, which produced quality photographs quickly, to the emergence o f  a new 
content genre, photojournalism. W ithout such developments in technology, pictorial 
magazines such as Life  in the United States and Picture P ost in Britain (both first 
published in the mid-1930s) would not have been possible (Davis, 1994). However, 
the technology did not determine the tone or nature o f  the magazines.
One o f the central arguments o f this thesis is that, although technology enables the 
m edia to  develop new content innovations, it does not determine what makes up that 
content. The thesis argues that social and other factors are crucial influences on a 
content innovation. In this vein, the content o f  magazines is always deeply influenced 
by the pervading culture o f the times. The 1800s, early-1900s, post-w ar years, the 
sixties, and the nineties all produced magazines very different in content, but which 
reflected the overall tone or Zeitgeist o f  society in those times. For example, 
im provements to photographic and printing technology allowed magazines to develop 
the photographic montage, in which a number o f pictures and images were overlaid 
each other or meshed together to create one image. The montage first emerged in the 
1930s in German and Soviet worker magazines, such as the Arbeiter Illustrieter 
Zeitung  (AIZ) and the Sov ’etskeo Foto. The AIZ used montages for political satire. 
The target o f  its satire was the Nazi party and its leaders. Therefore, in 1933, when the 
Nazis assumed power in Germany, the magazine moved to Czechoslovakia. It was
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printed there and smuggled back into Germany until 1938, when the Nazis entered 
Czechoslovakia. The AIZ was also one o f the first magazines to use repetition o f 
pictures, cinematic sequential picture stories, dramatic contrasts o f picture scale, and 
cut-outs (Owen, 1992). The importance o f this point is that it highlights how the 
technology enables new forms o f content to emerge (the montage), but the tone o f the 
content -  political satire -  is influenced by the wider social issues and cultural 
influences o f  the time, and how macro-level social and cultural factors are an 
influence on content.
The time needed for new innovations to develop and diffuse into popular use 
means that a content form, such as magazines or digital media, isn’t complete in its 
early years. The magazines o f  today -  characterised by full-colour pictures, glossy 
paper, desk-top layout allowing for elaborate design, better quality, cheaper and faster 
printing -  are very different publications to the ones that existed in the 1900s and 
before. M agazines as they are today evolved over time. They w eren’t  a ‘given’ from 
the beginning. This thesis believes the same can be said o f  digital media. Many o f the 
technologies that will enable the evolution o f digital media as a content form have not 
yet emerged. Many o f  the practices that will become standard in digital media content 
production are not yet possible. In ten years, the digital media o f  today will probably 
seem primitive, just as a 1900s magazine would seem today. Technology will enable 
changes in the evolution o f digital media content innovations, but will not determine 
them, and wider social and cultural influences will set the tone.
James M onaco (2002) argues that an earlier content form -  film/cinema -  has over 
many years built elaborate grammars, and viewers have a mature ability to decode the 
signified/signifiers in a film text. Certain shots or music indicate certain meaning or 
moods, which the viewer, through understanding film/cinema grammar, can decode. 
However, the decoded meanings do not always correspond to the inscribed meanings 
o f the film producers. M onaco suggests that a similar process o f accumulating 
grammars is underway for digital media content, but is still at an early, weakly 
developed, stage.
Like digital media, the magazine initially struggled to  distinguish itself as a new 
distinct content form. It was defined largely in terms o f the older media (books). It 
borrowed techniques and practices from the older media, but slowly adapted them to 
suit the new format. And eventually it cut loose from the older media and found its 
own space and purpose. It evolved into a content form that was very different from
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what it was at the beginning. This thesis argues that digital media is at the beginning 
o f a similar process; that although digital media defines itself largely in terms o f the 
traditional media, it will eventually be recognised as a distinct medium, having 
accumulated its own codes, grammars and rules o f  production, and its own niche role 
within the media. A quote from John M orrish illustrates the point. He writes: “A web 
magazine is a magazine by analogy only” (Morrish, 1996: 175). (Likewise, an online 
newspaper is a newspaper by analogy only.) Similarly, Enter was a magazine by 
analogy only. It defined itself as a magazine because, in the struggle to shape itself as 
an object for consumption, it had to draw on familiar, established concepts. But as 
digital media matures into a more distinct content form, such content innovations will 
have less need to define themselves in terms o f the traditional media.
2.11: Conclusion
The next chapter, primarily on systems o f innovation, will contain a synopsis o f  the 
overall conceptual framework, to clarify how social shaping contributes to it. Also, it 
will outline how social shaping compensates for the conceptual weaknesses o f 
systems o f innovation, and how systems o f  innovation offers a fuller articulation o f 
some o f the concepts touched on in social shaping theory.
It is im portant in this chapter to move beyond the technological determinist 
conception o f innovation -  as a closed process -  and towards the open conception 
presented by social shaping theory. The main value o f social shaping theory is that it 
recognises the importance o f social and cultural influences, which as will be outlined, 
are o f particular im portance to content innovations. Also, social shaping theory 
recognises that innovation has a social context o f production and consumption. 
Technological determinism suggests that the technology changes the environment o f 
production and, in particular, consumption.
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Chapter 3: Literature review 3: systems of 
innovation and the digital media sector
Chapter 3: Literature review 3: systems of innovation and the digital 
media sector
3.0: Overview
The second major constituent o f the conceptual framework is systems o f innovation, 
which attends to how the linkages and interactions between actors within an economy 
form a system in which innovation occurs. In previous academic research on the role 
o f  innovation within the economy and the emergence o f new innovations, there is 
little explicit overlap between the systems o f innovation concept and the social 
shaping approach. However, this thesis argues that a conceptual framework that 
combines elements o f both traditions will provide a deeper understanding o f the 
processes underlying the development, production and emergence o f innovations, at 
both a broad industrial level and the micro-level o f  companies. The systems o f 
innovation concept, traditionally employed on macro and meso-level studies, provides 
a useful framework in which to analyse the emergence o f the Irish digital media 
content industry: it highlights how innovation does not occur in isolation by 
examining the linkages between companies, and between companies and the 
supporting institutional set-up, and how the competencies and knowledge necessary 
for innovation are transferred within the system. It emphasises that the emergence o f 
the content industry is subject at various levels to checks and balances, brakes and 
accelerators, both within and outside the company, and within and outside the 
industry. Above all, it demonstrates that innovation can not be explained, as Nicholas 
N egroponte puts it, “through purely technological imperatives” (Negroponte, 1995: 
81).
Although not an exact fit, the traditions o f social shaping and systems o f 
innovation complement each other in the study o f emerging innovations and an 
em erging innovative industry. Social shaping studies tend to focus on the influences 
and factors that shape the emergence o f individual innovative artefacts, such as the 
television or the electric light (Marvin, 1998; Thomas, 1987; Williams, 1974). And, as 
w ith systems o f  innovation, the subjects o f social shaping studies are, for the most 
part, technological or material artefacts.
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Systems o f  innovation studies have a broader scope, and examine innovation 
internationally, nationally, regionally and sectorally. Sectors are binded by a common 
base o f  innovative activity (such as the digital media sector, which comprises 
technology, applications and content), and are o f particular importance to studies 
focusing on areas o f specialisation within a national or international system o f 
innovation (automobile production in Sweden, for example). In so doing, it shows 
how the concept can be applied at many levels, including in this thesis at the level o f 
individual companies. The systems o f innovation concept will be applied most 
extensively in the qualitative study o f the emerging Irish digital media content 
industry. A  combination o f  systems o f innovation and social shaping will be applied 
to the quantitative case-studies o f  individual content companies, to better understand 
the processes o f innovation within them, and to assess the influences on the 
innovative process o f actors both within and outside the firm.
There are a number o f weaknesses in applying the systems o f innovation concept 
to the study o f  the emerging content industry. Although the concept places innovation 
at the centre o f economic growth, it is Aveak in accounting for how new innovations 
emerge. The main body o f the literature is concerned with mature innovation systems, 
with a well developed institutional set-up, and an innovation process reliant heavily 
on formal R&D (based on the application o f technical and scientific knowledge) 
within large private firms. The content industry is at an early stage o f its emergence, 
and my research suggests, so too is the institutional set-up to support it. Furthermore, 
formal R&D, and the application o f  technical and scientific knowledge, is not a strong 
characteristic o f  firms within the industry. However, the emphasis o f  the literature 
began to shift in the early 1990s, particularly in writings from the Aalborg School, 
which tried to move the focus from formal R&D to interactive learning by actors in 
the system (Lundvall, 1992; Lundvall, 1998; Lundvall, Johnson, Anderson and 
Dalum, 2001). Also, in recent years, the concept has begun to  be applied to emerging 
systems, such as the useful work of, among others, Egan, Saxenian and Pavlik in 
applying it to emerging digital media content industries in the United States and 
Canada (Egan and Saxenian, 1999; Pavlik, 1999; Cooke, 2002; Scott, 1998; Brail and 
Gertler, 1999; Heydebrand, 1999). The shift to emerging sectors, and the promotion 
o f  interactive learning, makes the concept more applicable to the emergence o f the 
content industry and understanding how innovations emerge from it. However, this is
a marginal shift within the literature, and the dominant emphasis remains fixed on 
mature, industrial innovation systems.
In addition to this shift, a concept has emerged within the literature that has 
potential to be usefully applied to content innovation: styles o f  innovation. Systems o f 
innovation -  within a nation, for example -  assume strong linkages and relationships 
between companies, and between companies and external institutions, as well as 
influential factors such as the natural resources o f a nation. The particular 
characteristics or make-up o f  the system influences the ‘styles’ o f innovation it 
produces. (In certain studies, such as Hoogma and W ebber (1998), they are 
considered determinants o f  style.) Dissimilar systems o f innovation tend to produce 
dissimilar styles o f innovation. The literature, with its emphasis on industrial 
innovation, usually speaks o f  styles o f innovation in the sense o f technological 
similarity or dissimilarity (Vertova, 1998). For this thesis, the outcome would be 
content similarity or dissimilarity. Whereas the literature concentrates on the 
influence o f natural (material) resources on innovative output, my research indicates 
that social and cultural factors have a greater influence on the ‘styles’ o f  content 
innovation that emerge from the Irish system. The concept has not been applied 
notably to  the style o f other digital media content industries abroad, to which content 
similarity or dissimilarity could be compared, to serve as a gauge on the influence o f 
social and cultural factors and the institutional set-up o f  the system. This may open a 
worthwhile area o f research in the future.
3.1: Joseph Schumpeter
The w ork o f  economist Joseph Schumpeter precedes by several decades the main 
body o f  literature on systems o f innovation. However, the origins o f  the concept can 
be traced to his work, and he greatly influences the w ork o f later theorists such as 
Christopher Freem an1, Luc Soete and Charles Edquist, all o f  whom work extensively 
in the systems o f  innovation tradition.
1 Freeman was technologically determinist in much of his work. However, in his writings on systems of 
innovation, he demonstrated an awareness that technology did not emerge under an autonomous 
momentum. He was aware that many factors influenced the emergence of a new technology. Freeman’s 
weakness as a theorist was that, in his model, he bestowed on technology too privileged a status; he 
over-estimated its influence on the innovation process at the expense of important, but less obvious, 
social factors. Freeman, in the opinion o f the author, was a soft-detenninist. The conceptual framework 
of this thesis incorporated elements of soft-detcrminism, and as shall be outlined in this chapter,
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Schumpeter was one o f  the first economists to examine economic growth and 
technological change from an innovation perspective. The majority o f  neo-classical 
economists examine how resources, including technical knowledge, are allocated 
within an economy, and they neglect the innovation aspect to economic development. 
W riting in the middle o f the 20th century, Schumpeter stresses the impetus that 
innovation can give to an economy, and he puts forward the notion o f  long wave 
cycles o f  capitalist development, which bring about ‘creative gales o f destruction’. 
These are periods o f intense change, in which clusters o f radical new technologies 
emerge to replace older, established ones. These periods o f profound technological 
change are usually accompanied by similarly profound social changes, although 
Schumpeter never explicitly argues that the new technologies determine social 
change. But here he echoes much o f the later post-fordist thinking, that capitalist 
development occurs in distinct phases. Although in the post-fordist conception, these 
phases are characterised by a set o f social, political and economic conditions (Preston, 
2001: 37; Schumpter, 1994).
In contrast to traditional linear models o f  technological determinism, Schumpeter 
presents technological progress as a series o f ‘long w ave’ cycles o f about 50 years 
each. His work draws on the earlier writings o f Soviet theorist Nikolai Kondratieff, 
who in the mid-1920s tried to explain the reasons why capitalism had developed a 
predictable pattern o f  boom and bust periods every 50 years. These ‘w aves’ were 
linked to technological changes but, importantly, were not triggered or determined by 
technology. N ew  technologies could be exploited to their potential only if  favourable 
economic conditions w ere in place (Hall and Preston, 1988: 4). Schumpeter, a decade 
or so later, articulated K ondratieff s theory in greater depth. However, he follows a 
narrower determinist line than his Soviet predecessor, in that he places a heavier 
emphasis on the ability o f  new emerging technologies or innovations to pull 
capitalism into a boom, or an up-swing phase. Like Kondratieff, he argues that the
Freeman’s work made a valuable contribution to it. In researching the emergence of the systems of 
innovation concept, Freeman traced its origins back further than Schumpeter, to German economist 
Friedrich List, who in 1841 was writing about the national system o f political economy (Freeman. 
2000). His writings contained, in rudimentary form, many elements of the later systems of innovation 
concept. List’s mission was to devise stratagems to push the German economy ahead of the English 
one, and he stressed the importance of learning about technologies to stimulate innovation. However, 
his intellectual contribution was noted only after the systems of innovation concept had been well 
established, meaning Schumpeter had a more immediate and direct influence on the concept as it was 
emerging.
innovation process has many dimensions, and factors such as economic and socio­
political conditions are influential. The first phase o f a cycle is characterised by an up­
swing, in which a series o f  inter-related radical innovations emerge. There then follow 
a down-swing phase, characterised by a series o f incremental innovations, or minor 
improvements, to the radical new technologies that were introduced during the up­
swing phase. M inor booms and busts can occur during this time, but the general trend 
is for the down-swing to  continue until eventually a new set o f  radical innovations 
emerge, which leads to the up-swing phase o f  the next cycle.
Schumpeter identifies four such cycles that were crucial to  the development of 
industrial capitalism:
1: The first long wave, from the 1790s to the 1840s, was characterised by the 
emergence o f  w ater and steam power, early mechanisation o f a number o f industries, 
including textiles, and new iron production techniques.
2: The second long wave, from the 1840s to the 1890s, saw the introduction of 
railway transport, steam power in factories, and precision engineering o f machinery 
and tools.
3: The third long wave, from the 1890s to the mid-1940s, heralded the emergence of 
electrical engineering and machinery, as well as increased use o f  chemicals.
4: The fourth wave, from the 1940s on, was characterised by mass diffusion o f 
motorised transport, electronics and aerospace.
M y conceptual framework privileges to a greater degree the social factors that are 
crucial to  the emergence o f new innovations, which in a Schumpeterian model are 
necessary for the beginning o f  the up-swing phase o f a new wave. His model provides 
a historically grounded account o f  technological and industrial change. However, 
Schumpeter and subsequent neo-Schumpeterian theorists acknowledge the temporal 
assumptions o f the model and qualify it by stating that the 50-year cycle o f waves is 
an approxim ate timeline -  the waves could be 40 or 60 years, longer or shorter.
However, like many retrospective accounts o f innovation, it appears relatively 
easy to  impose a pattern on history, to collapse a linear path on technological and 
economic development, and employ it as the basis for predicting future development. 
Such historicism is out o f  synch w ith the overall conceptual framework o f this thesis, 
which holds that innovation is a risk-laden process, influenced by many factors and 
social actors, and as such cannot be predicted with genuine certainty. The process can 
not be reduced to the certainty and predictability o f ‘long w ave’ cycles. The
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Schumpeterian and neo-Schumpeterian ‘long wave’ model betrays its determinist 
roots by trying to impose a predictable pattern on technological development. 
Although certain favourable technological, social and economic conditions facilitate 
the beginning o f  a wave, there is no guarantee that this will happen in the future, or 
that cycles o f  future innovation will follow the general pattern o f those in the past.
Another weaknesses o f the Schumpeterian approach is that he gives no precise 
details on how the emergence o f a cluster o f  technological innovations sparks the up­
swing phase o f  a long wave (Preston, 2001: 124). Neither does he give an adequate 
explanation for why or how new technologies begin to  emerge. This echoes criticisms 
o f  the later systems o f innovation literature, which through its bias towards macro­
level analysis has difficulty explaining how new innovations are brought into the 
system (W ebber and Hoogma, 1998). As already outlined, moves have been made to 
try to incorporate into the concept an adequate explanation for how innovations 
emerge. But this thesis further develops the concept by incorporating into it elements 
o f  social shaping theory, to recognise the social and cultural influences on content 
innovation, and the importance o f an innovation’s social context o f production and 
consumption.
One o f  Schumpeter’s arguments is that the new technologies stimulate production, 
which push the economy into growth. It is a determinist notion o f  a technology-led 
system o f  economic change, and more in line with supply side economics, which are 
characteristic o f  the majority o f governmental and industry accounts o f innovation.
However, Schumpeter does not reduce the process totally to technology. He 
places much o f  the responsibility for the beginning o f up-swing phases on the 
shoulders o f entrepreneurs, or ‘heroic’ entrepreneurs as he terms them. Similar to 
many determinists, but to a lesser extent, he tries to personalise innovation, which 
glosses over the complex and multi-dimensional processes that underpin it. Also, his 
emphasis on individual entrepreneurs implies that innovation is a relatively isolated 
process. Later systems o f  innovation writings emphasise that even private firms 
developing innovations have numerous and strong linkages to external actors.
Finally, Schum peter’s conception o f ‘creative gales o f destruction’ is useful to this 
thesis. (Later Schumpeterian work, or Schumpeter Mark II, focuses on the 
accumulation o f  competencies and innovations within a system, which is relevant to 
companies in the content industry, as they build up their competencies through 
interactive learning and experience.) It demonstrates that the profiles o f  innovating
industries are dynamic and changing, not static. Although Schumpeter uses it to 
explain technological change on a macro-national level, I apply it to the meso-level o f 
an industrial system o f  innovation. A system o f innovation, as shall be outlined, is 
continually in flux, as new innovations emerge or modifications are made to 
previously existing innovations. A continual process o f change and restructuring also 
occurs in the organisational, social and economic layers. A tension arises as the new 
challenges or replaces the old, or as the role o f an old technology is renegotiated in 
society. This change is often seen as a ‘crisis’ or a stress between opposing groups, as 
part o f the conflict that is inherent in systems o f  innovation.
Innovation means something new: it can be a new combination o f  elements from 
previously existing innovations, or improvements (process innovations) to existing 
innovations. It encapsulates the continuities with the past, and the additions to it in the 
present. A radical innovation is a substantial development, such as the development o f 
a new base technology, and a process (incremental) innovation would be an 
im provem ent to it. To further innovate, a system has to replace, eliminate or 
renegotiate established innovations or innovators.
3.2: Systems of innovation
As stated in the previous chapter, the social shaping approach emerged in the mid to 
late-1980s to challenge older, and cruder, theories o f  social, technological and 
economic change. Fragments o f  what would become the basis o f  the theory are 
present in the earlier works of, among others, Raymond W illiams (1974), but it w asn’t 
articulated in a unified form  until the 1980s. Similarly, fragments o f systems o f 
innovation can be found in Schumpeter’s work in the 1930s, and even as far back as 
Friedrich L ist in 1841, but again the theory w asn’t articulated in unified form until the 
mid-1980s. However, unlike social shaping theory, which is concerned with 
technological change, systems o f innovation is more focused on how innovation 
stimulates economic growth. Whereas systems o f innovation stresses how interaction 
is necessary to form a system in which innovation occurs, social shaping is concerned 
with how the interactions shape emerging innovations, in both their production and 
consumption contexts.
Systems o f  innovation challenges orthodox economics, which tries to explain 
economic growth and innovation through the allocation o f resources, under the
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assumption that economic growth proceeds through the application o f universal rules, 
and that the context o f innovation matters little. As Lundvall writes, the conclusion o f 
this rationale is that “national differences in culture and institutions may affect the 
way things are done, but it is assumed that the impact on the allocation o f  resources 
and the efficiency o f production is so minor that they can be neglected” (Lundvall, 
1997: 1 ). Systems o f innovation offers a holistic view o f innovation. Actors -  
organisations (companies), institutions (government/state agencies, universities) and 
economic structures (monetary system) -  interact at various levels, and the linkages 
and relationships between these actors combine to, in effect, produce a systems in 
which innovation occurs. Unlike the neo-classical economic method o f analysing 
resource allocation, early systems o f innovation writing emphasises the importance of 
formal R&D in institutions such as universities and, especially, within organisations 
such as large private firms. This brings and accumulates new scientific and technical 
knowledge within the system, which is used as the basis o f  producing new 
innovations to  stimulate economic growth. The institutional set-up supports 
companies as they develop innovations and, later, as they try to stabalise them within 
the wider economy.
Innovations, according to  Charles Edquist, are “new creations o f economic 
significance” (Edquist, 1997: 1). Often they are new combinations o f previously 
existing innovations, or improvements to previously existing innovations, or 
significant (radical) new innovations. But rarely would an innovation emerge without 
being built upon or influenced by previous research or innovations. Similar to social 
shaping theory, systems o f innovation highlights the continuities new innovations 
have w ith the past. However, a weakness o f the approach is its failure to fully 
acknowledge the social influences on a system, or how the workings o f  a system are 
an inherently social activity.
N ot all innovations are o f  direct economic significance, as Edquist’s definition 
suggests. N either is all innovation technological or industrial. Organisational and 
institutional innovations are also important facets o f emerging systems. This will be 
outlined in greater detail later in the chapter.
Before engaging in a deeper analysis o f the concept, I must first qualify the use o f 
the word ‘system ’. Although at first sight it connotes something consciously 
developed, with all the constituent parts working harmoniously towards the same 
goal, this is not so. Systems o f innovation are riddled with internal conflicts, between
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actors that have competing or even opposing goals. For example, a competing goal 
would be a company that tries to increase its market share at the expense o f  a rival. 
An opposing goal would be a management that tries to introduce a new technology to 
the factory floor to improve efficiency, but meets resistance from workers because the 
technology changes work practices and results in job loses. Or it could take the form 
o f government institutions, such as the one regulating monopolies and mergers, which 
tries to prevent a monopoly in an industry by blocking one company’s bid to take over 
a rival.
But despite such conflicts and differing goals, and despite the fact that more new 
innovations perished than survived, the overall effect o f the interplay o f  these various 
social actors is positive. The culmination o f their actions is to form a system in which 
innovation occurs, even if  many o f  the players are competing against each other and 
trying to advance at the expense o f  others. As Richard R. Nelson and Nathan 
Rosenberg write:
“There is no presum ption that the system was, in some sense, consciously 
designed, or even that the set o f  institutions involved work together smoothly 
and  coherently. Rather, the ‘system ’ concept is that o f  a  set o f  institutional 
actors that, together, p lay the major role in influencing innovative 
performance. ” (Nelson and  Rosenberg, 1993: 5-6)
The systems o f  innovation concept is criticised for being determinist (that, for 
instance, the institutional set-up is a determinant o f innovation) and functionalist 
(Lundvall, 1997: 10). My conceptual framework rejects the determinist undercurrent 
in the literature. And although institutions evolve to performed functions within the 
system, this thesis rejects the functionalist assumption that they are consciously 
created.
However, it is important to note that the system aren’t entirely conflict based. 
There are institutions that facilitate the innovation process, such as universities (for 
educating w orkers and engaging in research) and state bodies, including the Labour 
Court (to help settle industrial disputes) and Enterprise Ireland (which provides 
support services to companies).
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3.3: National system of innovation
Since the concept was first articulated, systems o f innovation has had various 
applications as a tool for analysis, the most common o f which is as a ‘national’ system 
o f innovation [NSI], The title was first used by Christopher Freeman in a book he 
w rote on innovation in Japan (Freeman, 1987). The term emerged to counter neo­
classical assumptions that, although national cultures, institutional set-ups and 
economic structures differ, their effect on productive and innovative performance is 
negligible and can largely be ignored. The NSI argues that these factors have a crucial 
effect on productive and innovative performance, although there is a tendency in the 
literature to regard them as determinants. M ore recent writings argue that national 
cultures (although only passing references are made to the influence o f culture), 
institutional set-ups and economic structures affect the style o f innovations that 
emerge from  national systems (Vertova, 1998; Lundvall, 1998). To assess the extent 
to which the N SI effects the style o f  innovation in the content industry, I had to place 
greater stress on social and cultural influences than would have been usual in systems 
o f innovation studies, concerned mainly with industrial and technological innovations. 
Stefano Breschi and Franco Malerba, who contribute valuable writings to advancing 
the concept o f  a sectoral system o f innovation, offer the following definition o f an 
NSI:
“A national system o f  innovation takes the geographical boundaries o f  the 
innovation system as given and analyses the workings o f  that composite and  
varied set o f  actors involved in the innovation and  diffusion processes - firm s , 
universities, professional schools and public research institutes, and  the 
governm ent -  and  the links among them. ” (Breschi and Malerba, 1997: 130)
A flaw in Breschi and M alerba’s definition is their assumption that the 
geographical boundaries o f  an NSI can be taken as a given. This is also a weakness o f 
neo-classical economics, which according to Lundvall, regards nations as “national 
facts” (Lundvall, 1997: 1). For theoretical coherency, as well as the practical purpose 
o f  focusing my empirical research and analysis, I believe it is necessary to set a 
boundary to  a system o f  innovation, be it industrial, sectoral or national. The 
boundaries in which a national system operate is a set o f borders. However, it is a 
theoretical w eakness to regard the borders as a given, or in the neo-classical sense, a
national fact. The tendency to regard national borders as a given reflects the tendency 
within the literature to examine mature, well-established systems within countries 
w ith similarly well-developed economies and stable borders. Historically, however, 
borders have shifted, and the boundaries o f territories have been re-drawn. The 
borders o f  a nation are not always a given -  sometimes they are in dispute, as in 
certain areas o f the Balkans, or Northern Ireland. It would be more accurate to speak 
o f a generally recognised, if  not wholly accepted, set o f borders.
Also, Breschi and M alerba’s definition is reliant too heavily on a spatial concept 
o f a nation, which is consistent with the general trend in the literature to emphasise 
natural resources (such as territory) and place less emphasis on social and cultural 
influences. Bendict Anderson (1983) offers an alternative vision o f a nation. He 
argues that there is nothing natural about the setting o f  a country’s borders, and so a 
nation can not be defined simply in terms o f  an area o f  land locked within a set o f 
borders. He highlights that, especially after times o f conflict, borders are re-drawn 
and peoples find them selves to be geographically in one country, but culturally and 
socially they regard themselves part o f a different one. And so, Anderson argues, a 
nation is more than just the lines o f its borders. He claims it is preferable to think o f 
nations as “imagined communities”, in which cultural beliefs and practices and social 
norms are shared and accepted by a majority o f  the people.
For my analysis, I take the NSI to operate within the borders o f the 26 counties o f 
the Irish Republic (disputes about the legitimacy o f the border with the N orth will 
remain outside this thesis). However, such a spatial definition has to be underpinned 
by a recognition o f  the commonality o f  certain cultural practices and social norms 
among the various actors within the country’s NSI.
Although I employ the NSI as an analytical tool, I take into account weaknesses 
and criticisms o f  the concept. A common criticism is that, because o f  globalisation 
and the increasing pow er and mobility o f multinationals, the nation is becoming 
irrelevant as the basis o f  analysing innovation systems (Nelson, 1993; W eber and 
Hoogma, 1998; Lundvall, Johnson, Anderson and Dalum, 2001). Nelson, for 
example, argues that globalisation has led to the creation o f an ‘international’ system 
o f innovation, in which the economies and societies o f  the w orld’s countries have 
become increasingly linked to and dependant upon one another. In such a climate, 
Nelson argues, it is difficult to isolate a nation as a subject for analysis, w ithout 
making substantial reference to the international factors that influence and shape its
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system o f innovation. However, this thesis argues that there isn’t any suggestion that 
a system o f innovation should be regarded as a closed system. One o f the key 
missions o f the early literature is to demonstrate that companies do not innovate in 
isolation. Therefore, at a macro-level, it would be counter-productive to regard 
national systems as operating in isolation. My empirical research, both quantitative 
and qualitative, demonstrates that Irish digital media content companies have strong 
economic and institutional linkages to external actors both inside and outside the 
national system. To disregard linkages outside the national system would skew the 
empirical findings. That said, the N SI concept provides a useful framework in which 
to analyse the emerging industry. Characteristics o f  the Irish NSI, and the linkages 
firms form within it, tend to be the major influences on innovation within the content 
industry.
A further criticism o f the concept is that, even setting aside external factors, the 
term  N SI is internally misleading, although such a criticism could be directed at a 
system o f innovation on any level. Richard R. Nelson writes:
“The term suggests much more uniformity and correctedness within a nation 
than is the case. Thus, one can discuss Canadian agriculture pretty 
independently o f  Canadian telecommunications. ” (Nelson, 1993: 518)
His argument operates on two levels. A linguistic flaw in the terminology is that 
‘system ’ implies unity, whereas much o f  the activity within the system is conflict- 
based (and these conflicts could intensify when conducted within the confinements o f 
the national system). Second, with the reference to Canadian agriculture and 
telecom munications, Nelson is furthering the argument that the mere fact o f  a 
com pany’s geographical location within a nation does not mean it can be analysed 
purely w ithin the context o f  that country’s NSI. M uch innovation, especially 
industrial innovation that is the dominant subject o f the literature, tends to be 
transnational. This further weakens the concept o f the NSI: if  innovation crosses 
borders, how can it be analysed within one set o f borders? Lundvall argues that while 
multinationals spread their organisations over many countries (such as production and 
assembly plants), they tend to retain their core innovation R&D within the home NSI 
(Lundvall, 1998). This trend is noticeable in my quantitative study o f  the emerging 
Irish content industry: Irish firms that have expanded abroad tend to retain the core o f  
their innovative activities in the domestic N SI (foreign offices are concerned, mainly,
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with sales and distribution, or localisation). Foreign firms located in Ireland tend to 
retain the core o f their innovative activities in their country o f origin, and assign to 
their Irish operations the lower-end tasks o f  production, assembly and localisation. 
But this shows how, even for transnational organisations, the domestic N SI remains a 
central influence on their innovative efforts.
Numerous studies have been conducted to try to gauge the level o f influence o f 
the NSI, and a consistent trend has emerged that different NSIs produce different 
innovations. Even countries that are geographically and culturally close produce 
different innovations, depending on the characteristics o f the institutional set-up and 
characteristics o f the NSI. Charles Edquist, for example, outlines the following as a 
reason to retain the NSI concept:
“One reason is the fa c t  that...there are sharp differences between various 
national systems in such attributes as institutional set-up, investment in R&D, 
and  performance. For example, the differences in these respects between 
Sweden and  D enmark are remarkable -  in spite o f  the fa c t that these two 
sm all countries in Northern Europe are very sim ilar in other respects such as 
language, culture, standard o f  living, lifestyle, consumption patterns, size o f  
the pub lic  sector, and  strength o f  trade unions. ” (Edquist, 1997: 12)
Richard R. Nelson, although he stresses the difficulties o f isolating a nation as a 
subject for analysis, also acknowledges how the particular characteristics o f a nation 
and an N SI can effect innovation. He writes:
“Certainly, the policies and  program s o f  national governments, the laws o f  a  
nation and  the existence o f  a common language and shared culture define an  
inside and  an outside that can broadly affect how technical advance 
proceeds... Although there are many areas o f  similarity between the systems o f  
countries in comparable economic settings, there still are some striking  
differences as well. Japanese firm s  in the semiconductor business tend to be 
different fro m  American, German or French firm s... A nd  the reasons fo r  these 
differences reside, to a  significant degree, in differences in national histories 
and  cultures, including the timing o f  a country’s entry into the 
industrialisation process. ” (Nelson, 1993: 16)
O f particular interest to this thesis is N elson’s statement about the importance 
surrounding the timing o f a country’s entry into the industrialisation process. This, 
historically, has had a strong influence on Ireland’s path o f industrial and innovative 
development. (This will be outlined in greater detail in chapter five, so only a brief 
summary w ill be given here.) When the industrial revolution was underway in Britain 
in the 1700s, Ireland didn’t participate, being stifled by British occupation and 
deliberate policies to keep the country unindustrialised and weak. Thus, after 
independence was gained under the Free State in 1922, the country was poorly 
equipped to  begin the industrialisation process. The economy was dependent on 
agriculture for several decades, with the turn to industrialisation beginning only in the 
1950s. Entry to the EEC, and structural funds to improve the country’s infrastructure, 
helped the country to industrialise. (Factors external to the N SI that assisted its 
development.) But due to the country’s late entry to the industrialisation process, 
Ireland had to play infrastructural and economic catch-up with many o f  its fellow 
European countries. The process accelerated greatly in the late 1990s, with the Celtic 
Tiger boom, but it was only at the end o f the year 2000 that the Taoiseach could claim 
Ireland had reached the average European standard o f living (Irish Times, 8 January 
2001).
As stated by Nelson, the differences between N SIs often stems from factors such 
as the resources o f  a nation, its history, politics, environment, culture and social 
structure. All o f  these factors can make a nation more or less conducive to innovation. 
But one o f  the main factors concerns the size o f the nation. W hereas the United States 
is a large NSI, Ireland is a small one. This, as we shall see, has had quite profound 
effects on the innovative performance o f the country.
M uch o f the discussion about the limitations o f the NSI concept is conducted 
within the systems o f innovation literature itself. Despite its worth in examining 
economic growth, innovation and technological development, it has yet to move, 
significantly, outside a small circle o f academia and into the dominant discourse 
among government and industrial agencies. The Organisation for Econom ic Co­
operation and Developm ent (OECD) and the European Commission do acknowledge 
the concept and have incorporated it into their research agenda, but institutions such 
as the W orld Bank and the International M onetary Fund remain resistant to it 
(Lundvail, Johnson, Anderson, Dalum, 2001). Therefore, much o f the writing that 
could have been construed as critiques of, or challenges to, the N SI concept do not
explicitly acknowledge it. Determinist writings on globalisation, for example, 
consistently relegate the importance o f the nation. They emphasise the supposed 
borderless characteristics o f  globalisation, and the world-wide conformity being 
brought about by it, by announcing the “death o f  distance” (Cairncross, 1998), “the 
demise o f  geography” (Toffler, 1970) and the “global village” (McLuhan, 1989). 
Globalisation theories, in part, emerged in response to the perceived diminishing 
im portance o f  nation states as players in global economics and innovation. While 
acknowledging that nation states have, indeed, lost some o f their power and influence 
in world economics and innovation, I believe that the nation remains a crucial factor 
in and influence on innovation. The global market, which many (including Kelly, 
1999) believe has pushed the nation into the background, is by no means 
homogenous; the composite countries are culturally, socially, environmentally, 
politically and economically diverse. What proves to be a successful formula for 
innovation in one country is likely to  fail in another if  it doesn’t pay due regard to 
these differences and adapt accordingly. A weakness in the systems o f innovation 
concept in general is that it focuses on innovation production and disregards the 
context o f  its consumption, which often is crucial to the success o f a content 
innovation. A  study by Aphra Kerr (1999) provides an example o f how crucially 
important national and cultural factors are in influencing the success or failure o f  an 
innovation, Kerr uses the example o f  an American software company that tried to 
provide content, via its Internet site, to the French market. Initially, most o f  the 
content was generated in America and translated into French. However, French 
consumers w ere turned off by the perceived American slant to the content. Even after 
attempts by the company to  localise the content, by appointing an editorial team in 
France, the project still failed, because the perception remained that the content was 
an Americanised version o f French (Kerr, 1999: 7-10).
The company suffered a great financial loss (somewhere in the region o f  $200 
million a year) because, naively, it believed that a formula for successful innovation 
in America could simply be transplanted into another national and cultural context 
w ith the same success. (Digital media content that proved popular with an American 
audience was unappealing to a French audience.) Also, the company believed that its 
practices for successful innovation in the development o f  software and digital media 
tools could be applied with similar success to the creation o f digital media content 
artefacts. The company failed to appreciate the strong resistance that national culture
can mount in the face o f unsuitable innovations (or content), and that the development 
o f  digital media content artefacts requires different competencies to the development 
o f  software applications. The example o f the failed content project in France could be 
used to substantiate the argument that the fate o f an innovation is not down purely to 
the innovation itself. Other, social, factors can be decisive. This case highlights how 
content innovations are open to cultural and social influences, in both their production 
and consumption. Cultural influences are more crucial than is evident in the systems 
o f  innovation literature.
3.4: Small national systems of innovation
Ireland is a small player in global economics, accounting for less than one percent o f 
the economy o f the European Union. For this reason, Ireland’s NSI faces problems 
that the systems o f  larger countries do not, or at least not to the same extent. The 
defining disadvantage o f a small national system is the size o f  its domestic market. 
The smaller the national system, the smaller the domestic market, and the more 
companies have to orient themselves towards the export market if  they are to generate 
the profits necessary to  justify (and, indeed, undertake) innovation.
According to Vivien Walsh, the scientific, technical and industrial processes o f 
innovation are becom ing more complex and costly, a trend that is squeezing tighter 
the innovative capacities o f smaller systems (Walsh, 1988: 37-38). The cost savings 
associated with mass production and economies o f scale are necessary to  recoup 
investment in innovation; to achieve these economies o f scale, however, companies 
have to  move beyond the domestic market. This, argues Walsh, means that smaller 
countries are more deeply integrated than larger countries into the global market. She 
uses the example o f  Swedish companies, which are more likely to export and invest 
abroad than similar sized US companies. W alsh concentrates on industrial companies, 
generally those producing technological innovations. The findings o f my empirical 
research support her argument: that Irish companies producing technological 
innovations are to a high degree export orientated. But her assertion is less applicable 
to the Irish digital media content industry, in which significantly fewer companies 
service foreign markets (see chapter five). Systems o f  innovation literature focuses on 
production, not consumption, and fails to consider how the social context o f 
consumption can influence the commercial success or failure o f an innovation. (To
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counter this weakness, this thesis combines systems o f innovation with social shaping 
theory, which is more sensitive to the social context o f production and consumption.) 
A lthough industrial and technological innovations are also consumed and 
appropriated in social contexts, the cultural factors associated with content 
innovations are stronger, and often a content innovation that proves successful in one 
country can, because o f  cultural and social variances, prove unsuccessful in others. 
But this influence on innovation, largely disregarded by the systems o f innovation 
literature, suggests why Irish content companies are less embedded in the world 
economy than technology or industrial companies. However, my study indicates that, 
between 1999 and 2002, the number o f content firms servicing foreign markets 
increased. Ireland, since government policy began to shift in the 1950s from 
protectionism, has had an open economy, which has become deeply embedded in, and 
dependent upon, the global economy. However, as a small MSI, Ireland faces a 
number o f problems. First, it has no indigenous companies o f truly global stature in 
the ICT or high-tech sectors. (Some second-tier Irish companies were emerging when 
this study began in October 1999, such as Baltimore Technologies, Riverdeep and 
Iona Technologies. Their fortunes, however, dipped in the intervening three years, as 
shall be indicated in chapter five.) The country’s largest telecommunications 
company, Eircom, was floated on the stock exchange in 1999, and it was quickly 
shown to be a small player in international terms. It tried to expand into the 
telecom munications market in Britain, but in 2001 began a retreat back to the 
domestic market, to focus on its core fixed-line telephony business.
Because the indigenous companies within the Irish NSI tend to be small-scale, the 
country depends on foreign investment, which although it has raised employment 
levels, has done little to raise the innovation level o f  the NSI. Ireland can claim to be 
the European home o f  many global ICT and high-tech companies, such as M icrosoft, 
but the operations here tend to be at the lower-end o f  the high-tech industry -  in 
assembly and localisation rather than R&D. Microsoft, for example, has its European 
headquarters here, but the operation is concerned mainly with the relatively dow n­
stream work o f  localisation and distribution o f its products to the European market 
(Kerr and Preston, 1997: 21). The products themselves are researched and developed 
back at the company's headquarters in Seattle, America.
M ost indigenous Irish companies that trade globally tend to concentrate on niche 
markets, especially those in the ICT or high-tech sectors. They search out markets that
the large corporations have either overlooked or believe would not be profitable or 
worthwhile to enter. W alsh argues that production o f niche innovations is a 
characteristic o f  companies within small NSIs (Walsh, 1988). My empirical research 
suggests that this, more so than orientation to foreign markets, is true o f  both 
technological and content innovators in the Irish system. The global structures o f 
traditional media are increasingly being represented in digital media content, and Irish 
companies tend to fill the gaps that are left: either producing indigenous Irish content 
that bigger, foreign companies do not, or providing niche content innovations -  such 
as educational artefacts -  that are too small or unprofitable for larger content 
companies.
The Irish Software Association [ISA] has targeted specialisation and niche 
markets as the way forward. In its 1998 report, entitled To boldly go: the Irish  
software industry -  a strategy fo r  growth , the association states that the country has to 
produce companies that can “dominate global markets in specific niches” (ISA, 1998: 
1). However, such a strategy leads to another problem that is commonly experienced 
in small countries. Devoting resources and finances to R&D o f niche products is risky 
-  as w ith most forms o f  innovation, there is no guarantee o f  the outcome being 
successful and profitable. The market for a specialised, niche product can be too 
limited to be profitable. Also, the development o f such products is costly, and firms in 
Ireland often experience difficulties in gaining access to venture capital. Another 
difficulty w ith the strategy is that (relatively) small firms competing in niche markets 
are unlikely to generate high levels o f employment.
By considering the num ber o f multinationals located in Ireland, it is obvious that 
Ireland is deeply embedded in the world economy. But how ‘em bedded’ is the world 
economy in Ireland? For example, the Irish economy needs M icrosoft (which employs 
about 1,500 people in this country), but does Microsoft need Ireland? I f  the company 
decides to move its European headquarters to Germany or France, the decision would 
adversely effect the Irish economy, but would have little effect on M icrosoft’s 
performance in the world economy. Indeed, as Denis O ’Hearn notes, widespread 
withdrawal o f  investment by multinationals from Ireland was a major contributor to 
rising unemployment in the 1980s (O ’Hearn, 1995: 93). On a smaller scale, this began 
to occur again w ith the global economic downturn in 2001. Taking employment as a 
crude measurement o f  economic activity (and the weaknesses associated with such a 
crude measure will be outlined in chapter five), unemployment rose by 20,000 in the
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year to February 2001, from a situation where it had been declining steadily since the 
mid-1990s (w w w .esri.ie. viewed on 18 June 2002). The Irish Republic’s small, open 
economy is vulnerable to such decisions by multinationals. It is an instance o f how 
the influence o f nation states within systems o f innovation has diminished that, often, 
they are more dependent on multinationals than multinationals are on them. As 
Charles Edquist and Bengt-Ake Lundvall argue: “The old model [of an industrial 
society] was based on the fact that the social-democratic state and the large firms were 
m utually  dependent. I f  this dependency goes only one way in the future, the basis for 
corporatism will erode” (Edquist and Lundvall, 1993: 292).
The greatest threat to Ireland’s economic fortunes comes not from within the 
country, but from outside. Decisions by foreign governments o f the richest nations, 
and by multinational boards who decide to close down their Irish operations, can all 
have serious repercussions for the Irish economy. But the process does not really 
work vice-versa. An economic disaster in Ireland will probably go unnoticed by most 
o f  the rest o f the world, but a downturn in, say, the American economy could have -  
and since the downturn o f 2001, has had -  serious effects on the Irish economy.
Therefore, to construct an accurate picture o f the situation in this country, any 
systems o f innovation analysis o f Ireland has to place prominent emphasis on the fact 
that it is a small nation with an open economy.
3.5: Sectoral and industrial systems of innovation
Although the N SI sets the context, or the environment, in which Irish digital media 
content companies operate, the concept is too general for the purposes o f this study. 
The more focused concept o f  a sectoral system o f innovation has the potential to be 
fruitful, but it is still too loose for my research agenda. I use it as the basis o f putting 
forward a related concept with a narrower scope. Later in the section, I shall explain 
why the sectoral concept is too loose and how I tighten it. But first, I shall discuss the 
sectoral concept in broad theoretical terms.
The sectoral system o f innovation concept is useful for analysing trends among 
companies in a sector, how  a sector is emerging, for uncovering its areas o f 
specialisation, how the institutional set-up supports it, and how trends in the NSI 
effect the sector. The concept is most closely associated with the w ork o f  Stefano
76
77
Breschi and, in particular, Franco Malerba, who offer the following definition o f a 
sectoral system o f innovation:
“A sectoral innovation system [is] a system (group) o f  firm s active in 
developing and making a  sector’s products and in generating and utilizing a 
sector's technologies; such a system o f  firm s is related in two different ways: 
through the processes o f  interaction and cooperation and through the process 
o f  competition in innovative and market activities. ” (Breschi and Malerba, 
1997: 152)
Like the NSI, the sectoral system is not closed. Companies within the sector have 
economic and institutional linkages and relationships with actors external to the 
sector, such as the venture capital layer o f the NSI, or institutional support provided 
by semi-state agencies such as Enterprise Ireland, which also provides institutional 
support to other sectors. The value o f  Breschi and M alerba’s definition is that it 
focuses attention on companies at the core o f a sector, which is a useful means o f 
uncovering information that could be overlooked in a broader, national analysis. 
M alerba’s (1999) concept o f  a sector, however, includes both the companies and the 
institutional set-up, but for my quantitative study, I narrow the focus to companies, 
while maintaining an awareness o f  the importance o f the institutional set-up. Malerba, 
unlike much o f the previous N SI studies, believes the concept has value for studying 
emerging sectors. He writes the following on how, typically, an industry or sector 
emerges:
“E arly in the history o f  an industry, when knowledge is changing very rapidly, 
uncertainty is very high and the barriers to entry very low, new firm s  are the 
m ajor innovators, and are the key elements in industrial dynamics. When the 
industry develops and eventually matures and technological change fo llow s  
well defined trajectories, economies o f  scale, learning curves, barriers to 
entry and  financia l resources become important in the competitive process. 
Thus, large firm s  with monopolistic power come to the forefront o f  the 
innovation process. " (1999: 11)
M y quantitative study suggests that the emerging content industry accords broadly 
to M alerba’s taxonomy: the barriers to entry are low (although gaining access to 
venture capital and funding is a consistent problem), and much innovation occurs
within smaller companies, although a tendency is emerging for smaller companies to 
be taken over by larger ones. In an embryonic form, larger companies, although not 
yet with monopolistic power, are beginning to edge ahead in the innovation process. 
This will be discussed in greater depth in chapter five.
The strengths and weaknesses o f the sectoral concept echo those o f  the NSI, but 
on an appropriately reduced scale. The sectoral concept shifts attention away from the 
neo-classical approach o f resource allocation and to R&D based innovation and, later, 
interactive learning. Sectoral systems o f innovation studies stress the importance o f  
formal R&D among companies in the sector, which as argued earlier is not as 
applicable to  the content industry. The N SI influences innovation within a sector, and 
the sectoral system allows for a focused examination o f  this. The weaknesses o f the 
sectoral approach are similar to those associated with the national approach: how to 
isolate a sector for study within an NSI. In defence o f the NSI concept, I argue that 
there is no suggestion that an N SI should be regarded as a closed system. The same is 
true o f  the sectoral system: external linkages, whether to the NSI or the international 
system, are important, and my research has to maintain an awareness o f them.
Breschi and M alerba classify sectoral systems o f  innovation under five headings, 
as follows (1997: 143-149):
1: Traditional sectors, such as agriculture and textiles.
2: M echanical industries and the industrial district.
3: The auto industry.
4: The com puter mainframe industry.
5: Software, the modern micro-electronics industry and Silicon Valley.
There is no room in Breschi and M alerba’s schema for a content industry, or a 
general heading under which a content industry can comfortably be placed. This, 
again, is consistent with the dominant strain in the literature to direct research 
attention to industrial, technological and material innovations. Also, the broad scope 
o f their classifications is rooted in the tradition o f the concept being applied to macro­
level studies. In an orthodox application o f  the sectoral concept, the digital media 
sector would comprise technology, applications and content. This is too loose for my 
research agenda, which is specifically on content. Therefore, I put forward concept o f 
an industrial system o f innovation. The advantage o f  this concept is that it allows 
research to be focused on areas within a sector that perhaps display characteristics or 
processes different to those o f  other areas in the sector. (As argued already,
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technological innovation displays marked differences to content innovation, and are 
not always suitable to be grouped together for analysis in a broad sectoral study.) It 
allowed for an analysis o f the patterns o f emergence and processes o f innovation that 
are particular to the content industry. The industrial concept mirrors the sectoral one 
but on a reduced scale, and contains similar strengths and weaknesses.
3.6: Taxonomy of innovations
Innovations, as I outlined earlier, are new creations o f economic significance, usually 
new combinations o f previously existing innovations, or improvements to existing 
innovations. Innovations are not a break with the past, as determinists such as Toffler 
(1970) claim, but a continuation and extension o f it. Companies do not innovate in 
isolation, but interact on many levels with other companies and the institutional set­
up, to gain access to required competencies, knowledge and infrastructures. The 
innovation process, being influenced by many factors and actors, is uncertain, and the 
results o f  it can not be predicted with genuine certainty. Bengt-Ake Lundvall writes: 
“For instance, it is not reasonable to analyse a process o f  learning and  
innovation without bringing fundam ental uncertainty into the picture. To do 
so would boil down to the contradictory assumptions that learners already 
knew everything that could be learnt, in advance, and  that innovators knew all 
possible outcome to the process o f  innovation. ” (Lundvall, 1998: 3)
The definitions o f innovation within the literature are production based, and take 
no account o f an innovation’s context o f consumption: the different ways it can be 
appropriated, interpreted and transformed by users, or how social actors are active in 
negotiating a role for it that can differ from the one inscribed in it by its producers. 
(Also, the concept has only a limited recognition o f  an innovation’s social context o f 
production, as shall be outlined later.) In this way, the literature implies that 
innovations arrive as closed artefacts. Christopher Freeman and Luc Soete provide a 
rare example in the literature o f recognising that innovations have a context of 
consumption, although they restrain their argument from suggesting that the context 
o f consumption can re-negotiate the role and use o f an innovation. They warn against 
reducing innovations to their purely economic value. They write that innovations have 
value “in the more fundamental sense o f enabling people to do things which have
never been done before” (Freeman and Soete, 1999: 2). They stress that innovations 
have social and cultural consequences (though not determinants, this thesis argues), 
and not just economic ones.
A recurring theme within the literature is how systems o f innovation, in the main, 
do not produce radical new technologies, but incremental innovations to previously 
existing technologies. Richard R. Nelson, for example, writes:
“M ost industrial R&D experiments are on products that have long been in 
existence -  such as aircraft, automobiles and cameras (which have been in 
existence fo r  150 years). It is these existing products that serve to define the 
fram ew ork within which improvements can be identified and  undertaken. ” 
(Nelson, 1993: 9)
The reason why most R&D is conducted on already existing innovations is as 
follows: an existing innovation represents an investment by a company. I f  the product 
is ‘retired5 to make way for a newer, better innovation, the company no longer gains 
any return on its initial investment. Because development o f radical new innovations 
carries great costs and even greater risks, it is safer, and comparatively cheaper, to 
continue investing in incremental improvements to existing innovations. (A radical 
innovation would, for example, be the development o f a new base technology, such as 
a computer; a process innovation would be an improvement to it, such as a computer 
with a faster processing speed.)
Gerard Rosegger (1986) illustrates the level o f risk when trying to develop and 
introduce a new innovation or technology. He quotes a study o f 120 American 
companies, which found that between 50 and 60 percent o f  all R&D projects never 
result in a commercially released product. He writes:
“For the United States economy as a whole, it has been estimated that some 
10,000 new products are developed each year, o f  which 80 percent die in 
infancy; and that o f  the remaining 2,000 new products, only about 100 
incorporate significant technological advances as well as satisfying an 
economic demand. ” (Rosegger, 1986: 10)
A nother way in which the development and introduction o f radical new 
innovations can be impeded is through the previous selection o f industry standards. 
As new innovations emerge into and are stabilized in an economy, a mass o f  legal and
80
81
technical standards builds around them, which influences or, often, restrains the 
direction o f  future innovations. For example, a radical new piece o f  software would 
have little chance o f success if  it is not compatible with M icrosoft’s operating system, 
which runs the majority o f  the w orld’s personal computers. Although content 
competencies -  writing competencies, filming and editing competencies, and design -  
are not subject to industry standards (but to widely recognised conventions), the 
adoption o f  industry standards in the technologies employed to produce and publish 
digital media content set a framework in which the industry has to work. For example, 
com puter digital media content has to be developed either for PC or M acintosh 
platforms.
In any case, it would obscured the picture to place such an emphasis on radical 
innovation without the following qualification: R&D comprises a small part o f any 
system o f innovation. Indeed, as Christopher Freeman and Luc Soete highlight, less 
than tw o percent o f the labour force in the United States is engaged in R&D. The 
figure is less than one percent in most other countries, including the Republic o f 
Ireland (Freem an and Soete, 1999).
The preceding paragraphs highlight the literature’s early stress on innovation 
through R&D. The organisational structure o f digital media content companies, as 
will be outlined in the qualitative research chapters, does not incorporate formal 
R&D. The systems o f innovation concept became more relevant to the content 
industry w ith the shift to innovation through interactive learning. Bengt-Áke Lundvall 
outlines the following model for interactive learning and the accumulation o f 
knowledge and competencies, which although it is rooted in the study o f industrial 
and technological innovation, is useful for the study o f  innovation in the content 
industry. His model is tied to the ‘styles’ o f innovation produced by a system, a shift 
which also increases the concept’s usefulness as a tool for analysing the emerging 
industry. His taxonomy is as follows:
1: Know-what: based on knowledge o f  facts or information.
2: Know-why: principles and laws o f  motion in nature, in the human mind and 
society; most closely associated with technological and scientific innovation.
3: Know-how: competencies, the ability to perform a task. Lundvall writes that: 
“K now -how  is typically a kind o f  knowledge developed and kept within the border o f 
the individual firm or a single research team” (Lundvall, 1997: 15).
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4: Know-who: to seek different sources o f knowledge, competencies from outside the 
company. For example, in scientific innovation, to gather information from 
disciplines in which the company lacked knowledge.
(Lundvall, 1997; Lundvall and Johnson, 1994.)
The interactive learning taxonomy is underpinned by the following: learning by 
doing, learning by using and learning by interacting.
On adapting Lundvall’s model to content innovation, know-why becomes less 
significant. The application o f technical and scientific knowledge is not a strong 
characteristic o f  the content industry. The technological innovations -  such as digital 
cameras -  required to produce digital media content are developed outside the 
industry, although they might have been included in a broader sectoral study. 
Lundvall fails to elaborate on his definition o f  knowledge or information, or how they 
apply to the innovation process. But taking knowledge and information in their 
everyday sense, as cognition based on facts or perception, they are extremely 
im portant to the content industry. M uch o f the content produced by the industry is 
information, such as news, and structures and routine practices are developed within 
the organisation o f  companies to gather and produce information. An omission from 
Lundvall’s taxonom y on competency and knowledge accumulation is how companies 
also accumulate infrastructures. In the case o f content companies, these could be 
technical, production and information gathering infrastructures. This thesis 
incorporates infrastructure accumulation into Lundvall’s model w hen applying it to 
the qualitative case-studies. Know-how and who are extremely im portant to the 
companies in my qualitative case-studies: how, to build a base o f competencies within 
the organisation; and who, to gain access to competencies outside the organisation. In 
my empirical research, the know-why isn’t as applicable. The validity o f  Lundvall’s 
model will be tested more intensely in the qualitative research chapters. However, 
Lundvall’s model, while not entirely relevant to the study o f  the content industry, is 
preferable to an alternative model offered by Freeman and Soete. Their model, from 
the perspective o f  this thesis, suffers from being rooted too deeply in the R&D- 
focused industrial concept o f  a system o f innovation. For them, the requirements for 
successful innovation within a firm are as follows:
1: Strong in-house professional R&D,
2: Perform ance o f  basic research or close connections with those conducting such 
research;
3: The use o f  patents to gain production and to bargain with competitors;
4: Large enough size to finance fairly heavy R&D expenditure over long periods;
5: Shorter lead times than competitors;
6 : Readiness to take high risks;
7: Early and imaginative identification o f a potential market;
8: Careful attention to the potential market and substantial efforts to invoke, educate 
and assist users;
9: Entrepreneurship strong enough effectively to co-ordinate R&D, production and 
marketing;
10: Good communications with the outside scientific world as well as with customers 
(Freeman and Soete, 1999: 202).
The industrial and technical bias o f their model is obvious, which makes it more 
difficult than Lundvall’s model to adapt to the content industry.
1: Based on my empirical research, content companies tend not to engage in 
formal R&D, or have dedicated R&D divisions. Innovations to content artefacts tend 
to emerge from the various teams -  management, editorial, technical -  working on 
them. M arket research is often conducted before a new content artefact is developed.
2: Content companies have little connection with actors performing basic 
research, although through the market they have access to the content innovations 
developed by competitors.
3: Patents do not really apply to the innovations developed by content companies, 
and so it is more relevant to speak o f the importance o f copyright to protect the 
content o f one company from being reproduced by another. The branding o f digital 
media content is, within the industry, viewed as an important means o f  establishing a 
successful content artefact, which increases the importance o f copyright protection.
4: The tendency is that the larger the organization, and the larger the amount o f 
finance it has access to, the greater its potential to bring more ambitious forms o f 
content to market. (Again, the R&D reference is not relevant.) However, this is not 
always so in practice, and large organizations produce quite conservative forms o f  
content. One o f  my research findings suggests that smaller digital media content 
companies, w ith a small amount o f capital, often lack the necessary resources to bring 
a content artefact to market and stabilise it within the economy.
5: Shorter lead times than competitors is not a guarantee o f success in the content 
industry; as in the majority o f  industries, it is difficult to judge what will and will not
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be successful. The Enter  case-study will present an example o f  a content artefact that 
was the first to market, but was unsuccessful and was withdrawn before any 
competitors emerged.
6 : The readiness to  take high risks applies to most systems o f innovation, although 
in the em erging digital media content industry, the strategy o f  Irish companies seems 
low risk, as will be outlined in chapter five.
7: Early identification o f  a potential market is, again, not a guarantee o f success, 
given the risk-laden and unpredictable nature o f innovation. The three qualitative 
case-studies for this thesis, Ireland.com, Rondoinondo and Enter, all identified a 
potential market early. Enter failed in the market and was withdrawn after a year and 
a half. Rondomondo was closed by its parent organisation within tw o years o f  being 
estabished. Ireland.com , although a well reputed website w ith high traffic figures, is a 
loss-making venture for The Irish Times Group, and when the parent company 
encountered financial difficulties, it reduced financial support to Ireland.com.
8 : Educating and assisting users is an important area for some digital media 
content producers. In an emerging industry, there is a tendency to try to frame 
emerging new innovations in familiar terms, to make them objects for consumption. 
The Enter  case-study will document the difficultly the producers had in explaining the 
concept o f  the CD-ROM  magazine to interviewees, investors, advertisers and the 
public.
9: Entrepreneurship has, since the time o f Schumpeter, diminished in importance 
as a spur to innovation. The majority o f industrial innovation takes place w ithin large 
m ultinational corporations, governed by boards o f directors rather than single 
entrepreneurs. However, entrepreneurship is still important at the level o f  start-up 
digital media content companies. However, there is a tendency for successful start-ups 
to be taken over by larger companies, which dilutes the role o f the entrepreneur in the 
development o f  further innovations.
10: M aintaining contact with the outside scientific world is not an important 
requirem ent for the digital media content industry, although maintaining a level o f 
contact with the outside technical world is important. My research suggests that the 
competencies most likely to be sought outside the organization are specialized 
technical com petencies that are too costly to develop in-house or are required on a 
one-off basis.
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A criticism o f  the systems o f innovation concept is that, although it examines 
processes o f innovation (company linkages, institutional support), it fails to explain 
the genesis o f  innovations and how they emerge. This is, partly, because the early 
literature focuses on mature systems, and the concept has to account only for process 
innovations to mature technologies, and not account for their original emergence. One 
o f the reasons for this is the literature’s emphasis on macro-level variables, which are 
too distant from the micro-level processes within firms that influence the early 
emergence o f  an innovation (W ebber and Hoogma, 1998).
To try to incorporate into the concept a greater sensitivity to the micro-dynamics 
o f innovation, M atthias W ebber and Remco Hoogma put forward the notion o f 
technological niches, which they define as “a specific domain for the application o f  a 
new technology, functioning as a testbed where, under temporary protection from 
market and other institutional pressures, producers and users and sometimes 
government develop it to maturity” (W ebber and Hoogma, 1998: 4). Again, the 
technological bias is evident, and implied in their definition is the assumption that, 
when diffused out o f  the technological niche, the innovation is near completed, 
subject only to later process innovations (a closed artefact). In the content industry, 
while early development is indeed cocooned within the micro-setting o f the firm, on­
going development, revision, and re-design is common while the innovation is in the 
public sphere. Usually the content innovation is not “developed to maturity” before 
release. The learning-by-doing, learning-by-interacting and learning-by-using 
taxonomy means that the initial innovation might be deemed unsuitable or 
unsatisfactory and changed. I t is, in general, micro-level changes that the systems o f 
innovation concept has difficulty explaining, Although, because o f the nature o f 
content production and innovation -  ever changing and ephemeral -  distinct maturity 
is harder to quantify than for technological innovations. The assumption in the 
literature is that macro-level variables stimulate and directe innovation (top-down 
innovation). W ebber and Hoogm a argues that micro-level variables stimulate and 
direct innovation (bottom-up innovation). This thesis rejects the determinist 
assumption that innovation is directed (shaped or influenced is preferable, and more 
in keeping with the uncertain nature o f innovation). It argues that a combination o f 
top-down and bottom-up influences innovation within the content industry: the N SI 
influences the style o f innovation, but the micro-level processes within companies -  
as will be outlined in the qualitative case-studies -  crucially influence the innovations
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that emerge. The concept o f a technological niche is not applicable in W ebber and 
H oogm a’s form to the content industry, and at a minimum would have to be re-titled 
‘innovation niche’, to account for the wider range o f innovations recognised by this 
thesis (technological, organisational, content). My qualitative research suggests that 
development within a company is not entirely insulated from market pressures, or that 
a company can offer a closed environment in which to undertake early development. 
(The value o f the systems o f innovation concept is that, within acknowledged 
boundaries, organisations and systems are open to the outside.) M arket pressures can 
cause a company to, in effect, eliminate the development o f a content innovation, as 
in the case o f  Rondomondo developing E-TV (see chapter seven). The technological 
niches concept is emerging and still marginal to  the main body o f systems o f 
innovation research. Few empirical case-studies are offered; the methodologies are 
unclear and draw little conceptual or methodological material from other disciplines. 
W ebber and Hoogma try to develop the concept entirely within the established 
framework o f  systems o f  innovation literature. This thesis furthers the embryonic 
concept by drawing on social shaping theory, to study the micro-dynamics o f 
innovation within companies and the social context o f production, and to be aware 
that innovations also have a social context o f consumption.
3.7: Types of innovation
W ithin the literature, there are, broadly speaking, four types o f innovation strategy 
that a company can follow:
1: Offensive innovation;
2: D efensive innovation;
3: Imitative innovation;
4: Traditional and dependent innovation.
(Freeman and Soete, 1999)
Offensive innovation is a strategy designed to gain market leadership by being the 
first to introduce an innovation or artefact to the market. Only a small percentage o f 
firms pursue a successful offensive strategy, and even fewer are successful for any 
length o f  time (Freeman and Soete, 1999). This is partly due to the high cost o f 
undertaking basic research (or development costs for content) and the great risks and 
uncertainty that accompany the introduction o f a new innovation. Another reason is
that once an innovation has been introduced to the market, it becomes a target for 
defensive innovation, whereby a competitor introduces a similar innovation. A 
defensive innovator will try not to fall too far behind the original innovator, lest it not 
be able to make up lost ground. Also, it will not simply re-produce the original 
innovation. It will make process innovations to it. A defensive innovator needs to be 
agile enough to anticipate and respond to new emerging innovations that are likely to 
be successful w ithin the system.
The advantage o f a defensive approach is that another innovator undertakes the 
costly basic research and risky introduction. The disadvantage, however, is that the 
company starts from behind, and for a time at least, a competitor enjoys monopoly 
profits.
The defensive approach o f  incorporating process innovations into the original base 
innovation is how such innovators differ from an imitative innovator. An imitative 
innovator ‘im itates’ an innovation that has already reached maturity. This type o f 
innovation does not, in a significant manner, apply to the content industry. Although 
general forms o f  content innovations -  such as portal websites, or interactive games -  
are similar, they are more akin to defensive innovations than exact imitations. 
Copyright laws prevent the reproduction o f content without the prior permission o f 
the copyright holder.
The term  traditional innovator is perhaps misleading, because such an innovator 
doesn’t really innovate at all. It is concerned with industries and products that have 
long since reached maturity, and the market no longer demands radical innovations, or 
even in some cases incremental innovations. These innovators are found in 
‘traditional’ industries, such as agriculture, textiles, or the production o f synthetic 
rubber.
The final innovator in Freeman and Soete’s taxonomy is a dependent innovator, 
which as the term suggests is ‘dependent’ on the innovations o f  other industries, and 
highlights the cross-sectoral dimensions to innovation within an NSI. For example, a 
tyre manufacturer is dependent on the producer o f synthetic rubber. Digital media 
content is dependent on technologies produced by computer and software applications 
innovators.
Offensive and defensive innovators are, my research indicates, the most relevant 
form s o f  innovators to the content industry, especially w ith it being at an early stage 
o f its emergence. Few  companies have gained monopolistic power, the barriers to
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entering the industry remain low, and many new content innovations and artefacts are 
released, and the (seemingly) successful among them tend to be defensively 
innovated. This will be outlined in greater detail in the empirical research chapters.
Freeman and Soete’s definition o f defensive innovators is confusing, however. 
Their taxonomy, oddly, takes no account o f offensive innovators that, once their 
innovation has been stabalised in the economy, have to defend their position from 
competitors, possibly by improving their own original innovation.
3.8: Styles of innovation
The styles o f  innovation concept emerged, partly, to  address an increasingly 
acknowledged weakness in systems o f  innovation: how to explain why different 
systems produce different types o f  innovations. Neo-classical economics argue that 
national characteristics have a negligible influence over economic development. 
Flowever, as the systems o f innovation concept developed, and the weight o f case- 
study evidence increased, it became apparent that national characteristics have an 
influence on the types o f innovations that emerge out o f  an NSI. Early systems o f 
innovation studies, based predominantly on measuring R&D activity and the 
im portance o f macro-level variables, are aware that national characteristics influence 
the innovation process, but have difficulty explaining why. Later work, which shifted 
closer to a model o f  interactive learning and competency accumulation, can more 
easily analyse the link between national characteristics and the styles o f  innovation 
that emerge out o f  the NSI. An N SI assumes strong linkages and relationships 
between companies, and between companies and external institutions, as well as 
influential factors such as the natural resources o f a nation. The particular 
characteristics or make-up o f  the system will influence the ‘styles’ o f innovations that 
emerge out o f it. D issimilar systems tend to produce dissimilar styles o f innovation. 
The literature, with its emphasis on industrial innovation, usually speaks o f styles o f 
innovation in the sense o f  technological similarity or dissimilarity (Vertova, 1998). 
For this thesis, the outcome would be content similarity or dissimilarity. W hereas the 
literature concentrates on the influence o f natural (material) resources on innovative 
output, my research indicates that social and cultural factors have a greater influence 
on the content ‘styles’ that emerge out o f the Irish system. The concept has not been 
applied notably to  the style o f  other digital media content industries abroad, to which
content similarity or dissimilarity could be compared, to gauge the influence o f  
cultural factors and the institutional set-up o f the system.
However, a flaw in the emerging approach is the assumption that national 
characteristics are a determinant of, rather than an influence on, the style o f 
innovation. Studies o f national characteristics are conducted at a macro-level, and are 
biased towards technological innovations, and concentrate, for example, on how the 
institutional set-up effects innovation. While institutional set-up is, indeed, a deep 
influence, cultural and social characteristics o f the N SI are more important for 
influencing the ‘styles’ o f content innovation.
The styles concept also adds a flexibility to the systems o f  innovation concept that 
had been missing: that not all innovation is rigidly systemic, that it can be a passing 
phase and, through the emphasis on learning, styles o f  innovation can be developed 
by someone not rooted in the tradition, or the industry (Lundvall, 1997: 14).
3.9: Taxonomy of institutions
Innovation depends on the interplay o f  a number o f  actors. One o f  the most important 
o f  these is institutions. The character o f the institutional set-up is regarded by this 
thesis as an influence (but in the literature as a determinant) on the style o f  innovation 
that emerges from a system. In many popular as well as academic discourses on 
innovation, institutions are regarded as inhibitors, through placing restrictions and 
regulations on innovating firms. In many cases, this is indeed true. But the overall 
effect o f  institutions w ithin systems o f innovation is to facilitate and stimulate 
innovation.
A ccording to Charles Edquist and Björn Johnson, institutions incorporate “norms, 
habits, practices and routines” (Edquist and Johnson, 1999: 43). They argue that 
within the literature there has been much conceptual vagueness about what exactly an 
institution is. Many institutional theorists regard institutions in the everyday meaning 
o f the term, as a ‘concrete’ thing, such as a university, or government department, or 
an R& D  department within a large private firm. Institutional economists, on the other 
hand, traditionally adopt a theoretical definition, although they rarely deal w ith the 
role o f  institutions in the innovative process. They adopt a ‘sociological’ meaning o f 
institutions as the norms and processes that pattern behaviour, for example, routines,
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shared expectations, and morals, “including certain ground rules for economic 
behaviour often referred to as property rights” (Edquist and Johnson, 1999: 43).
Edquist and Johnson offer a definition that they claim is flexible enough to 
encompass both concepts o f  an institution, but is not so rigid that it inextricably links 
them. Only a flexible definition, they believe, will be beneficial to  the analysis o f 
systems o f innovation, which has a wide variety o f institutions in a wide variety o f 
forms. Systems o f innovation, in the main, regard the innovation process as open, so a 
tight definition that narrows the conception o f institutions could remove from 
consideration important elements o f the overall process. This thesis adopts their open 
definition o f  an institution, which is sensitive to both its tangible forms (university, 
for example) and less tangible forms (the norms and practices therein).
Although neo-classical economics feel no unease about neglecting, or at times 
ignoring, the role o f  institutions, this, claims Edquist and Johnson, is an oversight that 
seriously undermines attempts to understand the true nature o f innovation, especially 
within a market economy. They argue that:
“In  any economy ‘out there ’ exchange will always be supported by a wide 
range or routines, rules, norms and  laws, i.e. by an institutional set-up. This 
support is so necessary fo r  markets to be able to function  that the concept o f  a  
pure institutional free  market does not seem to make much sense. ’’ (Edquist 
and Johnson, 1997: 48)
This institutional set-up includes the various laws governing trade. For example, 
the courts can provide redress for a firm that suffers from a breach o f contract. 
Institutions also oversee the extremely important matter o f copyright and patents, 
which protect the work o f  innovators, especially in high-tech and media industries. 
(Copyright, as stated, is an important institutional regulation in the digital media 
content industry.) Even the monetary system, under Edquist and Johnson’s definition, 
is counted as part o f the institutional set-up. A market economy could not function 
without money and mechanisms, such as the Central Bank, to track and regulate the 
value o f  money.
Edquist and Johnson, broadly speaking, regard institutions as having three basic 
functions:
1: To reduce uncertainty in the innovation process by providing information (e.g. 
legal, technical and scientific information to firms, such as a university performing
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basic research, which is later used by industry). They qualify this by saying that it is 
impossible to remove genuine uncertainty from the innovation process. They cite the 
example that most innovation projects are terminated before market testing, and 
among those that manage to reach the market, most do not survive long.
2: To manage conflicts and co-operation between firms and other interest groups 
within the system, such as the state’s labour relations mechanism to resolve conflicts 
between workers and management. Such conflicts, if they are allowed to run 
unchecked, can seriously inhibit the productive and innovation processes.
3: To provide incentives for innovation (patents, copyright) and to channel resources 
to innovative activities by, for example, a government agency financing specific 
programmes, by providing grants, tax breaks and subsidies (Edquist and Johnson, 
1997: 51-52).
Another reason why institutions are important is that they provide stability. 
Systems of innovation are constantly changing, as new innovators enter the system 
and unsuccessful ones are eliminated from it. There is no stable equilibrium that a 
system should settle on, because in such a situation, it will have ceased to innovate. 
So, in a constantly changing environment, institutions provide continuity. Although 
institutions change and re-shape themselves, they tend not to change as quickly as the 
surrounding innovations. This often leads to the accusation that institutions act as 
inhibitors to innovation.
Establishing regulatory frameworks for emerging innovations can slow their 
introduction. It can also have the effect of introducing them in a considered and 
intelligent manner, which doesn’t leave the diffusion of an innovation purely to 
market forces.
Even if, sometimes, institutions do inhibit the emergence of a new innovation, 
they still play a central role in its eventual emergence (or not, as the case may be), 
both in terms of providing institutional support and creating a regulatory framework. 
They also play a role in cementing the position of an innovation in an economy. After 
an innovation has successfully emerged and stabilised within the economy, a mass of 
legal and technical standards build around it, with the potential effect of regulating or 
restraining future innovation in the area. For example, the adoption of industry 
standards can force future innovations down certain development paths while closing 
off others.
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Institutions perform important functions in systems of innovation through 
facilitating and encouraging innovation. On a wider scale, the work of Ian Miles, 
among others, has examined the roles that services sectors and services innovation 
play in the new economy (Metcalfe and Miles, 1999; Andersen et al, 2000; Miles and 
Miozzo, 2002). Miles argues that services innovation (such as the ways services 
sectors process and present information to organisations) is a quite neglected area of 
innovation research. However, services industries often act as facilitators to and 
agents for innovation (though technology and information transfer) in manufacturing 
industries. They are active users of cutting edge technologies and techniques, and 
thereby play a leading role in their appropriation into a market/economic 
environment. This gives services a central importance in innovation networks. Miles 
includes the following among the services industries: financial services, insurance, 
real estate, legal services, medicine and health. His work focuses mainly on 
manufacturing industries, and how services innovation facilitates or spurs innovation 
in manufacturing. The Irish digital media content industry also relies on financial 
services (investment), real estate (premises), and legal services (copyright protection). 
Sate agencies such as Enterprise Ireland and Forfas act as facilitators to innovation by 
supplying information and support to companies in the industry. It is important, 
therefore, to recognise services as an active layer in a system of innovation, especially 
as services have grown dramatically in importance as sectors in advanced industrial 
economies.
3.10: Organisations
For conceptual clarity, it is important to note that organisations are different to 
institutions, although many treat the terms as interchangeable.
Organisations, according to a definition offered by Edquist and Johnson, are 
“formal structures with an explicit purpose and they are consciously created. 
They are players or actors within a system o f innovation. In contrast, 
institutions may develop spontaneously and are often characterised by a 
specific purpose. ” (Edquist and Johnson, 1997: 47)
However, despite Edquist and Johnson’s contribution, there is little formal 
conceptualisation within the literature of the types of organisational structures that are
active within systems, or how on the micro-level of the company, they can influence 
the innovation process. So, for my conceptual framework, I drew on work from 
outside the literature. In the definition adopted by this thesis, the term organisation 
includes companies that develop digital media content innovations. The qualitative 
chapters suggest that the organisational structure that most facilitates content 
innovation is one with a high level of flexibility. In certain instances, when a digital 
media innovator is operating within a larger, rigid non-digital media organisation, 
tension arises, as they try to fit together.
Ian Mangham offers three schools of organisational theorising: classical or 
machine, human relations, and systems (Mangham, 1979).
The classical or machine school perspective borrows heavily from classical 
economics. It likens organisations to machines, in which the various parts -  including 
the people contained therein -  work together, like cogs, to produce the desired result. 
It assumes that the individual will always act rationally and in the best interests of the 
organisation.
The human relations school rigorously criticises the notion that people’s 
contribution to organisations can be reduced to such mechanised and automated 
terms. It argues that individuals have much greater levels of autonomy in 
organisations than classical theorists allowed for, and indeed it believes that 
organisations work more efficiently when individuals are accorded such autonomy. 
The human relations school rejects the mechanised, impersonal and routinised 
concept of the organisation. It regards the individual as being central to organisations; 
they are not just cogs in a machine. Individual relationships, attitudes, values and 
emotions effect the workings of organisations. It differs from classical theory in that it 
emphasises people instead of positions. The individual is seen as central to the 
organisation; it is not the organisation that is central to the individual. According to 
this theory, an organisation operates best when people feel it satisfies their “social, 
ego and self-actualisation needs” (Mangham, 1979: 9).
Finally, the systems approach, which according to Mangham suggests that the 
optimum method of examining organisations is to conceptualise them as a system of 
interdependent, interacting elements, all of which influence each other.
This echoes many of the ideas of holism that informs the literature on systems of 
innovation: that a wide set of actors are connected, and that a change in one part of the 
system will effect the other parts. (It is, for instance, against theories such as Bell’s
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post-industrial society, which views the different realms of society as developing 
independently of each other.) The biological sciences are often used as metaphors for 
the workings of a system of innovation, especially among those who subscribe to 
evolutionary economics. The first is the metaphor of an organism: how all the parts of 
the body (of the system) work to keep the organism alive (the system innovating). 
This, in a more specific context, has also been applied to organisations in the systems 
approach, that all parts of the organisation work together to keep it functioning. The 
second metaphor borrows from the Darwinian theory of natural selection: the fittest 
firms survive, while the weakest perish: that variations occur in the system (in 
biology, they are mutations; in systems of innovation, they are new innovations). 
Good variations survive, while poor ones are eliminated. While these metaphors are 
not without their weaknesses (the best innovations do not always survive), they are 
useful for visualising how the system works (McKelvey, 1997).
Tom Burns and George .M. Stalker offer an alternative organisational model for 
managing innovation (Burns and Stalker, 1961; 1979; 1994). Their model is sensitive 
to how the external environment (such as emerging technologies and commercial 
practices of an industry) can influence the organisation of a company. They propose 
that organisations can, broadly, be divided into ‘mechanistic’ and ‘organic’ systems. 
The type of system adopted is related to the rate of change in the commercial and 
technical environment of an industry. Mechanistic systems are characteristic of 
mature, relatively stable industries, which have low rates of change and highly 
established patterns. The organisations and individuals within them have to deal with 
few unfamiliar situations. Mechanistic organisations tend to spawn rigid 
bureaucracies; each department or individual within the organisation has a specialised 
role. If they encounter a situation outside of their responsibility, they will pass it on to 
their immediate superior or to the most appropriate site of power within the 
organisation. Burns and Stalker argue that an “ideology of bureaucracy” can become 
ingrained in a mechanistic organisation. If, for economic or technological reasons, the 
organisation has to adapt to change, it simply redefines roles and working 
relationships which “reinforce the formal structure” (Burns and Stalker, 1979: ix). 
When a mechanistic organisation expands, it adds on new layers of bureaucracy to 
deal with the new tasks.
Organic organisations are common to industries with a high rate of change in their 
commercial and technical environments, especially newly emerging industries.
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Flexibility is the key, as the organisations and individuals within them have to face 
unfamiliar or rapidly changing situations. Because roles within organic organisations 
are less clearly defined there is less bureaucracy, which makes it easier for the 
organisation to respond to new emerging markets trends and technologies. Individuals 
enjoy more general responsibility within the organisation, because actions and 
decisions are not broken down into specialised components, as they would be in a 
mechanistic organisation. Therefore, write Burns and Stalker, “more information and 
considerations enter into decisions, the limits of feasible action are more widely set” 
(Burns and Stalker, 1979: 11).
They argue that organisations falling between their bi-polar ideal models are 
dysfunctional intermediates, because they hinder the organisations from achieving 
their desired goals. However, 1 argue that they were being too negative in assuming 
that such organisations are necessarily disadvantaged in achieving their desired goals. 
My three case-study companies were small and flexible, especially compared to the 
parent companies of two of the case-studies. However, roles within the organisations 
weren’t entirely fluid, and a solid layer of bureaucracy underpinned the organisations 
in administrative areas. Their organisational structures were not regarded by the case- 
studies, or by my own research, as a hindrance to achieving their desired goals. There 
is room between Burns and Stalker’s ideal models for organisational structures to be 
affirmative rather than dysfunctional intermediaries.
Like Manghan, Burns and Stalker examine the relative levels of fulfilment 
individuals achieve in different organisational systems. They suggest that individuals 
feel deeper commitment to organic systems, because they have more overall 
responsibility for the successful completion of tasks, and have a higher input into the 
performance of the organisation. They suggest that individuals in a bureaucratised 
mechanistic system view their contribution to the organisation in terms of their 
narrowly defined role within it. Beyond that they feel little responsibility for the 
overall success of a task. Because they lack responsibility and power, individuals feel 
alienated from the overall performance of the organisation. This echoes Manghan’s 
argument about the relative levels of fulfilment individuals achieve in humans 
relations and machine models of organisation.
Burns and Stalker also write that new industries are eroding the basis of traditional 
hierarchy in mechanistic organisations, where long service, experience and a 
knowledge of the workings of the organisation would lift people to senior positions.
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In newly emerging industries, with companies based on organic organisations, 
technical knowledge can be the key to advancement. They write that in traditional 
mechanistic organisations “to be older meant that one was more effective and better 
qualified. But in the new situation of technical and commercial change, this basis of 
authority has become invalidated” (Burns and Stalker, 1979: xvii). There was some 
basis for this in the structures of my three case-study companies. People at senior 
levels did tend to have more experience and be older than those at lower levels, but 
they had less experience and were younger than people in equivalent positions in 
traditional media organisations. Also, because senior people in my case-study 
companies tended to be relatively young (no one had yet reached their forties), they 
maintained comparable levels of technical knowledge to younger people at lower 
levels of the organisation.
Based on my empirical research, the organic system (and, in broad principle, the 
human relations school) is most relevant to digital media content innovators, which 
depend greatly on new types and clusters of competencies, creativity and initiative, 
rather than on mechanical production and re-production. Autonomy for people to act 
on personal judgement and ideas is a strong feature of content production, and does 
not lend itself to the mechanical conception of individuals within mechanistic or 
classical organisations. The organisations must also be flexible enough to respond to 
the rate of change in the technological and commercial environment of the digital 
media content industry. Because the industry is still young, the rate of change is high. 
However, the organisations cannot be conceptualised purely in terms of organic or 
human relations models. There are elements of mechanistic models to be found also. 
There are instances of how the different parts of the organisation work together to 
form a system, or one part of the organisation takes charge of a specific task, and 
responsibility for this is not shared across the organisation. In the case-study chapters, 
I will write in greater depth on the structures, work practices and valued competencies 
within the organisational structures of digital media content producers, and outline 
which organisational theory is most relevant to them.
3.11: Information
It is important to note the role of information within a system of innovation, and 
examine how information is transferred within this “population of innovators”, as
Schumpeter terms it. Isaac Newton once likened the study of science to “standing on 
the shoulders of giants”, by which he meant that the scientific ideas and findings of 
the present are built upon those of the past; it is a continual and cumulative process. 
Similarly, the ideas and findings of the present will be drawn upon in the future.
The same is true of systems of innovation. The innovative successes and failures 
of the past are drawn upon in the creation of the innovative successes and failures of 
the present, and this will carry through to the creation of future innovations. 
Information is central to the process, especially for technical and scientific innovators. 
It is beyond the scope of any one company or organisation to possibly undertake 
every piece of research needed to develop an innovation, or to have access to every 
piece of specialised knowledge that is necessary. Even a firm that is undertaking basic 
(original) research still needs to draw on the research and work of others, be it through 
the use of scientific models or theories or scientific instrumentation that is created by 
other companies. In this way, the process of information or knowledge accumulation, 
in the pursuit of innovation, is inherently social. An example of this is information 
networking, in which an innovator has linkages to other companies or organisations 
that have access to specialised knowledge, research or competencies that are 
necessary for a particular innovation. However, in a specialised field, the information 
usually has a low circulation, primarily within the relevant group of engineers and 
scientists.
A system of innovation simply couldn’t work without the transfer of information; 
consequently, the system has to develop mechanisms that allow for such transfer, 
from those who possess information to those who require it. This, for example, could 
take the form of information published in scientific journals, or research in 
universities or state institutions. Not only is the transfer of information important 
within a system, but also the transfer of competencies. Content companies often have 
to seek competencies from outside their organisations; in the context of digital media 
content production, the main competencies sought outside depend, often, on the 
background of the organisation. If its background is in content production, the main 
competencies sought outside tend to be technical. If the background of the company is 
technical, it tends to seek content competencies. Companies acquire competencies 
either through hiring the relevant people or companies, or acquiring companies with 
the necessary competencies. Linkages between companies within the system enable 
the transfer of competencies. As my case-study chapters will demonstrate, each of the
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companies in my qualitative research depend on linkages to external companies or 
agencies for competencies that are lacking within their own organisations.
3.12: Synopsis of conceptual framework
An innovation is something new, either a new combination of previously existing 
innovations, or an extension of a previously existing innovation (Edquist, 1997). 
Innovations do not emerge in isolation, without context or any prior setting in an 
economy. Innovations are built upon prior innovations, or draw upon (in the case of 
industrial innovation, for example) technical or scientific knowledge established in 
prior research. The complexity of developing an innovation -  the technical and 
scientific knowledge required, as well as the appropriate competencies and production 
infrastructures -  mean that no one organisation could house all that is necessary, so 
interaction with external actors, on many levels, is crucial. This could be a company 
interacting with another company, to acquire necessary competencies, or with an 
institution such as a university, to acquire important scientific information.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a concept emerged to try to track the 
interactions that are necessary for the development and emergence of innovations 
(Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993). The systems of innovation concept 
notes the importance of interaction and linkages between actors in an economy, which 
despite functionalist and determinist connotations, it likens to the workings of a 
system. The concept also stresses how the various layers of the system 
(organisational, institutional and economic) are necessary for the development of 
innovations. Neo-classical economics tried to explain economic growth through the 
allocation of resources. Systems of innovation tries to explain it through innovation, 
with early analyses being based primarily on measuring the level of formal R&D 
activity in large private companies. The emphasis on formal R&D, based on technical 
and scientific knowledge, is indicative of the main focus of systems of innovation 
studies: industrial and technological innovation within mature systems in well- 
established economies.
The concept contains many deficiencies that have to be addressed before it can be 
applied to the study of content innovation within an emerging industry. Formal R&D 
is not a strong characteristic of digital media organisations, and innovation does not 
occur through the application of technical and scientific knowledge. In the early
1990s, a marginal shift occurred in the systems of innovation concept, making it more 
conducive to the study of content innovation within an emerging industry (Lundvall, 
1992, 1998; Lundvall and Björn, 1994). A greater emphasis has been placed on 
innovation through interactive learning: learning by doing, by using and by 
interacting. Emphasis has also been placed on the importance of competency, 
knowledge and infrastructure accumulation within organisations, as their experience 
of developing innovations grows and the innovations become more complex.
The development of a content innovation is a multi-dimensional process, subject 
to influences at various levels: within the company, within the industrial system of 
innovation and the national system of innovation. However, the systems of innovation 
concept has to be adapted in two further respects before it can be applied to the study 
of content innovation: first, because of the concept’s emphasis on industrial and 
technological innovation, it tends to disregard the social and cultural influences that 
are crucial to the development of content innovations. Second, with its emphasis on 
well-developed systems and, related to this, its focus on macro-level variables (such 
as the institutional set-up or the natural resources of a nation), it has difficulty 
examining the micro-dynamics of innovation within firms, or how new innovations 
begin to emerge. There is a move within the systems of innovation literature to focus 
attention on how the particular characteristics of a system effect the ‘style’ or types of 
innovations that emerge from it (Lundvall, 1997; Webber and Hoogma, 1998). This 
work, however, is at an early stage of articulation and is still marginal within the 
tradition. It, too, focuses on industrial and technological innovation and so holds little 
regard to the influence of social and cultural factors. Also, it is underpinned by the 
flawed assumption that characteristics such as the institutional set-up are determinants 
of innovation. But the styles concept does represent a slight move towards 
recognising that an innovation has a context of production (or, as conceptualised in 
this thesis, a social context of production). With the exception of brief and rare 
examples (Freeman and Soete, 1999: 2), the literature fails to recognise that 
innovations also have a context of consumption.
To compensate for the conceptual weaknesses of systems of innovation, this thesis 
draws on social shaping theory, which contributes to a deeper understanding of how 
the social context of production influences and shapes an emerging content 
innovation. It is also valuable to examining how the micro-processes of innovation -  
overlooked by the main body of systems of innovation research -  are a crucial
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influence. Whereas systems of innovation stresses how interaction is necessary to 
form a system in which innovation occurs, social shaping is concerned with how the 
interaction shapes emerging innovations, in both their production and consumption 
contexts. Social shapers argue that innovations can be developed in different ways, 
are not closed artefacts, but open to different interpretations and appropriations, and 
so are constructs of meanings and uses. As in systems of innovation, the main focus 
of social shaping research is technological innovation, and so the main concepts have 
to be adapted to the different area of content innovation. But social shaping does place 
a greater stress than systems of innovation on the importance of social and cultural 
factors, although much of the research is underpinned by a light determinist 
assumption that such factors determine the final form of an innovation.
Social shaping emerged in the mid-1980s to counter determinist assumptions that 
technological change causes social change. The early writers tried to shift the focus 
from technology’s effect on society to society’s effect on technology (MacKenzie and 
Wajcman, 1985; Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, 1987; Silverstone and Livingstone, 1989). 
They argued that the development of technologies is not a linear process, with a 
technological innovation emerging along a defined and predictable development path. 
Many development paths are open (a flaw in their argument, which suggests that 
innovators know in advance all possible alternative paths, and all possible final forms 
an innovation could take). They further suggest that innovators make rational choices 
to follow the most efficient path. This suggests that all factors influencing the 
innovation process are within the control of the innovator. The research for this thesis 
suggests they are not. Such control and rationality is also at odds with systems of 
innovation literature, which argues that innovation is an uncertain and risk-laden 
process.
Systems of innovation tends to apply its research at a macro-level, focusing on 
national economies and sectors within them. Social shaping studies, however, take a 
qualitative approach and examine the development and emergence of individual 
innovations or technological artefacts. The research directs attention to the micro­
processes of innovation within companies, and how the actions of social actors shape 
the innovations that emerge.
Chapter 4: Methodology
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
4.0: Overview
Drafting a workable research methodology is one of the pivotal tasks for a doctoral 
study such as this. The quality of the research is largely dependent on the quality of 
the methodology. A strong, focused methodology provides a framework in which to 
gather information in a reliable, consistent manner, and to allow the researcher make 
productive use of the limited time with case-studies. The methodology makes the 
research process transparent, so weaknesses in the approach can be factored into a 
reading of the research, and to allow the methodology to be re-producible, so future 
research in the area can be conducted using similar methods and the research findings 
can be compared.
The previous chapters outlined the various theories and intellectual traditions that 
have informed the research. But there is a great jump from theory to the practical 
application of empirical research methods. It is important to note that the theories 
outlined so far are informing the research methodology, not dictating it. By imposing 
a prescriptive methodology, the thesis would be in danger of offering “a solution in 
search of a problem” (Jensen, 1991: 6).
A prescriptive and rigid methodology would produce flawed results -  it would 
produce results to fit the methodology, and these results might not be a fair reflection 
of what is ‘out there’. Although the methodology is underpinned by methods from the 
two main traditions in academic research, qualitative and quantitative methods, it is 
flexible enough to adapt to circumstances as they arise within the case-studies.
4.1: Quantitative analysis
In academic literature, research traditions are usually polarised into two camps: 
quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative research is the older of the two approaches, 
and traditionally has been the dominant (Palys, 1997: 12). It is the research 
methodology most closely associated with technological determinism. Quantitative 
research involves counting, either the amount of something, or the level of change in
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it, or the frequency with which it occurs. A simplified example of a quantitative 
research project would be as follows: the project would first define its fields of 
research interest, for example to find out how many people in Ireland own personal 
computers. It would then develop a systematic method to quantify the information, 
perhaps by framing a questionnaire that could be presented to a representative sample 
of respondents. The researchers would then tally the number of people asked against 
the number of computers owned to produce the final result -  that 25%1 of Irish people 
own a personal computer.
The quantitative approach employs systematic methods that can be repeated, so 
similar research can be undertaken at a later date and comparisons can be made. This 
enables researchers to measure the rate of change in a phenomenon -  that 30% of 
Irish people owned a personal computer when a similar study was conducted the 
following year. This methodology is employed in my quantitative study of the Irish 
digital media content industry, to in part measure the changing profile of the industry 
since 1999.
Quantitative analysis has its roots in the natural sciences and positivism. Early 
advocates of applying natural science research methods to social science projects are 
Auguste Comte and Wilhelm Wundt. The belief that natural science methods are 
neutral carries through to their application to social science studies. The alleged 
neutrality of quantitative analysis is heavily criticised by, in particular, qualitative 
researchers, who argue that strong biases are build into the subject matter of 
quantitative studies, and into the methods used in such studies. Another defining 
element of quantitative analysis is detachment, or as Palys put it, objectivity through 
social distance (Palys, 1997). The thinking is that, to remain neutral, a researcher has 
to remain ‘apart’ from the phenomenon he is studying; if he becomes too close, 
personal feelings and biases will taint the findings. As we shall see later, detachment 
is a controversial issue within research debate.
The quantitative approach is a form of nomethetic analysis, which means it has a 
preference for aggregated data. The assumption is that, because a study encompasses 
the responses of many people, exceptions to the rule cancel each other out. Thus, the 
results of the study show what a ‘typical’ example of a phenomenon is, or how a 
respondent ‘normally’ behaves. Through statistical aggregation, general patterns of
1 This figure is fictitious and used only for the purposes o f example.
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development emerge, which allows a researcher to make inferences about the pace 
and direction of a phenomenon’s development.
4.2: Qualitative analysis
While quantitative analysis strives for detachment, qualitative analysis holds that the 
best way to study a phenomenon is to get as close to it as possible. Qualitative 
research distinguish between case-studies or subjects based on their particular 
qualities. It is an inductive approach to research -  it moves from the particular to the 
general. From the close study of a (relatively) small number of case-studies (for 
example, four digital media companies), it draws general conclusions about a 
phenomenon (the digital media industry). In effect, it is the reverse of the deductive 
quantitative approach, which aggregates data on a general phenomenon (the digital 
media industry) and uses this to make inferences about specific cases (what 
constitutes a ‘typical’ digital media company).
The literature on qualitative research seems to have a less coherent and defined 
awareness of what exactly the methodology is; this is because, compared to 
quantitative analysis, qualitative research is less definable. Quantitative research 
rigidly imposes rules on the method of the research -  it explicitly defines what it is 
looking for, and establishes a systematic method for collating the relevant 
information. Anything that falls outside the system is ignored.
In contrast, qualitative research is a more open and flexible methodology, which 
allows the researcher to adapt it to the terrain of a particular case-study. For example, 
in the digital media content industry, quantitative research might produce an 
inferential (and abstract) example of what constitutes a ‘typical’ digital media content 
company. In reality, few -  if any -  digital media companies would conform perfectly 
to the ‘typical’ example (the Platonic idea verses the reality). Qualitative research is 
flexible enough to accommodate differences; it believes that there is a great deal to be 
learned from such differences, and it is a failing of quantitative analysis that it ignores 
the subtle differences between firms, or phenomena.
Qualitative analysis rejects the numbers of quantitative methodology, because it 
believes that one can not reduce the actions of rational, cognitive beings to 
mathematical methods and frameworks. This stems from qualitative analysis’s roots 
in phenomenology. In line with their phenomenological influence, qualitative
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researchers embrace Max Weber’s concept of verstehen, which aims at an empathetic 
understanding of human actions and behaviour (Palys, 1997).
Qualitative research is traditionally associated with social shaping, because it 
is a human centred methodology. It places the researcher in close proximity to the 
relevant phenomenon, and the researcher studies it by employing the techniques 
of observation, interviewing and document analysis. For one of my case-studies, I 
spent several weeks at the office of the company, observing how the organisation 
operated, and how the employees interacted with each other and with the 
technological infrastructure that had been developed to produce digital media 
content. It also involves observing what decisions are made, how they are formed, 
and what are the crucial factors influencing the final choices (why is one course of 
action chosen over another).
Whereas quantitative research makes general trends visible and can provide a 
broad sweep of information regarding a phenomenon, qualitative research’s strength 
lies in its ability to examine a particular case and tease out information that is detailed 
and of-depth. It can help achieve an understanding of the meanings of the events, 
situations and actions of the actors in a study, and the context in which they occur 
(Maxwell, 1996).
Qualitative analysis is a naturalistic method of research (Patton, 1987), in that it 
tries to study participants in their ‘natural’ setting. Especially with observation, the 
researcher tries to study the way a participant normally behaves and interacts with 
other actors; the ideal is that the participant will act the same way when the researcher 
is present as he would if the researcher were absent. Qualitative observation tries as 
much as possible to orient itself to the normal behaviour and routines of the 
participant, with the researcher trying to be as unobtrusive as possible on the natural 
setting of the participant.
4.3: Weaknesses of both approaches
Both methodologies have weaknesses, which have to be factored into the empirical 
research. In the case of quantitative research, its principle strength is also its principal 
weakness. It produces numbers, which make general trends visible but provide no 
depth of analysis of those trends. Also, it has only a limited facility to examine the 
context of a phenomenon, to examine for example how people appropriate and
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interpret ICTs and form social practice around them. Underlying processes are 
missed, such as the interaction between the user and the machine, the integration of 
the machine into the user’s life, and the routines and habits of use. All of these 
underlying processes are important, but too subtle to be picked up by ‘detached’ 
quantitative methods (Berger, 1991).
Whereas quantitative research is criticised for imposing rigid rules, qualitative 
research is often criticised for not imposing them. There is a perception, especially 
among natural scientists, that qualitative research is arbitrary, because as a research 
discipline, qualitative analysis seems to lack just that: discipline. Robert K. Yin 
dismisses that perception, arguing that “the demands of a [qualitative study] on a 
person’s intellect, ego, and emotions are far greater than those of any other research 
strategy” (Yin, 1994: 55). A quantitative researcher follows the rules and routines 
established in the methodology, whereas a qualitative researcher has to be responsive 
to events as they happen; he has to use initiative, knowing that the quality of his 
decisions will reflect in the quality of research that is produced.
Quantitative researchers advocate objectivity through social distance, and claim 
they are more objective because their methods are rooted in the ‘neutral’ natural 
sciences. But quantitative analysis is just as vulnerable to bias as qualitative analysis. 
All research involves selection: selection of what to study, whom to include in the 
study, whom to leave out, what to ask, and what constitutes a representative sample. 
All o f these instances leave room for the personal biases and preferences of the 
‘neutral’ quantitative researcher to enter the study. It can be argued that the potential 
for bias on the part of a qualitative research is during the fieldwork, but the potential 
bias in quantitative research is at the time the methodology is framed.
The work of qualitative researchers is often crucially influenced by factors outside 
of their control. For example, this could relate to the quality of the access that the 
researcher is granted to the case-study. If the case-study is a company anxious to 
protect commercially sensitive information, then the researcher will not get a full 
view of the workings of the organisation, and the results will be flawed. If the case- 
study allows the researcher free access and relative autonomy while observing, and if 
the respondents are open and honest while being interviewed, this increases the 
chances of the research producing accurate and useful results. Problems can also arise 
if the researcher is seen as an outsider and treated with suspicion, or if the researcher’s 
presence alters the normal behaviour of the case-study (Newcomb, 1999).
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It would be inaccurate to dichotomise too severely the traditions of qualitative and 
quantitative analysis, because elements from both traditions are often used in research 
projects. Indeed, Uwe Flick notes that the two approaches are not “incompatible 
opposites” (Flick, 1998: 40). Projects that employ both techniques benefit from the 
analytical and empirical strengths of each. Flick describes the debate as to which is 
the superior methodology as “old and unfruitful” (1998: 40). Usually, the optimum 
results are gleaned through embracing both methodologies.
The four case-studies I selected required the use of techniques from both 
traditions.
1: The Irish digital media content industry -  conducted using mainly quantitative 
methods. It is designed to map the general landscape in which Irish digital media 
companies operate, and measure the dynamics of innovation within it. It examines the 
commonalties and characteristics of digital media companies, and the advantages and 
disadvantages of being based in Ireland. Essentially, the quantitative case-study places 
the three individual qualitative case-studies into context. Also, it shows the general 
trends of the sector’s development. The techniques employed in this case-study are 
database and document analysis, as well as statistical aggregation.
2: The Irish Times Group and Ireland.com -  a traditional media organisation that 
publishes a digital media content website. The in-depth qualitative analysis shows the 
characteristics particular to the print and digital media elements of the organisation, 
and the processes of innovation within them. The techniques used in this study 
include interviewing, observation and analysis of relevant documentation.
3: Enter -  a magazine published on CD-ROM by a digital media start-up 
company. This was a retrospective study. The company, Pure Communications, is still 
active, but ceased production of Enter in mid-2001, so I had to adjust my 
methodology accordingly. I employed the techniques of in-depth interviewing and 
document analysis, and at the office of the company I was given a demonstration of 
how, editorially and technically, the CD-ROM was produced.
4: Rondomondo -  a multimedia content venture that was based within a company 
(Eircom) whose core competency is in telecommunications technology. Here, the 
qualitative research tried to show whether the company’s traditional competency in 
technology had aided or impeded the digital media content project. Rondomondo
4.4: Synthesis
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closed in 2001, which forced the researcher to frame it as a retrospective case-study. I 
employed the techniques of in-depth interviewing and document analysis.
4.5: Research strategy and evidence base
One of the challenges of conducting real-time research into an emerging industry is 
that the project is vulnerable to the unexpected: changes in the industry can 
necessitate changes in the research interests and in the methodologies. I have stressed, 
in previous sections, that qualitative research methods are flexible and can adjust to 
the changing terrain of a study. This was necessary for my methodology. In the first 
year of research, the Irish economy was positive and growing. In the second and third 
years, the economic environment had deteriorated, with performance declining across 
many sectors and industries, including digital media content. The changed 
circumstances had severe effects on my case-studies and, in turn, my research 
methodologies.
On beginning the thesis, my initial research strategy was broad. In principle, I 
wanted to conduct a meso-level case-study to monitor general trends in the emerging 
industry, and complement this with mico-level research in a number of individual 
companies. However, at this time, I wasn’t sure which and how many companies I 
would use as case-studies. One of my early tasks was to narrow these broad principles 
into specific research strategies and case-studies that could be implemented within the 
three year timeframe of my study. In late 1999 and early 2000, while 1 was still in the 
literature review phase, I began to tentatively monitor companies that showed 
potential as case-studies. I also began to examine the logistics of empirical research: 
how could a meso-level study of the overall industry be implemented, how would I 
approach a research assignment within a company, and what sources of information 
and research tools were available to me?
The quantitative meso-level case-study was the first piece of empirical research I 
undertook, and its methodologies were the least effected by the Irish and global 
economic downturn. I set out my areas of interest -  there were five categories of 
companies, which will be outlined in detail in chapter five. I identified sources where 
I could access information about companies in the industry. I outlined the aspects of 
the companies I was interested in: core innovative activities, employment levels, 
location, whether they were indigenous or foreign, and the number of people they
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employed. I conducted the first section of the quantitative study in the last two weeks 
of March and the first week of April in 2000. I conducted the second and third 
sections during the same periods in 2001 and 2002. This gave me three snap-shots of 
how the industry was emerging, and allowed me to compare year on year progress 
and change. Each year I was able to return to the same sources of information and 
compile data in the same way.
The sample for 2000 contained 125 companies across all five categories; the 2001 
sample contained 126, and the 2002 sample contained 106. Chapter five contains 
tables with detailed breakdowns of the companies. It also includes the criteria by 
which I included companies in the sample. When compiling the samples, I wrote a 
detailed profile of each company, which I updated in 2001 and 2002 to note any 
changes in innovative activities, ownership, employment levels, or export markets. 
These profiles are part of the evidence base for the thesis but were too large to include 
as an appendix. They can be viewed on request.
My sources of information were as follows: the online databases compiled by 
Enterprise Ireland, the Industrial Development Authority and Forfas fwww. enterprise- 
ireland.com. www.ida.ie. www.forfas.ie')1. Additional information was gathered 
through two commercial online databases: Factfinder and Kompass.ie. I did encounter 
difficulties when using these sources. Government agencies, in particular, were slow 
to up-date their databases. These difficulties will be outlined in greater detail in 
chapter five.
The methodologies employed on the qualitative case-studies were more directly 
effected by the economic downturn, as well as by other circumstances that are more 
likely to hinder qualitative than quantitative research. On completing the first year’s 
sample of my quantitative research, I argued that, broadly, three kinds of content 
firms were characteristic of Ireland’ emerging digital media content industry: core 
digital media content firms, digital media content ventures emerging from traditional 
media companies, and digital content ventures emerging from technology-centred 
companies. The industry in Ireland is small and I had to choose from a small number 
of potential case-studies. I wanted to achieve balance by having at least one of each 
kind of company. That is not to argue that the case-studies selected are representative
1 Enterprise Ireland had responsibility for building up and supporting indigenous industiy in  Ireland 
an d  fo r finding suitable strategic partners abroad for Irish companies. The Industrial D evelopm ent
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of all similar companies within the industry, or that general conclusions can be drawn 
from these particular examples. Rather, they provide a useful insight into how 
companies of differing origins operate within the system of innovation for the content 
industry. Examining the different types of companies gives a deeper understanding of 
the processes of innovation in different contexts, and of the factors that contribute to 
successful and unsuccessful content innovation.
Ireland.com and Rondomondo stood out as valuable case-studies. Ireland.com is 
the most high profile example in Ireland of a traditional media company supporting 
digital media content. Rondomondo held a similar profile for a technology-centred 
company. I had a wider choice in selecting a core content company but also faced 
greater difficulties when I approached potential case-studies. Martello Multimedia is a 
small company that develops content on commission from external parties. It was 
commissioned in 2000 by the Royal Irish Academy to produce a CD-ROM of the 
historical Cathach manuscript. I approached the company, outlined my research 
interests, and asked to use the Cathach project as a case-study. The company refused 
permission, citing a hectic schedule and the need to maintain confidentiality for a 
project in development.
Another potential case-study was Fios Feasa, a company based in County Kerry 
that developed CD-ROMs in the Irish language. It was appealing as a case-study for a 
number o f reasons: first, it tried to sell its content within the domestic market and 
abroad, particularly to America. Second, it was an Irish language content developer, 
one of the few in the industry, and it would have presented a valuable opportunity to 
examine the difficulties of developing content in a minority language. The Irish 
Diaspora belongs to the wealthy English-speaking (Anglophone) community, and has 
been targeted as a potentially lucrative market for Irish content developers. Fios Feasa 
could have provided an interesting instance of how the Diaspora, and other foreign 
markets, respond to content produced in the Irish language. Third, the company was 
located in Kerry, away from the concentrated cluster of companies in Dublin and the 
well-developed infrastructure of the city. It could have added geographical balance to 
the case-studies (the final three were all located in Dublin) and highlighted the 
difficulties of being located outside the main centre of content development in this 
country. However, the company closed in 2000 and I eliminated it from consideration.
A uthority ’s m ain  role w as to attract foreign com panies to  Ireland. Forfas prom oted the developm ent of 
enterprise, science and technology in  Ireland.
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My initial research strategy was to engage in participant observation in all of my 
qualitative case-studies, so I could view the ‘real-time’ production of content. In early 
to mid-2000 it was still a realistic ambition. But by this stage, I had to make definite 
decisions about how many and which companies I would use as case-studies, to allow 
time to do background research before making initial contact. I had intended to use 
four companies, but after consultation with my supervisor, I reduced the number to 
three. Four qualitative case-studies, in addition to the quantitative case-study, would 
have forced me to shorten each chapter and not do justice to the scope of the research.
I decided to include lreland.com and Rondomondo, and added Pure 
Communications as the core digital media content company. Pure Communications 
published a CD-ROM magazine called Enter, which in 2000 was growing in 
popularity. I began to monitor the development of each company in mid-2000. 
However, the fortunes of two of the case-studies had fallen dramatically by the time I 
began empirical research in 2001. Rondomondo had closed by mid-2001 and Pure 
Communications ceased producing the Irish edition of Enter later the same year. 
Therefore, I had to revise my methodological strategies, moving them from operating 
on the basis of ‘real-time’ research to being retrospective accounts of innovation. 
When I selected these case-studies, they were innovators that still had the potential to 
be successful. By the time I began empirical work, they were failed innovators: one 
had been eliminated from the industry, and the other had shifted its interests to other 
areas of content production.
I secured interviews with individuals who held key positions in both organisations. 
In the case of Enter, the individuals were still employed by Pure Communications and 
they were able to give me a demonstration of how, editorially and technically, the 
CD-ROM magazine was produced. I still used most of my intended research 
techniques, such as document analysis and in-depth interviews, but the changed 
circumstances denied me the opportunity to observe the ‘real-time’ production of 
content and engage in informal interviews in the work setting, which provided many 
valuable insights during my research placement at lreland.com. The tense of the 
interviews also changed. Interviewees from Rondomondo and Pure Communications 
spoke about what they did. Interviewees from Ireland.com spoke about what they 
were doing or were going to do. Ireland.com was the only case-study that allowed me 
to fully implement my intended methodology: document analysis, in-depth formal
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interviews, observation of the ‘real-time’ production of content (during a three-week 
research placement), and informal interviews in the work setting.
The following is a log of the semi-structured in-depth interviews I conducted for 
each case-study, along with an approximate running time. Each interview was 
recorded and transcribed.
Ireland.com interviews:
Conor Pope, deputy editor, Ireland.com, personal interview, 29th August 2002. 
Running time: one hour
Conor Pope, deputy editor, Ireland.com, personal interview, 22nd August 2001. 
Running time: one hour.
Conor Pope, deputy editor, Ireland.com, personal interview, 14* June 2001. Running 
time: two hours.
Brendan Marrion, marketing executive, Ireland.com, personal interview, 20th August
2001. Running time: one hour.
John McMahon, database administrator, Ireland.com, personal interview, 17th August
2001. Running time: one and a half hours.
Austin McGeogh, advertising executive, Ireland.com, personal interview, 17th August
2001. Running time: forty-five minutes.
The interviews were supplement with informal interviews with editorial and 
technical staff during my research placement at the company.
Enter interviews:
Roisin Carroll, technical designer, Enter, personal interview, 5th February 2002. 
Running time: 45 minutes.
Ben Lenihan, creative director, Enter, personal interview, 29th January 2002. Running 
time: one hour.
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Ken Sweeney, editor, Enter, personal interview, 22nd January 2002. Running time; 
one hour.
Rondomondo interviews:
Aoibheann Gibbons, chief operations officer, Rondomondo, personal interview, 27th 
July 2002. Running time: two hours.
Declan Tuite, senior production engineer, Rondomondo, personal interview, 2n April 
2002. Running time: one hour.
Emma Kavanagh, publications manager, Rondomondo, personal interview, 21st May
2002 .
Each case-study chapter contains a section outlining in detail the precise methodology 
and any difficulties 1 encountered while trying to apply it.
4.6: Conclusions
Quantitative and qualitative research methodologies have various strengths, but I am 
also aware of their weaknesses. I argue that using them together offers the possibility 
of compensating for their weaknesses. Quantitative research methods allow me to 
document general trends in the industry’s emergence. Using qualitative methods I 
complement this by examining instances of innovative organisations on a micro-level. 
The emergence of the industry is a multi-level process and needs to be examined at a 
macro, meso and micro-level. Combining qualitative and quantitative methods allows 
for such a multi-level analysis.
The downturn in the industry placed a strain on my research methodology; my 
quantitative methodology was largely untouched, but my qualitative methodology had 
to be substantially revised. Two of the case-studies, which I had intended to conduct 
in ‘real-time’, had to be re-framed as retrospective studies. This also changed the tone 
of the case-studies; instead of examining active innovators trying to successfully 
stabilise innovations within the market, I was examining failed innovators and the 
reasons for the failure.
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Although this placed a strain on my initial research strategy, the strain was felt less 
by my conceptual framework. Technological determinism tends to overlook failed 
technologies. Social shaping of technology is concerned with reasons why some 
technologies are successfully developed and adopted and why other (some times more 
efficient) technologies aren’t. And systems of innovation regard failure as inherent in 
innovation: an innovation system is based largely on conflictual dynamics, with
successful innovators and innovations advancing at the expense of others, and
unsuccessful innovators and innovations being eliminated from the system. The initial 
case-study selection -  of the industry in general and of three companies -  was, in 
many respects, going to be a study of success. However, it turned out to be a study 
that was closer to failure. The industry experienced a downturn and the three 
companies encountered difficulties of various degrees. The literature informing my 
conceptual framework was already aligned to the possibility of examining failure, and 
although I did have to re-frame the conceptual framework, the shift was less
substantial than it was for my initial research strategy.
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Chapter 5: Case-study of the Irish digital media content industry 
5.0: Overview
The literature review outlines the importance of systems of innovation at national, 
sectoral and industrial levels. It notes how innovation and the emergence of 
innovative industries is subject to macro, meso and micro-level influences, both 
within the innovation systems and without. In particular, it argues that national social 
and cultural factors influence the ‘styles’ of innovation that emerge from a system.
This chapter contains the quantitative case-study of the Irish digital media content 
industry. It aims to illustrate trends in and influences on the industry’s emergence, to 
gauge the general level of innovation and areas of innovative activity within it, and to 
locate the national and industrial systems of innovation in which individual digital 
media companies operate. The chapter is based on an original quantitative study I 
conducted at yearly intervals between 2000 and 2002. The initial profile of the 
industry was compiled in the last two weeks of March and the first week of April
2000, and was updated at the same time the following years. This provides three snap­
shots over a three year period of how the industry is emerging.
The literature on systems of innovation argues that an emerging industry will not 
be stable: its profile will change constantly, as unsuccessful innovators are eliminated, 
new innovators enter, successful innovators prosper, and previously successful 
innovators go into decline. The literature also outlines how some innovators, having 
reached a certain innovative level, cease to develop further, become dependent on a 
core, stable artefact, and begin to stagnate. The literature further argues that 
companies within a small domestic market -  and a small NSI -  are characterised by a 
struggle to break into larger foreign markets, to recoup investment in innovation. The 
three year quantitative study allows me to assess these tendencies in an Irish context. 
The majority of innovation studies and systems of innovation analyses are focused on 
industrial innovations and within mature industrial sectors, and are rarely applied to 
content innovations and the emergence of content industries (Nelson, 1993; Freeman, 
1999; Edquist, 1999). The processes of innovation surrounding the development of a 
content innovation or artefact are often more difficult to quantify than those
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surrounding an industrial innovation. Content development tends to be based on 
creativity and initiative, and other less tangible influences, rather than on the 
application of scientific or technical knowledge. Although the general pattern of the 
digital media content industry’s emergence displays similarities to that of an industrial 
sector, there are important differences, which will be discussed later in the chapter.
The emergence of content industries (whether digital media or traditional media) 
depend, crucially, on the prior development of technological (industrial) innovations, 
for example broadcasting systems, television sets and electricity in the case of 
television as a medium. As noted earlier, the technology does not determine the 
content or the cultural form of the medium, but it does enable the creation and 
delivery of certain types of content. The digital media content industry depends on the 
previous emergence of hardware and software applications.
The quantitative study concentrates on companies whose core innovative activity 
is the creation of digital media content. However, the study regards hardware and 
software applications innovators as indirect contributors to the emergence of the 
industry, and so traces their development over the three years. This not only gives a 
fuller context to the emergence of the content industry, but also allows me to contrast 
its emergence with that of industries more traditionally associated with industrial 
innovations.
5.1: Resources and limitations of the approach
Elsewhere in the thesis, I outline how the majority of studies of Ireland’s digital 
media industry -  from both governmental and industry sources -  attend to the 
material, technological, applications and infrastructure aspects of the industry’s 
emergence, rather than to the content, symbolic aspects. Part of the (implicit) reason 
for valuing the hardware and software industries over content is that technical 
companies tend to create a higher number of jobs (as shall be demonstrated in the 
quantitative study). A record of high job creation and low unemployment is a valuable 
asset to any government. Content is relatively neglected as a distinct industry within 
the overall Irish digital media sector. This is indicated by the fact that no state 
industrial or economic agency has compiled an official database profiling the 
companies within the industry, or no agency has devoted significant resources 
(financial or human) to monitoring its emergence year on year. (However, in late
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2002, Enterprise Ireland commissioned a directory of digital media companies. It was 
commissioned too late to be used as a resource for my research, but it does suggest a 
growing institutional regard for the industry.) The state agencies that have built-up 
databases of companies within the digital media industry fail properly to segregate the 
companies according to their core innovative activity, with the result that content 
companies are listed alongside hardware companies, software applications developers 
and, on occasions, telecommunications companies (see www. enterprise-ireland.com, 
www.ida.ie. www.forras.ie). The research for this thesis also suggests that the agencies 
failed to significantly update their databases between 2000 and 2002. However, it is 
not uncommon for industrial classifications and statistics to lag behind new 
innovative developments. But for real-time research into a newly emerging industry, 
this poses problems.
Many quantitative studies, including Daniel Bell’s The coming o f the post 
industrial society (1976) and much of Toffler’s work, are based on industrial and 
economic statistics produced by state and industrial agencies. Although such an 
approach contains weaknesses (discussed elsewhere in the thesis), such information 
provides a valuable reference for tracing the development of an industrial sector, 
especially in the case of a sector in the early stages of its emergence. Official 
chronicling of the digital media content industry’s emergence is haphazard, and 
provides little coherent overall analysis.
In the absense of an official, comprehensive database focused on content 
companies, I had to address the situation by drawing on information gathered from a 
variety of sources. The databases compiled by Enterprise Ireland, The Industrial 
Development Authority and Forfas offered a starting point1. Because content 
companies were not segregated from non-content companies, I had to examine the 
entire listings, checking each company individually to determine whether its core 
innovative activity matched the criteria for inclusion in my study. (The criteria were 
set out later in the chapter.) Additional company listings were gathered through two 
commercial online databases: Factfinder and Kompass.ie. Factfinder, in particular, 
proved useful, because it updated its company listings and profiles every six months. 
Factfinder was operated by Business and Finance magazine, which was a quality
1 Enterprise Ire land  had responsibility for building up and supporting indigenous industiy  in  Ireland 
and for finding suitable strategic partners abroad for Irish companies. The Industrial D evelopm ent
119
publication of Irish business news. However, as with the state agencies’s databases, 
neither Kompass.ie nor Factfinder segregated companies according to their core 
innovative activity. Media articles were also used to keep a check on new emerging 
companies.
Within very real resource limitations, I have tried to map and record every 
company active in digital media content creation in Ireland between 1999 and 2002, 
alongside every new entrant to the industry in the same period. To this end, I have 
compiled a database of Irish digital media content companies that is more focused 
than any offered by state agencies or commercial databases. One of the weaknesses of 
my approach, however, is that, despite using a number of sources, some eligible 
companies may have slipped through without being recorded by the study. New, 
smaller digital media innovators especially might not have come to the attention of 
state agencies or commercial databases, and thus would not have been included in 
their listings. But in any system of innovation, recording the presence of new entrants 
is a difficult task: some new companies shy away from publicity, to protect 
innovations in development from being imitated before being brought to market, or to 
deny an advanced warning to an established innovator that it will have to protect its 
position within the industry.
With the above constraints factored in, I believe the resulting database is as 
comprehensive and detailed as time and resources allow. It provides an accurate 
indication of the profile, trends in and influences on the emerging industry between 
1999 and 2002.
Because of the time devoted to compiling the database, I had to narrow the scope 
of the quantitative study. I decided to focus on companies whose core innovative 
activity is the production of digital media content. However, many important actors 
within the industry are located within larger organisations whose core innovative 
activities are not the production of digital media content. When this study began in 
1999, a lot of hype surrounded the possibilities for digital media content. Clearly, 
much of this hype had evaporated by 2002, yet only three years previous, many 
technology companies that possessed the technological infrastructure to deliver digital 
media content also advanced serious strategies to become creators and publishers of 
it. In addition, many traditional media companies were eager to expand their interests
A uthority’s m ain role w as to  attract foreign com panies to Ireland. Forfas prom oted the developm ent of 
enterprise, science and technology in  Ireland.
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onto the web. The majority of the technology companies had, by 2002, retreated from 
the production of digital media content and had refocused on their traditional core 
competencies (Eircom, for example). The traditional media companies had, in many 
cases, begun to scale-down their digital media content ventures or were planning to 
reduce the level of their investment (Ireland.com). Non-core producers had an 
important influence on the emergence of the industry in the three years of the study: 
they were often the leading innovators within the industry. Their location within 
larger, profitable organisations allowed them to call upon deeper financial, technical 
and human resources than many core-producers, which in the Irish industry tend to be 
small and poorly funded. My quantitative study is necessarily selective, and it would 
have been desirable to include non-core producers because these also belong to any 
fully comprehensive systems of innovation analysis of an emerging industry. The 
qualitative case-studies, however, try to address and compensate for this problem. 
Two of the qualitative case-studies are based on non-core producers: one from a 
company with a technology background (Eircom, and its digital media unit 
Rondomondo), and one from a company with a traditional media background (The 
Irish Times Group, and its digital media subsidiary Ireland.com). The case-studies 
examine how location within a larger organisation influences the production of digital 
media content, what factors are emerging as particular to (or have a greater tendency 
to occur within) non-core producers, and how these contrast to factors that are 
emerging as particular to (or have a greater tendency to occur within) core-producers.
For the study, I divide the companies into five categories, as follows:
1: Irish digital media content producers (MPs).
2: Foreign digital media content producers (FMPs).
3: Irish indirect digital media content producers (IMPs).
4: Foreign indirect digital media content producers (FIMPs).
5: Innovative Irish firms (IFs).
(The rationale behind the classifications will be outlined in the next section.)
The study includes indigenous and foreign companies. Foreign companies and 
investment forms important layers of Ireland’s NSI and the industrial system of 
innovation, because they are active innovators within the system. They are important 
centres for employment and the development of competencies associated with digital 
media content production (both creative and technical). But my study suggests that
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operations in Ireland tend to engage in the lower innovative aspects of the digital 
media content creation process, localisation for example. The indirect producers, both 
indigenous and foreign, are involved in the production of hardware and software 
applications, and are the more traditional focus of governmental and industry analyses 
and academic innovation studies. They are included in the study because they offer a 
valuable opportunity to contrast the emergence of a material (technological) industry 
that has close and important linkages to the emerging content industry.
The fifth category is a by-product of the way the state agency and commercial 
databases are structured. Because their listings don’t segregate content, software and 
hardware companies, I had to check the profiles of many companies that were not 
involved either directly or indirectly in the development of digital media content. 
Many of these companies produced original innovations in the areas of software or 
hardware development. It required little additional effort to compile a database of 
them. By including innovative software and hardware companies, my research 
indicates that many of the trends I uncovered within the content industry are not 
exceptional or exclusive to it. Many similar developments are occurring in other areas 
of the so-called digital economy, such as software development, and are often 
influential factors within the overall NSI. Also, by highlighting the characteristics that 
are not exclusive to the content industry, a clearer picture begins to emerge of the 
characteristics that are particular. The fifth category is also useful for gauging the 
general level of innovation achieved by indigenous technology companies, how it 
fluctuated over the years, and how closely it kept in line with innovative fluctuations 
in the direct and indirect content categories.
5.2: Classification of companies and criteria for inclusion
The following paragraphs outline the criteria I set for classifying the companies. The 
sample for 2000 contains 125 companies across all five categories; the 2001 sample 
contains 126, and the 2002 sample contains 106. The tables in this chapter contain a 
breakdown of the figures that emerged from the empirical research. The original 
research material on which the figures are based can be supplied on request.
1: Irish digital media content producer. Code: MP. This includes Irish companies 
that are producing digital media content innovations or artefacts of their own, as well
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as companies that have produced webpages or CD-ROMs for clients. Although the 
latter’s work is based on the content that their clients want on the web or CD-ROM, 
the companies heavily shape the selection, design, editing and final form of the 
content. In that way, the companies are active in the creative process that leads to 
digital media content.
2: Foreign digital media content producer. Code: FMP. This is a foreign company 
involved in the development of digital media content innovations or artefacts. To 
qualify for my study, the company isn’t required to have developed an innovation or 
artefact from beginning to end in Ireland, but it has to have undertaken some 
innovative activity here as part of the overall development process. The results of my 
study suggests that most foreign content creators use Ireland as a base for localising 
innovations or artefacts for re-sale in other markets, with the primary R&D being 
conducted in the company’s country of origin.
3: Irish indirect digital media content producer. Code: IMP. This includes Irish 
companies that have developed hardware or software artefacts that facilitates the 
creation of digital media content, for example a company that has developed web- 
authoring software. However, to qualify for my study, the company has to have added 
an innovative element of its own: a company that simply re-sells Microsoft web- 
authoring applications doesn’t qualify. A company that has developed its own piece 
of web-authoring software, even if it is only to undertake a specialised task, does 
qualify, because it has shown itself to have made an innovative use of the new 
technologies. Such an innovation would be classed as process or incremental, which 
the study suggests is characteristic of most of the companies in the category.
4: Foreign indirect digital media content producer. Code: FIMP. This includes 
foreign companies located in Ireland that have developed hardware or software 
artefacts that facilitate the creation of digital media content. To qualify for my study, 
the company has to have undertaken some innovative activity in Ireland associated 
with the development of the final artefact. Companies that simply use this country as 
a base to assemble their hardware or package their software are not included.
5: Innovative Irish firm. Code: IF. This includes Irish companies that are not 
involved in the development of digital media content innovations or artefacts (either 
directly or indirectly), but have shown themselves to be innovative through 
developing their own piece of hardware or software. In my study, this is usually a
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company that has developed a specialised piece of hardware or software to serve a 
niche market.
Later sections of the chapter will contain a detailed breakdown of each year’s 
sample, and will outline the emerging trends in each category.
5.3: Development of Ireland’s NSI
Richard R. Nelson, while examining the different development paths of the Korean 
and Taiwanese NSIs, writes: “The reasons for these differences reside, to a significant 
degree, in difference in national histories and cultures, including the timing of a 
country’s entry into the industrialisation process” (Nelson, 1993: 16). With this in 
mind, no analysis of Ireland’s system of innovation would be complete without 
making reference to the past. Space is limited, so only a brief schematic account is 
possible here. The aim is to sketch the development and the peculiarities of the Irish 
system of innovation and to explain why, among its European counterparts, Ireland 
was one of the last countries to experience extensive industrialisation. It also traces 
how macro-level influences, such as government policy to open the economy, attract 
foreign investment, and direct investment towards certain industries, influenced the 
content developed in the industrial system. Also, as industrialisation matured, how the 
institutional set-up thickened to support it.
Ireland’s long-standing dependence on agriculture as the basis of its economy was 
in large measure a result of the country’s 800-year-long colonisation by England, 
which ended only in the early part of the twentieth century. Historian Tim Pat Coogan 
argued that the union with England in the eighteenth century killed off most Irish 
industries, which also had the affect of stifling the “spirit of enterprise” in the country 
(Coogan, 1976: 150). It was English policy to keep Ireland unindustrialised, weak and 
poor, and only in the north-east corner of the country -  populated mainly by unionists 
loyal to England -  was industry allowed to flourish.
When the country finally gained independence under The Treaty of 1921, the 
government of the Free State was more concerned with ensuring that the fledgling 
democracy did not collapse than with trying to industrialise the country. Even if the 
government had turned its hand to trying to push industrialisation, it would have faced 
a difficult task. Centuries of colonial repression, two wars -  the War of Independence 
and the Civil War -  and the partition of the North under the terms of The Treaty had
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left the country with a weak economic base. In 1926, for example, only 13% of the 
Irish workforce was employed in manufacturing, as against a figure of 40 to 45% in 
Britain (O’Malley, 1994: 32). But in spite of an awareness that the richer economies 
of Europe were moving away from dependence on agriculture to dependence on 
industry, the Irish government still regarded the land as the foundation of Irish 
society, both economically and culturally.
The Free State embarked on an era of economic protectionism that lasted until the 
mid-1950s, although in a real practical sense the barriers of protectionism were not 
pulled down until the Sean Lemass era of the 1960s. Until then, however, if 
innovation did occur in the Irish economy, it did so in the area of import substitution. 
Such policy planning, according to economist Eoin O’Malley, was underpinned by a 
belief that “protection helped to overcome the difficulties faced by new or small 
[Irish] firms in competing with larger and stronger established foreign competitors” 
(O’Malley, 1994: 32). The downside of the strategy was that it helped firms only in 
technically mature and less complex types of industry, meaning “there was little 
progress in developing the more technologically demanding or highly skill-intensive 
activities” (1994: 32).
In effect, Free State policy was a reversal of the government’s strategy between 
1999 and 2002. Whereas the modern leaning is to welcome and encourage 
competition, and build up the Irish economy through embracing high-tech industries, 
the Free State government tried to eliminate foreign competition from the domestic 
market, and it shied away from high-tech industries.
Conservatism was the dominant characteristic of Ireland’s economic thinking, and 
this was best exemplified by the Department of Finance, which since the foundation 
of the state was not only the most powerful government department but traditionally 
also the most conservative (Lee, 1989). It was too occupied with the year to year task 
of preventing the further deterioration of the country’s finances to devote significant 
resources to devising stratagems to lift the country out of its economic rut. As 
historian Joe Lee remarks:
“The Finance perspective was even more myopic than that o f the politicians, 
who at least often looked as far as the next election. Finance gave the 
impression that it rarely looked beyond the next budget. ” (Lee, 1989: 345)
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By the time Lemass came to power, it was clear that a radical shift was taking 
place in global, and especially European, economics. The European Economic 
Community had been formed in 1957, and it was becoming apparent that the 
economies of the future would work on the principals of free competition and closer 
ties between nation states. Economic isolationism and protectionism, as practiced by 
Ireland, would not serve the country’s interests any longer (if, indeed, they ever really 
did).
One way in which the government opened up the economy was by encouraging 
foreign companies to invest in Ireland. But as a concession to Irish companies that 
had depended on protectionism for survival, and weren’t equipped to compete with 
superior foreign companies, the government often sought assurances that these 
companies would mainly be export orientated and not focused on the Irish market. 
(No such assurances were sought by the government in the modern era, reflecting a 
shift to neo-liberal, free-market policies.) However, this did not mean that Ireland 
became a hotbed of innovation upon opening its economy. Until the end of the 1960s, 
foreign investment was concentrated in industries that, although labour-intensive, had 
already reached a high level of technical maturity. These industries included clothing, 
footwear, textiles, plastics and light engineering (O’Malley, 1994). The tasks carried 
out in the Irish operations were more manufacture and assembly than R&D, and they 
had little affect in raising the level of innovative activity within the Irish national 
system.
The next major step in the country’s economic development came with 
membership of the European Economic Community (EEC). Ireland, along with 
Britain, had applied for membership of the EEC in the 1960s. However, when the 
French government of de Gualle vetoed Britain’s entry, Ireland withdrew its 
application because it did not want to be inside the EEC while its largest export 
market, Britain, was outside. France eventually lifted its veto, allowing Britain and 
Ireland to join in 1971. From then on, Ireland was seen abroad as a gateway into the 
EEC (now European Union) market, which made it more attractive as a location for 
foreign multinationals.
This had positive and negative effects. The most obvious positive effect was 
increased employment, and consequently more money, from wages, circulating in the 
local economies. But in the 1970s and ‘80s, the Irish economy derived few other 
benefits from the multinationals’ presence, certainly not in terms of creating skills-
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intensive employment or raising the general level of innovation within the national 
system. Ireland’s economic development resembled the ‘dependency’ model that 
emerged in many South American and Asian countries: dependency on foreign 
investment to create employment, predominance of low-paid, low-skilled 
manufacturing jobs, exportation of profits out of the country, and a relatively weak 
base of indigenous industry. (The relative failure of indigenous industry, and 
dependence on foreign multinationals, was examined in a report by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on Ireland’s innovative 
standing in the 1980s. The report, entitled Innovative policy Ireland, ranked the 
country’s innovation orientation in the bottom quartile of the industrialised countries.) 
Sociologist Denis O’Hearn notes how foreign multinationals operated within the Irish 
economy without becoming deeply embedded in it. He writes:
“Trans-national corporations (TNCs) imported nearly all o f the material 
inputs they used in production and exported nearly all o f their output, so that 
they did not create demand for Irish products (backward linkages), nor did 
they supply down-stream Irish companies, which used their semi-fabricated 
products in the production o f something else (forward linkages)... TNCs failed, 
to reinvest resources in the Irish economy, instead removing the vast majority 
o f their profits from  Ireland. By the mid-1980s, observers began to refer to a 
'black hole ’ through which capital was sucked out o f the Irish economy. ”
(O ’Hearn, 1995: 91)
Although the situation improved since the 1980s, the trend continued into the 
period between 1999 and 2002. In a specific industrial sense, my quantitative study 
suggests that foreign digital media companies (both direct and indirect producers of 
content) base their lower-end innovative activities in Ireland and retain the higher-end 
R&D activities in their country of origin.
Membership of the EEC, and the free trade among member countries that 
accompanied it, left many indigenous companies exposed. Finding themselves 
uncompetitive in their domestic market, many of them had to close. The 
multinationals absorbed much of the job losses from indigenous industry, but when 
recession forced the withdrawal of many multinationals from Ireland in the 1980s, the 
unemployment rate rose sharply, from about 10 percent to 20 percent (O’Hearn, 
1995).
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Ireland industrialised within an unusual political system, which like most elements 
of recent Irish history related back to the manner in which the country achieved 
independence. Unlike in other European countries, such as England and Germany, 
where national politics crystalised around social and economic issues, politics in 
Ireland revolved around the national question (Chubb, 1992). In England and 
Germany, the emphasis on social and economic issues created a political system 
balanced on a left and right-wing axis. In Ireland, the defining difference was not the 
parties’ social and economic ideologies -  which were practically indistinguishable, 
anyway -  but whether they were for or against The Treaty of 1921. The Treaty 
created the Free State, which was independent of Britain, but it divided the country 
into North and South, with six counties in Ulster remaining in the United Kingdom. 
Shortly after The Treaty came into effect, a civil war ensued between pro and anti- 
Treaty supporters. Fine Gael was the pro-Treaty party; Fianna Fail (or Sinn Fein, as it 
was then known) was anti-Treaty. The Irish Labour party tried not to align itself to 
either side in the national question, trying instead to concentrate on social and 
economic concerns. So dominant was the national question in Irish society at the time 
that Labour drew little support and became isolated and weak. This status quo has 
carried through to the modern day. Fianna Fail and Fine Gael are still the biggest 
parties, with Labour a distant third. The Treaty, however, is no longer a significant 
factor in attracting support for the parties; traditionally, support was based on family 
loyalties -  if a father voted Fianna Fail, it was likely his son would too. Although, 
there is evidence that this is changing and that the parties are more susceptible to 
floating voters among the younger population. However, the social and economic 
policies of the major parties remain similar, with all of them nestling in a relatively 
close bunch in the centre of the political spectrum. This has a significant influence on 
the policies pursued to industrialise the country.
For many years, industrialisation was based on social-democracy -  a balance 
between state intervention and capitalism. Industrial policies were heavily influenced 
by Adam Smith’s notion of trickle-down economies. The Irish state’s thinking was 
best encapsulated in the Sean Lemass phrase: “A rising tide lifts all boats.” The state 
would assist business; the better business did, the greater would be the levels of 
employment; employment would, in turn, alleviate poverty. The state facilitated 
business through tax breaks and grants, and it established the Industrial Development 
Authority (IDA) to attract foreign companies here, and offer institutional support.
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Also, the state intervened directly in the economy by establishing state and semi-state 
bodies such as Telecom Eireann, CIE, the ESB and Aer Lingus. However, in recent 
years, the government has been more influenced by neo-liberal policies, and in many 
areas of economic activity, the state has been rolled back. Many state bodies have 
relative autonomy by being semi-state bodies. Other state-bodies (or semi-state 
bodies) have been privatised, such as Telecom Eireann, or have at some stage been 
considered for privatisation (Aer Lingus). The market in Ireland, especially in 
telecommunications and broadcasting, has been deregulated. This neo-liberal thinking 
is very much in evidence with regard to the digital media content industry. In general, 
it is left to the market to guide the direction in which the industry is emerging. 
Numerous government sponsored reports that have been published on digital media 
and the “Information Age” are heavily influenced by neo-liberal ideology. They 
espouse a market-led, technology-push development -  the value of digital media is 
primarily economic, not social, and people are regarded as consumers rather than 
citizens in an “Information Society” (IDA/Forbairt, 2000; Enterprise Ireland, 1999; 
Information Society Ireland, 1996; Forfas, 2001). This thesis argues that neither 
Information Society nor market-led supply side economics provide a sound basis for 
developing the digital media industry, because both are based on a flawed 
understanding of the nature of technological and social change. Yet, the state is an 
influential actor within Ireland’s system of innovation; consequently, so too are the 
neo-liberal policies that it implements.
The economic boom that the country experienced in the late 1990s can be traced 
to the financial difficulties of the 1980s. Governments in the late-1970s and early- 
1980s borrowed heavily to finance give-away budgets. Throughout the early-1980s, 
public finances sank deeper into debt as the government had to borrow more and more 
money to meet its public spending commitments and to repay interest on the original 
sums borrowed. Also, the widespread withdrawal of multinationals from the country 
led to a sharp increase in the unemployment rate; public finances came under 
increased pressure as the government received less money from corporation and 
income tax and had to pay out more in unemployment and welfare benefits. The only 
valve to release pressure from the public finances was the fact that many younger 
people emigrated during that period. In the late-eighties, the Fianna Fail government 
of Charles J. Haughey initiated the Programme for National Recovery, which reduced 
public spending and thus reduced the amount of money the government had to borrow
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to meet its spending commitments. The programme also promoted Social Partnership 
between employers, workers and the government, which helped produce stability 
within industry and improve what were poor levels of industrial relations. Agencies 
such as the IDA began to aggressively promote Ireland as a suitable location for 
multinationals. The IDA was successful in this, and as more multinationals located 
here, the government received more in corporation and income tax, and had to pay out 
less in unemployment and welfare benefits.
In simplified terms, the culmination of this was the Celtic Tiger economy in the 
late-1990s, during which the government worked with budgetary surpluses for the 
first time in the state’s history. However, Ireland as a small, open economy is 
vulnerable to economic trends in the wider global market. The slowdown of the 
American economy in 2000 began to be felt in Ireland in 2001. Although the Irish 
economy did not fall into recession, economic growth began to fall (Irish economic 
growth in real GDP was 10.5% in 2000, 6.6% in 2001, and was expected to be 3% for 
2002 -  www.ersi.ie. viewed 15 April 2002). The quantitative study will measure the 
effect the global and Irish economic slowdowns had on the content industry.
The aim of this section is to outline in broad terms the historical, political and 
economic influences on the NSI in which the content industry is emerging. The 
positioning of Ireland as an open economy welcome to -  and dependent upon -  
foreign investment affects the digital media content industry. Foreign innovators are a 
stronger feature of the hardware and software applications industries than the content 
one. But the general national economic policies of the government, the success in 
implementing them, and the institutional and organisational structures in place to 
support economic and innovative activity, are all influences on the emergence of the 
content industry. The holistic conceptual framework of this thesis holds that all these 
seemingly disparate actors are bound by linkages -  some strong, some weak -  and 
contributes to a process that facilitates the emergence of the content industry and 
innovations within it.
5.4: Clusters
This thesis has, so far, treated the Irish Republic as one cluster of digital media 
development. This is acceptable because of the small size of the country. However, 
now that I am applying the concept of an industrial system of innovation, rather than
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assessing it in broad theoretical terms, 1 must state that Irish digital media content 
companies are geographically concentrated in one area of the country, the capital city, 
Dublin. Of the 63 companies (both indigenous and foreign, MP and FMP) in the 2000 
study, 49 (77.77%) were located in Dublin. Of the 63 companies in the 2001 study, 51 
(80.93%) were located in Dublin, and in the 2002 study, the figure was 44 (81.48%) 
of the 54 companies.
Table A: the location of firms in the MP category for 2000,2001 and 2002
Location of firms:
Category: MP
Year: 2000 2001 2002
D ublin: 44 -  (75,86% ) Dublin: 4 6 -(7 9 .3 1 % ) Dublin: 41 -  (80.39%)
Cork: 2 -  (3.44% ) Cork: 3 - (5 .1 7 % ) Cork: 3 -  (5.88%)
M onaghan: 1 -  (1.72% ) M onaghan: 1 — (1.72%) M onaghan: 1 -  (1.96% )
Carlow: 1 -  (1.72% ) Carlow: 1 -  (1.72%)
Lim erick: 2 - (3 .4 4 % ) Lim erick: 1 — (1.72% ) Lim erick: 1 -  (1.96% )
W aterford: 1 -  (1.72% ) W aterford: 1 -  (1.72%)
Galway: 3 -  (5.17% ) Galway: 3 - (5 .1 7 % ) Galway: 3 -  (5.88% )
Kerry: 1 - (1 .7 2 % )
W icklow: 1 - (1 .7 2 % ) W icklow: 1 -  (1.72% ) W icklow: 1 -  (1.96% )
Kildare: 1 -  (1.72% )
D onegal: 1 - (1 .7 2 % ) D onegal: 1 -  (1.72%) Donegal: 1 — ( 1.96%)
Total firms: 58 Total firms: 58 Total firms: 51
Table B: the location of firms in the FMP category for 2000, 2001 and 2002
Location of firms
Category: FMP
Year: 2000 2001 2002
Dublin: 5 (100% ) Dublin: 5 (100%) Dublin: 3 (100%)
Total firms: 5 Total firms: 5 Total firms: 3
Table C: the location of firms in the MP and FMP categories for 2000,2001 and 2002
Location of firms
Categories: MP and FMP
Year: 2000 2001 2002
D ublin: 49 -  (77.77% ) Dublin: 51 -  (80.95%) Dublin: 44 -  (81.48% )
Cork: 2 - (3 .1 7 % ) Cork: 3 -  (4.76%) Cork: 3 -  (5.55% )
M onaghan: 1 -  (1.58% ) M onaghan: 1 -  (1.58% ) M onaghan: 1 — (1.85% )
Carlow: 1 - (1 .5 8 % ) Carlow: 1 - (1 .5 8 % )
Lim erick: 2 -  (3.17% ) Lim erick: 1 — (1.58%) Lim erick: 1 -  (1.85% )
W aterford: 1 -  (1.58% ) W aterford: 1 -  (1.58%)
Galw ay: 3 -  (4.76% ) Galway: 3 -(4 .7 6 % ) Galway: 3 -  (5.55% )
Kerrv: 1 -  (1.58% )
W icklow: 1 - (1 .5 8 % ) W icklow: 1 -  (1.58%) W icklow: 1 -  (1.85% )
Kildare: 1 - (1 .5 8 % )
Donegal: 1 — ( 1.58%) Donegal: 1 -(1 .5 8 % ) Donegal: 1 (1.85% )
Total firms: 63 Total firms: 63 Total firms: 54
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The increased concentration in Dublin results mainly from new entrants being 
established there and many of the smaller content companies in other areas of the 
country closing. The pattern of companies being concentrated in Dublin -  and the 
level of concentration increasing consistently over the three years -  is also evident 
when I assess the overall location of companies across the five categories. The 
percentages rose from 74.4% in 2000 to 76.16% in 2001 and 76.41% in 2002.
Table D: the location of firms across all five categories for 200», 2001 and 2002
Overall location of firms
Category: all categories
Year: 2000 2001 2002
Dublin: 93 -  (74.4% ) Dublin: 9 6 - (7 6 .1 6 % ) Dublin: 81 -  (76.41% )
Cork: 1 1 - (8 .8 % ) Cork: 12 -  (9.52% ) Cork: 10 -  (9.43% )
Galw ay: 4 -  (3.2% ) Galway: 4 -  (3.17% ) Galway: 4 -  (3,77% )
Lim erick: 5 -  (4%) Lim erick: 4 -  (3.17% ) Lim erick: 3 -  (2.83% )
W aterford: 1 -  (0.8% ) W aterford: 1 -  (0.79%)
Kerry: 1 -  (0.8%)
K ildare: 1 -  (0.8% )
Donegal: 1 -  (0.8% ) D onegal: 1 -  (0.79% ) D onegal: 1 - ( 0  94%)
Carlow: 1 -  (0.8% ) Carlow: 1 -  (0.79%)
Clare: 1 -  (0.8% ) Clare: 1 -  (0.79%) Clare: 1 -  (0.94% )
M onaghan: 1 -  (0.8% ) M onaghan: 1 -  (0.79%) M onaghan: 1 -  (0.94% )
W icklow: 2 - ( 1 .6 % ) W icklow: 2 - (1 .5 7 % ) W icklow: 2 -  (1.88% )
Louth: 2 -  (1.6% ) Louth: 2 -  (1.57%) Louth: 2 -  (1.88%)
M eath: 1 -  (0.8% ) M eath: 1 -  (1.57% ) M eath: 1 -  (0.94% )
Total: 125 Total: 126 Total: 106
The number of counties in which relevant companies are located reduced 
annually. In 2000, the companies were spread over 14 counties. By 2001, the spread 
had reduced to 12, and to ten by 2002. Over the three years, Cork had the second 
highest concentration of companies (8.8% - 9.52% - 9.43%), with Limerick and 
Galway next (4% - 3.17% - 2.83% and 3.2% - 3.14% - 3.77% respectively). Such a 
spread of digital media companies is consistent with the demography of the country. 
According to the most recent set of census figures available to the study3, the 
population of Ireland is disproportionately concentrated in the east of the country, in 
Dublin and the province of Leinster (CSO, 1996). Over half the population (1.9 
million) live in Leinster, with half of those people living in Dublin and its hinterland. 
The west of the country is especially depopulated, with Connaught having only 12% 
of the population, despite accounting for 25% of the land mass. Munster, with one
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million inhabitants, is the second most populated province. The three Ulster counties 
in the Republic -  Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan -  has a combined population of 
234,000 people. The trend in recent years, through migration and emigration, has been 
a depopulation of rural areas, especially in Connaught, and a growth in population in 
urban areas, especially Dublin.
Digital media content clusters tend to emerge in the larger urban areas, where they 
have access to well developed infrastructure, institutional and organisational support, 
employees and customers. But many authors, including Egan, Saxenian and Pavlik 
(all 1999), have concerned themselves with examining why strong digital media 
content clusters emerge in one city and not in another. Their work concentrates on 
America, where some large cities, such as San Francisco, lack a strong digital media 
content cluster, whereas others, such as New York, have very strong ones. Some of 
the trends uncovered by their work are relevant to explaining the development of 
clusters in Ireland, although a direct comparison is difficult. The Republic of Ireland 
has only one large city, Dublin, in which a content cluster could realistically have 
developed. (It is interesting that the second and third largest Irish cities developed the 
second and third largest clusters respectively.) However, this does not mean I cannot 
assess Dublin’s suitability as a location for a digital media content cluster.
Edmund A. Egan and AnnaLee Saxenian have studied the San Francisco Bay area, 
which has a strong digital media technology cluster. It was expected that, as a spin-off 
from this, a strong digital media content cluster would emerge. This failed to happen, 
despite the perceived suitability o f the area. Egan and Saxenian explain that the area is 
“unusually weak in traditional media...there was no media industry to employ artists, 
writers, musicians and other creative talent” (Egan and Saxenian, 1999: 20-27). Their 
work assumes that each large urban centre offers a developed infrastructure 
(telecommunications, transport), institutional and organisational support, and a pool 
of employees and customers. However, the decisive factor seems to be whether the 
city has strong competencies in content creation, not in technology. John V. Pavlik 
(1999) conducted a similar study to Egan and Saxenian, except his mission was to 
determine the conditions that had enabled New York to develop a strong digital media 
content cluster. He, too, places emphasis on the balance between technical
3 The Central Statistics Office in  Ireland planned to undertake another census o f the country in  2001, 
but postponed until 2002 because o f  the outbreak o f foot and m outh disease. The results o f  the census 
w ill be published  too late fo r inclusion in  this study.
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competencies and content competencies. Although New York is relatively weak in 
technology, it is strong in traditional media content competencies. Pavlik notes that 
seven of the world’s largest media companies are located in New York, including 
Time Warner (ranked one), Viacom (four), Advance Publications (fifteen), NBC 
(nineteen), CBS (twenty-four), Hearst Corporation (thirty-seven), and Dow Jones and 
Co. (forty), as well as The New York Times (Pavlik, 1999: 83). This emphasis on 
content in traditional media is reflected in the digital media cluster that has developed 
in New York. Pavlik notes that 76% of the city’s digital media companies are 
concerned with content creation and design. Only 5% are concerned with software 
development. The remaining 19% is made up of digital media marketing and 
consultancy companies (Pavlik, 1999: 81). A study by Nachum and Keeble (cited in 
Cooke, 2002) links the concentration of film and music industries in Soho, London, to 
the clustering there of digital media companies, with the cluster showing a “bias 
towards traditional media and advertising, growing from the audio, video and print 
media in the neighbourhood” (Cooke, 2002: 296).
Shauna G. Brail and Meric S. Gertler have conducted a similar study in Toronto, 
Canada, and have arrived at similar conclusions concerning the criteria necessary for 
the development of a strong digital media content cluster. They write: “A key aspect 
of the Toronto economy that is absolutely fundamental to the emergence and strength 
of multimedia production in the region: namely, its status as Canada’s major centre 
for cultural industries and related activities” (Brail and Gertler, 1999: 100-101).
I would argue that in Dublin, too, it is content competencies rather than technical 
ones that are decisive to the development of the digital media content industry. But 
again, direct comparisons with the American or Canadian situations are difficult to 
make. Because Dublin is the Republic’s only large city, it is also the centre for the 
country’s technological competencies, as well as its content competencies. The cities 
cited by Egan, Saxienan, Pavlik, Brail and Gertler have strong competencies in either 
one or the other, but not in both. In an Irish context, Dublin has strong competencies 
in both, which makes it a rare cluster for analysis. (At least, rare when compared with 
the clusters examined in traditional academic literature.) The majority of the country’s 
media organisations operate out of Dublin. The country’s two main newspaper 
publishers, The Irish Times Group and Independent News and Media, are located in 
the city, as are all of the country’s national Sunday newspapers. Also located there is 
the state’s national television and radio broadcaster, RTE; the national independent
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radio station, Today FM; the independent television station, TV3; and most of the 
country’s magazines are published in Dublin, as are most books, The only notable 
media exceptions are TG4, the Irish language television broadcaster, which is based in 
Galway; and The Irish Examiner newspaper, which has its headquarters in Cork but 
maintains a bureau in Dublin. The city also contains the main theatres, museums and 
the National Concert Hall. These organisations and institutions accumulated together 
form a rich cluster of culture, arts, media and entertainment competencies upon which 
digital media content developers can draw. It is consistent with the work of Allen 
Scott (2000), who argues that major cities become centres of cultural production, and 
also with Andy Pratt’s (2000) argument that in centralised systems of innovation -  as 
Ireland had -  the major cities account for a disproportionately high level of media 
activity.
Certainly, it fits the profile of an area that would be suitable for a digital media 
content creation industry, in terms of the competencies that are regarded by Pavlik, 
Egan and Saxenian as necessary for such a development. It must be remembered, 
however, that in Ireland there is no real alternative to Dublin, given the centralised 
government apparatus, and concentration of industry, institutions and population.
Another reason why Dublin is a suitable location for an emerging digital media 
content industry relates to Amin and Thrift’s concept of “institutional thickness” 
(cited in Pavlik, 1999: 86-87). This concept regards the institutional support that is 
available to a firm to facilitate its operation. This thesis argues that it would be fruitful 
to widen the concept to institutional and organisational thickness. In chapter three, I 
discuss the important role of organisations and institutions within systems of 
innovation, and also the difference between an organisation and an institution, and the 
different roles each play. Organisations engage in the transfer of knowledge, 
competencies and infrastructures -  from, for example, companies that possess them to 
those that require them -  and a larger cluster offers greater depth of and range for 
transfer.
Innovation requires the support of each, and both also emerge along with an 
industry. This ‘thickness’ is really an institutional (and an organisational) 
infrastructure that supports innovative activity within the digital media content 
industry. The holistic conceptual framework of this thesis acknowledges a wide 
dispersal of institutions and organisations that supports innovative activity. They 
range from financial institutions to state bodies such as Forfas, and also
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telecommunications facilities (Eircom) and venture capital funds. Ireland has a highly 
centralised government and state apparatus, which is concentrated in Dublin. As the 
capital city, it has the most fully developed organisational and institutional 
infrastructure. However, this should not be taken to mean that the infrastructure has 
fully  developed. Pavlik writes that in New York the digital media industry will not 
reach maturity until after the institutional thickening has finished, or at least has 
evolved to a higher level. Only then, “hype will be replaced by viable business 
opportunities” (Pavlik, 1999: 94). In 1999, many ICT and digital media content 
ventures in Ireland were based more on hype than viability, as suggested by the 
contraction of the industry uncovered by the quantitative study (discussed in a later 
section). Business models for digital media content were also emerging and changing 
during the three years, and were becoming more disciplined towards turning a profit 
from content. Companies were less prepared to subsidise unprofitable digital media 
content ventures. For example, during my research at Ireland.com, a source told me 
that The Irish Times Group was hardening its position towards supporting the 
website, which was coming under intense pressure to reduce losses.
The Irish digital media content industry is at an early stage of its emergence, so 
the institutional and organisational thickening is far from finished. It is a gradual 
process, similar to how, gradually, a mass of legal, technical and economic supports 
build around major new technology systems as they stabilise within an economy. An 
indication of how immature the thickening is for the content industry came from the 
state agencies that had not compiled distinct profiles of it. However, there are 
indications that they are beginning to recognise the industry as being distinct from 
hardware and software applications industries. Enterprise Ireland, for example, 
organised in December 2001 a conference to discuss the potential for digital content 
creation in Ireland. Enterprise Ireland, which offers institutional support across a 
wide-scope of industries, has also begun to commission reports on the digital content 
industry, such as Multimedia Ireland: realising the potential (1997) and Update o f 
new media industry (1999). The reports attend to many of the trends highlighted in 
this thesis: under-fmanced companies, the difficulties of stabilising products within 
export markets, development of niche products, and the need to increase the 
sophistication of products, technologies and competencies. The underlying philosophy 
of the reports, however, is of a technology-driven, market-led industry, and the reports
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rely heavily on quantitative statistics without putting them into the context of a 
coherent analysis of the emerging industry.
5.5: Employment
When research for this project began in 1999, Ireland was still experiencing the Celtic 
Tiger economy -  the most sustained period of economic growth in the state’s history. 
Optimistic estimates of future growth touched most industries in the economy, 
including digital media content. But the economic slowdown of 2001 and 2002 
dissipated much of the optimism, and again the content industry was no exception. In 
1999, the national unemployment rate had been dropping consistently since 1993, 
when it was 16%, to just under 6% in 1999, to 4.7% in 2000, 3.7% in 2001 and 4.2% 
in 2002 (www.ersi.ie. viewed 16 April 2002). Again, trends in the wider system of 
innovation were reflected in the content industrial system.
Irish digital media content producers (MPs) comprised the largest category over 
the three years, yet provided the lowest average employment: the average staff size 
was 32 in 2000 and 2001, and 38 in 2002.
Table E: Number of firms and their employment averages in MP catcgorv, 2000,2001 and 2002
Year No. of firms With
employment
figures
Total
employment
Average
employment
2000 58 49 1,594 32.53
2001 58 52 1,696 32.61
2002 51 48 1.865 38.85
These figures suggest that MPs bucked the wider trend -  rising average 
employment at a time of economic slowdown and job cuts in the wider NSI. 
However, average employment rose between 2001 and 2002 partly because the 
industry contracted, from 58 companies for the first two years to 51 in the third. 
Smaller companies, with employment figures below the average, closed and thereby 
increased the average employment of those remaining. However, despite the 
industry’s contraction, it did experience an overall increase in employment, from 
1,594 to 1,696 to 1,865, at a time when employment was decreasing in the wider 
system of innovation.
Such flat figures mask the dynamics of change that were occurring on the ground 
(company) level of the industry. The employment figures give no indication of the
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precise nature or quality of the jobs; this is a weakness of my study, but it was beyond 
my resources to obtain a detailed breakdown of the type and quality of the jobs in 
each company across the five categories. However, this study takes employment as a 
crude measure of expansion, contraction or stabilisation of companies within each 
category. The year between 2000 and 2001 was quite stable for the MP category: 
employment remained stable in 78.85% of companies; it rose in 17.3% and fell in 
3.8%. The profile of the industry remained stable, with five companies dropping out 
and five new entrants. Between 2001 and 2002, the industry was less stable. 
Employment held steady in 66.66% of companies. It fell in 18.75% and rose in 
14.55%. Three firms had been taken over and absorbed into larger organisations, and 
could no longer be considered separate entities. The slowdown affected the industry 
in that the number of new entrants had decreased (three) and the rate of dropout had 
increased (seven).
Tabic F : Changing profile of  and employment averages for MP category, 2001 and 2002_________
Year: 2001
E m ploym ent figures w ere available for 52 of the firm s: in the year since 2000, em ploym ent rem ained 
stable in  41 (78.84% ).
Em ploym ent fell in  2 (3.8% ).
E m ploym ent rose in  9 (17.3% ).
T here w ere five new  entries to the category and five drop outs. _________________________ _
Year: 2002
E m ploym ent figures w ere available for 48 o f the finns: in the year since 2001, em ploym ent rem ained 
stable in 32 firm s (66.66%).
Em ploym ent fell in  9 (18.75% ).
Em ploym ent rose in 7 (14.58% ).
T here w ere three new  entries to  the category.
Three fin n s  w ere absorbed into larger organisations that had bought them  out.
Seven firm s dropped out o f the  ggtggorg._________________________ ________________________________________
The MP employment figures contrast poorly to those in the IMP category, which 
despite the economic slowdown also experienced an overall rise in average and total 
employment. Over the three years, average employment rose from 74.28 to 75.78 to 
96.16, with total employment rising from 1,040 to 1,061 to 1,154. The category 
experienced a high degree of stability between 2000 and 2001, with employment 
remaining stable in 85.71% of companies and rising in 14.28%.
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Table G: Number of firms and their employment averages in IMP category, 2000, 2001 and 2002
Year No. of firms With
employment
figures
Total
employment
Average
employment
2000 15 14 1,040 74.285
2001 15 14 1.061 75.785
2002 13 12 1,154 96.16
Table H: Changing profile of and employment averages for IMP category. 2001 and 2002______
Year: 2001
Em ploym ent figures w ere available for 14 o f the firms: in the year since 2001, em ploym ent rem ained 
stable in 12 (85.71% ).
Em ploym ent rose in  2 (14.28% ).
No com pany in  the category experienced a fall in employment.
O ne new  com pany entered the category, and one dropped out.____________________________________ _
Year: 2002
Em ploym ent figures w ere available for 12 of the firm s: in  the year since 2001, em ploym ent rem ained 
stable in  2 firm s (16.66% ).
Em ploym ent fell in  five (41.66% ).
E m ploym ent rose in  five (41.66% ).
Two com panies dropped out o f the category.
T here w ere no new  entries.
No company experienced a fall in employment. One company dropped out and 
one entered. From this stable position, the industry experienced a high level of change 
between 2001 and 2002: employment held steady in only 16.66% of companies. It fell 
in 41.66% and rose in 41.66%. Two companies dropped out and none entered. The 
overall pattern in both MP and IMP was a rise in employment accompanied by a 
contraction in the number of companies -  the industries moved towards fewer but 
larger companies. (As the systems of innovation literature argue, industries tend to 
emerge along this pattern, as they progress towards maturity. In new industries, when 
barriers to entry are low, innovations spring mainly from small start-ups, but the 
industry moves towards a structure of larger companies with monopolistic power as 
the years passed.)
These patterns are replicated broadly when I examine foreign digital media 
content companies, both direct and indirect producers. Total employment had dropped 
in both categories by 2002, and although average employment had continued to rise in 
one, it had begun to fall in the other. Foreign direct and indirect digital media content 
producers tended to operate on a much larger scale than their Irish equivalents, with 
their average employment often being multiples of that in the indigenous categories. 
Average employment in the FMP category rose over the three years from 324.6 to 
444.6 to 706.66. Its total employment, however, did not rise annually. Having grown
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between 2000 and 2001, it experienced a dip between 2001 and 2002, from 1,623 to 
2,223 to 2,120.
Table I: Number of  firms and their employment averages in FMP category, 2000, 2001 and 2002
Year No. of firms With
employment
figures
Total
employment
Average
employment
2000 5 5 1.623 324.6
2001 5 5 2.223 444.6
2002 3 3 2.120 706.66
Table J: Changing profile of and employment averages for FMP category, 2001 and 2002
Year: 2001
Em ploym ent figures were available for five o f  the five firm s. Em ploym ent rem ained stable in  four 
(80%).
Em ploym ent rose in  one (20%).________________ _____  _____  _____  ____  ____  ____  ___ _____
Year: 2002
Em ploym ent figures were available for three of the three firms. Em ploym ent rem ained stable in  one
(33.33% ).
Em ploym ent rose in  one (33.33% )
Em ploym ent fell in one (33.33% ).
Two firm s dropped out o f the category. There w ere no new  entries._____________ _____________________
Economic indicators suggested that the global economic slowdown began to be 
felt in Ireland in 2001. The FMPs tended to be more deeply embedded in the global 
economy than equivalent indigenous firms (discussed in a later section), and were 
quicker to display the affects of the global economic slowdown. Indigenous 
industries, less embedded, were somewhat slower to display the affects. Although a 
high rate of drop-out was experienced in the indigenous content industry between 
2001 and 2002, it was off-set by rises in employment in the remaining companies.
FIMP was the category most strongly affected by the economic slowdown in 
terms of employment, even if all of the companies within the category remained 
active for the full three years of the project. Between 2000 and 2001, total 
employment rose from 8,285 to 11,395, but fell in 2002 to 9,237. Reflecting the trend 
in the wider NSI, employment fell between 2000 and 2001, but rose by 2002, 
although not to the 2000 level. Average employment mirrored the pattern for total 
employment: it rose between 2000 and 2001, from 1,035.635 to 1,424.375, but had 
fallen by 2002 to 1,154.645. The profile of the category remained stable over the three 
years, although this masked the extent of change on the ground level. Between 2000 
and 2001, employment remained stable in 50% of companies, rose in 37.5% and fell 
in 12.5%. Change in employment (which this study takes as a crude measure of
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expansion, contraction or stabilisation of firms) had accelerated by 2002. Employment 
remained stable in only 12.5% of companies; it rose in 25% and fell, quite 
dramatically, in 62.5%. The category was composed mainly of American 
multinationals, which in the harsher economic climate were scaling down their 
operations abroad and, in the main, were consolidating their business in their country 
of origin. None of the companies, however, pulled out of Ireland completely, although 
some American multinationals not included in this study -  such as Gateway, the 
personal computer manufacturer -  did.
Table K: Number of firms and employment averages in F1MP category, 2000, 2001 and 2002
Year No. of firms With
employment
figures
Total
employment
Average
employment
2000 8 8 8,285 1.035.625
2001 8 8 11.395 1.424.375
2002 8 8 9,237 1.154.625
Table L: Changing profile of and cmployment averages for IMP category, 2001 and 2002________
Year: 2001
E m ploym ent figures w ere available for eight o f the firms: in  the year since 2000, em ploym ent 
rem ained stable in  four (50%).
E m ploym ent rose in  three (37.5% ).
Em ploym ent fell in  one (12.5%).
N o firm s entered or dropped out o f the category.____________________________________________________
Year: 2002
Em ploym ent figures w ere available for eight o f the firms: em ploym ent rem ained stable in  one (12.5%). 
Em ploym ent rose in  two (25% ).
Em ploym ent fell in  five (62.5% ).
N o firm s entered or dropped out o f  the category.____________________________________________________
The final category (IF) is Irish firms that are not located, either directly or 
indirectly, within the digital media content industry, but have produced innovations in 
the areas of hardware or software applications development. Among the indigenous 
categories, IF followed more closely than MP or IMP the trends in the wider Irish 
NSI, in which employment rose in 2001, but fell in 2002. A similar pattern was 
discernible in this category. Between 2000 and 2001, total employment rose from 
1,817 to 2,010, but fell by 2002 to 1,414. Average employment between 2000 and 
2001 rose from 46.589 to 51.583, but fell by 2002 to 47.133. The category achieved a 
high degree of stability between 2000 and 2001, when it contained 39 and 40 
companies. However, it contracted significantly by 2002, falling to 31. Considering
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the parallel drops in average and total employment, not only were fewer people 
employed in the industry, they were employed in fewer and smaller companies. 
Between 2000 and 2001, employment remained stable in 71.79% of companies; it 
rose in 20.51% and fell in 7.6%. However, a greater degree of flux was evident in the 
category in 2002, with employment remaining stable in only 33.33%, rising in 30% 
and falling in 36.66%. There were no new entrants, but seven companies dropped out 
and two were absorbed into larger organisations that had bought them out. Like the 
other categories, the tendency was towards contraction.
Table M: Number of firms and their employment averages in IF category, 2000, 2001 and 2002
Year No. of firms With
employment
figures
Total
employment
Average
employment
2000 39 39 1,817 46.589
2001 40 39 2.010 51.538
2002 31 30 1.414 47.133
Table N: Changing profile of and employment averages for IF category, 2001 and 2002 ________
Year: 2001
E m ploym ent figures w ere available fo r thirty-nine o f the forty firm s: in  the year since 2000, 
em ploym ent rem ained stable in  tw enty-eight (71.79%).
Em ploym ent rose in eight (20.51% ).
E m ploym ent fell in  three (7.6%).
O ne firm  entered the c a t e g o r y . __________ ______________ ____________ ___________________________
Year: 2002
E m ploym ent figures were available for th irty  o f  the thirty-one firm s: in  the year since 2001, 
em ploym ent rem ained stable in ten  firm s (33.33%).
Em ploym ent rose in  n ine (30%).
E m ploym ent fell in  eleven (36.66% ).
Seven firm s dropped out o f  the category.
Two w ere absorbed into larger organisations that had bought them out.________________________________
There is a tendency among state agencies to prioritise hardware projects over 
content projects, because the payback in terms of employment is seen as greater. In a 
related study, Aphra Kerr (1999) notes the difficulty a Northern Irish CD-ROM 
producer had in securing state funding for a cultural content project. The project 
would have been shelved had the company not received funding from outside of 
Ireland, from the European Union. Even then, the company experienced difficulty, 
because the EU failed to appreciate the cultural specificities of the project, and often 
made unrealistic demands on the company in return for the funding.
The trend of valuing the technology over the content is related to the determinist 
notion that, once the technology is in place, everything else will follow on. This has
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failed to materialise in Ireland in terms of a vibrant content industry, with contributing 
factors being a lack of funding and venture capital, a small domestic market, lack of 
demand from abroad for Irish digital media content artefacts, and the persistent 
dominance of the traditional media as outlets for Irish content.
Another characteristic of the indigenous digital media industry is that it operates 
on a much smaller scale than the foreign digital media companies located here. The 
gulf in average employment in the technology orientated indirect categories is 
striking. For indigenous companies in 2000, the average was 74.285. The average for 
foreign companies was over fourteen times that, at 1,035.625. As regards direct 
content producers, foreign companies had an average employment that was over ten 
times that of indigenous ones: 324.6 as against 32.53. The gulf narrowed significantly 
by 2002. The multiple for indirect producers was twelve times, 96 as against 1,154. 
Irish innovative firms, which were not related to digital media content, also provided 
a small average employment: 46.5 in 2000. This further suggests the small-scale of 
indigenous technology companies.
5.6: Venture capital investment in the digital media content industry
Access to venture capital is a problem for many indigenous content companies and is 
a serious hindrance to innovation. A joint report by the IDA and Forbairt, published in 
1999, conducted a survey in which indigenous digital media companies -  though not 
specifically in the content industry -  were asked where they had derived their start-up 
capital from, and what were their sources of current capital (IDA/Forbairt, 1999: table 
xi). The companies were asked to list their sources of funding under six categories. 
For both start-up and current capital, the largest category was founder’s personal 
funds, and the smallest was venture capital. For start-ups, 80% of the companies listed 
founder’s personal funds as a source of capital; only 10% listed venture capital. For 
current capital, the respective figures were 50% and 7% (approximately).
Forfas, in its National Competitiveness Report for 2001, reported a cross-sector 
drop in venture capital investment, from what were already poor levels, especially in 
the content industry. At Enterprise Ireland’s Digital Dividends conference in 
December 2001, Walter Hobbs, a director of ACT Venture Capital, one of the larger 
venture capitalists operating in the Irish system, stated that his company was more 
willing to invest in core technologies (hardware, software, applications) than leverage
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core technologies (customer accounts, service providers, content). Core technologies 
are viewed within the venture capital industry as a more secure investment, because 
they are regarded as a tangible product. Hobbs said: “Content is perceived in Ireland 
as a tough area, risky. It doesn’t mean they [venture capital companies] don’t invest, 
but perception can be taken as reality” (Digital Dividends, 2001). Within a system of 
innovation, there are various brakes on and accelerators to the emergence of a new 
industry. Venture Capital is an important layer within the national system, and its 
perception of content as a risky investment is certainly a brake on the emergence of 
the industry. At the same time, the venture capital layer does, in instances, act as an 
accelerator, as in the expansion of one of my qualitative case-studies, Enter CD-ROM 
magazine. In November of 2000, it received a venture capital investment of £2 
million, which allowed it to publish its content artefact in the British market. But, 
within six months, the company had pulled out of the foreign market. Its expansion 
was a failure, which could have been viewed within the venture capital industry as a 
further confirmation that content is a risky investment.
5.7: Irish digital media content producers (MPs)
The companies in this category tend to fall into narrow bands of characteristics: few 
employees, not radically innovative, and concentrated on domestic and niche markets.
Vivien Walsh claims that the defining characteristic of a small NSI is the size of 
its domestic market: the smaller the domestic market, the greater the pressure on a 
company to export to find the larger markets necessary to benefit from economies of 
scale and recoup the cost of heavy investment in innovation (Walsh, 1988). She 
claims that companies in smaller nations are more likely than ones in larger countries 
to be well integrated into the world economy, which is one reason why Swedish firms 
are more export orientated than their American counterparts. Ireland has a small 
system, comprising only one percent of the total economy of the European Union, and 
seems a fitting example of Walsh’s conception of a small national system.
Her writings focus on industrial companies (and industrial innovations). My 
research findings suggest that, in the Irish system, technology orientated hardware and 
software applications companies are more inclined than content companies to move 
beyond the small domestic market. My findings suggest further that certain factors 
exert a stronger influence on content companies than on industrial companies, and
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these factors are often crucial to restraining content companies within the domestic 
market. (This will be discussed in more detail later.)
One limitation of the quantitative data available for this study is its inability to 
provide precise indicators such as the exact percentages for the amount of business 
each company conducts within and outside the domestic market. My approach is to 
measure the number of companies that indicate they service foreign markets. This 
activity might not make up the majority of their business, but it signals an attempt to 
move beyond the domestic market and widen the reach of their innovations.
Of the five categories, MPs showed by a significant percentage the greatest 
propensity to operate entirely within the domestic market. In 2000, 58.62% indicated 
that they operated entirely within the domestic market -  the only time that the 
majority of companies in any of the categories were limited to the domestic market. 
Some 41.38% of companies serviced foreign markets, although many of these, 
according to their client lists, retained the majority of their client base in Ireland.
By 2001, the category had shifted substantially towards foreign markets: content 
companies that indicated they serviced foreign markets out-numbered those that 
operated entirely within the domestic market, 55.17% as against 44.83%. But by
2002, the category had begun, marginally, to tighten around the domestic market, with 
47.05% of companies operating within the domestic market and 52.94% reaching 
abroad. The category’s expansion into and contraction from foreign markets mirrored 
trends of employment in the wider system of innovation, which rose between 2000 
and 2001, but fell by 2002, although not to the 2000 level. Similarly, the tightening of 
the MP category in 2002 around the domestic market did not reach the 2000 level. 
The year between 2001 and 2002 saw dramatic change in the profile of the category, 
with three new entrants, three being absorbed into larger organisations, and seven 
dropping out. The companies that dropped out tended to be among those supplying 
innovations abroad, which suggested they were quicker to feel the effects of the 
global slowdown than those operating entirely within the domestic market were. 
Indeed across the five categories, there was a correlation between the category’s level 
of activity in the global economy and its employment and contraction levels.
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Table O: Percentage of firms in the MP category that operated entirely within the domestic 
market or serviced foreign markets___________________ ____ ___________________ _______________
Year: 2000
O f the 58 firm s, 34 operated entirely w ith in  the dom estic m arket (58.62%)
Tw enty-four indicated I hat they serviced foreign m arkets (41.38% )________ ______ ____________________
Year: 2001
O f the 58 firm s, 26 operated entirely w ithin the dom estic m arket (44.82%)
Thirty-tw o firm s serviced foreign m arkets (55.17%)________________________________________________
Year: 2002
O f the 51 firm s, 24 operated entirely w ith in  the dom estic m arket (47.05%)
Tw enty-seven indicated that they serviced foreign m arkets (52.94% )___________________ _____________ _
The technology oriented IMP category had a higher percentage of companies 
supplying innovations to foreign markets, and it represents a tighter fit with Walsh’s 
argument that firms within smaller NSIs try to break into larger markets. In 2001, 
26.66% o f firms operated entirely within the domestic market, while 73.33% 
indicated that they supplied innovations to foreign markets. The percentages remained 
stable for 2001. But in 2002, reversing the trend in the MP category, IMPs tightened 
around the foreign markets, with the percentage rising to 76.92. The category 
contracted marginally during this period -  two companies dropped out, and there were 
no new entrants -  but the affects were felt more so by those operating entirely within 
the domestic market.
Table P: Percentage of firms in the IMP category that operated entirely within the domestic 
market or serviced foreign markets________________________________________________ _ _________
Year: 2000
O f the 15 fin n s, 4 operated entirely w ithin the dom estic m arket (26.66% )
E leven indicated that they serviced foreign m arkets (73.33% )________________________________________
Year: 2001
O f the  15 finns, 4 operated entirely w ith in  the dom estic m arket (26.66% )
E leven  indicated that they serviced foreign m arkets (73.33% )________________________________________
Year: 2002
O f th e  th irteen  finns, three operated entirely w ith in  the dom estic m arket (23.08% ).
T en f in n s  indicated  that they serviced foreign m arkets (76.92%).__________________________________ ___
In the two foreign categories, FMP and FIMP, 100% of the companies indicated 
that they serviced foreign markets -  their presence in Ireland inherently suggests that 
they are active beyond the borders of their country of origin. But their embeddedness 
in the world economy is reflected in the patterns of their total employment, a rise by
2001, a fall by 2002, but not to the 2000 level. A pattern emerged that the more
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deeply a category was embedded in the world economy, the less likely it was to show 
a rise in total employment. The global slowdown of 2000 began to significantly affect 
Ireland in 2001, so those companies deeply embedded in the world economy were 
exposed to it for longer and tended to feel its fuller affects.
Table Q: Percentage of firms in the FMP category that operated entirely within the domestic 
market or serviced foreign markets __________________________________________________
Year: 2000
O f the five firms, five indicated that they serviced foreign m arkets (100%).____________ __________ ____
Year: 2001
O f the five firms, five indicated diat they serviced foreign m arkets (100%).___________________________
Year: 2002
O f the tliree finns, three indicated that they serviced foreign markets (100%),_________________________
Table R: Percentage of firms in the FIMP category that operated entirely within the domestic 
market or serviced foreign m a r k e ts _____________________ _______ ____________________________
Year: 2000
O f the eight firms, eight indicated that they serviced foreign m arkets (100%)._________________________
Year: 2001
O f the  eigiu firm s, eight indicated that they serviced foreign m arkets (100%)._________________________
Year: 2002
O f the eight firm s, eight indicated that they serviced foreign m arkets (100%)._________________________
This pattern was true, also, of the IF category, which was more deeply embedded 
in the global economy than the other indigenous categories, MP and IMP. Its 
employment rose to 2001 and fell to 2002 -  it fell below the 2000 level (the only 
category that did so). Also, the category significantly tightened around the global 
market over the three years. Between 2000 and 2002, the number of companies 
indicating that they were active abroad rose from 69.23% to 75% to 80.65%. The 
category contracted significantly between 2001 and 2002, from 40 to 31 companies, 
which accounted for the loss in employment. Some 36.66% of the companies 
remaining in the category shed jobs during the period. This contrasts poorly with the 
content industry. In terms of employment, the contraction in the category was off-set 
by job rises in the remaining companies, which characterised the category as having 
fewer but larger companies. The IF category produced fewer and smaller companies.
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Table S: Percentage of firms in the IF category that operated entirely within the domestic market 
or serviced foreign markets_______ ______________________ ___________________________ _________
Year: 2000
O f the 39 firms, tw elve indicated that they operated entirely w ithin the domestic m arket (30.76%).
Twen Iv-scvcn indicated that they serviced foreign m arkets (69,23%),__________________ ______________
Year: 2001
O f the forty firm s, ten  indicated that they operated entirely w ithin the dom estic m arket (25%).
Thirty indicated  that I hey serviced foreign m arkets (75%). _____________________________________
Year: 2002
O f the thirty-one firm s, six indicated that they operated entirely w ithin the dom estic m arket (19.35%). 
Tw enty-five ind icated  that they traded  serviced foreign m arkets (80,65% ). _____________________
The foreign firms, by their presence in Ireland, are all active in foreign markets. 
Of the three indigenous categories, the technology orientated IMP and IF categories 
are substantially more embedded than the content MP category in the world economy. 
IMP and IF are closer to the traditional subject (industrial, technological and material 
innovations) of systems of innovation analyses and innovations studies, and 
correspond closer to the findings that emerged from the literature. One such finding is 
Walsh’s contention that firms within a small NSI will be characterised by a struggle to 
break into foreign markets. This contention is less relevant to the content industry 
than to industries associated with technology -  indeed, content was the only category 
to display a retreat to the domestic market, even if the retreat was slight.
The innovations literature indicates that as major technology systems emerge so 
too do a mass of legal and technical standards to support them (Winner, 1987: 76). 
Major technological systems, such as ICTs, cross national borders, but they also 
conform to certain industrial standards. Variances occur between systems in different 
countries, but the requirement that innovations conform to industrial standards ensure 
that the variances are slight. Therefore, a process or product innovation to the major 
technology system could, with relative ease, be adapted or localised to suit such 
variances. The technical differences are specified. The industrial technical standards 
for computer hardware and software applications tend to conform closely across the 
global economy, so an Irish firm adapting a niche hardware or software application 
would have a relatively easy task. This would seem to have underpinned the trend for 
the IMP and IF categories to become increasingly embedded in the global economy 
over the three years.
However, the principle o f rigidly applying industrial standards is not as relevant to 
the content industry and the production of content innovations or artefacts. As
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indicated in the literature review, content doesn’t always travel well between nations 
and regions, due to language, cultural and social differences. More so than technical 
innovations (although societies could appropriate such innovations in different ways), 
content innovations often reflect the cultural and social values of the society of which 
they are a part, and it is more difficult to transplant them into societies to which these 
values are not common or familiar. Content is often culturally specific, which is a 
factor of development that tends to be overlooked by technology-centred accounts of 
innovation but has real and profound implications for companies in the MP category 
producing content rooted in Irish social and cultural values and history. MP 
companies are more inclined to remain confined within the domestic market, or to 
return having ventured outside it, because an expected demand for Irish content 
abroad has failed to materialise. Over the three years, the Irish online content ventures 
that gathered substantial audiences abroad were the RTE website, Ireland.com, 
Online.ie and Local Ireland. (RTE and Ireland.com are part of non-core producers.) 
Of these, Local Ireland closed, owing euro6 million to Eircom. RTE and Ireiand.com 
were being scaled down because their parent organisations had encountered financial 
difficulties in their core businesses. And Online.ie implemented job cuts between 
2001 and 2002. No offline content projects (such as CD-ROMs) have gathered a large 
audience abroad. A CD-ROM version of The Book o f Kells4 was developed in 1999, 
but it had limited sales abroad. Aphra Kerr (1999) notes the difficulty of trying to 
move an unsuitable content innovation into a foreign market, and the strong resistance 
posed by local social and cultural values. In the industry, the companies that are most
4 The fo llow ing inform ation was gathered through an  interview  1 conducted on  16 N ovem ber 2000 witii 
E laine K irw in, O perations M anger o f X  Com m unications, w hich developed the CD -RO M  of the Book  
o f  Kells. T he C D -R O M  cam e in two editions, a standard edition and a lim ited edition. It had an overall 
prin t run  o f 10,000 copies. Betw een its launch on the 24 February 2000 and the date o f  the interview in 
m id-N ovem ber o f  the sam e year, all 500 copies o f the lim ited edition had been sold, as had 6,000 
copies o f  the standard edition. M s K irw in estim ated that the majority o f  CD-ROM s had been sold 
w ith in  Ireland and to Irish people. However, 700 copies had been sold to the U nited States through the 
com pany’s online ordering system . Also. 1,000 CD-ROM s accom panied the actual B ook o f  K ells  w hen 
it w ent on tour in Australia in mid-2000, and all o f those copies w ere sold. A bout one quarter o f the 
CD -RO M s w ere sold through the Trinity L ibrary shop, and M s K irw in estim ated that a sizeable portion 
o f  those custom ers would have been foreign tourists. W hen I asked her to w eigh developm ent costs 
against the m arket for the artefact, she to ld  me that the project would recoup its developm ent costs 
w hen all 10,000 copies of the initial print run were sold. That estimate was interesting, as it gave an 
idea o f  the sales required  by a  reasonably am bitious digital m edia content project to break even. We 
could take the fo llow ing cm de m easurem ent to gain some idea o f the cost involved. E ach copy o f the 
standard CD -RO M  cost £20 (m ultiplied by 9,500 copies gave a total cost o f £190,000), w hile the 
Lim ited Edition cost £40 (m ultiplied by 500 copies was £20.000.) All 500 copies o f  the lim ited edition 
w ere sold (generating  revenue o f £20,000), as were 6,000 copies o f  the standard edition (£120,000). So, 
nine m onths after the artefact w as launched, it was roughly £70,000 below its break-even figure.
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successful abroad supply content that is unrelated to Irish social and cultural values 
and history, such as digital media educational artefacts supplied to the North America 
market.
5.8: Innovative activities of Irish digital media content producers (MP)
The companies in this category tend to be characterised as follows: few employees, 
not radically innovative, serving niche markets, and with a higher percentage of 
companies than in other categories operating entirely within the domestic market. The 
innovative activities of the companies in this industry fall into six categories, as 
follows:
1: Design: This includes companies engaged in the design of content for clients, 
usually corporate, such as the design of websites. In many cases, these companies 
supply writers and graphic designers to produce the content available on corporate or 
other websites. Many of the companies in this area also offer consultancy services, 
e.g. for website design. These actors tend to engage in low-end innovative activities, 
and their business models tend to be conservative: they are first commissioned by a 
client before they begin designing content.
2: Development of educational or training digital media content artefacts: This 
includes companies that develop artefacts to educate people through the medium of 
digital media. A wide variety of educational artefacts are produced by these 
companies, such as Smartforce’s educational artefacts for the American educational 
system, or Compupharma’s training artefacts for the medical profession. The 
companies in this category tend to engage in higher-end activities. They tend to 
develop the artefacts from the beginning through to the final form, and employ a wide 
range of competencies in the process, such as writing, animation, audio and video. 
The artefacts themselves tend to have high levels of interactivity with the user. It is a 
higher risk business model, because the companies are not commissioned to develop 
such artefacts and there is no guarantee of recouping their investment when the 
artefacts are delivered to market.
3: Production of uncommissioned digital media content: This includes companies 
that develop digital media content innovations or artefacts with the intention of 
publishing them themselves or bringing them to market. This is higher-end content 
creation, because the idea for the innovative content artefact usually originates and is
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developed within the company. The majority of the competencies required -  
technical, creative, organisational -  are developed within the company. Examples 
here include Emigrant publications, which publishes a weekly online news-service 
for Irish emigrants, or Pure Communications, which produces a monthly CD-ROM 
magazine for retail. These companies tend to employ a higher risk business model: 
they receive no significant income until the innovation is brought to market, and 
within a system of innovation, the majority of innovations brought to market fail.
4: Commissioned digital media content: This category includes companies that 
produced content innovations or artefacts, such as CD-ROMs, on commission from 
clients, usually corporate. These range from producing elements of an overall 
innovation or artefact -  such as animations for a CD-ROM -  to producing the artefact 
from start to finish, drawing on all the technical, content and organisational 
competencies and infrastructures necessary for such a production. This tends to be a 
lower-end innovative activity because the companies are usually servicing the needs 
of non-digital media corporate clients whose requirements don’t stretch either the 
technology of digital media or the content competencies associated with it. It is a 
conservative innovative approach because the companies in this categoiy do not 
attempt to develop content of their own, which could be more ambitious and make a 
more innovative use of digital media technologies and content creation competencies. 
5: Localisation: Through localising the content of others, these companies play 
active roles in shaping the final form of the innovations or artefacts, and in the 
process that leads to content creation. So, in this study, they are included as part of 
the content industry. The companies in this category usually engage in lower-end 
innovative activities, such as dubbing language or editing content to fit with the 
dominant social and cultural values of the intended market.
6: Development of interactive games: Interactive games, in the three years of my 
study, failed to become a significant element of the Irish digital media content 
industry. Shauna G. Brail and Meric S. Gertler suggest one possible explanation as to 
why games developers struggle in smaller systems of innovation. They write:
“Games development is a very expensive mass market undertaking that 
requires access to finance, markets, distribution channels and, increasingly, 
the support o f large corporations” (Brail and Gertler, 1999: 107).
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The main interactive games developers and publishers are located in larger 
countries and larger systems of innovation: America (Electronic Arts, Microsoft), 
England (Eidos), France (GT Interactive) and Japan (Nintendo, Sony, Sega, Konami). 
However, some games developers are emerging in Scotland and in peripheral regions 
of England (Cornford and Naylor, 2001). Aphra Kerr (2001) notes the oligopolistic 
structure of the global games industry. A few companies control publishing and act as 
gatekeepers for the industry. Independent games developers encounter extreme 
difficulty in financing development of games -  which can take two years or more -  
and successfully bringing them to market without securing a publishing deal from one 
of the main games companies. Kerr’s study records the immense difficulty 
experienced by Irish developers -  which tend to be small-scale, poorly financed, and 
located away from the main centres of games development -  in securing publishing 
deals. In the three years of my research, Funcom was the largest games developer in 
Ireland; it employed 30 people and secured a deal with Sony to publish a game, Speed 
Freaks, on the Playstation console in Europe in 1999 and America in 2000. However, 
Funcom closed its Dublin office in 2001.
Table T: Innovative activities of the firms in the MP category, 2000 (first row across), 2001 
(second row across) and 2002 (third row across)
Design Localisation Educational 
and training 
artefacts
Uncommissioned 
digital media 
content
Commissioned 
digital media 
content
Games
17 (29.3% ) 3 (5.17% ) 14 (24.13%) 8 (13.79% ) 15 (25.86% ) 1 (1.72% )
14(24 .13% ) 3 (5.17% ) 13 (22.41%) 8 (13.79% ) 17 (29.31% ) 3 (5.17% )
13 (25.49% ) 1 (1.96% ) 10 (19.6% ) 11 (21.56% ) 13 (25.49%) 3 (5.88% )
O f the companies active in design in 2000,58.82%  offered consultancy services. In 2001,50%  of 
the companies offered consultancy services. In 2002,38.46%  offered consultancy services.
In 2000, 62% of the industry was involved in the relatively low-end tasks of 
designing content, producing commissioned content and localisation. Only 13.79% 
was responsible for the higher-end tasks of developing uncommissioned digital media 
content.
As stated earlier, the year between 2000 and 2001 was one of high stability for the 
category, and so it proved for the breakdown of the innovative activities of the 
companies within it. There was a slight drop in the number of companies offering 
design and consultancy services. The level of localisation remained the same, while 
the number of companies producing commissioned digital media content rose by
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almost 4%. Some 58% of firms were engaged in these relatively low-end innovative 
activities, so there was a slight shift (4%) to the higher innovative areas of developing 
uncommissioned content, educational and training artefacts, and interactive games. 
Development of interactive games and educational artefacts rose, while 
uncommissioned content production remained stable at 13.79%.
The year between 2001 and 2002 brought a quite dramatic contraction of the 
category, and the remaining companies were more likely to be located in the higher 
innovative areas of uncommissioned content production, educational and training 
artefact production, and games production. Some 52% of companies were located in 
the relatively lower innovative areas of localisation, commissioned content 
production, and design and consultancy, down 10% over the three years and 
suggesting an industrial shift to higher innovative activities. Design and, especially, 
consultancy continued to diminish within the industry. The percentage of companies 
involved in the production of commissioned digital media content remained stable, at 
25.49%. But the number of companies producing uncommissioned content rose 
sharply, to 21.56%, suggesting that through the economic slowdown, these companies 
remained durable and new companies were willing to engage in this innovative 
activity. Over the three years, the tendency was for this industry to contract, but for 
the remaining companies to move to higher innovative activities.
Also, proximity is a notable feature for companies producing commissioned 
content. For example, Dublin-based company X Communications was commissioned 
by Trinity College Dublin to develop a CD-ROM version of the Book o f Kells. The 
company’s other notable commissions included developing websites for the EBS 
Building Society, Amarach Consulting and the Film Institute of Ireland.
Guinness Ireland, C1E, Dublin Bus, Beamish and Crawford, Aer Lingus, The 
Sunday Business Post, and many others, had their websites developed by Irish digital 
media companies when, technologically, there was no reason why foreign digital 
media companies could not have done the same job to a similar or superior standard. 
My research findings suggest that the same holds true in reverse: Irish digital media 
companies tend not to receive commissions from abroad, even though there are few 
technological reasons why they couldn’t produce work to the same quality as a 
foreign client’s local company.
Despite arguments that the emergence of ICTs would diminish the importance of 
distance (Toffler, 1970; Cairncross, 1998), it remains an important influence on the
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emergence of the Irish digital media content industry. My quantitative study suggests 
that Irish digital media content producers, in the main, produce for and receive 
commissions from Irish clients. Often, it is not the technical competencies of a 
company that wins a contract, but its proximity to the client. Thus commissions are 
won through less tangible forms such as informal networks -  relationships between 
people -  that technology-centred theories omit.
The NSI’s characteristics -  small domestic market, venture capital layer reluctant 
to support content, attraction of foreign companies that based lower-end innovative 
activities here -  influence broadly the innovations that emerge from the Irish system. 
They tend to be small scale, aimed at niche markets, not radically innovative, and not 
especially rooted in Irish social and cultural values. Further research, over a longer 
period of time, will be necessary to study how NSI characteristics influence the styles 
of innovation that emerge from the industry. The industry is still at an early stage of 
its emergence, and the styles of innovation have yet to fall into established patterns. It 
would be beneficial to re-apply the styles of innovation concept when the industry has 
reached a higher level of maturity, and the styles of innovations emerging from it 
have fallen into more established patterns. This would provide a more solid basis for 
gauging the influence of NSI characteristics on styles of innovation.
5 .9 :  I n n o v a t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  f o r e i g n  d i g i t a l  m e d ia  c o n t e n t  c r e a t o r s  ( F M P s )
The results of my study suggest that FMPs tend to be larger-scale than MPs, provide 
high levels of employment, and their overall (international) organisations tend to be 
highly-innovative. However, the innovative activities conducted within the Irish 
national system of innovation tend to be the lower-end tasks of localisation and, from 
a systems of innovation perspective, contribute little to lift the innovative level of the 
industry. For 2000 and 2001, 80% of the companies were involved in localisation, 
mainly for the European market. Only 20% of the companies focused their main 
efforts on the production of original content innovations or artefacts. However, by
2002, innovation was eliminated from the Irish system, as the economic slowdown 
began to hit and multinationals consolidated their businesses around their country of 
origin. All of the remaining companies in 2002 were active in localisation, which this 
thesis argues is a relatively low-end element in the process of content creation.
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Table S: innovative activities of the firms in the IM P category, 2000, 2001 and 2002
Year Localisation Content production
2000 4 (80%) 1 (20%)
2001 4 (80%) 1 (20%)
2002 3 (100%)
This raises questions about how embedded multinationals are in the Irish 
economy. Localisation is a task that could have been undertaken with relative ease in 
many different countries. Ireland’s attractiveness to foreign multinationals is based on 
favourable tax incentives, an educated, English speaking workforce, modest wage 
levels and a presence within the EU market. Yet, these are not enough to copper- 
fasten the multinationals to Ireland. As Denis O’Hearn notes (1995), many 
multinationals which based low-end manufacturing operations here pulled out of this 
country in the 1980s when economic conditions (outside as well as inside Ireland) 
turned unfavourable. To a lesser degree, a similar pattern is emerging with ICT 
companies engaged in the production of hardware and software applications; they 
tend to base lower-end manufacturing, assembly and localisation operations here. The 
more low-tech the operations are here, the easier it is for multinationals to leave. What 
is also apparent is that multinationals are contributing little to turning the Irish 
economy into a system of radical innovation. The government has acknowledged the 
need to entice multinationals to establish higher-end operations here, to secure them 
to the Irish economy (RTE, 15 September, 2000). But with the slowdown -  and 
multinationals consolidating their businesses around their countries of origin -  this 
failed to occur on a significant scale during the timeframe of this project.
5 . 1 0 :  I n n o v a t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  I r i s h  i n d i r e c t  d i g i t a l  m e d ia  c o n t e n t  c o m p a n ie s  
( I M P s )
The main characteristics that emerged from this category are as follows: the 
companies tend to be small-scale, provide low levels of employment, are not radically 
innovative, but have a higher propensity than indigenous content companies to service 
foreign markets. Over the three years, this tended to be a stable category. In 2000, 
40% of the companies were involved in the production of software applications, 
26.66% developed hardware products and 33.33% combined hardware and software 
(which, given the small scale of the companies within the category, suggests a lack of
155
specialisation). By 2001, the category had consolidated around the development of 
software (46.66%), eased on hardware (20%), while the number of companies 
combining software and hardware remained stable (33.33%). The category suffered a 
slight contraction by 2002, which affected most strongly the development of hardware 
products. Software applications development remained relatively stable at 46.15%, 
but hardware development dropped to 15.38% (some 10% over the three years). The 
number of companies combining hardware and software development rose to 38.33%.
Table U: innovative activities of the firms in the IMP category, 2000,2001 and 2002
Year Software
innovations
Hardware
innovations
Both
2000 6 (40%) 4 (26.66%) 5 (33.33%)
2001 7 (46.66%) 3 (20%) 5 (33.33%)
2002 6 (46.15%) 2 (15.38%) 5 (38.33%)
The companies in this category apply themselves to the development of process or 
product innovations to emerging or established major hardware or software systems 
that facilitate the production or delivery of digital media content. These technology 
systems tend to be highly standardised across global markets, which in part is a factor 
for many companies operating outside the domestic market. They service niche 
markets, in a vein similar to Vivien Walsh’s contention that companies within a small 
system of innovation would concentrate on niche, process innovations, or “specialised 
applications of a basic technology” (Walsh, 1988: 53). The level of innovative activity 
seemed to rise little over the three years.
5 . 1 1 :  I n n o v a t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  f o r e i g n  i n d i r e c t  d i g i t a l  m e d ia  c o n t e n t  p r o d u c e r s  
( F I M P s )
Similar to foreign digital media content producers, the companies in this category 
tend to be large-scale, provide high levels of employment, and the organisations as a 
whole tend to be highly innovative. However, the more innovative activities are not 
undertaken here, but tend to be carried out in the multinational’s country of origin, 
which stifles their contribution towards raising the level of innovative activity within 
the Irish system.
In 2000, 50% of companies manufactured innovations or artefacts here that were 
researched and developed elsewhere. Some 12.5% had manufacturing operations that
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incorporated an element of development (although their main activity remained 
manufacturing). Of the firms, 37.5% maintained localisation operations here (e.g. 
localising software applications) that had an element of development. (But again, the 
main focus was localisation, not development.)
Table V: Innovative activities of the firms in the FIMP category, 200», 2001 and 2002
Year Manufacturing Localisation Manufacturing
with
development
Localisation with 
development
2000 4 (50%) 1 (12.5%) 37.5%
2001 4 (50%) 1 (12.5%) 1 (12.5%) 2 (25%)
2002 4 (50%) 1 (12.5%) 1 (12.5%) 2 (25%)
The level of development carried out in the category dropped between 2001 and 
2002. For both years, 50% of the companies maintained manufacturing operations, 
12.5% maintained localisation operations, 12.5% maintained manufacturing with an 
element of development, and 25% maintained localisation with an element of 
development. The innovative level of the category seemed to drop after 1999.
5 .1 2 :  I n n o v a t i v e  f i r m s  ( I F )
The companies in this category tend to be small-scale, not radically innovative, 
provide relatively low levels of employment, but of the three indigenous categories 
shows the highest propensity to service foreign markets. In 2000, 94.87% were 
involved in the production of software innovations, while 5.13% combined their 
software innovations with hardware innovations. The relevant figures for 2001, after 
the category had undergone a slight expansion, were 92.5% and 7.5%. In 2002, after it 
had undergone a significant contraction, the figures were 93.55% and 6.45%. The 
innovative level within the industry was low and consisted mainly of process 
innovations to previously established major software systems, conforming to Vivien 
Walsh’s conception of companies in small national systems developing “specialised 
applications of basic technologies” (Walsh, 1988: 53). The process software 
innovations they developed were to serve niche markets. The major software systems 
tended to be established globally, which in part accounted for the high number of 
companies in this category that delivered to foreign markets.
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Table W: innovative activities of the firms in the IF category, 2000,2001 and 2002
Year Software Hardware Software and 
hardware
2000 37 (94.38%) 2(5.13%)
2001 37 (92.5%) 3 (7.5%)
2002 29 (93.55%) 2 (6.45%)
5 .1 3 :  C o n c l u s i o n
The innovation studies approach which is informed by technological determinism 
suggests that new sectors and industries emerge along a linear and predictable path, 
on an upward route with an ever increasing size and sophistication of its innovations. 
Despite predictions for continued future growth in 1999, the content industry had 
contracted by 2002. And although it has tightened around higher-end innovative 
activities such as the development of uncommissioned content, educational and 
training artefacts, and interactive games, the sophistication of innovations and 
artefacts being developed has not raised significantly since 1999. In the three years of 
the case-study, the emergence of the industry was closer to Schumpeter’s waves 
theory of mini-booms and busts, growths and contractions, but with the overall trend 
within a wave (50 years or so) being of growth and an increase in the sophistication of 
innovations developed within the industry.
A three year study covered but a fraction of a Schumpeterian wave, and research 
over a longer time-span would be necessary to test the suitability of the waves concept 
to account for the emergence of the Irish digital media content industry. However, 
given the short history of the industry, the approximate 50 year time-span of a 
Schumpeterian wave is not available. However, in my research, the year between
2000 and 2001 brought marginal growth and, in keeping with the systems of 
innovation concept, unsuccessful innovators were eliminated from the industry but 
were replaced by new innovators. The industry contracted between 2001 and 2002 -  
although new innovators entered the market, they were outnumbered by unsuccessful 
innovators eliminated from it. The contraction coincided with the slowdown in the 
wider economy, and although the contraction in the content industry wasn’t in synch 
or directly proportional to that in the wider economy, it suggests that trends in the 
national system influenced those in an industrial system (a macro-influence on the 
industry’s emergence -  the qualitative chapters will examine micro-influences on
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individual companies, which are the constituent parts of the emerging industry). The 
thesis rejects any assumption that trends in the NSI determined those in the industrial 
systems, but the national system proved to be an influential factor over the three 
years. Nelson suggests, for example, that: “The factors that make for commonality 
within a single country...largely define the factors that make for commonality across 
sectors within a country” (1993, 518). All the categories in my study share certain 
commonalities -  they are clustered around Dublin, tend to engage in lower-end 
innovative activities, and a slowing of growth coincided with that in the wider 
economy. The macro-economic forecasts for 20035 suggested a return to a higher 
level of economic growth, and this, in turn, could influence growth in the content 
industry. The year between 2001 and 2002 may be viewed as a blip in an overall trend 
of growth, or one of the mini-busts of Schumpeterian theory. However, such 
forecasting cannot be verified by this thesis, which rejects the notion of inevitable 
technological trajectories or any such predictability in the emergence of a new 
industry.
5 The Economic and Social Research Institute, according to a story in The Irish Times (23 April 2002), 
predicted tliat although economic growth for the whole of 2002 would average 3.1%, the economy 
would grow by 5% for the final three months of the year. The rate for 2003 was expected to be 4.4%.
Chapter 6: Case-study: Ireland.com
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The purpose of the last chapter was to draw a general picture of the Irish digital media 
content industry -  to monitor its emergence and the main influences on it, and tease 
out its main characteristics and areas of innovative activity. The methodology chapter 
argues that such a general study is necessary to produce balanced and accurate results 
in my research.
The general study, by its nature, is too removed to examine many of the subtle and 
complex processes and interactions that take place within individual digital media 
content companies. Many of these processes and interactions have a profound 
influence on the direction and final form of a content innovation. Therefore, they need 
to be examined to develop a better understanding of the nature of digital media 
content creation, and to gauge how macro and meso-level influences affect innovation 
at the micro, firm level, and vice versa. To achieve such an understanding, the 
following case-study chapters will leave the general and focus on the particular.
The particular, in this chapter, is a qualitative case-study of a digital media content 
venture located within an organisation whose core activity is not the production of 
digital media content. The organisation is The Irish Times Group, whose core activity 
is to publish a quality daily broadsheet newspaper in the Republic of Ireland. The 
subject of the case-study is the Group’s website, Ireland.com. In researching the 
emerging digital media content industry, I am interested in Irish examples of digital 
media content innovations, how they emerge and evolve, and the influences on them. 
Ireland.com presents an opportunity to examine a digital media content form 
(website) that has a direct relationship with a traditional media content form 
(newspaper). This relationship heavily influences the style, content and production of 
Ireland.com, but as the website has matured, it has evolved into something distinct, 
something more than just a digital media reflection of The Irish Times newspaper.
As outlined in the literature review, in relation to books and magazines, emerging 
media content forms often borrow heavily from traditional media content forms. But 
the relationship and influence weakens as the new media form matures and develops
Chapter 6: Case-study: Ireland.com
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its own codes, grammars and techniques. Whereas the magazine was once regarded as 
“a book with a flimsy cover” (Owen 1992: 13), the book and the magazine today are 
regarded as two distinct, independent content forms. I will argue that The Irish Times 
and Ireland.com are at an early stage of a similar process. Of course, the similarity 
with books and magazines can not be carried through intact, because they are general 
content forms. The Irish Times and Ireland.com are specific content innovations, 
produced by the same organisation, which bonds the two on many levels. But, this 
thesis argues, The Irish Times and Ireland.com are a specific instance of a general 
trend -  that, generally, digital media has borrowed heavily from the production 
techniques, competencies and values of traditional media, but as digital media has 
begun to mature, it has refashioned many traditional media practices to suit the new 
medium and has developed competencies, techniques and values of its own. (From a 
systems of innovation perspective, Ireland, com as a content innovation has begun to 
accumulate competencies, knowledge and infrastructures. It has achieved this not 
through the undertaking of formal research and development, as specified in the early 
systems of innovation writings, but through the interactive learning that later 
incarnations of the model are moving towards.) In this vein, The Irish Times website 
has evolved since its establishment in 1994 into a content innovation that has many 
elements and practices distinct from the newspaper. So much so that the term online 
newspaper, popular in the mid-1990s when the web was first emerging into 
mainstream use, is no longer spoken in the office of Ireland.com. Although the 
website publishes content originally generated for the newspaper, it also offers 
content and services generated exclusively for the website, and generated using 
techniques more suited to the web than to The Irish Times’s traditional print concerns. 
The Irish Times, a newspaper company since 1859, has in recent years embraced, 
learned and evolved new content creation and technical competencies and entered 
new media domains. This thesis argues that few media forms are static -  they change 
in terms of style, content, production techniques, and technology. As demonstrated in 
the literature review, magazines are still evolving, despite being an established, 
traditional media content form. Newspapers, too, are evolving, as is digital media. 
Although the fundamentals of the print Irish Times are the same as in 1994 -  same 
standards of journalism, target readership, news values -  the newspaper was not the 
same in 2002 as it was then: changes had occurred in Irish society, which in 1994 was 
entering the Celtic Tiger economic boom, certain sections of Irish society had
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experienced seven years of unprecedented economic growth and wealth, and there had 
been many social changes associated with this. These changes influenced the content 
of the newspaper and its style and presentation. The paper expanded, with more 
pages, supplements and business sections; it introduced a magazine and recruited new 
journalists and workers who exerted an influence over the final product. The Irish 
Times as a newspaper and a traditional media content innovation continued evolving. 
It was not static. Neither was Ireland com, but because it was based in a newer 
medium (digital media), its evolution was more apparent and dramatic. It evolved into 
something more than what it was when it was first launched in 1994.
But there is a lot of uncertainty over its future development direction. A senior 
Ireland.com employee said no one knows for sure how digital media as a content 
form will evolve, so it is important to be flexible enough to adapt. This case-study 
presents an opportunity to assess the evolution, thus far, of Ireland.com as a content 
innovation, to examine the organisational innovation in Ireland.com and The Irish 
Times, and assess how it interacts with external actors both within the digital media 
content industry and outside.
Being, for so long, a traditional newspaper company, The Irish Times Group has 
had to undergo a quite significant organisational innovation to integrate a new media 
division into its structure. But, as shall be argued later in the chapter, The Irish Times 
Group is at an early stage of this organisational innovation; it is in transition and, in 
effect, operates a two-tiered organisational structure: the first is the more systematic, 
rigid organisational structure of the print newspaper, where the layers of bureaucracy 
and the demarcation of tasks and responsibilities has been forming since 1859 and has 
reached a high level of maturity. (As shall be outlined later, newspaper newsrooms 
have developed a conventional structure and The Irish Times newsroom does not 
differ greatly from it.) The second is the more fluid, flexible structure of the digital 
media division. A rigid structure has had less time to develop. In any case, staff at 
Ireland.com believe a rigid structure would not be suitable. Digital media is at an 
early stage of its emergence, and so are the organisational structures to support it. (In 
the conceptual framework of this thesis, not only is there an emergence of a 
supporting institutional set-up external to the company, but also the emergence of 
organisational structures within the company.) At this early stage, Ireland.com 
believes it is best to keep its organisational structure as flexible as possible, so it can 
respond quickly to changes as the medium matures.
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In early 2001, The Irish Times Group was re-aligning itself as not just a 
newspaper publishing company but an open-ended publishing company, capable of 
delivering content across print and digital media platforms. In the organisation’s own 
words, it wanted to embrace competencies, content forms and markets that were not 
always consistent with “the traditional franchise areas of the newspaper” 
Oittp./Avww./re/qn<:/.coffl/about/web/webhistory.htm. viewed on 23 July 2001). However, later 
in 2001, financial difficulties in the core newspaper business forced a re-assessment 
of the Group’s ambitions. The Group consolidated around the core busines, and 
although it maintained the new media division, financial support to it was cut and it 
was put under increased pressure to deliver revenues. However, the process of 
organisational innovation within The Irish Times Group influences the production of 
content, and the final form of content innovations, both for print and digital media. It 
is important, therefore, to consider this organisational innovation, especially at this 
early stage of the website’s emergence, when the options remain relatively open and 
no rigid structure has been established.
Ireland.com is run by a subsidiary company, Itronics Ltd, but it is a wholly owned 
subsidiary and Ireland.com can not be treated as an actor that is independent of the 
overall Irish Times organisation. Ireland.com is worthy of a case-study analysis 
because it is one of the most successful Irish digital media content innovations. It has 
achieved a large usership both within and outside the state, and as such is an 
important actor within the industry, According to the latest independently audited 
figures for the website (May 2002), it receives 25.5 million page impressions per 
month and has 2.3 million users (www.ireland.com/about. viewed 2 September 2002). 
The focus of this case-study will not be on how those 2.3 million users consume the 
content on Ireland.com, or their patterns of consumption, but on how the content for 
lreland.com is produced. The website would seem to have overcome the difficulty of 
being able to produce content that is consumed both within the domestic market and 
abroad. The empirical research for this thesis suggests that Irish digital media content 
companies, especially core companies, have difficulty producing content that is 
commercially successful beyond the limited domestic market. In this respect, 
Ireland.com highlights how a traditional media company can have advantages over a 
start-up in producing a digital media content innovation.
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The advantages and disadvantages of the research methodologies employed by this 
thesis are discussed in an earlier chapter and so shall not be repeated here. I shall, 
however, note the particular methodologies I employed while undertaking the case- 
study of Ireland.com. I used qualitative methods, which included semi-structured in- 
depth interviews with a number of people involved in the editorial, technical and 
commercial areas of the Ireland.com organisation. I also undertook document 
analysis, mainly of the website itself, and I engaged in observation during a three 
week period I spent in the office of Ireland.com, in August 2001.1 left the office with 
an agreement to renew contact at a later date, when my thesis was nearer completion, 
to discuss any intervening changes to the website that were relevant to my study. The 
main reason for this was that, during my three week research placement, the 
incorporation of audio and video was planned as the next phase in the website’s 
development. Renewing contact, I believed, would allow me to better assess the 
process of integrating audio and video into the website, which had, since its 
establishment in 1994, been mainly text and image-based. However, by the time I 
renewed contact in August 2002, events at The Irish Times Group had taken an 
unexpected turn, and had affected the innovative development of Ireland.com. My 
aim was no longer to assess the integration of audio and video, as originally agreed, 
but to assess how the changed financial circumstances at the Group had affected the 
development of the website.
6 . 2 :  B a c k g r o u n d  t o  The Irish Times a n d  Ireland com
6.2.1: Background to The Irish Times
The Irish Times was established in Dublin in 1859 as a quality, broadsheet newspaper. 
In its early years, the politics of newspaper accorded with the political views of its 
founder, Major Laurence Knox. It was a conservative newspaper, and it described 
itself as such in its first edition on the 29th March 1859. The newspaper later aligned 
itself with unionist politics in the years prior to Irish independence from Britain. On 
the foundation of the Free State in 1922, the newspaper committed itself to following
6.1: M ethodology and justification for case-study
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an “independent political line” (httD://wvvvv./re/ana'.cow/about/print/lii.slorv.htm, viewed 23 
July 2001). However, in an emerging Irish society still struggling with the National 
Question, it took many years for the public’s perception of The Irish Times as a 
unionist newspaper to fade. According to one commentator, the public’s perception of 
unionist sympathies within the newspaper was not unfounded, with many on the 
editorial and managerial staff being more sympathetic to the government in London 
than the one in Dublin (Oram, 1983). Largely because of its unionist sympathies, The 
Irish Times appealed to a small, select section of Irish society, so much so that the 
editor of the newspaper, Conor Brady, once said: “It used to be said that every time a 
name appeared in the deaths’ column of The Irish Times, the circulation of the paper 
went down by one” (Oram, 1993: 51).
The Irish Times began to turn into a liberal, independent newspaper in the 1960s, 
as the composition of the editorial staff began to shift, with the appointment of 
younger journalists and editors more in tune with changes in Irish society at the time. 
Not only was the news agenda opened and greater freedom allowed in the topics and 
styles of journalism, but also the newspaper introduced changes such as placing the 
bylines of reporters on stories. Bylines were a standard style convention in the modern 
newspaper industry, but prior to the sixties, they were uncommon.
Ownership of the newspaper remained in private hands until 1974, when The Irish 
Times Trust was established. The Trust was formed during the uncertain economic 
conditions of the mid-1970s to protect the newspaper from commercial takeover. The 
Trust’s charter obligates it to maintain The Irish Times as “an independent newspaper 
primarily concerned with serious issues for the benefit of the community throughout 
the whole of Ireland, free from any form of personal or party political, commercial, 
religious or other sectional control” (hm://ww\\>.Ireland c W about/print/historv.htm. viewed 
on 23 July 2001).
The circulation of the newspaper has been rising steadily since the mid-1980s. For 
the year 2002, its readership averaged 343,000 per day (The Irish Times, 5 September 
2001). Although The Irish Times was not Ireland’s biggest selling daily newspaper 
(the Irish Independent’s readership averaged 591,000 per day), 85% of its readers 
came from the affluent and influential ABC1 readership group -  professionals and 
business people. The Irish Times, therefore, is regarded as an extremely influential 
media organ in the Republic of Ireland.
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6.2.2: Background to Ireland.com
According to one Ireland.com employee, the decision for The Irish Times Group to 
begin developing a digital media content innovation was down to “a combination of 
luck and vision, and a lot more luck than vision” (Pope, Ireland.com, 2001). In 
describing it as such, the employee was being consistent with social shaping theory on 
the arbitrariness of the emergence of innovations. The emergence, or development 
path, of Ireland.com as a digital media content innovation was not inevitable; it was 
down to a number of factors, conditions and influences, too many to make the process 
predictable with any great degree of certainty. Almost to emphasise the arbitrariness 
of the process, one could argue that the origins of Ireland.com are grounded in a 
chance occurrence while The Irish Times Group was seeking to innovate the print 
newspaper.
In 1994, executives from The Irish Times Group were on a tour of the United 
States to try to find a suitable new printing press for the newspaper. They visited the 
printing operations of a number of US newspapers. The last newspaper they visited 
was the San Jose Mercury News, which was the first newspaper in the world to begin 
publishing an online edition. Before the executives left, the editor of the San Jose 
Mercury News showed them the newspaper’s website. And from that, the executives 
left the United States without having bought a printing press, but with the idea of 
putting The Irish Times on the web.
The Irish Times first appeared on the web in September 1994. It had a limited 
amount of content from the print newspaper and was purely text-based, due to the 
technical limitations of the dominant web browsers of the time, Lynx and Mosaic. 
(Lynx was a purely text-based browser; Mosaic allowed some basic graphical content. 
It wasn’t until the development of the Netscape browser that graphics could be 
incorporated into websites on a significant scale.) It would be nearly two years before 
graphics and photographs would be added to the website in any substantial form. 
Although The Irish Times undertook no advertising to support the early website, it 
quickly began to attract 1,000 visitors a month. This, according to deputy editor 
Conor Pope, demonstrated to the company’s management that the web offered the 
potential to open a much broader base for The Irish Times, in terms of potential 
audiences, sources of revenue and channels for delivering content.
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For the first year of its existence, The Irish Times on the Web (as it was then 
called) was posted on the web by a number of technical operators based in Trinity 
College Dublin. At the time, The Irish Times organisation didn’t possess the necessary 
technical competencies to publish the web edition itself. The technical people, who 
had no editorial background or training, took copy from the print Irish Times files, 
slotted it into a webpage template, and posted it on the web. By late 1995, 
management at the newspaper had decided that, if it were going to produce a serious, 
professional electronic media artefact, it had to have trained journalists working 
exclusively on the website. Four journalists began working on the website in early 
1996; their remit was to provide the necessary editorial and content creation 
competencies. Also employed were people with the necessary technical competencies, 
so The Irish Times organisation had begun to achieve a balance between the content 
creation and technical competencies necessary to produce a digital media content 
innovation.
Around 1995/1996, a number of commentators (mainly from a technological 
determinist perspective, such as Negroponte, 1995) were predicting the demise of the 
print newspaper, to be replaced by online newspapers. (Such technological 
determinist claims are critiqued elsewhere in the thesis.) Many newspaper
organisations were worried about how to respond to this perceived new threat.
However, the emerging patterns of digital media content consumption contradicted 
their predictions, and were more consistent with the historical trend that the 
emergence of a new media form does not necessarily cause the demise of an older 
media form. While, at first, they may seem competitive, the relationship changes as 
the new medium matures, and they slip into uncompetitive, often complementary, 
roles. Irish Times management realised early on that the newspaper’s print content on 
the web was being consumed abroad, by people who couldn’t access the physical 
print edition. In Ireland, the print newspaper was still being bought and read, in
preference to consuming the content online. Print and digital media are different
media, appealing to different audiences and serving different roles. They can be 
complementary rather than competitive, as evidenced by the fact that, since the 
establishment of the website in 1994, the usership of the website and the circulation of 
the newspaper have both been rising. (Usership of the website has been rising rapidly 
abroad, but even within Ireland itself, circulation and usership have both been rising 
steadily.) In 1996, 88% of the website’s traffic came from abroad. Because of the
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website’s heavy reliance on content from the print newspaper, traffic remained 
disproportionately high from abroad for a number of years. In March 1999, the 
website was relaunched as Ireland.com; it offered content from the print Irish Times, 
but also content on ancillary websites, which contained general and tourist 
information about Ireland. Such content was aimed at users outside the state. It 
established a breaking news service, which was aimed primarily at users within the 
state. It began to offer web services such as free email to appeal to both groups. 
(These wouldn’t be the patterns of consumption for every user, but according to 
Ireland.com’s own (mainly quantitative) research and perceptions o f usership, they 
would be the typical, general trends.)
Under the Ireland.com label, the balance of usership shifted; in 2001, 60% of 
traffic came from outside the Republic of Ireland, and 40% from within. Usership for 
the year 2000 rose to 24.6 million page impressions and 1.5 unique users per month. 
In March 1999, at the time of the relaunch as Ireland.com, the website was registering
6.5 million page impressions per month and had 585,000 users. (Its number of users 
just over doubled in a year, while its page impressions quadrupled, which would 
suggest that those who did use the website stayed on it for longer. At lreland.com, this 
was believed to be a result of the more varied types of content on the website.) Its 
impression and usership figures for 1998 and 1999 were similar, which suggested that 
an element of stagnation had set in. So the relaunch as Ireland.com was well timed, 
because between 1999 and 2000, the website was expanding rapidly again, with 
traffic more than doubling. Traffic figures for 2000 and 2001 (I gathered the latter 
figures from internal documents on impression rates) were also similar, but in 2001 a 
planned website redesign was regarded as necessary to stimulate further traffic 
increases. In 1998, the website recorded an average of just under six million page 
impressions per month and had 620,623 users. In 1997, it had 4.25 million page 
impressions per month and 396,131 individual users. The Irish Times on the Web was 
the first Irish website to have independently certified figures for usership, and it began 
doing so in 1996. The principal reason for this was to carry more authority when the 
website approached advertisers, to demonstrate that it could deliver a sizeable 
audience.
Itronics Ltd, the wholly owned subsidiary that ran Ireland.com, employed 53 full­
time people in 2001 across the editorial, technical, commercial and administrative 
areas of the organisation. (As will be outlined later, significant job cuts were
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implemented between my research placement in August 2001 and the renewal of 
contact in August 2002.) The company employed nineteen staff journalists, as well as 
offering shift work to a number of freelance journalists. This is consistent with the 
practice in the traditional media, in which it is common to employ the services of 
freelance journalists and sub-editors. However, workers on the managerial, 
commercial and administrative areas of the business tend to be contracted or 
permanent. The employment figure for Ireland.com was slightly misleading, however, 
because it took into account only the people who worked directly for Ireland.com. 
The journalists and sub-editors who worked for the print Irish Times could be 
regarded as working indirectly for Ireland.com. The stories they wrote for the print 
newspaper formed much of the content on the website. This will be discussed further 
in the section on competencies.
6 .3 :  E v o l u t i o n  o f  Ireland.com a s  a  c o n t e n t  i n n o v a t io n
6.3.1: Overview
After completing my three week research placement in August 2001, I argued that 
Ireland.com had undergone three significant phases of innovative development as a 
content innovation, and was about to enter a fourth phase. Based on my research at 
the time, it was a valid argument. When I renewed contact, however, circumstances 
had changed at The Irish Times Group. Financial difficulties had forced the Group to 
cut costs across all areas of its organisation, and it began to scale-down the 
lreland.com organisation. The website was moved more quickly than originally 
planned to a subscription model, in an attempt to raise revenues.
First, based on my August 2001 research, I will outline the three phases of 
innovative development that Ireland.com had gone through, and outline what was 
planned as its next phase. Then, I will outline the changed circumstances at the Group 
and how they shifted Ireland.com as a content innovation onto a different 
development path.
As stated, by August 2001, lreland.com had undergone three significant phases of 
innovative development and was about to enter a fourth. However, this is not to argue 
that innovation within Ireland.com occurred only in sudden, distinct phases -  minor,
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process innovations are on-going and continuous, as they are in the majority of digital 
media content innovations. However, there are certain periods of Ireland.com'’s 
existence which are marked by intense change to the content innovation -  in the aims 
and presentation of the website, and the competencies, knowledge and infrastructures 
required to produce it. These phases, in the context of innovation at Ireland.com, 
represent significant steps forward in the evolution of the website as a content 
innovation. During each phase, the website slid further away from the print 
newspaper, to being a more distinct, independent content innovation.
In some respects, the four phases represents an approximate model, because not 
everything associated with a phase of innovation took place within a distinct, neat 
timeframe, and it perhaps suggests a greater level of linearity to the process than was 
the case. The implementation of plans from one phase of innovation sometimes 
overlapped with the beginning of the next phase. Plans to implement new innovative 
practices could have been formed long before it was attempted to implement them in 
practice. Or some plans for innovation may have been implemented on a small-scale 
first, to assess their feasibility and their potential value to the content innovation, 
before the risk was taken to implement them more fully. For example, in 1998, The 
Irish Times on the Web began forming plans to integrate audio and video into the 
website: three years later, in June 2001, there was only a small amount of audio and 
video on the website, mainly in the ancillary websites which provided general 
information about Ireland. It was expected to be another month (September 2001) 
before audio broadcasts were incorporated into the breaking news section, and this 
would have been regarded as the beginning of the deeper integration of audio into the 
website. The planned next step was to integrate video broadcasts into the breaking 
news service.
The integration of audio and video into the website was the expected fourth phase 
of innovative development, and it was in August 2001 the one that Ireland.com 
seemed on the verge of entering. Yet the idea for integrating audio and video had been 
formed before even the third phase was implemented, which was the relaunch of the 
website as Ireland.com. Despite such temporal weaknesses, the four phase model 
remains a useful tool for tracing Ireland.com’s evolution as a content innovation, and 
for noting (generally) how The Irish Times Group has integrated a digital media 
element into its organisational structure, and how the larger organisation influences 
the processes of innovation within Ireland.com.
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6.3.2: The first phase (September 1994 -  late 1995)
When I interviewed deputy editor Conor Pope on 14th June 2001, I asked him to 
assess the website’s progress since it was established. He replied: “In the space of 
seven years, we’ve gone from a state of complete and abject nothingness into having
1.5 million different people accessing the site every month” (Pope, Ireland.com, 
2001). The first phase could be seen as going from a state of complete and abject 
nothingness to having something -  establishing a presence on the web, even if by 
today’s standards of the website, it was a primitive presence. The background to the 
establishment of the website was already outlined, but it is worthwhile to restate that 
The Irish Times Group was seeking to innovate the print newspaper when it came 
across the idea to develop a digital media content innovation.
As discussed in the literature review chapters, new media borrow from the 
traditional media in order to make unfamiliar concepts and practices familiar (Marvin, 
1988). This is partly the reason why “online newspaper” gained currency as a term to 
describe the websites of newspapers. Print newspapers and online newspapers provide 
a rare example of a close and direct relationship between a traditional media form and 
a new media form. When The Irish Times on the Web was first established, it carried 
the weight of history of its traditional media predecessor, something a content 
innovation produced by a digital media start-up company doesn’t experience. There 
are certain values, traditions, standards and practices that the website has inherited 
from the print Irish Times, and in many instances, these values, traditions, standards 
and practices are not consistent with (or suitable to) how a digital media venture 
should operate. Of course, some of them in a general application are suitable, such as 
the fundamentals of good journalism, but their precise application doesn’t suit the 
website: what has worked for decades in print isn’t necessarily going to work on the 
web. Although in the early days, the thinking was that it would. There was a 
renegotiation process whereby the website adapted, changed or dropped the values it 
inherited from the newspaper, as part of its evolution as a digital media content 
innovation. However, most of this did not take place in the first phase.
The first year of the website could be seen as a period of gentle experimentation, 
with The Irish Times organisation growing increasingly familiar with an unfamiliar 
medium, gaining a sense of what would and what wouldn’t work on the website, and
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assessing the feasibility of a newspaper company developing a digital media content 
innovation. It was also a period of assessing the competencies required to produce a 
successful digital media content innovation, and engaging in an active search to 
acquire the competencies lacking within The Irish Times organisation. In the early 
days, it couched the website in familiar, print media terms. It described the website as 
an online newspaper, called it The Irish Times on the Web, and tried to fashion it as a 
digital media reflection of the print newspaper. Because the content of the website 
was entirely text-based, it suited the traditional competencies of the newspaper -  the 
production of content in words. All of the content on the website had been originally 
generated for the newspaper, so the production of content for the early website relied 
entirely on the techniques, codes and grammars of the print media. Only in the 
publication of the content did the two differ; it was found that, within The Irish Times 
organisation, there was not sufficient technical competencies to publish the content 
online, so the company had to go outside the organisation, to the technical operators at 
Trinity College Dublin. I spoke to one of the Trinity people approached by The Irish 
Times to work in this capacity. He said the main competencies being sought by the 
organisation were a knowledge of HTML and some experience in graphics (although 
this didn’t have as high a priority as HTML). They were not asked if they had a 
background in content creation, writing or journalism (Christopher Power, email, 26 
July 2001).
This thesis argues that innovations rarely arrive as completed artefacts -  they are 
constructs of meanings and uses, with a social context of production and 
consumption, open to the influences of many actors and capable of being interpreted, 
appropriated and negotiated in different ways. The Irish Times on the Web was not a 
completed artefact when it was first published. It was subjected to a series of on-going 
process innovations, as the people involved in publishing it appraised what worked 
and what didn’t work, and began a process of competency and knowledge 
accumulation, which as argued in the literature review is crucial to the development of 
innovations. They decided that the technical competencies to publish the website 
should be brought within the organisation. They also realised that, even though Irish 
Times newspaper journalists had content competencies, they were too far removed 
from the production of the website for their content competencies to have a telling 
effect. The technical people who worked directly on the website lacked content 
competencies. Although the website, then, was based almost entirely on content from
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the print newspaper, problems arose with the prioritisation of news-stories and the 
rewriting of stories that, in their original print form, weren’t suitable for the website. 
Not all of the content from the newspaper was published online, so choices had to be 
made about what to include and exclude. And as much of the traffic to the website 
originated from abroad, there was the question of whether to prioritise stories that 
might be of more interest to foreign users. To make such judgements professionally 
required what journalists called news-sense. Many journalists themselves have a 
vague, unclear understanding of what news-sense is; it is regarded almost as a 
received knowledge, and explanations of it are usually reduced to journalists claiming 
they have an instinctive knowledge of what is and is not news. Numerous studies 
(Manof, 1986) have shown that it is not an instinctive knowledge, but a pattern of 
thinking into which journalists are socialised according to the prevailing culture and 
values of the media organisation in which they work. Such studies suggest that news- 
sense follows strict patterns of what is likely to be considered news: power is news, 
for example, so the actions of an authority figure are more likely to be considered 
news than those of a person who does not wield significant power in society. It is not 
the purpose of this thesis to critique the conventions of journalism, but it is important 
to note them, because they are an intangible cultural influence on the innovation 
process that in a standard application of the systems of innovation concept would be 
accorded negligible importance. The content creation competencies required to 
produce Ireland.com do not just relate to the direct production of content, but also to 
the choices made about what to produce and publish; therefore, news-sense has a 
crucial influence on the final form of the website.
The early website contained no graphics or photographs because the dominant 
web browsers of the time could not accommodate them. However, even as a text- 
based website, it was a significant content innovation for a traditional newspaper 
company. It demonstrated that there were other channels through which The Irish 
Times Group could deliver its print content. As visitors to the site increased, it 
convinced the Group’s management that the website justified the risk associated with 
further innovation and further investment. It had made its initial entry into the digital 
media content industry, and the website had undergone some process innovations 
(graphics had begun to creep into it by the end of the first phase). The Irish Times 
Group had gained a sense of the limitations of the original, text-only format, and what 
needed to be done to open up the website’s potential. Crucially, during the first phase,
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The Irish Times Group learned that the techniques of the print media could not be 
grafted whole onto a digital media format, and that the website required content 
competencies to be applied directly to it. This, in turn, led to the second phase. People 
with content competencies were employed to work directly on the website, and they 
initiated a process of learning and innovation that would help The Irish Times 
organisation produce a content innovation better suited to the emerging medium. This 
showed the beginnings of innovation through interactive learning, as outlined in 
Lundvall’s model (1992), with competency accumulation growing, increasing 
complexity of the innovation, the elimination of unsuccessful elements, and a greater 
emphasis on successful elements, based loosely on Lundvall’s model of learning by 
doing, using and interacting.
6.3.3: The second phase (late 1995 -  March 1999)
The second stage of the evolution began at the end of 1995, when the then editor of 
the website, Seamus Martin, contacted four journalists with a view to working on the 
website. Control of the technical production of the website had been taken back from 
the technical operators in Trinity College and the necessary technical competencies 
were brought in-house. By this stage, The Irish Times Group had taken a significant 
step forward in terms of organisational innovation, in that it was incorporating new 
competencies into its structure, and also had begun to expand its technical 
infrastructure for producing the website. During the second phase, the website began 
to incorporate photographs and graphics, but this did not go too far beyond the 
traditional print competencies of the organisation. However, the organisation was 
becoming increasingly aware that, as the website developed and matured, the 
competencies required to produce it would become further divorced from those 
required for the production of the newspaper.
The website was still lacking in original, web-exclusive content; it was known as 
The Irish Times on the Web and the majority of its content was originally created for 
the newspaper. Content creation competencies were employed mainly in the selection 
and editing of content to make it more suited to the website. Application software had, 
by this stage, developed to such an extent that a deep knowledge of HTML was not 
required to create a webpage, which reduced the burden of technical competencies 
required for the publication of content. Stories from the print Irish Times would be
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sent via a direct computer feed to the websites’s computer system between 4pm and 
midnight. Irish Times on the Web journalists would take stories from the queue, re­
write the copy and the headlines if necessary, and convert the text into HTML using 
Microsoft Word. They would layout the webpage in the template house-style of The 
Irish Times on the Web. Deputy editor Conor Pope acknowledged that, during this 
time, there was “a lot of fairly dull cutting and pasting on behalf of all the editorial 
staff’ (Pope, Ireland.com, 2001). In its prioritisation of stories, the website tried to 
mirror the newspaper as closely as possible, to maintain consistency between the two. 
By this time, the website had begun to publish photographs, but published fewer than 
the newspaper, because the layout of the webpages was not designed to accommodate 
a large number of pictures. Also, the technical limitations of Internet speed meant that 
pictures could take a long time to download, which would undermine the website’s 
aim of allowing users quick access to information. This phase highlighted influences 
on the content innovation that were external to the organisation: the requirement, 
imposed by The Irish Times Group, on Ireland.com to maintain consistency with the 
newspaper (the ethos of Irish Times journalism meant that news values were shared 
between newsrooms, so even without daily contact between the two, the news 
agendas of both should have broadly accorded). Also, there were the restrictions of 
the technological infrastructure across which Ireland.com content was delivered.
Towards the end of the second phase, the website began to test to a greater extent 
the content competencies of the journalists by introducing a rolling news-sections, 
which posted up-dates of major stories that broke during the day. This was one of the 
first examples of the website producing web-exclusive content. It also, according to 
Conor Pope, was the first indication that The Irish Times organisation had begun to 
break out of the print mentality that fresh news couldn’t be published until the next 
day’s edition of the newspaper. However, in comparison to the current breaking news 
section in Ireland.com, the rolling news section in The Irish Times on the Web was 
limited; many of the stories were based on copy from news agency feed, such as 
Reuters, and therefore was generated externally to The Irish Times Group. This meant 
there was less stress on the website’s journalists to employ their abilities in original 
reporting, and the section didn’t cover the range of news topics that the later one did. 
The initial rolling news-section of The Irish Times on the Web was a period in which 
the organisation was assessing the feasibility and value of such an innovation. It 
wasn’t until the third phase (the relaunch as Ireland.com) that further investment and
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innovation were implemented to expand the section and make it a more fully 
integrated, innovative element of the website.
Here, we see a slow increase in the level and complexity of the content 
competencies that were being applied to the website, necessitated by the increasing 
complexity of the content innovation itself as it developed to a greater level of 
maturity. During this phase, the team working on the website developed a sharper 
sense of what worked and what didn’t work on the web, and the potential of it. They 
had moved beyond many of the early misconceptions of the medium and its form -  it 
was a different medium to print, and so the website shouldn’t have settled for being 
just an ‘online newspaper’. This informed, in March 1999, the third phase in the 
website’s evolution as a content innovation. During the second phase, The Irish Times 
on the Web was accumulating the competencies and knowledge (the know-how of 
Lundvall’s model of innovation through interactive learning) necessary for the next 
stage of the website’s innovative development. It was also assembling a team of 
employees large enough to service the expansion that would be necessary for the next 
phase of innovation, and developing the organisational and technological 
infrastructures to allow them to work. (By the time of the relaunch as Ireland.com, it 
employed 35 people. In 2001, it employed 53 people full-time, not including the 
freelance journalists who supplemented the editorial team.) Also, during the second 
phase, the plan for the fourth phase -  the incorporation of audio and video -  was 
circulating around the office of the website.
This phase is notable more so for the accumulation of new technical competencies 
within The Irish Times organisation than for the development of new content creation 
competencies. The format of the website during this phase still followed the lead of 
the print newspaper and didn’t place great demands on the content competencies of 
the people working on it. Usually, only a light-touch sub-editing job was necessary to 
make print Irish Times content suitable for publication on the web. (The content had, 
of course, already been sub-edited in the newspaper offices on D’Olier Street.) 
However, the technical competencies necessary to host, design and publish the 
website were brought within the overall Irish Times organisation. A computer system, 
based on Microsoft software applications, was installed (The Irish Times, in contrast, 
continued to use the Atex computer system, installed in 1991), and new technical 
competencies were necessary to install and maintain the system and plan the 
underlying technological architecture of the website. Again, employing Lundvall’s
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model, the competency and infrastructure accumulation had grown as the complexity 
of the overall innovation had increased.
6.3.4: The third phase (March 1999-M a y  2002)
The third phase marked the most significant step forward for the website as a content 
innovation, as it began to offer a greater variety of content that required the 
application of more complex content and technical competencies. As well as the print 
content, the website began to offer a substantial amount of web-exclusive content 
which required the application of new competencies. This content was created purely 
to suit the website; with print content, publication on the website was a secondary 
concern. The website began to offer online services, such as an email facility, which 
were outside the “traditional franchise area” of the newspaper as a supplier of news 
content 0ittp://w\vw./re/a/7f/.coff;/aboutAvcb/wcbhistory.lnm. viewed on 23 July 2001). The 
technical competencies and resources to establish and fully maintain an email service 
were beyond The Irish Times organisation, so the competencies of an actor from the 
international system of innovation had to be employed, an Israeli company called 
Commtouch.
It was at this time that the website stopped describing itself as an online 
newspaper; it began to describe itself as a site for “news and services for the Irish 
Internet user and those interested in Ireland in general”. (This message appears as the 
heading on the browser window when a user logs onto the Ireland.com homepage.) In 
terms of its design, aims, content, services and the competencies required to produce 
it, the website had taken its most significant step away from the newspaper and 
towards becoming something distinct, something more than just a digital media 
reflection of the print newspaper. This was signified by changing the name of the 
website from The Irish Times on the Web to Ireland.com.
The thinking behind the Ireland.com label was to give the website more freedom 
to offer services that traditionally wouldn’t have been associated with The Irish Times 
newspaper, or would have been outside its traditional franchise area. The title The 
Irish Times on the Web suggested just that: it was The Irish Times newspaper on the 
web. Ireland.com suggested there was more, and this enabled the organisation to 
better serve what it viewed as its two main markets: breaking news to the domestic 
market, under The Irish Times name and reputation, and print news and general
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information and services to its users abroad under the Ireland.com brand. The new 
title was an attempt to give the website a separate, marketable identity. A mission 
statement on the website referred to Ireland.com as the “definitive brand of quality 
information and services for Ireland aimed at Irish Internet users and the rapidly 
expanding 'Irish interest' market” 0it(p://www./re/fl;7^.coffl/aboiit/web/webcontent.htm. viewed 
on 23 July 2001).
The breaking news section, especially, imposed demands on the content 
competencies of Ireland.com journalists; during a newsday, The Irish Times 
newspaper did not file copy to the website, and the website did not file copy to the 
newspaper. Therefore, all the content in the breaking news section had to be generated 
by beland.com -  some was taken and rewritten from news agency feed (a common 
and standard practice among newspapers, who paid a fee to the news agencies to 
subscribe to their services). The rest was generated by Ireland.com journalists 
exclusively for the website. To run the section, Ireland.com had to establish its own 
information gathering structures and routines. (The know-what of Lundvall’s model, 
although in his conception information was necessary to produce an innovation; here, 
information was part of the final innovation.)
During this phase, the content, which Conor Pope described as “enormously 
valuable”, began to be delivered across other platforms. The content had to be adapted 
to suit the particular platform, which required the development of new competencies, 
both technical and content. These platforms included Wireless Application Protocol 
(WAP) mobile phones (Ireland.com supplied content to Eircell’s WAP service, E- 
Merge), and SMS text messages of news up-dates to mobile phones. During my 
research placement, the company was discussing plans to deliver content to palmtop 
computers. Ireland.com, at this time, operated according to the emerging business 
model of maximising revenue from digital media content through sending it across as 
many platforms as possible.
Ireland.com had, in 2001, been evolving as a content innovation for seven years. 
The experience accumulated at that stage was being written into a style-book on good 
practice in digital media publishing. However, the book was far from finished. The 
recommendations and directions in it were regarded as tentative, because no one was 
sure how digital media would evolve and what would constitute good practice for 
digital media content creation in the coming years. Stylebooks, however, were a 
tradition within the print media, and they seemed to be carrying through to the new
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media. Using Lundvall’s model, the next phase of innovation -  the integration of 
audio and video -  would have required a new process of competency, knowledge and 
infrastructure accumulation within the organisation.
(5.3.5; The expectedfourth phase
Ireland.com was, in August 2001, at an important juncture of its evolution as a 
content innovation. It was still heavily reliant on an old media form -  the newspaper -  
for its content. But, increasingly, it was generating its own, original content, 
employing competencies not traditionally associated with the newspaper, and it was 
providing services that were not available through the newspaper. This suggested that 
while the newspaper and the website were bonded, with the website borrowing 
practices from the newspaper, the relationship was beginning to weaken, as the 
website matured and became something distinct. That was certainly the belief among 
the staff of Ireland.com, who viewed themselves as creating something original and 
not just a web reflection of The Irish Times newspaper. The next stage of its evolution 
as a content innovation was expected to be the incorporation of audio and video, 
which would have pushed it further beyond the traditional print competencies of The 
Irish Times, and required the Ireland.com organisation to embrace competencies more 
traditionally associated with the broadcast media.
Senior editorial staff at the website was aware as early as 1998 that audio and 
video offered innovative possibilities to the website. In an interview in July 1998, 
Conor Pope said:
“I  would like to get to a situation where, at a major news conference in two 
years time, you would have...an Irish Times on the Web microphone. We 
could record the conference digitally and put it on the web live. The 
potential fo r  growth is enormous, and we have to start embracing sound and 
video. The problem is that at the moment people’s software and hardware 
makes it grindingly slow to download sound or video. But that problem will 
lessen as the technology improves” (Pope, Irish Times on the Web, 1998).
A recurring issue in my research is the limitations placed on content innovation by 
the technological infrastructure and delivery systems. The problem had lessened
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considerably since July 1998, especially in relation to audio. In June 2001, audio on 
the website (as a substantial part of the breaking news service) was still a projected 
six months away. The timeframe for the integration of video was dependent largely on 
the success of the audio integration. However, Ireland.com was aware of the risks 
associated with such innovation and of the unpredictability of the process. In 
reference to the audio broadcasts on breaking news, Conor Pope said: “They’re a trial; 
they mightn’t work. They might prove impossible to do” (Pope, Ireland.com, 2001).
The website, in August 2001, already had some audio and video elements to it, 
mainly in the ancillary websites. It had provided some video news, such as the video 
interviews with a Government Minister and an opposition politician arguing the case 
for and against the Nice Treaty in the referendum in 2001. (,lreland.com sought the 
technical competencies and infrastructures of an external actor, The Yard studio, to 
film and compress the audio and video content.) But these were relatively small scale 
samples of audio and video content. They were not immediate, live news, and could 
be seen as experiments to assess the feasibility of audio and video on the website 
before taking the innovative risk of integrating them on a more significant scale. Such 
a move would have required The Irish Times organisation to integrate new 
competencies and infrastructures, both content and technical, more traditionally 
associated with the broadcast media.
After my research placement ended in mid-August 2001, Ireland.com continued to 
build the competency base and infrastructures necessary for the launch of audio news 
broadcasts. The organisation screen-tested people for the role of broadcasters, and 
was on the point of launching the audio news-service when the Group announced the 
scale of its financial difficulties. Savings were sought across all areas of The Irish 
Times Group -  newspaper and website -  so the addition of audio broadcasts to the 
breaking news-service was cancelled. Conor Pope said: “All the new products and 
new ideas we were going to implement this year and next year have been put on hold. 
It costs an awful lot of money to host audio and video content. We don’t have that 
money. And a lot of products that we could have implemented in the past have had to 
be scrapped because they don’t follow our commercial imperative, to reduce costs and 
make money” (Pope, Ireland.com, 2002).
He also suggested a shift in attitude from July 1998, and August 2001, when he 
argued that The Irish Times Group would be better served focusing on its core media 
competencies instead of branching into audio and video, which previously were
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regarded as important elements of the Group’s overall digital media strategy. He also 
suggested that rather than there being a deepening convergence of media, a trend of 
deconvergence was emerging (or that predictions of convergence were overstated), 
especially in relation to people’s content consumption patterns. He said: “I’m not sure 
if there’s any great interest in having audio and video products online. If someone 
wants to watch television, they’ll generally speaking watch television” (Pope, 
Ireland.com, 2002). Deconvergance in people’s content consumption patterns is 
outside the scope of this project, but could prove a useful area for future research.
Investment in building the website’s technological infrastructure was cut, and 
40% of the Ireland.com’s full-time employees were made redundant. This not only 
undermined the organisation’s ability to add innovative elements to the website, but 
also its ability to maintain its level of service. Peripheral services and ancillary 
websites (which weren’t generating revenues) were cut. The website shifted to a core 
service of proving Irish Times content, breaking-news, a searchable archive, and a 
subscription email service. Elements of the website that were cut had previously 
justified their continuance through serving a public interest, but they were no longer 
justified under the company’s commercial imperative. Pope said that cut-backs had to 
be balanced against the need to maintain a quality of service, “within limited 
resources”, otherwise people wouldn’t subscribe to the website.
6.3.6: Innovation at Ireland, com
Each phase of Ireland.com’s development has involved innovation. Innovation often 
involved negotiations between various actors within the Ireland.com organisation, 
with each trying to push the website in a direction that would best serve their interests. 
In August 2001, Ireland.com was in the process of planning a website redesign. A 
core group of people within the organisation carried the responsibility for leading the 
redesign. This group was made up of two people from editorial (the editor and deputy 
editor), two people from technical, one person from commercial and one from design. 
Each gave their views on how the site should be redesigned; each group represented 
specific interests within thq  Ireland.com organisation, and so argued a case best suited 
to the interests of their area. The meetings tried to move forward through consensus, 
with the aim of achieving a balance between what the editorial people and the 
commercial people wanted, and what the technical people believed was feasible.
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However, people from different areas brought different agendas to redesign meetings. 
Conor Pope said: “Obviously, the people who are behind the property site want to be 
given as much prominence as possible; the people behind jobs want jobs to be given 
as much prominence as possible; the editorial people want content to be given as 
much prominence as possible” (Pope, Ireland.com, 2001).
Ireland.com outsourced some of its redesign work to a Dublin company called 
Windmill Lane. An Ireland.com designer went to their office and they worked 
together on various redesigns, taking on board comments made at redesign meetings. 
Windmill Lane’s sample designs were submitted to the core group, and they adopted 
the design they believed was best suited to the future direction and innovation of the 
website. The final redesign was quite small-scale: a new-look homepage and a new 
portal for navigating the site. Breaking-news and Irish Times news-stories remained 
largely the same, because an automated system had been implemented for publishing, 
and changing it would have required a substantial overhaul of the underlying 
technological architecture.
Innovation at Ireland.com was influenced by many factors, including cost. They 
weighed the cost of an innovation against the risk: if an innovation was believed to be 
too costly or risky, it would be dropped. Ireland.com’s innovative capacity operated 
within budgetary constraints (which tightened in 2002), so they had to achieve a 
balance, weighing the risks and costs of an innovation against the potential benefits to 
the website. Marketing executive Brendan Marrinan, who was involved in the 
research of new innovations for the website, said: “We might love to have it [an 
innovation], but if it’s going to be a [financial] drain on us, what’s the point?” 
(Marrinan, Ireland.com, 2001). Overall, Ireland.com was a financial drain on The 
Irish Times Group’s finances. Tighter finances constrained further innovation of the 
website, and the Group was not prepared to cover the costs associated with integrating 
audio and video.
Although much of the innovative effort in Ireland.com was based on achieving 
consensus despite actors’ differing goals (mechanisms to resolve conflicts were a 
feature of systems of innovation), the majority of it was based on co-operation. For 
example, one journalist, Fiona McCann, stressed the importance of the close 
relationship between the technical and editorial staff when innovating the production 
system for the website. The purpose of the technical staff was to service the needs of 
the editorial staff. The two sets of actors liased to develop a production system most
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sensitive to the needs of the editorial staff. This culture of co-operation between 
editorial and technical staff stemmed, partly, from Ireland.com being part of a 
traditional media company. Fred Moody noted the high level of friction that existed at 
Microsoft between content and technical staff during the development of the digital 
media content artefact Exploropedia (Moody, 1995). This was because Microsoft was 
a technical company, and some technical workers felt their positions and status were 
being diminished by having to work on content projects.
Essentially, within Ireland.com, innovation occurred through a serious of 
negotiations between actors with conflicting interests, which at a micro-level is 
consistent with the theory on innovation within a system of innovation. Not 
everything within the Ireland.com organisation facilitated innovation, but innovation 
still occurred.
6 .4 :  C o m p e t e n c i e s  w i t h i n  t h e  Ireland com o r g a n i s a t i o n
There is a dichotomy in the competencies employed to create content for Ireland.com, 
in that there are two independent sets of actors creating content for the website: one 
set directly creating content for it, the other set indirectly creating content for it. There 
is little interaction between the two sets, and although they work to fundamentally 
similar news agendas (set by the traditional tone of the newspaper), they employ 
different techniques in the way they create content and the aims they have for it. The 
journalists in The Irish Times newsroom create content for a traditional medium and 
employ conventional print media techniques. The content, when finished, is sent 
across to Ireland.com, which makes the necessary adjustments (but does not create 
new content), and it is published on the web. At Ireland.com, when they create 
content, they do so with the website in mind, and create it to the specifications that 
they believe are suited to the website -  that the content be legible and it be short and 
the user should be able to consume it quickly.
Ireland.com believes it is important to have a set of journalists working 
exclusively to service the needs of the website, who fully appreciated what is required 
for it and will put its interests before those of the newspaper. This leads to a 
duplication of resources, whereby two journalists from The Irish Times organisation 
cover the same story, but for different outlets -  print and the website. In the case of 
the print journalists, the story could end up being published in both the newspaper and
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the website. This could be seen as economically inefficient within an organisation, but 
the thinking within The Irish Times Group is that the benefits (in terms of the quality 
of the print and web content innovations, and the speed at which content was 
produced for the website) out-weigh the additional costs. However, by August 2002, 
changed financial circumstances had forced a revision and restriction of this strategy, 
with the Group reducing the number of Ireland.com journalists as a cost-saving 
measure. The move reduced the volume of content produced for the website and the 
frequency of news up-dates.
Although most of the journalists in lreland.com have never worked for the 
newspaper and have no direct experience of working in its newsroom (however, the 
different ‘atmosphere’ of the Ireland.com newsroom was emphasised on more than 
one occasion), the fundamentals of Irish Times journalism are the same for the 
website: unbiased, quality, serious reportage.
In terms of writing competencies, the fundamentals of good writing and of Irish 
Times house-style remain the same for the website. House-style refers to the way in 
which language is used, not to the information that is conveyed. This refers to the 
preferred means of expression; for example, Irish Times sentences tend to be longer 
and more complex than, say, tabloid sentences, which tend to be shorter and simpler. 
There has to be consistency in matters such as the use of official titles (Mr, Dr). These 
are matters of great importance to newspapers, because house-style is an integral part 
of their identity. The house-style of The Irish Times is extended to the website. 
However, Ireland.com staff recognises that they are writing for a different medium, 
and it has different requirements. What is suitable for one may not be suitable for the 
other. Items written exclusively for the website tend to be shorter than those written 
for the newspaper, because it is believed that reading long passages of text is 
unwieldy on a computer screen. Also, the emerging patterns of news consumption on 
the web (short bursts of attention, not much time spent on each page, not read 
leisurely) do not lend themselves to long passages of text. But here, Irelcmd.com 
betrays the origin of much of its content, the newspaper. The majority of the news 
written, originally, for print is longer than, ideally, it should be on a website. Access 
to the print content is viewed as one of the key strengths of the website; however, this 
system is not without flaws, and in many respects it highlights the shortcomings of 
publishing content on a medium for which it was not originally created.
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Because the website has to maintain consistency with the newspaper, Ireland com 
can adapt house-style only in small respects. News-stories on Ireland.com tend to be 
shorter than those in The Irish Times. In an Ireland.com story of ideal length, the text 
will fit on one computer screen, to save the user from having to scroll up or down to 
fully read the text. However, if a story can not properly be told in this frame, the 
journalists will write it longer. Sub-editor Jason Michaels said: “We do not want to be 
a slave to length at the sacrifice of the content” (Michaels, Ireland.com, 2001). He 
referred to some house-style conventions, carried over from the print newspaper, that 
are not suited to the web and look “anachronistic”. For instance, Ireland.com is 
obliged to follow Irish Times house-style for the use of titles before each name, such 
as Mr, Ms and Mrs. Michaels, along with many Ireland.com journalists, believed this 
looks stilted on the web. Such titles have been dropped from content delivered across 
WAP mobile phones. The maximum length of a WAP news-story is 90 words. To 
save space, the writing is as stripped down as it can be without losing meaning or 
coherency; therefore, the titles of Mr, Ms and Mrs are omitted before names. 
Ireland.com is working towards being allowed the same discretion with stories on the 
website, but this involves negotiating with senior editorial executives at the 
newspaper, who insist that the traditional newspaper convention be maintained.
The integration of audio and video would have placed demands for new 
competencies, both technical and content. It would have placed new demands on the 
writing competencies of the journalists. Writing a script for a broadcast package 
requires different techniques to those required to write a print or web news-story. 
Print (web) news-stories are written in an inverted pyramid structure, with the most 
important information at the top and the least important at the bottom The structure 
of broadcast package scripts is to have a gentler introduction, building to the most 
important information. A print/web story is meant to be read, so the language and 
sentence structures are formal. Scripts are meant to be heard, so the language is less 
formal and more conversational.
In August 2001, there seemed a lot of uncertainty among the editorial staff 
towards audio and video news. They were enthusiastic about it and what it could add 
to the website, and were eager to learn the new competencies associated with it, but 
they were unsure as to how and when it would be implemented. The previous 
experience of Ireland.com journalists was rooted more in print media than broadcast, 
so learning the necessary audio and video competencies would have presented stern
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challenges. Conor Pope acknowledged the challenges, saying: “Learning how to do 
audio broadcasts and learning how to do video, they’re not things you know 
instinctively -  you have to learn how to do them, you have to practice” (Pope, 
Ireland.com, 2001). He stressed that because the medium of digital media was in 
flux, so too were the content competencies required of those creating content for it.
In August 2001, Ireland.com was outsourcing its audio and video work to The 
Yard studio in Sheriff Street, Dublin. In so doing, it availed of the competencies and 
infrastructures of another actor in the industrial system of innovation. At this time, 
Ireland.com planned to bring or develop more audio and video competencies in-house 
over the coming year, and install the necessary infrastructure by building a small 
recording studio in its office. The recording studio would primarily have been used 
for breaking news audio webcasts and would have had a direct line to The Yard. 
Ireland.com intended to maintain its relationship with The Yard, which had already 
invested in the necessary software, hardware and infrastructures for web broadcast, 
and had accumulated the appropriate competencies. It also had the necessary facilities 
to store the archived audio and video content of Ireland.com. The incorporation of 
audio and video into Ireland.com would have involved not just an evolution to the 
website itself, but also an evolution in the manner in which web audio and video 
content was produced. A studio engineer at The Yard, Adrian Legg, commented that 
current video content on the web amounted to “chucking TV on the web. It isn’t really 
suited. We won’t really see it being done properly until we have video produced with 
web production values rather than television values” (Legg, The Yard, 2001).
In August 2001, audio and video on Ireland.com was still an aspiration. In the first 
draft of this chapter, after the completion of the research placement, I wrote the 
following: “There is no guarantee that Ireland.com will successfully integrate the 
requisite competencies into its organisation or the audio and video content into its 
website.” The planned innovation was eliminated before it was made public, not due 
to the feasibility of the innovation itself, but because of macro-level (economic 
slowdown) and meso-level (deteriorating Group finances) factors. It highlights how 
innovation is an uncertain process, open to influences at many levels.
Content is not the only area in which the Ireland.com organisation has had to 
accumulate new competencies. Many of the technical operators have had to learn 
competencies. As the website evolved, so too did the technical architecture underlying 
it. When Ireland.com launched, the website ran on a Microsoft NT system. However,
187
because the website was growing in size and complexity, Ireland.com had to bring in 
greater levels of technical competency to operate the NT system. Database 
Administrator John McMahon was one of the people with the necessary competencies 
who was hired. He explained: “It [NT] was being used by developers with very little 
experience and there would be stages when they would be hitting manuals just to do 
things on the fly. Once lreland.com was up, they wanted to do things more seriously, 
so they had to hire someone in” (McMahon, Ireland.com, 2001).
In mid-2000, the Microsoft NT infrastructure was replaced with a system based on 
Unix, Oracle and Sun/Solaris. At that stage, the technical developers believed that the 
NT system could no longer handle the volume of content amassed within the 
Ireland.com system, especially the dynamic (interactive) content such as the world 
football system. Few of the Ireland.com technical operators had previous experience 
of working with Unix or Oracle, which were substantially different to Microsoft NT 
to operate, so a new process of competency accumulation, to accompany the 
infrastructure accumulation, had to begin. The new system was installed and running 
by Christmas 2000, after Ireland.com technical operators had attended a number of 
training courses organised by the software developer Oracle. John McMahon said: “It 
was a big change for me personally because I had no experience of Unix or anything 
outside the Windows infrastructure...The first thing we had to do was figure out how 
to use Oracle, because we had basically zero competencies in-house” (McMahon, 
Ireland.com, 2001). He described NT as an intuitive system, whereas Unix and Oracle 
were more powerful systems but required more complex and precise technical 
knowledge to operate. McMahon predicted that the current (August 2001) 
infrastructure would need to be upgraded in two years, at which time new technical 
competencies would also have to be brought and developed in-house.
6 .5 :  T h e  I r i s h  T i m e s  G r o u p  as  a n  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  i n n o v a t o r
The Irish Times Group has, since its establishment in 1859, been a traditional 
newspaper company. Therefore, historically, it was a significant shift in the direction 
and nature of the company that it began to re-align itself as a more open-ended 
publishing company, capable of delivering content across the print and electronic 
media. In many respects, the organisational innovation taking place at The Irish Times 
Group shows it to be a system of innovation in microcosm -  there are many different
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actors within the organisation, some with differing or conflicting goals, but the overall 
affect of their actions is to produce print and digital media content. I argue, based on 
my research, that The Irish Times Group is at an early stage of the process of evolving 
from being, purely, a newspaper company into being a more open-ended publishing 
company. An indication of the early stage of the process lies in how the company, 
essentially, still operates a two-tiered structure: the more rigid organisation of the 
print newspaper, and the newer, more flexible organisation of the digital media 
division.
Becoming a digital media company was still an aspiration for The Irish Times 
Group in August 2001, and an aspiration it had begun to back away from by August 
2002, to protect its core business. At the core of its business activity, it is still very 
much a traditional media company. Although the digital media division has become 
an important part of The Irish Times Group, its activities remain on the periphery of 
the core business. In August 2001, senior Ireland.com staff argued that the core 
business would not be enough to sustain the Group in the future, and the importance 
of the new media division would grow. In light of these comments, it is ironic that 
diminishing revenues from the core business motivated management to scale-down 
the digital media division.
In August 2001, The Irish Times Group was in transition; first, the overall Group 
organisation was in transition as it tried to incorporate two content innovations, and 
accumulate and develop the infrastructures, bureaucracies, competencies and 
resources necessary to support and produce them. But second, the specific 
infrastructures at The Irish Times newspaper and Ireland.com were undergoing 
organisational innovation, in order to support and produce the changing content 
innovations. The newspaper organisation was undergoing a modernisation process 
which involved a significant restructuring, the elimination of certain infrastructures, 
practices and competencies, and the introduction of new infrastructures, practices and 
competencies.
The newspaper had been expanding rapidly since the mid-1990s, and it was the 
expansion strategy that led the Group into financial difficulties by 2002 and caused it 
to implement cost savings across all areas of its organisation. In effect, this meant 
cutting organisational and infrastructure advancements, and through staff 
redundancies, cutting many of the competencies and knowledge that had been 
accumulated. The expansion had been financed mainly through using retained
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earnings from increased circulation and advertising revenue. The first public 
suggestions that the Group’s financial status had deteriorated came in April 2001, 
when the then managing director stated that further expansion could not be financed 
through cash reserves, and borrowing might be necessary (The Irish Times, 25 April 
2001). However, before this announcement, the Group had spent several years 
aggressively expanding both its print and digital media interests. In the late 1990s, the 
company bought an inserting machine for its printing press that allowed it to print 
more sections. The first section to benefit directly from this was Business this Week, 
which was published on Fridays. It expanded into two sections, Business this Week 
One and Business this Week Two: the first section concentrated on business news, and 
second on recruitment advertising. It was launched in mid-1997, when the boom in 
the Irish economy was still in the assent. The launch of the bigger business sections 
was a response to the increased interest in the country in business affairs (social 
influence on a content innovation). The Group bought a property on Burgh Quay, 
Dublin -  the building was formerly the offices of the Irish Press Group -  with the 
intention of moving its operation there. It abandoned the plan in 2000 and sold the 
property for £6.8 million in 2001. The managing director described the Burgh Quay 
property as “unsuitable” to accommodate the Group’s expansion plans. However, he 
added that the current premises on D ’Olier Street was no longer adequate for the 
expansion and modernisation of the newspaper, and the Group was, at that time, still 
looking at the possibility of acquiring a new premises or engaging in a significant 
renovation of the D ’Olier Street building (The Irish Times, 19 February 2000). The 
company spent £22 million on its expansion programme in 2000, and £46 million in 
2001 (The Irish Times, 25 April 2001). The Group committed large amounts of its 
financial resources to investing in new editorial and commercial systems and a new 
printing facility. The new printing facility, located in City West in Dublin, was 
operational by the end of 2001 and had double the print capacity of the previous 
printing press. The Group intended to transfer production of the newspaper to a more 
modern computer system. Such a transition required the development and 
accumulation of new (mainly technical) competencies to produce a traditional media 
product.
The organisation, in this instance, could have been viewed as a check to 
innovation. However, as discussed in the literature review, organisations have a role 
in facilitating and stimulating innovation, although not every actor within an
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organisation works towards this goal. Innovation was still occurring within The Irish 
Times Group, but perhaps at a slower, considered pace. There was a contrast within 
the two-tier organisational structure of The Irish Times Group: the bigger, more rigid 
organisation of the print Irish Times was relatively slow at introducing and integrating 
new technologies and innovative practices, whereas the smaller, more flexible 
organisation of Ire land, com could accommodate them quite quickly. Negotiations 
between various sets of actors first had to take place within The Irish Times before 
new innovative practices to the newspaper could be implemented. For instance, the 
company’s former managing director Nick Chapman noted the importance of having 
reached agreement with the trade unions before embarking on the Group’s four-year, 
£75 million investment programme (The Irish Times, 25 April 2001). This was 
necessary because there were actors within the organisation with differing goals (the 
stoneroom workers desire to retain their jobs versus management’s desire to 
implement more efficient production practices). This suggests that The Irish Times 
Group is a system of innovation in microcosm -  comprised of different groups, often 
with opposing goals, but the culmination of their actions is to, eventually, produce 
content innovations. The Irish Times Group was in a period of intense innovation, 
both to its content innovations and to its organisational structure, which made it ripe 
as a case-study for this thesis. It also suggests that The Irish Times newspaper -  
although it was a traditional media form -  is not static; it continues to change, 
innovate and evolve.
That was the state of organisational innovation when I completed my research 
placement in August 2001. By the same month in 2002, the situation had changed, 
through a combination of the management’s expansion strategy and changed 
economic circumstances external to the organisation. The company had spent all of its 
cash reserves on the expansion programme, in particular the printing press. With no 
reserves, the company was vulnerable to drops in profitability. Rising overheads and 
declining advertising revenues put the company on track for a £2 million loss in 2001, 
and a £17 million loss in 2002. In November 2001, the company announced that, 
excluding the Ireland.com organisation, it was seeking 250 redundancies from among 
its staff of 710. (In December, the redundancy programme was expanded to 
Ireland.com. The job cuts were expected to save £500,000, out of a total saving being 
sought of £1.8 from the Ireland.com organisation.) The job cuts were to be 
proportional across all areas of the organisation, so fundamentally the Group retained
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the organisational structure that emerged during the expansion programme, but on a 
reduced scale. (Although the proportion of job cuts was higher at Ireland.com, where 
40% of the full-time staff were made redundant.) However, with fewer people, the 
organisation’s ability to produce content was diminished. The paper began to be 
printed with fewer pages and supplements. This reduced the volume of content 
flowing into Ireland.com from two sources: first, the newspaper, and second, from the 
Ireland.com organisation, which also suffered redundancies and a diminished capacity 
to produce web-exclusive content. The Irish Times Group intended to save £10 
million through redundancies, and a further £7.5 million through cost-saving 
practices. Expansion programmes not already in place or underway were, in many 
cases, postponed or eliminated. For Ireland.com, this meant cancelling audio and 
video content, because of the cost involved in building the necessary technical and 
production infrastructures, and accumulating the necessary competencies among its 
staff.
The organisation of the newsroom in The Irish Times, even after the redundancy 
programme was implement, has remained conventional: editor -  deputy-editor -  
news-editor -  section editors -  reporters/photographers -  sub-editors -  layout and 
design. This, over the years, has emerged as the standard structure of newsrooms in 
the print media, and there is a rigid degree of demarcation. In part, this is at the 
insistence of trade unions, to protect employee’s positions; also, the company wants to 
maintain quality in the specific tasks necessary to produce a newspaper, by directing 
people’s talents and abilities appropriately. A good reporter will not necessarily be 
able to take a good photograph; a photographer might not be able to write clean copy. 
In The Irish Times, with its lines of demarcation, a reporter would under normal 
circumstances not be allowed to take photographs, as this would impinge on the duties 
and tasks of a separate set of workers. Ireland.com is newer and there hasn’t been 
time for rigid lines of demarcation and layers of bureaucracy to form. In the print Irish 
Times, there is a strict division between the role of reporters, sub-editors, 
photographers, layout and design people, and rarely are workers allowed to transgress 
these lines of demarcation. In Ireland.com, the reporters take photographs, sub-edit, 
and have a greater variety of competencies. At the website, there is a greater emphasis 
on journalists being multi-skilled and adaptable. The Ireland.com news operation 
works with less resources than The Irish Times one and can not afford to be as rigid 
with its demarcation of tasks.
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The organisational structure of The Irish Times is closer than Ireland.com to a 
mechanistic model (as discussed in chapter three), with journalists, photographers, 
and sub-editors each concerned with their specialised tasks and rarely extending the 
parameters of their responsibility beyond them. However, there are elements of the 
systems school of organisation inherent in this. The work of one group can depend on 
the work of another. Sub-editors cannot work until journalists supply them with copy. 
Sub-editors do not have responsibility for producing copy, but they cannot work until 
the journalists in the organisation have fulfilled their responsibilities. However, 
mechanistic organisation models are not, in a pure theoretical form, suited to media or 
content creating organisations; rather, it is more suited to industrial, Fordist factories 
of mechanical production and reproduction. Although media organisations are, 
indeed, comprised of interdependent elements, the notion of highly restricted 
autonomy poses problems. Media content creation requires a people centred 
organisational theory, because the competencies invested in people are crucial to the 
quality of the content innovation. A printing press would not print a quality 
newspaper unless there were skilled editors, reporters and sub-editors to assemble, 
write, rewrite and layout the content. Also, journalist traditionally feel an attachment 
and loyalty to their newspaper and to having their work published. Therefore, organic 
organisational elements must be regarded as important. Therefore, the organisation of 
The Irish Times newsroom is best viewed as lying between Burns and Stalker’s bi­
polar model of organic and mechanistic organisation. Burns and Stalker regard such 
an intermediary organisation as dysfunction. However, it has not hindered The Irish 
Times in its goal of producing news.
Ireland.com could also be viewed as lying between an organic and mechanistic 
organisational structure. But, this thesis argues, the mechanistic element is not as 
strong as in The Irish Times newsroom, and there is a greater dependency on the 
organic model. Irelcmd.com’s quality as a content innovation is dependent, crucially, 
on the competencies of the people employed on it. Also, the digital media content 
market is subject to more rapid technological and commercial change than the 
newspaper market, and Ireland.com must maintain a flexible organisation that can 
respond to such changes. The system in place in the newsroom of Ireland.com is 
similar to the structure of The Irish Times newsroom, and is as follows: editor -  
deputy editor -  breaking news editor -  journalists -  sub-editors -  technical operators. 
In eight years, the lines of demarcation and the layers of bureaucracy have not formed
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to the extent they have in The Irish Times newsroom. As Conor Pope said, the 
structure of the newsroom mlreland.com  is “as flexible as it possibly could be”. This 
is partly because of the size of the respective news operations. The Irish Times 
editorial meetings, of which there are three each day (morning, late afternoon and 
evening), are gatherings of the editors of the various sections of the newspaper: the 
editor, the duty news-editor, foreign editor, sports editor. Each of these editors have 
prior editorial meetings with the reporters or photographers under their charge and 
have already assigned markings. The agenda for each section has been provisionally 
set by the time of the main editorial meetings (although, the agendas are open to 
change as stories break). The main editorial meetings are formal affairs, with the 
various editors informing their colleagues of their respective news agendas, for 
example, on the home news and foreign news pages. A journalist from Ireland.com is 
present at each of these meetings to ensure that the newspaper and the website (in the 
breaking news section) are following broadly similar news agendas, and to make the 
website aware of the content to expect when print stories begin appearing on its 
computer queue. However, Ireland.com journalists attend the meetings on the 
condition that the website will not, in its immediate breaking news section, scoop the 
newspaper on an exclusive story it has planned for the following day. I attended Irish 
Times editorial meetings for 15 August 2001; on the news agenda circulated at the 
meeting, an exclusive Irish Times story on Dublin Corporation was labelled “not for 
breaking-news”.
In contrast to such formal gatherings of editors, the editorial meetings at 
Ireland.com are smaller and informal (but still business-like). The duty news-editor 
and a number of journalists (usually seven or eight) discuss the news agenda for the 
day. The journalists at Ireland.com are keen to emphasise how the ‘atmosphere’ in the 
Ireland.com newsroom is different to that in 27/e Irish Times newsroom. The 
Ireland.com newsroom has a less rigid system, more suited to the immediacy of web 
news. The flexibility in organisation reflects, in part, the flexibility of competencies 
that are required of Ireland.com journalists.
The Ireland.com office is grouped loosely into sections. It is open-plan, with 
commercial employees at the front of the office, technical operators in the middle, and 
editorial in a separate room at the back, which gives them a relative degree of privacy 
and isolation. However, there is a spill-over of journalists at desks in the main office.
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As The Irish Times organisation has evolved, so too has its relationship with its 
employees. The same is true of Ireland.com and its employees. Within The Irish 
Times Group, Ireland.com journalists are not accorded parity of status with Irish 
Times journalists. This is symptomatic of the newness of the Ireland.com venture. 
Most Ireland.com workers have not been with the company as long as Irish Times 
journalists, and so have not built up the same service record and entitlements. In 
August 2001, Conor Pope said that, hopefully, one day Ireland.com journalists will 
have the same status within the organisation as Irish Times journalists. This will 
involved intense negotiation within the organisation between various sets of actors; 
also a new framework (regulatory framework to govern web employees’ status, rights 
and entitlements) will have had to be drawn up. This is an indication of the on-going 
innovation and negotiations that take place within an innovative organisation such as 
The Irish Times Group. For example, the Ireland.com branch of the National Union of 
Journalists was, in the summer of 2001, in pay negotiations with company 
management, and union members were being asked to attend a chapel meeting to vote 
on the outcome. Also, as a result of negotiations between unions and management, a 
number of contract positions at Ireland.com were being turned into staff positions, 
and applications were being invited from suitable candidates. In addition, the union 
was negotiating a pension scheme for Ireland.com employees. This highlights some 
of the conflicting interests between actors within an organisation -  management and 
employees. As shall be outlined in the finance section, Ireland.com is still a loss 
making venture. In August 2001, before the company’s financial troubles were made 
public, management was striving to cut costs and budgets. Increasing labour costs and 
commitments were not in management’s interest, but they were in the interests of the 
employees.
The financial situation had intensified by December 2001, and much of the 
progress in securing the positions of Ireland.com employees was stripped away by the 
cost cutting and redundancy programmes. Parts of the programme were implemented 
through coercion. According to an Ireland.com source, management suggested that, if 
voluntary redundancy was not accepted, compulsory redundancy packages would not 
be as generous. Through the redundancies, the Ireland.com organisation was stripped 
of many of the competencies and knowledge that it had accumulated over the years. 
And reduced personnel and financial support from The Irish Times Group reduced its 
ability to further innovate the website.
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6 .6 :  Ireland.com  a s  a n  a c t o r  w i t h i n  a  s y s te m  o f  i n n o v a t io n
Ireland.com is an actor within industrial, national and international systems of 
innovation in two broad respects: first, in the sense that it does not house all of the 
competencies (mainly technical) required for digital media content creation within its 
own organisation and has to seek them from external actors; second, in that it is in 
competition with other digital media content creators. Ireland.com is an offensive 
innovator, being the first commercial Irish news and portal website, but became a 
subject of defensive innovation by other actors in the sector.
There is numerous examples of Ireland.com seeking the competencies of outside 
actors. For example, the website, using flash applications, had in 2001 an interactive 
table football game which was developed by an Irish digital media company called 
The Webfactory. The company is a core Irish digital media content creator, and one of 
the companies included in the quantitative study in chapter five. The rule within 
Ireland.com is that if a desired innovation is too costly or too technical to produce in- 
house it will be sent outside. Apart from the hire of freelancers to supplement its 
editorial team, Ireland.com usually seeks technical competencies from the outside. 
Ireland.com employed a campus company in University College Dublin, called 
Changing Worlds (www.changingworlds.com), to develop the application behind its 
MyTV personalised television programme listings service.
It is an indication of how small the system of innovation is for the Irish digital 
media content industry, and the linkages and competency transfer between companies, 
that both The Webfactory and Changing Worlds have also undertaken work for the 
online venture of Independent News and Media, which is The Irish Times Group’s 
main rival in the Irish broadsheet daily newspaper industry. Another indication of the 
small size of the industry is Ireland, com's use of The Yard for its audio and video 
work. The Yard was involved in the production of Enter, which will be the subject of 
a later case-study chapter.
The email service, because of the technical resources and complexity involved in 
maintaining it, is run in conjunction with an actor from the international system of 
innovation, an Israeli company called Commtouch.
Ireland.com will also outsource a technical job if the resources of its own 
development team are being concentrated on other projects. The Ireland.com
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development team was, in August 2001, working on a content management project to 
produce a more efficient system of storing and retrieving the growing volume of 
content in the website’s archive. (This was especially important after the switch in 
May 2002 to a subscription model, when the archive was expanded from 1998 back to 
1996 and promoted as a selling point for the website.) With in-house development 
resources being concentrated on this project, Ireland.com outsourced elements of the 
development work for its recruitment and property ancillary websites.
That side of the system of innovation involves co-operation between Ireland.com 
and external actors. Other traditional media companies in Ireland, such as the 
Examiner Group, the Independent News and Media Group, and RTE, have also 
established digital media ventures, but none have done so as early or as successfully 
as The Irish Times Group. (Successfully, not in commercial terms, because none of 
them are turning a profit, but in terms of the size of the audience gathered and the 
quality o f the content innovation.) In its mission statement, Ireland.com outlines the 
following as its purpose and interests:
“Ireland.corn's mission is to consolidate its position as the definitive source 
fo r  home news, international, sports, technology and business news, from an 
Irish perspective. The site's strategy is to be the definitive destination new 
media Irish site, providing authoritative information and services for the 
island o f Ireland, and the 'Irish interest' market which encompasses anybody 
who has an interest in, or is seeking information on, the island o f Ireland. 
Ireland.com aims to be at the forefront o f delivering information and services 
through the use o f innovative processes, technologies and delivery methods ” 
Oittp://www./re/flfl^.com/about/webAyebmission.htm. viewed on 23 July 2001).
The emphasis on being an ‘Irish interest website’ illustrates how, more so than for 
a technological innovation, national social and cultural influences affect the style of 
content innovation. Essentially, Ireland.com is pitching towards an audience that will 
be interested in Irish society and culture. It is also interesting that Ireland.com states 
its intention to “consolidate” its position, because as the first traditional media 
organisation in Ireland to publish a digital media content innovation, it was initially an 
offensive innovator. With other traditional media companies establishing defensive 
innovations, Ireland.com has had to consolidate its position by improving its own 
content innovation. However, the defensive innovations do not merely imitate
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Ireland.com', as argued in the literature review, the protection of copyright prevents 
imitative innovation in the content industry. But consistent with the literature, newer 
entrants to a system add their own distinguishing innovations to set them apart from 
previous innovations by other actors. The RTE and Examiner websites, although they 
incorporate elements that may have appeared first in similar form in Ireland.com, also 
have their own distinctive elements, such as video news clips on the RTE website. 
Irelcmd.com marketing executive Brendan Marrinan acknowledged that although 
Ireland.com, in the main, tries to be an offensive innovator it does not always 
succeed. He said: “We’d like to see ourselves as being the innovator...the first 
mover.. .instead of following someone else, even though that does happen. We want 
people to say, ‘look at what Ireland.com have done’, rather than ‘look at what RTE 
have done’” (Marrinan, Ireland.com, 2001).
Ireland.com has a leading position to maintain, and to do so, it continually strives 
to improve and redesign the website, add new features and be sensitive to changes 
that are taking place to the medium, to emerging trends and to decide when they could 
be usefully added or adapted to the website. But this is done within the financial 
constraints imposed by The Irish Times Group. As would be consistent with the 
literature on systems of innovation, Ireland.com has to be a constant innovator. Had, 
as intended, Ireland.com moved onto the next stage of its emergence - the fuller 
integration of audio and, later, video content -  it would have moved from the position 
of offensive innovator to defensive. RTE’s revamped its website in the summers of
2001 and 2002, including the deeper integration of audio and video into its news­
service. RTE seems to have a natural advantage, because its core content output is 
audio and video broadcast content, which can easily be converted into web audio and 
video content. (However, it is web audio and video produced with television 
production values.) Also, RTE has accumulated high levels of competencies within its 
organisation to create such content. Ireland.com had not, and the investment in 
infrastructure and human competencies, were regarded as unfeasible by The Irish 
Times Group.
Ireland.com is not just concerned with the innovative capacity of other actors 
within the Irish industry, but is also keeping a keen eye on the innovative activities of 
many within the international industry, such as Yahoo, Hotmail, Excite, The 
Guardian, The Electronic Telegraph and The New York Times.
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Content generated by The Irish Times Group is delivered across a number of 
platforms: print, web, text messaging on mobile phones, and WAP, also on mobile 
phones. The author has worked as a researcher on a project for the COMTEC 
Research Centre in Dublin City University in January 2001 and 2002. The project 
studied the attitudes within the digital media industry on emerging business models 
for generating revenue from digital media content (COMTEC, 2002). The study 
showed that there was a great deal of uncertainty surrounding business models, as 
many models that people believed would work for digital media content were losing 
money. One of the emerging models was to deliver content across as many platforms 
as possible. The study indicated that the most expensive part of the process was 
creating the actual content; delivering it was, comparatively, cheap, and so should be 
delivered across as many platforms as possible. The Irish Times Group could 
refashion its basic news content for delivery across a number of platforms without a 
great deal of expense. Traditionally, The Irish Times would be paid for its news 
content once (when a newspaper was purchased), but with digital media it had the 
opportunity to be paid several times for what was, essentially, the same content. It 
supplied WAP content to Eircell (now Vodafone) mobile phones, and also sent news 
updates via text messages, each of which was charged for. Conor Pope explained the 
model as follows: “The thing is to spread the content, which is enormously valuable, 
across as many platforms as you possibly can...You use the content in as many 
diffuse ways as possible to try to maximise the revenue” (Pope, Ireland.com, 2001).
New content (writing) competencies are necessary to create WAP content. The 
display screen on mobile phones is small, so Ireland.com has to cut the length of news 
stories and adapt writing house-style to suit the medium. For example, the maximum 
length of a WAP story is 90 words. To save on wordage, titles such as Mr, Ms and 
Mrs are dropped from WAP stories, although their use in front of proper names is 
house-style for both the newspaper and the website. This is a small, but significant 
adaptation of house-style, because use of full titles has been the formal writing style 
of The Irish Times for decades. The writing for WAP has to be pared as much as it 
could be without the story losing sense or coherency. WAP, in the case of 
Ireland.com news, is a reductive medium, giving only the basic details of a story. 
However, writing a WAP story is not simply a matter of taking the first couple of
6.7: Platforms
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paragraphs from an Ireland.com web news-story. An internal memo told journalists: 
“No matter how tight the story [on the website] it will always have to be rewritten for 
WAP. Using the first couple of paragraphs will never work” (Internal memo, 2001).
The style for SMS updates is to encapsulate the news in the form of a short 
headline, accompanied by the date and time. For example: 17/09/01, 5: 45: 
Government to build new hospital in Tallaght.” Three such news headlines are 
contained in each message, three of which are sent out each day, unless a major news 
story breaks and a message is sent out as a newsflash. Subscription to the service is 
available through the website, and the user is charged for each message received. 
Before the introduction of the subscription model, SMS was the only Ireland.com 
content form for which people were charged directly. (Users paid Vodafone for access 
to WAP content.) In the summer of 2001, over one million messages were being 
delivered by Ireland.com each month.
Ireland.com also plans to begin supplying content to palmtop computers (PDAs), 
which will also require the adaptation of content competencies to suit that particular 
content outlet.
6 .8 :  F i n a n c e s
In the first draft of this chapter, produced in September 2001, I based the finance 
section on the latest set of publicly released accounts for the Group. On the 25 April 
2001, The Irish Times Group reported its annual financial results for the year 2000. 
Pre-tax profits at the Group had increased by 34.4 percent to £14.7 million, which the 
Group claimed was a healthy financial performance for the year. However, the report 
noted that Ireland.com had cost the Group £3.5 million for the year, including a 
trading loss of £2.7 million and capital expenditure. At the time, The Irish Times 
Group had the ability to absorb such losses through revenue generated by other 
commercial activities of the organisation. In the report, the Group made clear its 
commitment to continue investing in and developing the website. Interestingly, the 
Group did not emphasise content as the means of turning Ireland.com’s losses into 
profits. Instead, it stated its intention of “focusing on developing revenue in the key 
recruitment and property areas” (The Irish Times, 25 April 2001).
There was, at this stage, no public declaration to move to a subscription model. In 
the initial draft, I made the following comment on how The Irish Times Group
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finances affected the website: “One of the key arguments of this thesis is that the 
processes of innovation are uncertain. As Ireland.com is still a substantial loss- 
making venture, its future success and existence as a content innovation are by no 
means certain. Factors within the overall Irish Times organisation are favourable to 
the website venture at the moment. The activities and profits of the main newspaper 
business allow the organisation to absorb losses, and allows the website space and 
time to develop into a profitable venture. However, The Irish Times Group is a 
commercial company, not a public service broadcaster, so Ireland com will, 
eventually, have to justify itself by turning in a profit. If conditions not directly related 
to the website were not favourable, they could have a detrimental effect on the 
website’s development as a content innovation. If the newspaper were less profitable 
or loss making, funds might not be available to absorb the losses incurred in 
establishing and further innovating the website. Or a more conservative management, 
working to tighter budget constraints, might not have been willing to support the 
investment and innovation necessary to develop the website.”
This came to pass in December 2001. Even before this, there were suggestions 
within Ireland.com that The Irish Times Group was losing patience with the losses 
being mounted by the website. A source in the company said: “I think a year and a 
half ago [early 2000] there was an awful lot more patience among corporations [for 
digital media content ventures], because they knew the market was young. With the 
dotcom downturn, companies have inevitably got slightly more concerned about the 
lack of revenue that websites are generating.” An Ireland.com source told me that 
after the Group’s finances were announced, a rushed decision was taken to implement 
a subscription model for the website, and there was a lot of unease within Ireland.com 
about the move. If it failed to generate the revenues necessary to make the website 
viable, there was no possibility of returning to a free service funded by advertising, 
and there was no substantial alternative model in reserve. In chapter eight, a case- 
study of Rondomondo, Eircom closed the loss making venture to remove a financial 
burden from the core business, which was generating diminished revenues. 
Ireland.com, although a loss making subsidiary, is an extension of the core news 
business and so there is a greater reluctance to eliminate it, because such a move 
would reduce the status of the Group, especially in an international media context. My 
research suggests, between 2001 and 2002, a growing acceptance among content 
companies that the model of advertising funded websites was not viable. Online
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advertising, in 2001, accounted for only 1% of total advertising spend across all 
media (www.newmedialine.ie. viewed 4 March 2002). Subscription models were 
implemented in the mid-1990s and, in the main, failed to generate sufficient revenues 
to make websites viable. Advertising models also struggled, so there is a growing tend 
of revisiting the subscription model. Companies do so under the assumption that 
people will consider their content valuable enough to pay for, and that people’s online 
behaviour has matured since the mid-1990s and they will be willing to pay for online 
content.
Irelcmd.com was the first Irish content website to charge. This is a trend among 
content websites produced by traditional media companies, such as The Financial 
Times and The New York Times. Marketing manager Aisling McCabe said: “It is 
becoming increasingly self-evident that a business model dependent solely on 
advertising revenue is not sustainable in today’s difficult marketplace” 
(www. irel and .com/ about/ money/, viewed 23 March 2002). Although I could not 
obtain exact figures, I was told during my research placement that advertising 
revenues for the year to August 2001 were down on the figures for the previous year.
The subscription rates are euro79 per year, euro 14 per month and euro7 per week, 
and permit access to The Irish Times content, the searchable archive, the breaking 
news section and the majority of the remaining ancillary websites. The website 
experienced a large drop in traffic (although audited traffic figures have yet to be 
released), so the subscription model first has to compensate for the loss of advertising 
revenue. (In the early years of the website, it had 6,000 subscribers to a free email 
news-service. When it tried to charge for the service (a subscription fee of 
approximately $40 a year), the number of subscribers dropped to 350.)
In August 2002, the website’s subscription base was 8,500. I was not told the 
number of subscribers the website needed to break even or enter profitability, because 
it was regarded as commercially sensitive information. But it was expected to be at 
least a year before Ireland.com would know if the subscription model was working. It 
was also expected to be a year before Ireland.com decided whether it had achieved 
the correct balance between free and paid content (accumulation of knowledge and 
experience). Access to Irish Times content, the breaking news-service and the 
searchable archive requires payment. The balance of free to paid content emerged 
through a serious of meetings (negotiations) between the editorial and the commercial
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departments. The free content is necessary to entice people to the website, but could 
not be so generous that people wouldn’t pay for access to premium content.
6 .9 :  C o n c l u s i o n
Ireland.com shows how the innovative process is uncertain (how initial visions for the 
website did not materialise) and multi-dimensional, influenced by macro-level factors 
(economic slowdown and falling revenues of the core business), and micro-level 
processes within the firm (editorial discussion, creativity and interactions). It also 
emphasises the importance of cultural and social influences and how they can affect 
the style of innovation that emerges. It shows also the importance of competency 
accumulation and, similar to Lundvall’s model, the importance of innovation through 
interactive learning, learning by doing, using and interacting. However, some of these 
competencies, knowledge and infrastructures were stripped from the organisation 
through the redundancy programme, which suggests that within a system of 
innovation, whether at the international, national or industrial level, there is not a 
simple linear accumulation of competencies, knowledge and infrastructures.
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Chapter 7: Case-study: Enter CD-ROM magazine 
7 .0 :  O v e r v i e w
This chapter contains a qualitative case-study of an Irish digital media content 
company called Pure Communications, which for 17 months from December 1999 
published an interactive entertainment magazine on CD-ROM format. The magazine, 
Enter, contained many of the traditional elements of a print entertainment magazine -  
celebrity interviews, features, film and music reviews -  but the content was presented 
in an interactive form suited to digital media. For example, interviews with musicians 
contained an option to listen to samples of their music, and the CD-ROM often had 
live, acoustic performances recorded exclusively to accompany interviews. The aims 
of the case-study are to examine the influences (macro, meso and micro) on the 
development of Enter, and to assess how Pure Communications accumulated the 
necessary competencies and infrastructures (content, production and technical). The 
chapter will also try to assess the value of a systems of innovation concept, especially 
as it relates to innovation through interactive learning, to studying the emergence and 
production of Enter. This will include an examination of how Pure Communications 
interacted with other actors in its industrial system of innovation (for example, the 
company availed of the facilities and competencies of a post-production studio called 
The Yard to record and edit its video content), the national system of innovation 
(advertisers and venture capitalists) and the international system of innovation (the 
company released a similar interactive magazine in Britain in February 2001).
The chapter shall also draw on aspects and concepts of prior research, such as the 
work of Carolyn Marvin, who studied how the techniques, codes and grammars of 
older technologies are grafted onto new technologies to allow people to make sense of 
them and to render them suitable for consumption (Marvin, 1988). Enter provides a 
valuable example of this -  it grafted the techniques, codes and grammars of a print 
magazine onto a digital media format to try to render it an object for consumption. It 
tried to render the (relatively) unfamiliar medium of digital media in a familiar way, 
through presenting it as a kind of digital magazine. This suggests that digital media is 
not a fundamental break with the past (as many technological determinists in the
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literature review chapters claim), but has continuities with it. However, these 
traditional techniques are often adapted to better suit the digital media format, or new 
techniques have to be fashioned to work in the new setting.
7 .1 :  M e t h o d o l o g y  a n d  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  Enter c a s e - s t u d y
Chapter four outlines the strengths of in-depth qualitative research, so they shall not 
be repeated here. However, the research is often weakened by being influenced or
affected by circumstances beyond the researcher’s control. Such is the case with this
chapter.
The case-study of Ireland.com employed the following qualitative research 
techniques: document analysis (mainly of the Ireland.com website), semi-structured 
in-depth interviews with actors within the Ireland.com organisation, and observation 
during a three week research placement at the company’s office. I had originally 
intended to apply similar methodologies to the Enter case-study, having received 
initial indications that such access would be possible. I first contacted Pure 
Communications by telephone in late November 2000, to ascertain whether it would 
be interested in participating in my research. The company’s response was positive, 
and it supplied a number of back-issues of Enter as a goodwill gesture. It was agreed 
during this conversation that I would renew contact in late January 2001, to arrange a 
series of interviews and discuss the possibility of spending time observing the actors 
within the organisation as they produced an edition of Enter.
However, by January 2001, circumstances at the company had become less 
favourable to my request for access. In the time since the original contact, the 
company had announced a substantial venture capital investment, was preparing to 
move into the British digital media content market and was re-designing Enter to suit. 
Although the researcher did not receive an outright refusal for access, the company 
had become less positive towards being researched, due to the commercial sensitivity 
of the re-design and market shift. Production of the Irish edition of Enter ceased in 
February 2001, with the company shifting its focus to the production of the British 
edition1. Pure Communications had, by this stage, transferred the majority of its
1 For clarity, I shall, when nccessaiy, distinguish between the Irish and British editions of Enter. The 
Irish edition consisted of the first fifteen issues, sold only on the Irish market; the British edition was 
the final two issues, designed primarily for and sold on the British market.
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content production to offices and studios in London, England. The first issue of the 
British edition, released in March 2001, was sold on the Irish market; the second 
issue, however, was not. Pure Communications ceased production of the British 
edition after the second issue. (As argued elsewhere in this thesis, innovation carries 
risks.) Therefore, I was unable to implement the qualitative methodology originally 
intended, and the scope of the research on Enter had to be scaled down.
In January 2002, when concerns over commercial sensitivity had been removed, I 
secured semi-structured in-depth interviews with the former editor of the CD-ROM, 
the creative designer (who was also one of the founders of the company and the co­
creator of the CD-ROM), and the technical designer, who was responsible for the 
technical tasks of putting the content on the CD-ROM. Although Enter was no longer 
being produced, Pure Communications was still active. It had scaled down its interests 
in digital media content generation, and had begun to focus more on the advertising 
and marketing strand of its business. This marked a return to the core competencies of 
the two founders, whose previous careers had been in marketing. However, the people 
who had played pivotal roles in the production of Enter were still employed by the 
company, and during my three visits to its office, they were able to show me the 
editorial and technical structures that existed while the CD-ROM was still in 
production,
Although I was unable to observe the real time production of Enter, I believe it 
remains a valuable and worthy case-study for this thesis. The relative failure of Enter 
in the commercial market should not preclude it from being examined as a case-study. 
As in other innovation studies, there are lessons to be learned from failure as well as 
success. The conceptual framework underpinning the research argues that, in any 
system of innovation, there are successful and unsuccessful innovators, whose 
combined efforts are necessary to produce a system in which innovation occurs. 
Although Enter ultimately proved unsuccessful in commercial terms, it demonstrated 
a number of important innovations (especially in an Irish context). It also provided a 
valuable example of a digital media innovation that defined itself largely in terms of 
the traditional media, yet was still engaged in a struggle to establish itself as a content 
innovation distinct from the traditional media. As such, it provided a useful Irish 
example of the early emergence of digital media as a content form.
Also, the quantitative study of the Irish digital media content industry (in chapter 
five) highlights some of the difficulties facing digital media content companies
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producing Irish content for the small domestic market. The experience of Pure 
Communications and Enter would seem to confirm many of those findings: this will 
be outlined in greater detail in a later section of this chapter.
As well as semi-structured interviews, my methodology included document 
analysis, which consisted mainly of an in-depth examination of the Enter CD-ROMs. 
During this phase of research, I assessed the media techniques used in the presentation 
of the content, and examined which of these techniques were adopted from the 
traditional media, which were adapted to suit the digital media format, and which 
techniques were emerging as new and exclusive to Enter. The CD-ROM was 
published monthly, and over the span of its seventeen issue life, I tried to assess its 
evolution and development as a content innovation. I also conducted document 
analysis of the Enter website. I supplemented the in-depth interviews and the 
examination of the CD-ROMs with information gathered from a number of secondary 
sources, such as news-reports in the business and technology sections of mainstream 
media publications.
7 .2 :  P u r e  C o m m u n i c a t i o n s  a s  a n  o r g a n i s a t i o n  a n d  t h e  b a c k g r o u n d  t o  Enter
Enter magazine was published by Pure Communications, an average sized (in Irish 
terms) digital media content start-up company, which employed 16 full-time staff and 
4 part-time. The company was founded in September 1999, and it had two strands of 
commercial activity. The first was based on the career background of two of the three 
founders: advertising and marketing. The second was a new area in which they had no 
previous experience: digital media content generation. The co-creators of the CD- 
ROM, Niall Austin and Ben Linehan, worked for the same advertising agency in 
Dublin. They left together to established Pure Communications with Jeanne Heery, 
whose background was in accounting. She became the company’s financial controller.
The first edition of Enter was published in December of 1999. By the end of its 
first year of publication, it had achieved average monthly sales of over 20,000 copies, 
and the company claimed the CD-ROM had achieved a moderate level of 
profitability. Enter bucked the trend of resource and finance shortages in the industry 
by securing a £2 million venture capital investment, which was announced in 
November 2000. It enabled the company to begin forming plans to release a British 
edition of Enter. Of this investment, about £500,000 was invested by Pat McDonagh,
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who was an influential figure in the rise of Smartforce and Riverdeep, two of the few 
Irish digital media companies to successfully sell content artefacts in foreign markets. 
The remaining money was supplied by Netvest.co, a British company that specialised 
in technology and media products (Business Plus, 1/11/2000). Netvest.co was viewed 
as a suitable strategic partner to assist the company’s move from the small Irish digital 
media content market to the bigger British market.
Pure Communications had its office on the Mount Pleasant Industrial Estate in 
Ranelagh, Dublin. For the first four issues of Enter, it used the recording studio of 
Midas Productions, on Baggot Street, Dublin. For later issues, it availed of the 
recording facilities at The Yard studio on Sheriff Street, Dublin, which offered 
competencies in design, authoring and compression for CD-ROM production. The 
Yard also undertook audio and video content work for Ireland.com during my 
research placement there in August 2001, which is an indication of the small size of 
the Irish digital media content industry.
By February 2001, Pure Communications had acquired offices in London, 
England, in preparation for the launch of the British edition. The move into the British 
market turned out to be a quick but costly failure, and it forced a significant 
restructuring of the company. It began to consolidate its operations back at its Dublin 
office. Although the primary impetus behind the founding of the company was the 
generation and publication of original digital media content, it was no longer in a 
financial position to do so. It switched emphasis to the advertising and marketing 
strand of its business (contracted work included designing advertisements for clients 
such as SuperValu and Club Orange). While other digital media content companies 
were closing during the economic slowdown that began to hit in 2001, revenue from 
the advertising and marketing strand kept Pure Communications in existence.
By early 2002, the content strand had started becoming more active, although the 
company was still not in a position to attempt a move back into the risk-laden and 
costly arena of content generation. It was in the process of creating a subsidiary called 
DSM Sport, which would act as a third-party host for the online content of sporting 
federations across the world. Also, it had a camera crew in the United States filming a 
sports programme for an American network television channel2. The company was
2 Pure Communications tried to diversify by moving into television content production. It owned a 3.5 
percent stake in TV Ireland, which was a broadband television sendee aimed at the Diaspora (Sunday 
Business Post, 26 August 2001).
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holding preliminary discussions with a number of partners and advertisers about a 
possible re-launch of the Enter title. However, it admitted that it would be at least a 
year, or possibly two, before it had formed a solid basis from which to re-enter the 
market as a generator of original digital media content.
The flurry of innovation in the technology industry in recent years has led to many 
failures; rather than closing, some of these companies have withdrawn temporarily 
from the market, reassessed their innovative efforts and direction, and re-entered the 
market. If Pure Communications succeeds in re-entering the market, it will be an Irish 
example of this. As a digital media content creator, it could be viewed not as a start­
up company but as a ‘start-up again’ company, whereby it draws on the initial 
experience (accumulated knowledge) of producing and marketing a digital media 
content innovation, analyses the weaknesses of the original innovation (whether 
failure was down to the innovation itself, flawed marketing strategy or business 
model, or a combination of factors), and tries to produce a more successful innovation 
the second time around. The company said that any future incarnation of the CD- 
ROM would be more focused than the general arts and entertainment artefact of the 
original. A music or film artefact was suggested as a possibility. In January 2002, the 
company had maintained the editorial and technical structures that existed during the 
production of Enter, it continued to employ people with the necessary content and 
technical competencies, had maintained its production infrastructure, and had added 
technical competencies, such as the ability to compress content in-house.
Pure Communications had a small but flexible organisational structure. There 
were no strict lines of demarcation, as in larger traditional media companies. 
Although people had a core set of responsibilities and duties within the company, they 
could be called on to work on tasks outside their specific areas. As in many digital 
media start-ups, the people were expected to possess an array of competencies and 
undertake a variety of tasks. Roisin Carroll, the technical director of the CD-ROM, 
also supplied content to certain sections. In general, the managing director was in 
charge of the general business direction of the company, securing investment and 
seeking opportunities for growth. The creative director had responsibility for 
designing the look of the CD-ROM, of the city and the rooms. The technical director 
was in charge of rendering the designs on the CD-ROM. The editor was in-charge of 
securing content and conducting interviews. Most of the recording and video 
production was conducted outside the company, by Midas Productions for the first
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four issues, and The Yard thereafter. The webmaster was in charge of posting the 
website and transcribing, in text form, interviews that were recorded for the CD- 
ROM. The people involved in the content strand of the business also worked for the 
advertising side. Ben Linehan, as well as designing Enter, also designed 
advertisements for the company’s clients. Roisin Carroll’s background was television 
graphic design -  Enter was the first digital media artefact she worked on -  and these 
competencies were used in the production of advertisements. The interviewees said 
that time pressure made it difficult to implement significant design changes to Enter. 
This was, in large part, due to the limited personnel, financial and technical resources 
available, and also because these resources had also to service the advertising strand. 
Technical designer Roisin Carroll said: “We had an awful lot of extra ideas that we 
never really got round to doing” (Carroll, Enter, 2002). The limited resources of the 
company would appear to have been a brake on the further development of the 
original concept. As my quantitative study suggested, limited resources was a general 
characteristic of Irish start-up digital media companies, which diminished the 
innovative potential of the industry.
7 .3 :  Enter, t h e  o r i g i n a l  v is i o n  a n d  t h e  t e c h n ic a l  r e a l i t y
The original vision for Enter, according to co-creator Ben Linehan, was to produce 
content that “the Internet promised but couldn’t deliver, due to technological 
restraints” (Linehan, Enter, 2002). The intention was to create digital media content 
with high quality audio and video that would offer deeper interactivity than was 
possible with online content. One of the earliest decisions was to produce Enter as an 
offline source of content. In the absense of an accessible, countrywide broadband 
network in Ireland, CD-ROM offered the only platform across which high quality 
audio and video could be delivered. While planning Enter’s creation in mid-1999, 
Linehan and co-creator Niall Austin anticipated the roll-out of a broadband network 
by 2002. Once broadband allowed them to deliver online audio and video content to 
the same quality as the CD-ROM, they would transfer Enter to the web. They had 
planned, by then, to have established Enter as a brand of digital media content, in the 
expectation that the people who had bought the CD-ROM over the previous two to 
three years would follow it online. Crucial to this model was the assumption that users 
who had paid a coverprice in newsagents for access to Enter content would, instead,
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be willing to pay subscription charges for online access. However, the timeframe for 
this business model fell on two fronts: the artefact did not survive till 2002, and even 
if it had, the broadband network had not been rolled-out to the extent that transferring 
it would have been viable.
Enter was an imitative innovation of sports and music CD-ROMs that Mali 
Austin saw while travelling in the United States. Austin and Linehan, while still 
working together for a Dublin-based advertising agency, began discussing the 
possibilities for similar CD-ROMs in the Irish market. An incentive to their planning 
was that they had not seen any similar CD-ROMs in Ireland or Europe, and they 
wanted to produce theirs before anyone else entered the market with such an artefact. 
They believed the sports and music CD-ROMs were too narrowly focused on a 
specific target audience (later experience would see them revise their opinion), and an 
Irish CD-ROM should have a broader appeal, to reach a large enough audience to 
make production viable. They decided that it should be a general arts and 
entertainment artefact, aimed at the age group they believed would be most likely to 
purchase digital media content artefacts (15 to 35 year olds).
The artefact was defined in terms of a magazine from the first edition to the last. 
Even in the early planning stage, it was framed in the language of a magazine. 
Linehan said: “It was going to be everything.. .it was going to be like a Hotpress, plus 
an Empire, plus an FHM , plus an arts page from The Times’’ (Linehan, Enter, 2002). 
Carolyn Marvin (1988) has written about the tendency to frame new media (or 
technologies) in the familiar terms of the old, to shape them as objects for 
consumption. Shaping Enter as an object for consumption was a constant problem for 
the company. Despite using the familiar reference of a magazine, the company still 
encountered difficulty explaining the concept of the CD-ROM magazine to 
advertisers, interviewees and the public. Often, the magazine analogy led to confusion 
and acted as a barrier to people understanding. Linehan offered two examples: some 
people thought the CD-ROM contained desktop publishing software that would allow 
them to design a magazine; others opened the cardboard cover which contained the 
CD-ROM and asked where the pages were.
There were limits to how closely a digital media CD-ROM artefact could be a 
‘magazine5, in the traditional sense of what constitutes the characteristics of a print 
magazine as a content form. Indeed, there were limits to how closely Enter's  creators 
wanted to replicate a print magazine. They decided not to place an index on the front
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(home) page of the CD-ROM, because it would have looked unimaginative in a 
digital media magazine and would have been an example of an old media technique 
that simply wouldn’t have been suited to a new media format. Therefore, they had to 
fashion something new. What they needed was something that would perform the 
same basic function as an index -  a central portal that would allow quick and easy 
access to content -  but would be consistent with the interactivity and look of a digital 
media artefact. They developed the concept of a virtual city, called Nighttown, in 
which the user travelled to different locations to access different content3. For 
example, the user travelled to Nighttown’s virtual cinema to access information about 
films, or to Nighttown’s virtual music bar for interviews with musicians and to see 
clips from music videos. In practice, all this entailed was dragging the mouse until the 
cursor was over a highlighted area, such as the building for the movie theatre, clicking 
on it, and the user would enter the virtual location. If they wished to leave, they 
clicked the back button, and they would return to Nighttown. The user could then drag 
the cursor across to the music bar if they wished to listen to music interviews.
Fred Moody’s research at Microsoft’s Multimedia Publishing Division in the 
early-1990s documented how developing a central concept for a digital media content 
innovation could be a difficult and time-consuming process. The success of the final 
innovation depended crucially on developing a suitable central concept to act as an 
interface between the user and the information contained on the CD-ROM. For the 
children’s interactive encyclopaedia Explorapedia, Moody noted the importance of 
“designing the encyclopaedia’s interface, trying to come up with an aesthetically 
appealing design so coherent that people could figure out how to use the 
encyclopaedia simply by looking at the screen and intuitively understanding what all
3 Although Lenihan didn’t claim it influenced the development of the city metaphor, the earlier 
Amsterdam Digital City (DDS) project echoed many of aspects of Nighttown. DDS, which began in 
1994. was subsidised by the local government to act as a facility for the citizcns of Amsterdam to gain 
access to official local authority and government information and to facilitate public debate. It was a 
network, which subscribers accessed through telephone lines and modems. DDS had an elaborate 
virtual city structure, with subscribers able to access information at different locations, e,g. in the metro 
section, subscribers could enter chat-rooms (cafes) for leisure. At other locations they could access 
minutes of city council meetings. Public debate among Amsterdam’s citizens flourished on DDS. It 
moved from depending on local government subsidies to non-subsidy, not-for-profit funding (tlirough 
the sale of advertisements and the ‘renting’ of virtual space). DDS was criticised for becoming 
increasingly commercialised and losing focus on its original role of democratising public debate in 
Amsterdam. In 2000, DDS began to divest itself of content strands that were unprofitable (DDS, press 
release, 5 October 2000; Besselaar and Beckers, 1998).
213
of its words, menus, and commands would do when activated” (Moody, 1995: 8). 
Nighttown had to serve a similar function for Enter.
According to Linehan, he and Austin hit on the idea of the city early in the 
planning stage of the artefact. Although a number of alternatives were considered, 
none came close to replacing the city. A crucial factor in opting for the city concept 
was that it offered greater advertising potential than the alternatives. The city was an 
environment into which a high level of advertising could be integrated without 
looking out of place, contrived, or intruding on the consumption of the content. As in 
a real city, advertising billboards could be scattered at various points around 
Nighttown (on the CD-ROM, these billboards had video footage from television 
advertisements running on a loop). Locations in the city could be named after 
sponsors, such as the Heineken Red Star Bar. One of the early alternatives to the city 
was a stately home. The creators were unable to devise a means of integrating 
advertising into a stately home without it looking out of place and contrived; it was 
more credible to name locations in a city than rooms in a stately home after a sponsor. 
Linehan said of choosing the city concept over the stately home: “It was a bit of a 
trade off from something that was high-brow to something that is getting sponsors in, 
advertising, which we had to do to supplement the small revenues we had in the 
beginning” (Linehan, Enter, 2002). As a study for COMTEC has indicated, 
advertising is a crucial source of revenue for the digital media content industry in 
Ireland and abroad (COMTEC, 2002). The economic slowdown since 2001 has 
squeezed the advertising revenues of digital media content ventures. Many 
organisations have begun reducing their investment in digital media content and have 
scaled down their operations. Advertisers, as a layer of the system of innovation, had 
a crucial influence not just on the design of Enter but also on the level and nature of 
its content. This will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.
Another reason for choosing the city concept was to allow the creators to include a 
wide diversity o f content while maintaining a logic to its inclusion. In keeping with 
the concept of the virtual city, all of the content in Enter was found at certain 
locations within the city: sports content was found at the virtual gym, film reviews at 
the virtual cinema, music at the virtual music bar, theatre interviews at the city’s 
virtual theatre, and interviews with authors took place at the virtual library. The basic 
principle of this mirrored the practice of print magazines, to group related content 
together in sections. It was not a practice that was determined by the technology of
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digital media, but a culturally and socially shaped practice, shaped out of traditional 
media practice and the necessity to create a technique that worked on a digital media 
format.
A large part of Enter’s design went into creating the feel of actually being in a 
city, into creating an environment for the user that was not only interactive but also 
immersive4. For interviews with guests, each background was designed to look like 
the interior of its location within Nighttown. With interviews in the library, the 
background comprised bookshelves, reading lamps and study desks. When clips of 
films were shown in the virtual cinema, the background was designed to look like an 
auditorium. Also, in an effort to make Nighttown seem a real, three-dimensional town 
in which the user was a visitor, the windows of certain rooms looked out over the city 
and, in the distance, the user could see other locations, such as the virtual theatre or 
gallery. For instance, an interview took place with RTE presenter Bianca Lukyx in 
issue six; in that room, in Enter's virtual television centre, the user could look out the 
window and see the buildings of other locations in the city, such as the music bar. 
This was also a subtle way of promoting the other content on the CD-ROM.
The creators claimed that they had little difficulty turning their initial vision into a 
technical reality. One of their principal goals was to avoid the technical constraints of 
publishing content online -  the poor quality of video and audio content and the long 
download times required. However, their chosen platform, the CD-ROM, imposed 
limitations of its own. Each CD-ROM could hold only 650 megs of material, and for 
technical reasons, 20 megs had to be left free. Each CD-ROM was filled almost to 
capacity, which forced editorial choices on the production team: in each edition, 
content had to be dropped or held over for the next edition because there was not 
enough memory to store it. Storage capacity often created tension between the 
production team and advertisers: advertisers wanted a certain level of content in the 
location they were sponsoring, yet there was often not enough room to run all of the
4 Immersion was an emerging facet that was crossing different genres of digital media content, but had 
emerged most strongly in interactive games. Andrew Darley, in Visual Digital Culture, wrote how “the 
ideas of interaction, participation, immersion” were particularly important for computer games as 
“emergent expressions of mass visual culture” (Darley, 2000: 148). Interactivity and immersion in 
games were vital to the sensory experience of the player being a participant in the computer game, 
rather than a passive consumer of content, as in the traditional media. The intention was to create the 
impression that the player had a role in (and influence over) unfolding the narrative of the game. 
Similarly, Enter stressed the importance of interaction with its users, with the aim of immersing them 
in the Nighttown concept, to make them more active participants in the consumption of the CD-ROM’s 
content.
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content they wanted. The closer the CD-ROM ran to capacity, the poorer the quality 
of the video content. The Yard studio used compression software to reduce the 
amount of space taken up on the CD-ROM by audio and video, but compressing the 
content down too far affected the quality. Video could come out as blurry, or as black 
and white, or certain colours could be off. The production team had to achieve a 
balance between maintaining the technical quality of the CD-ROM and including 
sufficient content to keep advertisers satisfied.
The CD-ROM’s limited capacity forced the creators to abandon their plans to 
introduce Virtual Reality Modeling Language (VRML) to the artefact. The city and 
all of the locations within it were based on two-dimensional screens. VRML would 
have added a three-dimensional effect. The user could have entered the room and 
viewed it from different angles. Also, they wanted to film interviewees from three 
camera angles, to give users a greater choice of perspective while watching an 
interview. These plans were never implemented because of memory constraints 
imposed by the CD-ROM platform. The long term plan was to integrate them into the 
online version of Enter after the roll-out of broadband had allowed it to transfer to the 
web and it wasn’t under such memory constraints.
Enter worked with a small production team and limited resources. The team, some 
of whom also had to service the advertising strand of the business, was under time 
pressure to produce the artefact each month and so found it difficult to introduce 
significant innovations to the original design. However, the team was wary of 
allowing the format and design to go stale. The format of the city was changed in 
issue eight. The original city was based on two separate screens, the Quay and the 
Plaza. The user clicked on an icon button to move between the two. The process 
innovation involved dropping the divide and presenting the city as one unified 
location. It was created out of four Photoshop screens stitched together. The user 
could scroll left or right across the screens; when the scrolling brought the user to the 
end of the fourth screen, the city would loop and return to the beginning of the first 
screen. This gave the illusion of the city being 360 degrees, even though it was 
comprised of four flat screens. The screens were formatted in Multimedia Director to 
allow the user scroll left and right. Other changes to the CD-ROM involved the 
introduction of new locations (and, correspondingly, new genres of content) and the 
elimination of others, depending on how successful the creators believed they were. 
Another consideration was whether an advertiser was willing to continue sponsoring a
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location. A core group of locations stayed, relatively unchanged, in the Irish edition 
for its fifteen issue span. (The British edition incorporated significant changes to the 
tone, nature and presentation of the content, and advertising levels dropped.) These 
locations included the comedy cellar, the music bar, the television centre, the theatre, 
the sports centre, the café, the library, the gallery, the style centre, the movie theatre 
and the restaurant. They encompassed many sections that would be found in a 
traditional print entertainment magazine -  comedy, music and television personality 
interviews, theatre, restaurant, book and film reviews, as well as sport, art and fashion 
sections.
The influence of advertisers over Enter was significant. They had greater input 
into the editorial process than would have been acceptable in other media 
organisations, where a higher value would have been placed on preserving editorial 
freedom from outside, commercial influences. This stemmed, in part, from the 
background of the founders, whose careers in marketing were based on servicing the 
needs of advertisers. (If their background had been in journalism, or in similar media 
careers, they might have been more reluctant to allow advertisers to actively influence 
the editorial process.) Pure Communications was in the rare position of being both a 
creator of advertising campaigns for clients and a publishing outlet for advertisers. 
Interviews were conducted in rooms in Nighttown’s various locations. The rooms 
were first sketched on card by Ben Linehan; they would be converted into Photoshop 
screens by Roisin Carroll, who would then email them to an advertising client for 
approval. For example, rooms in the Red Star Bar would be emailed to the advertising 
representatives of Heineken. Changes would be made based on the advertiser’s 
suggestions, such as to put more content in a location or to feature the company’s 
labels more prominently. Ben Linehan outlined how deep the influence of advertisers 
ran when he said: “If  we were approaching a new client, we would try to create an 
environment for them that would complement their produce. For example, when HB 
[manufacturer of ice-cream confectionery] came on board in the summer of 2000, we 
created a whole section for them that was based on lifestyle...that would fit in with 
their products” (Lenihan, Enter, 2002). The genres of content on the CD-ROM were 
often defined by what would fit with the general theme of an advertiser’s products.
Once the room design was approved by the advertiser (usually a couple of weeks 
in advance of publication), the video footage of the interview would be inserted. The 
interviews were filmed by a post-production studio called The Yard. The editor of
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Enter, Ken Sweeney, would view the raw footage and designate edits. The Yard 
would cut the film in their editing suite, compress the footage using Quicktime 
software, and return it to Pure Communications. The technical director, Roisin 
Carroll, would insert the interview into the appropriate room.
Amassing the content and designing it technically for the CD-ROM was a learning 
process (the Teaming by doing’ of innovation studies). This became most apparent 
when production of Enter was taken from the Irish operation and transferred to a new 
team in England. Irish editor Ken Sweeney said: “Something I think is quite 
important, the English magazine learned from our mistakes. They looked at our 
magazine and thought: oh, maybe there’s too much content. They looked at the city 
and thought, we can simplify this. They learned from what we had done and used that 
to make their magazine” (Sweeney, Enter, 2002). This suggests the interactive 
innovation of Lundvall’s model, where knowledge and experience are accumulated 
within the organisation through the production over time of the artefact. In this case, 
the knowledge accumulated during production of the Irish edition was used as the 
basis for a new production team to implement the next stage of innovative 
development, so the accumulated knowledge circulated within the expanded 
organisation.
It is important to note that although the Irish and British editions of Enter were 
published by the same company, and produced around the same basic concept, they 
were regarded as being two separate products. The Irish production team held the 
British edition responsible for closing the Irish one. Ken Sweeney stressed how it was 
“their failure” [the English team’s] that caused the end of the Irish magazine. The 
British edition had a separate editorial and production team, and a different focus to 
the Irish magazine. According to Sweeney, the Irish magazine tried to blend fun 
entertainment content with serious art and culture, such as interviews with authors on 
what had influenced their writing. The British edition, in contrast, was pure 
entertainment. Sweeney said: “The blokes who did the English one were the blokes 
out of Loaded. They wouldn’t have known too much about Irish culture, or culture in 
general. That’s how it changed. There was a little bit of pressure on me to make the 
last couple [of Irish editions] more like the English one” (Sweeney, Enter, 2002). He 
said that although the production of the British edition was technically superior, the 
content was of a poorer quality, and this was a contributing factor to its quick failure 
in the British market. He said that the first couple of Irish issues were Enter in its
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purest form, until he came under pressure to dumb-down the content to reach a wider 
audience.
7.4: The content for Enter
Pure Communications promoted Enter as being about the content, not the technology, 
and all three interviewees for this case-study stressed how, ultimately, it was the 
quality o f the content on the CD-ROM that induced people to purchase it. Enter had a 
small editorial team, and the main responsibility for supplying content rested with the 
editor, Ken Sweeney. Before becoming editor, he worked six years for the BBC film 
archive in London. He began writing The Diary column in The Evening Herald 
newspaper soon after becoming editor of Enter, and he used the material gathered for 
the CD-ROM as the basis of his columns. In return, The Evening Herald would 
promote the forthcoming issue of Enter.
He emphasised the importance of always having “great names” (celebrities who 
would be immediately recognisable as popular culture icons) to attract people to the 
CD-ROM. Having “names” also made it easier to persuade other celebrities to agree 
to be interviewed. The production team didn’t have formal editorial meetings, as in a 
newspaper or television newsroom. However, he did delegate editorial responsibility 
in areas he had little knowledge of, sport and fashion. The sports content was gathered 
by a print sports journalist who later began working for The Times in London. Fashion 
was the responsibility of Roisin Carroll, who was also the CD-ROM’s technical 
director.
According to Sweeney, the biggest problem he faced in gathering content was 
explaining the concept of Enter to interviewees. (This was a problem Pure 
Communications faced on all fronts when engaging with outside actors: advertisers, 
investors, interviewees and the public.) Often, he would have to send an interviewee a 
previous edition of the CD-ROM before they would agree to an interview. He said: 
“Names are wary about what they’ll do and won’t do. Getting them to go in blindly 
into something there isn’t an existing example of is difficult” (Sweeney, Enter, 2002). 
In the beginning, an informal network of contacts helped him secure interviews for 
the CD-ROM. Similar to how Austin and Linehan used contacts to win advertisers, 
Sweeney used his contacts in the music and television business. Initially, the 
structures of press publicity in Ireland were reluctant to allow Enter access to
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celebrities. For example, popstars had only a limited time for press interviews while 
visiting Dublin, and their record companies preferred them to concentrate on the 
traditional round of television, radio and newspaper interviews, because these were 
regarded as channels to the greatest amount of publicity. However, as Enter 
established itself, publicity representatives became more amenable to having their 
clients feature in the magazine. Universal was the first record company that allowed 
Enter access to its artists. When the other record companies saw that Universal artists 
were gaining publicity on the CD-ROM, they too began to promote their artists to 
Sweeney. A similar pattern emerged with film distributors and book publishers; once 
the artefact gained a certain level of recognition and familiarity, it was incorporated 
into the structures and routines of public relations for entertainers.
Complicating matters was that interviews, although recorded using standard 
television camera equipment, had to be filmed in front of a specialised blue screen, to 
allow a room background to be superimposed later. In the early editions, interviewees 
were taken to a special blue-room studio on Baggot Street, Dublin. Then the company 
invested in a portable blue screen, which, with the addition of special lighting, 
allowed interviews to take place at remote locations, such as a guest’s hotel room, or 
at the back of a concert. Sweeney said that most guest were experienced in giving 
interviews to television, and being interviewed in front of a blue screen did not affect 
them.
He said that his role in the magazine was to gather content that would make it 
popular, and in doing so he tried to tap into popular culture icons established in 
traditional media and try to win a share of their audience. Similar to Marvin’s 
concept, he opted for familiar references, in this case popular culture. For instance, he 
said: “Because it was hugely popular, we tried to get the Fair City5 people into the 
magazine and they would bring their audience” (Sweeney, Enter, 2002). He was 
conscious of the need to portray the magazine as a general entertainment artefact 
rather than a specialised, technological one. He said: “My basic direction was to make 
it popular.. .1 was afraid of it becoming a bit too technical, it would intimidate people” 
(Sweeney, Enter, 2002).
One of the problems with the content was that the CD-ROM could not handle 
movement easily. Sweeney said that expressive people, such as the musician David
5 F air City w as a popular soap opera on R TE television.
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Gray, were difficult to film because they moved their hands and arms as part of the 
rythms of their speech. Also, some of the stand-up comedians were restricted, because 
the Irish Enter could not handle stand-up, walkabout shots. (The production team 
behind the British edition of Enter overcame this problem.)
The findings of my quantitative study suggests that the majority of digital media 
content artefacts, produced by Irish start-up companies, are aimed at a niche market; 
for example, CD-ROMs on a topic of niche interest, such as the CD-ROM on the 
Book o f Kells or The Cathach manuscript. Enter aimed at a mainstream market. It 
tried to have something for everybody, even if it adhered to popular stereotypical 
assumptions on what constitutes male and female interests: sport for men, fashion for 
women, films for both. It is similar to the mainstream traditional media, trying to 
appeal to the largest audience possible. Most of the digital media artefacts in Ireland 
that have a wide audience appeal are usually developed by traditional media 
companies, such as the websites of The Irish Times Group and RTE, which draw on 
content produced by the traditional media activities of their respective organisations. 
Pure Communications was one of the few examples of an Irish digital media start-up 
company that tried to launch a mainstream digital media artefact, certainly in terms of 
offline content. Even though, in commercial terms, it failed to survive, it is important 
to note its innovative effort. The majority of innovations, especially in a newly 
emerging industry, prove unsuccessful. Enter, in both its guises, survived only a year 
and a half on the market. The majority of innovations fail to make even the market 
stage. There was an example of this within Pure Communications. It had planned to 
launch a CD-ROM artefact called Enter Business. It would have been an interactive 
business magazine similar in concept to the original Enter. The central concept was to 
be an office; the user would click on various areas of the office to access different 
kinds of content. This planned innovation, due to be released in January 2001, was 
never brought to market.
Each edition of Enter contained a substantial amount of content; it claimed to be 
the equivalent of 1,150 pages of a standard print magazine, although Pure 
Communications could present no evidence to support this claim. It seems an 
anomaly that the majority of content on Enter was audio and video, yet its content 
levels were measured in terms of the predominantly text-based magazine. If, as this 
thesis argues, Enter was a magazine by analogy only (see chapter two, section ten), 
the analogy was particularly imprecise and clumsy in this context. I tested three
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editions of the CD-ROM from its first year of publication, to measure the amount of 
content in each edition and to arrive at an average. I examined an early edition, a 
middle edition and a late edition. After the early editions, the magazine began to 
achieve a remarkable level of consistency in the amount of content it contained, 
although the reason for this was that the producers were working under tight limits as 
to the amount of content they could fit on the CD-ROM. The first edition examined 
(vol 2) took 2 hours and 39 minutes to view, read and listen to all the content. The 
second edition (vol 7) took 3 hours exactly, while the third edition took 3 hours and 5 
minutes. This was a simplistic, quantitative study that was intended only to give an 
indication of the amount of content in Enter and gave no insight into the quality or 
nature of the content (as a qualitative study would).
I took the same three editions and counted how many of the guests were Irish. 
Again, this was a crude quantitative measure, and took no account of the subjects 
people were actually interviewed about. But it gave an indication of how deeply the 
content of Enter was sunk into what the creators believed were Irish social and 
cultural preferences. (And how, more so than in a technological innovation, social and 
cultural values are reflected in a content innovation, and how this study had to be 
more sensitive to them than would have been normal in a traditional application of the 
systems of innovation concept.) For this short study, I defined an Irish guest as 
someone who either lived, worked or was born in Ireland. Volume two had 26 guests, 
of whom 25 were Irish and one was non-Irish. Volume seven had 32 guests, of whom 
26 were Irish and six were non-Irish. The total for volume twelve was 36 guests, of 
whom 32 were Irish and four were non-Irish. This was a deliberate editorial policy, 
because Enter was framing its content to appeal to the perceived content preferences 
of the Irish domestic market. Niall Austin said: “Another aspect of the Internet is that 
it has led, in a sense, to an Americanisation of culture and we were very keen with 
Enter to have a close on 100 percent Irish content” (The Irish Times, 11/11/1999). He 
was speaking around the time of Enter’s launch in November 1999. His attitude 
changed within a year, when the company began preparing the British edition and 
began framing the content to suit perceived British content preferences. The first 
British edition of Enter had 23 guests, two of whom were Irish. The two Irish guests 
had a sufficient international profile to be recognisable to a British audience, and their 
interviews were based on content that was re-used from the original Irish editions of 
Enter,
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The quantitative study in chapter five argues that content doesn’t always travel 
well between nations and regions, due to language and cultural variances. Content is 
often culturally specific. The chapter also argues that this is a factor of development 
that is overlooked by technology-centred accounts of innovation, but it has real and 
profound implications for Irish digital media content producers producing Irish 
content. My quantitative study found that the few examples of Irish digital media 
content artefacts that have proved successful in foreign markets tend not to be based 
on content that is specifically rooted in Irish society or culture. Such trends influenced 
the business development of Enter, which prioritised the larger market over the 
smaller market when it began to move into the British digital media content market. 
This hinted, also, at the unpredictability of how Enter would evolve as a content 
innovation. It was originally intended as an Irish digital media content innovation, but 
market conditions made it more enticing for Pure Communications to convert it into a 
British digital media content innovation.
As well as text (print) and video (television) content, Enter also had radio content 
at its virtual radio centre location. One of the regular guests in the later Irish editions 
was the host of a phone-in show on a popular Dublin station. (According to the editor 
of the CD-ROM, the basic reason for including this section was to try to tap into the 
audience of the radio show,) When the user listened to a clip from the radio show, an 
icon of a radio lit up in the corner of the screen. It was a meshing of old and new 
media. While consuming old media content through a new media technology (the 
personal computer), the CD-ROM framed the content as emanating from an old media 
technology -  a virtual radio set. Again, Enter was overt in its references to traditional 
media content and technologies.
The influence of the traditional media on Enter was apparent in many instances, 
but there were also differences, especially from the “magazine” that Enter claimed to 
be. With the slogan “watch, listen, control” for both the Irish and British editions, 
Pure Communications promoted the digital media magazine as a visual, sensory 
experience6. With traditional forms of media, such as television, the user watches and
6 Sim ilar to  the traits o f interactivity and im m ersion, an em erging facet o f digital m edia content was to 
create a sensation in the user. Again, this w as m ost apparent in interactive gam es, where depending on 
the genre o f the gam e, die intended sensations could be o f fun, fear, or excitem ent. This was attendant 
011 the user feeling  a  part o f (or im m ersed in) die game. N on-digital m edia form s also tried to create 
sensations o f  im m ersion. Im ax cinem a, Andrew  Darley noted, tried to create “a sensation o f  proxim ity 
and engulfm ent” for die view er (2000: 32). It achieved this by having a screen so large diat die viewer 
could not see its edges in  their peripheral vision. The content o f  Im ax cinem as were particularly
223
listens to the content, but generally consumes it in the linear manner that the creator 
intended. (Although if one were to conduct a semiotic study, it could be found that the 
viewer does not always interpret or decode the content in the ways the creator had 
intended.) With Enter, the CD-ROM claimed to be interactive, allowing the user 
control over the order in which the content was consumed. But it was a limited 
interactivity and control, which fell within certain parameters. The user was still 
guided in certain ways and had limited choices on offer. As Martin Reiser argued 
when writing about digital media games, the interactivity offers only “the illusion of 
control” (Rieser, 1997, cited in Kerr, 2001). The user did not have the freedom to 
jump immediately between any two points in the city. They had, first, to go through 
the main Nighttown screen, into a location, and then into a specific interview room. 
With the ‘control’ element of the slogan, the creators were promoting Enter as a more 
active medium to consume than, say, television, when the viewer was generally 
passive. However, to qualify that statement, a consumer of traditional media content 
is not totally passive because they are subject to a number of thought processes in 
trying to make sense of the content (for example, the thought processes necessary to 
follow the storyline of a film). Also, with the slogan on issue eleven -  the magazine 
that comes alive -  Enter, again, was emphasising how it was more of a sensory 
experience. It seemed a contradiction that Enter, keen to define itself as a magazine, 
flagged itself with the slogan “watch, control, listen”, which omitted the one activity 
that was of fundamental importance to consuming the content of magazines: reading. 
This gave an indication of how Enter could be considered a magazine by analogy 
only, and how its attempts to define itself in terms of a traditional media form were 
often clumsy and imprecise.
7.5: The Enter website
The CD-ROM incarnation of Enter was viewed as the initial stage in the innovation’s 
development, with the long-term goal being, when broadband allowed, to transfer it 
entirely to the web. Pure Communications, in the intervening time, intended to build 
and accumulate competencies and infrastructures for the production of online content. 
It developed a website to complement the content on the CD-ROM. This was, partly,
designed to  achieve sensations o f  m ovem ent, such as docu-film s on m ountain climbing. Enter  tried, in 
particular, to create a sense o f im m ersion in  its city concept.
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to begin phasing in the transition from being a CD-ROM artefact to being an online 
artefact: as network speeds increased, the company would have placed a greater 
volume of content online, and more ambitious forms of content such as interactive 
audio and video, until it was in a position to publish all of its content online. The 
website was also necessary to demonstrate to users that the web was an important 
element of the overall Enter content package. The company was trying, in the words 
of Linehan, to build “a loyal and satisfied customer base” which would continue to 
consume Enter content after the move online (Linehan, Enter, 2002). The early 
website was a tentative step towards increasing their familiarity with Enter content 
online. (However, the company would later leave its loyal customer base when it 
moved into the British market.)
Linehan and Austin believed the two platforms were complementary, rather than 
competitive, sources of content, which allowed them to take advantage of the relative 
strengths of online and offline platforms. The CD-ROM could load large amounts of 
video and audio content quickly while maintaining quality (download times would 
have been prohibitively long on the web and the quality would have been poor), 
whereas the web could handle ‘live data’. Content on the CD-ROM could not be up­
dated once the disk was pressed, so the only way Enter could offer up-to-date 
information was by encouraging users to interact with the website. For example, in 
the film reviews section of Enter was an option to connect to the web to view up-to- 
date cinema listings on the website. The impression to the user was that to make full 
use of the content of one platform, you had to use the other.
The researcher monitored the website for a year prior to Enter being discontinued, 
and the content on it expanded greatly over that period. It delivered content that was 
generally not found on the CD-ROM, or expanded on the CD-ROM material, For 
example, many of the video interviews on the CD-ROM were continued in expanded 
text form on the Internet. In August 2000, the company claimed to be the first to have 
launched an interactive online TV station in Ireland (The Sunday Business Post, 13 
August 2000). This was the first move towards publishing audio and video content 
online, and as such, it representative a tentative, small scale experiment for what was 
intended to be a more comprehensive innovation at a later stage. The online TV 
station encountered the very problems that Austin and Linehan had tried to avoid by 
publishing on CD-ROM: download times were long, especially for people using 
domestic Internet connections, and the sound and picture quality was poor. One of the
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strategies for the CD-ROM was to try to tap into the audiences of programmes or 
personalities established in traditional media, and Pure Communications repeated the 
strategy for the online TV station. The main programme was hosted by RTE presenter 
Dave Fanning, who had a large following among teenagers and young adults (Enter’s 
target audience) for his radio and television shows. The online TV station was another 
attempt to frame the new media artefact in terms of the traditional media, to give users 
some degree of familiarity. The content was downloaded via streaming technology, 
and it contained the usual elements of an entertainment television programme, such as 
celebrity interviews, reviews and performances. It was a spurious claim by Pure to 
describe it as a television station, as it consisted of only three to four programmes, 
updated each month to coincide with the release of the Enter CD-ROM.
The online TV station provided a typical example of the language that was used 
by actors within Enter: they used hyped, technologically determinist language such as 
iiEnter TV will revolutionise the way people watch television” (a quote attributed to 
Niall Austin on the Enter website). They seemed to have the pioneering, gung-ho 
attitude and promotional rhetoric of many technological determinists, of riding the 
wave of technology. In a Sunday Business Post article (13 August 2000), Niall Austin 
was quoted as saying: “TV in Ireland will never be the same again.” His approach to 
digital media seemed conceptually inconsistent and confused -  that quote was pure 
technological determinism, yet the website claimed that Enter emphasised the content, 
not the technology, which would be closer to the social shaping approach. And while 
always emphasising that what they were producing was new, they framed it in the 
language of the old. And as with most revolutionary technological determinist claims, 
they did not come to pass: television in Ireland was largely the same after Enter TV.
The website was closer in structure than the CD-ROM to a magazine. (The 
website contained an index and sections; however, it was still “a magazine by 
analogy”). The sections of the Enter website were as follows: home, regulars, guests, 
features, music, interact, shop. Each section contained sub-sections. For example, on 
the home page were sub-sections such as listings, games, Online TV, Movies, Links 
and Lotto.
The CD-ROM’s failure undercut plans to build the website as a comprehensive 
source of online audio and video content. The website remained online for five 
months after the final issue of Enter was published (it was taken offline in late 
October 2001), and continued to receive hits for most of this period. The company
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was reassessing its content strategy, and investigating a possible re-launch of Enter. 
But, at the time of my interviews in January 2002, it seemed most likely that any 
future artefact would remain, primarily, CD-ROM based. The broadband network was 
not yet in place to deliver audio and video content to the same quality as the CD- 
ROM. Also, the initial inclination of the company was that a future Enter would have 
a different tone -  it would not be a general arts and entertainment artefact. This, 
combined with a lengthy absense from the marketplace, meant Pure Communications 
would again have to start the process of building a “loyal and satisfied customer base” 
to follow it online.
7.6: Enter as an offensive innovator and the move into the British market
Pure Communications continually emphasised how it had produced Ireland’s and, 
later, Britain’s first interactive digital media magazine on CD-ROM. However, 
despite fashioning itself as an offensive innovator, the company witnessed no 
emergence of direct competitors, and so never had to assume the position of trying to 
protect market share. The literature review on systems of innovation holds that 
successful innovations usually give rise to defensive innovations, as actors within the 
system try to claim some of the ground created by the successful innovation. The lack 
of defensive innovators of Enter was linked to its commercial failure in the market, 
especially in the British market. The content innovation was launched at a time when 
wider conditions in the system of innovation were less favourable towards 
entrepreneurs and companies taking risks, because the technology sector was 
beginning to slowdown after a sustained period of boom.
The company framed the CD-ROM as a magazine, it was sold alongside 
magazines in newsagents, and magazines were the closest it had to direct competition. 
(The company intended to keep the magazine analogy even if the artefact had 
transferred online. Their reasoning was that they could describe it as a magazine in 
the same way that television had ‘magazine’ programmes.) However, the company 
had been expecting another, similar CD-ROM magazine to emerge as competition, 
and were surprised when one didn’t. Linehan said he and Austin, in the early planning 
stage, were fearful that someone would beat them to market, and during the seventeen 
issue life of the artefact, they were monitoring the market, waiting for a competitor to 
emerge. He tried to explain the lack of defensive innovators by suggesting that other
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companies believed they couldn’t compete with Enter in terms of content and 
production quality. He also made a claim that went against the orthodoxy of 
innovation studies theory -  that a lack of defensive innovations was one of the reasons 
behind the failure of the original content innovation. He claimed that if other similar 
artefacts had come on the market, it would have created a distinct genre in the 
marketplace and would have allowed Enter to reach a wider audience. Throughout the 
life of the artefact, the company had difficulties explaining to advertisers, 
interviewees and the public what exactly Enter was, and this undermined its ability to 
reach an audience. He reasoned that, with more artefacts on the market, a market 
segment would have been created, which would have enabled the artefact to achieve a 
deeper market penetration. This is an indication of the difficulty of successfully 
introducing a new innovation. Unless it readily falls into one of the established market 
segments, it is difficult to define a market for it (and goes against technology-push 
arguments that innovations create markets). Enter was classified in a traditional 
market segment because it had no distinct segment of its own to fall into. The CD- 
ROM was stocked with magazines in newsagents, and Linehan claimed that the CD- 
ROM never truly distinguished itself from print magazines in the view of the public.
The company viewed itself as an offensive innovator in entering the British 
market when it did, before the large print magazine publishing houses began 
producing similar artefacts. Again, like the Irish launch, they singled out traditional 
print publishers as their potential innovative competitors, but the expected 
competition never emerged. Niall Austin said: “The likes of EMAP and IPC [British 
magazine publishers] are professional but also conservative and would be slow to 
introduce anything like this” (www.entef.ie/eiiterweb/regulars/new.cfni, 
06/03/2001).
Despite the level of venture capital invested in the project and the confidence 
within the company that the experience of producing the original Irish Enter would 
make the transition to the British market a smoother and successful task, the British 
edition lasted for only two issues. Before the UK launch, Nail Austin, said: “The UK 
market is very competitive, but there is a capacity to succeed within it” 
(www.enter.ie/enterweb /regulars/new.cfm, 06/03/2001). The competitiveness of 
the market proved to be the main reason for the failure. The UK Enter was costlier 
than the Irish one to produce, and according to Irish editor Ken Sweeney, it got
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“swamped” in the bigger market by rival publications from the print magazine 
industry.
The impetus behind the move was the belief that, based on its experience of 
establishing a moderately profitable digital media content artefact in Ireland, Pure 
Communications could take the concept to the Britain. The market there was larger 
and carried potentially greater risks, but offered the potential o f greater rewards if the 
innovation proved successful. The company commissioned a London-based market 
research firm to gauge how receptive the British market would be to an artefact such 
as Enter. The firm reported back that a British version of the Irish Enter would not 
work in the new market. Ireland, being a smaller country, was more open to informal 
networks of contacts being used to secure interviews (content), and this would not be 
so in the larger, more formally structured publicity organisations in Britain. The CD- 
ROM might not be able to secure as many ‘names’ as the Irish edition had. Although 
Pure Communications tried to make the original CD-ROM appeal to both males and 
females, it was bought mostly by males. Roisin Carroll, technical designer on the Irish 
Enter and responsible for gathering content for the CD-ROM’s fashion section, said: 
“I think boys would buy it mostly. I am interested in technical stuff, but I’d never 
watch a CD-ROM, so I ’m not really sure. I did the fashion shows, and I felt there was 
no girls buying it, and I know the boys didn’t watch it [the fashion section]” (Carroll, 
interview, 2002). The marketing and promotion of the original Enter was gender 
neutral, but the marketing of the British one was, on the advice of market research, 
aimed specifically at males. A constant task of the original production team was 
explaining that using the CD-ROM required no deep technical knowledge. In the 
experience of Pure Communications, males did not understand the concept of Enter 
any better or quicker than females, but males were more likely to experiment with it 
and grow familiar through use, because they tended to have a greater interest in 
computer and technical matters. The fact that the British edition, essentially, dropped 
women from its audience raised questions about the gendering of digital media 
content: that males were perceived as being more receptive to digital media, both as a 
technological and content artefact. (Cynthia Cockburn (in Silverstone and Hirsch, 
1992) has conducted valuable work on the relative technological competencies of 
males and females, and how this has affected usage.) This could have implications for 
future digital media content production and for how women will consume digital 
media content, but such issues are outside the scope of this thesis. However, a number
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of important studies have been conducted on the genderisation of ICT technologies 
and content in favour of males, such as Spilker and Sorenson (2000)7. Enter, in this 
context, provided an example of a digital media content artefact that tried, initially, to 
appeal to both sexes, but eventually re-shaped itself to appeal more to males.
Market research indicated that the same pattern of males dominating the audience 
could be expected to emerge in Britain. However, in the larger British market, there 
was less pressure to create an artefact with general appeal. In the Irish market, a 
special interest audience would not have been large enough to sustain the CD-ROM. 
However, in the British market, a special interest audience could, potentially, be large 
enough to sustain it. The market research indicated that men’s lifestyle magazines 
offered the greatest potential to establish a version of Enter in the British market, 
because the print magazines were purchased mostly by young males, the very 
grouping that had purchased the original artefact on the Irish market.
Investment in the British edition was heavy, and its collapse was quick. Pure 
Communications didn’t have the necessary financial resources to subsidise a loss- 
making innovation while it tried to establish itself in the market. Two editions of the 
CD-ROM were published; a third was put together, but never released.
As an isolated occurrence, it was an indication of the company’s ambition that, 
after enjoying a degree of success with its initial innovation, it tried to move into a 
larger market where the potential rewards were greater. However, when viewed 
through a systems of innovation perspective, it is worrying that Enter, as a source of 
Irish digital media content, was lost to the British content market in such a fashion. 
When set against the findings of chapter five -  that digital media content start-up 
companies are less likely than companies in other industries to go beyond the limited 
domestic market -  Pure Communications bucked the trend by making a concerted 
effort to bring its innovation to a foreign market. Commentators such as Vivien Walsh 
argue that innovative firms within small systems of innovation are characterised by a 
struggle to break out of the limited domestic market. The findings of my study
7 Spilker and S orenson’s w ork focused on the production o f a digital m edia content artefact (hat was 
aim ed specifically at a fem ale audience. The CD-ROM , called JenteRO M , w as aim ed at girls aged 
betw een fifteen  and thirty. The producers o f the CD-ROM  believed digital m edia as a technology and 
content fo rm  w as gendered in favour o f males. Jen teR O M  represented a deliberate attem pt to inscribe 
fem inine attributes into the technology and content to reach a fem ale audience. The attributes were 
based on  w hat the producers believed w ere fem inine characteristics, and included calmness, 
convenience and co-operation. The distribution system  o f Jen teR O M  and Enter  differed. Enter  was 
sold as an  individual artefact; Jen teR O M  was bundled with a  print m agazine that was bought mostly by 
w om en in  the fifteen to thirty years age bracket.
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suggest that statement isn’t as applicable to Irish digital media content companies, 
which tend to produce for the Irish market and receive commissions for work from 
Irish clients. This relative isolation from the world economy seems to have the effect 
of blunting the innovative edge of Irish digital media content creators, who often 
engage in imitative innovations of artefacts that larger foreign digital media 
companies do not produce or localise for the small Irish market. However, Enter was 
an exception to this general trend, even if ultimately it failed to successfully move 
beyond the domestic market. Pure Communications, in this instance, provides a 
specific example of general problems facing the Irish digital media content industry: 
that Irish content tend not to sell well in foreign markets, the cost of adapting a 
company’s core content innovation is high, and the risk of failure in the new market is 
even higher.
The small size of the Irish market makes the larger UK market more attractive. 
Finance to fund innovation and expansion is crucial within any system of innovation. 
Pure Communications overcame a problem undermining the innovative efforts of 
many Irish digital media content creators: acquiring the venture capital investment 
necessary to bring an innovation to a new market. As part of this process, the larger 
market assumed priority for Pure Communications. The company discontinued the 
Irish edition of Enter in February 2001, because the high cost of content creation and 
the finances of the company didn’t allow it to produce separate Irish and British 
editions. On the launch of the British edition, a largely British produced and British 
content-orientated digital media artefact was being sold in Ireland, whereas prior to 
this, an Irish produced and Irish content-orientated digital media artefact was being 
sold on the Irish market. A characteristic of the system of innovation, in this case the 
small size of the domestic Irish market, had a decisive influence on the production 
and final form of the digital media artefact.
There was nothing radically new to the design of the British Enter -  the central 
concept remained a virtual city, but a more futuristic city than Nighttown. Related 
content was still grouped together in locations in this futuristic city, so the British 
Enter could be regarded only as a process innovation to the overall concept of the 
artefact as a digital media magazine. And whereas Enter used to describe itself as 
Ireland’s first interactive magazine, for the British market it changed this claim to: 
“The UK’s first interactive magazine.” It is interesting to note that although Enter was 
almost a year and a half old at this stage, and attempting to establish itself in a
231
different market, it still defined itself in terms of a traditional media content form -  
the magazine -  in order to fashion itself as an object for consumption.
The Guardian newspaper noted that the launch of Enter as a digital media men’s 
lifestyle artefact followed a “dismal” set of audited circulation figures for the men’s 
lifestyle print magazine industry in Britain, with for example Esquire's circulation 
falling by 39% in the preceding year (The Guardian, 20 February 2001). So overtly 
did the British Enter defined itself in terms of the print media that The Guardian 
linked its chances of success to trends in the print magazine industry.
The British edition was viewed by the Irish production team as being technically 
superior to the Irish one, but inferior as regards content. (It had less content which 
allowed it to look better than the Irish version.) One of the technical limitations that 
the British magazine overcame was that it could accommodate movement more easily
-  because it contained less content, and more memory was left free on the CD-ROM, 
the compression of video footage was less severe, and therefore the picture quality 
was higher. Also, when filming against the blue screen, it could have people standing 
up and walking around, which was a technical limitation that the Irish edition did not 
overcome.
The failure of the British edition had significant effects on the company. It was 
held responsible for shelving production of the Irish edition. It drained the finances of 
the company and forced it to restructure the content strand of the business, which 
essentially resulted in a withdrawal from the generation of original digital media 
content. It was revenue from the advertising and marketing strand of the company that 
kept Pure Communications in existence.
7.7: Content creation competencies employed in the production of Enter
This thesis argues that digital media is at an early stage of its emergence as a content 
form and has borrowed production techniques and competencies from traditional 
media forms. However, digital media is beginning to adapt these techniques to suit its 
own format and develop new techniques of its own. Such was the case with Enter, 
which in its presentation of audio, video and text content borrowed techniques from 
television, radio and print media, but had to adapt these techniques.
For recording of its video interviews with guests, Enter used traditional television 
camera shots, the film technique of shooting against a blue screen and superimposing
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a background later, and it used cut-edits for interviews with guests, to string quotes 
together to allow guests to make points coherently. That technique was often used in 
radio. If an interviewee spoke three sentences, but the middle sentence was not 
relevant to the subject of the interview, the radio journalist could cut it out and run the 
interview as if the third sentence had been spoken naturally after the first. This is a 
common radio technique, permissible as long as the edit does not distort the 
interviewee’s meaning. It is also a technique used in television, but because television 
shows footage of the person speaking, the edit becomes more difficult to disguise. If a 
second or two of interview were cut, the interviewee’s body position and facial 
expression would change dramatically and unnaturally. For example, there could be a 
dramatic jump in a hand movement while a guest is speaking. In television, the 
following technique has emerged to disguise the edits: at the point of the cut, the shot 
moves to background footage or to the interviewer, while the interviewee’s voice 
continues to be heard. The voice cut can be made here, while the screen isn’t showing 
the speaker, and so a careful voice edit can create the impression that the person had 
continued speaking without any alteration. In this way, the edit appears seamless. The 
shot can, then, turn back to the interviewee, who will be shown speaking normally. 
This is a common technique for television news interviews and interviews for 
entertainment programmes.
This traditional television technique did not work well on Enter, because the 
format of the interviews did not allow it to disguise the edits. The camera remained 
focused on the interviewee all the time (the interviewer was never shown). Because 
the design format chosen for the interview allowed no facility to move the interviewee 
out of the shot when an edit was made, a jump in the interviewee’s facial expression 
and body position was apparent at the point of the edit. After the first two editions of 
Enter, it slowly began to phase out cut-edits as a technique. Because the creators were 
not able to seamlessly edit a quote which had strayed off the point, they tended to end 
quotes quicker. Shorter quotes meant guests had less room to develop points, and 
most quotes were reduced to sound-bytes. It was an instance of Enter sacrificing 
content for aesthetics, or substance for style -  the interviews looked more polished, 
but they were shorter and the guests were given less time to speak. This reduced the 
interviewee’s ability to critically engage in-depth with the topic they were discussing. 
The fuller text transcripts available on the website showed that guests had often made 
more detailed and cogent points than were presented on the CD-ROM. However, in
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keeping with the general tone of entertainment media, Enter tended not to be critical 
of guests (whose co-operation it required to make the artefact appealing to 
consumers). The interviews tended to be laudatory, and there was little critical 
analysis of people’s work. Often, artists, musicians and writers were allowed to 
showcase their work without criticism.
7.8: A traditional business model for a new media artefact
Pure Communications claimed that, at its peak, the Irish edition had achieved sales of
20,000 copies per issue, and the company was moderately profitable (Ireland on 
Sunday, 5 November 2000). However, these circulation figures were not presented as 
being independently audited, and the company offered no details on its moderate 
profitability. As argued elsewhere in this thesis, digital media as a content form is 
emerging, and so too are the business models for generating revenue from digital 
media content. Enter adopted a traditional print media model to generate revenue 
from its artefact -  a combination of cover-price paid by the consumer at newsagents, 
and revenue from advertisements on the CD-ROM. This model is dependent, 
crucially, on circulation figures. The higher the circulation figures, the higher the 
level of revenue generated from cover-price. High circulation also allows a company 
to charge higher rates to advertisers, for delivering to them a larger audience. This, 
however, was not to be the long-term business model, or the one which the company 
believed would ultimately bring most financial return to Enter. Once the artefact had 
transferred to the web, the company would have begun charging subscriptions fees for 
access to the content, while at the same time continuing to receive revenue from 
advertising. Subscriptions fees were characteristic of many commercial websites in 
the late 1990s. As a business model it was largely abandoned, because not enough 
users were willing to pay the fees, and low traffic figures prevented websites from 
charging high rates to advertisers. A model emerged that allowed free access to 
websites, which increased traffic rates and, in turn, the rates that could be charged to 
advertisers. However, only a small minority of commercial websites were able to 
survive on advertising revenue alone, because of the high costs involved in the 
production of content. (In 2001, my research indicated that many commercial 
websites were revisiting the model of subscription fees.) The situation was 
exacerbated by the economic slowdown that emerged in the United States and most of
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Europe in 2001 and arrived in Ireland in 2002. A COMTEC study, in which I was 
engaged as a researcher, monitored a wide spread of digital media industry 
publications in 2000 and 2001, to note the general trends that were emerging. The 
results of the study suggest that, as the economic slowdown hit and companies were 
reducing their advertising budgets, the monies allocated to online advertising were the 
first to be cut (COMTEC, 2002). Television, which is regarded as the most important 
advertising medium, especially in America, was the last to experience advertising 
cuts. Advertising revenue, which in boom times had generally not been sufficient to 
sustain websites, declined to the point where digital media content ventures were 
forced to consider alternative strategies to generate revenue. Part of this process was 
to revisit strategies that had failed in the past, in the hope that they could be more 
successfully adapted or would work in the current context of the Internet, which is at a 
more mature stage of development than it was three or four years ago. Part of the 
thinking underlying the return to the subscription model is that online payments are 
more secure than they were in the late 1990s, and online transactions, such as the 
purchase of goods through Amazon.com, have become a common experience for 
many web users. This, many companies believe, will make web users amenable to 
paying subscription charges. However, the COMTEC study suggests that, globally, 
the industry is still generally at a discussion stage over revisiting this model, and there 
are as yet no indicators as to the likelihood of it succeeding a second time around. 
Pure Communications had the intention of building Enter as a brand of content that 
would attract a loyal consumer base, which would then follow it online and be willing 
to pay subscription charges for access. However, this intention was contradicted by 
the company’s later actions, when it abandoned its consumer base in Ireland to move 
into the British market.
As outlined earlier, the design of Enter was influenced crucially by the need to 
integrate a high level of advertising into the artefact. The company had difficulty 
explaining the concept of the CD-ROM magazine to advertisers. Often Ben Linehan 
would have to present a mock-up sketch of a location or a room to a potential 
advertiser before they would commit. Pure Communications had to develop a 
different system for charging advertisers. Their format wasn’t conducive to using the 
systems employed in traditional media: they couldn’t charge for airtime, as in 
television and radio, and they couldn’t use the rate card system employed in print 
(which measured circulation against advertising space on a page). Instead, they
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developed the system of charging advertisers a fee to sponsor a location in the city. 
Pure Communications stressed to advertisers that, although Enter’s audience was not 
large, it was concentrated in a particular market. Similarly, in the print media, The 
Sunday Business Post has a relatively small circulation but charges high rates to 
advertisers, because the majority of its readers fall into the ABC1 category, which 
traditionally has the highest purchasing power. The market research for Enter 
indicated that its audience was adolescents/young males who traditionally would have 
a reasonable amount of disposable income and would have bought the consumer, 
lifestyle products advertised on the CD-ROM.
One of the limitations of Enter's revenue model was that, during the fifteen issues 
of the Irish edition, it was dependent on a small, core group of advertisers: Heineken, 
Mars, Toyota, Tia Maria. The company added only a small number of new advertisers 
as the editions progressed -  ESB, HB ice cream and Jameson Whiskey. (Advertising 
was won either through the personal contacts of Linehan and Austin or cold calling 
clients.) Advertising provided another example of how Enter drew on traditional 
media techniques and content; the most prominent advertisements, such as for 
Heineken, were simply advertisement footage taken from television and run 
continuously on a small display in the centre of the PC screen. With the transition to 
the British market, there was significantly less advertising on the CD-ROM: it lost 
many of the exclusive Irish market advertisers that stuck with it during the Irish Enter, 
such as ESB, Network 2, and Bus Eireann, but it added no new advertisers from the 
British market. It ceased production after the second issue, which wasn’t enough 
time to build up an advertising client base in the United Kingdom. (A factor here was 
that Linehan and Austin did not have the same number of personal contacts with 
advertisers in Britain as they had in Ireland.)
Pure Communications did not have the cushion of profitable, non-digital media 
activities to absorb financial losses incurred by its digital media activities. It, 
therefore, had less time, freedom and flexibility to experiment with business models 
until it developed a successful one. It needed a successful model quickly, to produce a 
return on the investment to which it had committed its financial resources.
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The aim of this chapter is to provide a qualitative study of an Irish digital media 
content innovation produced by a start-up digital media content company. This allows 
me to discuss in a grounded manner some of the more abstract theoretical concepts 
and trends analysed in the literature review chapters. The Enter case-study provides a 
valuable opportunity to examine how an individual digital media content company 
conformed to or differed from the general trends in the industry, as outlined in the 
quantitative study in chapter five.
Enter proved to be an unsuccessful innovation, surviving only seventeen months 
after its launch in September 1999. However, it demonstrated a number of important 
innovations which are noted in this chapter. The case-study demonstrates how Enter 
evolved as a content innovation, undergoing process innovations to the central 
concept, and adapting traditional content creation techniques to better suit the 
requirements of the digital media format. It also shows how other actors within the 
system of innovation acted as brakes on or accelerators to Enter's development as a 
content innovation, and macro, meso and micro influences on it. Macro influences 
included Irish social and cultural values, which were reflected in the artefacts’s 
content, and the small size of the domestic market. Meso influenced include the 
importance of venture capitalists and advertisers to the expansion and viability of the 
artefact, and the restrictions imposed on it by the technological delivery 
infrastructures. Micro-level influences and dynamics within the organisation included 
the editorial decisions of the production team and the design direction taken by the 
two creators. The accumulation of knowledge, competencies and infrastructures was 
less apparent in Pure Communications than in Ireland.com. Pure didn’t gradually 
build up its knowledge, competencies and infrastructures as its content innovation 
developed and matured. As a start-up the company put them in place at the beginning 
and didn’t expand on them significantly in the artefact’s seventeen month span 
(although the company did establish a similar set-up in London for the British 
edition). Enter was subject only to minor, process innovations, and so didn’t expand 
greatly on the established knowledge, competencies and infrastructures of the 
organisation. However, the accumulated knowledge did assist the British editorial 
team in improving certain aspects of technical production, such as the ability to have 
walkabout guests, and did as is suggested by Lundvall’s interactive learning model.
7.9: Conclusion
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The organisational structure conformed to that of the other qualitative case-studies
-  small and flexible, with an emphasis on individual creativity, and closer to the 
organic model than the mechanistic of organisational theorising. As an actor within an 
industrial system of innovation, Pure Communications was more self-contained than 
Ireland.com or Rondomondo (see next chapter). The competencies and infrastructures 
it sought most from an external actor came from The Yard, which recorded and 
compressed much of its audio and video footage. Apart from this, the main external 
interactions were with venture capitalists and advertisers. The company did not 
received institutional support from agencies such as Enterprise Ireland.
Paschal Preston (cited in Kerr, 2001) offers the following as a list of economic 
characteristics for media and cultural industries: high first copy costs and relatively 
low reproduction costs, high risk factor and low chance of success, the importance of 
distribution, advertising and a relatively large home market. Such characteristics were 
common to Enter, and in general terms, the experience of Pure Communications was 
similar to that of many actors in the media industry (both in traditional media and 
digital media industries). However, in an Irish context, Pure Communications was 
unusual; it was a rare example of an Irish start-up company that tried to launch a 
mainstream digital media content artefact in the domestic market and then secured 
sufficient venture capital to attempt to establish it in a foreign market. Preston’s list of 
economic characteristics applied to Enter as follows: the pressing and reproduction of 
CD-ROMs was relatively inexpensive after the content had been amassed. Bringing 
such an innovation to market carried a high-risk factor, and its withdrawal from the 
market was testimony to the difficulty of succeeding. Its development was impeded 
by a small domestic market, and so it tried to break into a larger foreign market. When 
doing so, it tried to re-model itself (in the tone of its content) as an indigenous British 
digital media artefact. (The British CD-ROM, and the accompanying website, never 
mentioned that Enter originated in Ireland.) Its distribution was through newsagents’ 
(the traditional distribution system of print media), but failure to generate sufficient 
advertising revenue, particularly after the shift to the British market, was a factor in its 
withdrawal from the market.
Pure Communications had tentative plans to re-launch the Enter title in 2003 or 
2004. It intended to draw upon its initial experience of developing a digital media 
content innovation to produce a more robust and successful innovation the second 
time around. For a number of reasons, Enter failed as an innovation the first time.
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This thesis argues that the processes of innovation are risk-laden and unpredictable; 
there are no certainties and, therefore, no guarantees that Enter would be a successful 
innovation in any future form. The downturn in the technology sector, and the global 
economy generally, may affect the company’s ability to bring a new digital media 
content innovation to market. However, Pure Communications and Enter 
demonstrated a number of important innovations in the context of the Irish digital 
media content industiy, and it is important for this thesis to note such innovative 
effort.
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Chapter 8: Case-study: Rondomondo
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This case-study, Rondomondo, was established as a business unit within Eircom, 
which is Ireland’s largest telecommunications company. Eircom owns and operates 
the means of delivery for digital media content in Ireland -  the telephone network. 
Like many telecommunications companies around the world in the late 1990s, it 
believed it would not be exploiting the full commercial potential of its own 
technological infrastructure if it settled for being just a deliverer of other companies’ 
content. It believed it had also to become a producer of content. In the mid to late- 
1990s, content was regarded as offering huge potential for profit, and Eircom did not 
want to watch as other companies made large profits from content delivered across its 
network.
Eircom built up a diverse portfolio of investments in the digital media content 
industry, either establishing ventures in partnership with other companies, or buying 
into previously established ventures. Rondomondo, however, was the company’s most 
prominent and concerted attempt to become a leading actor in the industry. As a 
business unit within Eircom, it was well-financed, had skilled staff, and access to 
high-end production technology and delivery systems. Yet it closed within two years, 
and in so doing, it fell into a strong global trend of content innovators emerging from 
technology companies and failing.
The aims of this case-study are to examine the processes of innovation within 
Rondomondo and the influences on them: organisational, technical and social. It also 
traces the accumulation of competencies, knowledge and infrastructures within the 
organisation.
Chapter 8: Case-study: Rondomondo
8.0: Overview
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Although, for reasons outlined earlier, the quantitative study of the emerging industry 
focuses on core companies, 1 believe the qualitative case-studies should contain a 
sample from each of the main types of companies emerging from the industry, to 
compare their relative processes of innovation and the influences on them, their 
strengths, weaknesses, successes and failures. That is not to argue that the case- 
studies selected are representative of all similar companies within the industry, or that 
general conclusions can be drawn from these particular examples, but that they will 
provide a useful insight into how companies of differing origins operate within the 
system of innovation for the content industry. I believe that examining the different 
types of companies will give a deeper understanding of the processes of innovation in 
different contexts, and of the factors that contribute to successful and unsuccessful 
content innovation.
As outlined in the methodology chapter, I began to monitor the development of 
my case-study companies in mid-2000, while the thesis was still in the literature 
review phase. Rondomondo, however, closed in June 2001, having begun winding 
down its operations in April of the same year. In an emerging industry, it is important 
to learn not only from what is successful but also from what is not. Failure is inherent 
in any system of innovation, and can often give insights to understanding better the 
processes of innovation within an emerging industry. Rondomondo was the most 
prominent Irish example of a technology company setting up a dedicated digital 
media content entity, and as such it warranted attention. Also, in Ireland, Eircom is 
the most significant actor in maintaining the technological infrastructure for delivery 
of digital media content -  the telephone network. Through this, it exerts a strong 
influence on the emergence of the industry, with regard to the speed and cost of 
delivery and consumption of content over the Internet. All of my case-studies, at some 
stage, mentioned the restrictions imposed on content development by the limitations 
of the delivery infrastructure.
Circumstances forced this case-study to be retrospective. The weaknesses of such 
studies have been outlined elsewhere, but in the case of a failed innovator, such an 
approach is unavoidable. The methodology is based on document analysis -  I 
catalogued elements of the company’s website before it was taken offline -  secondary
8.1: M ethodology and justification for case-study
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sources, such as media reports on Rondomondo, and original, in-depth interviews 
with staff who worked in key areas of the unit.
8.2: Background to Eircom and its involvement in the digital media content 
industry
Telecom Eireann1 came into existence as the sole telephone operator in Ireland on 1 
January 1984. Since the establishment of the Free State in 1922, the postal and 
telephone services in Ireland had been under the control of the Department of Posts 
and Telegraphs. Concerns in the late-1970s over the efficiency of both services led to 
a review of the activities of the department. The Dargan Report, published in 1979, 
recommended that the running of the services be transferred to separate statutory 
bodies. An Post, to run the postal service, and Telecom Eireann were established as 
semi-state bodies under the 1983 Postal and Telecommunications Act.
Telecom Eireann made significant improvements to the telephone service, which 
were acknowledged by the Minister for Communications, Ray Burke, in May 1988 
(Flynn, 1998). He said the improved telephone service was a factor in the IDA’s 
success in attracting foreign firms to the country. By 1999, the telecommunications 
infrastructure had become an even more important factor, to service the needs of high- 
end technology and digital media companies, although the slow roll-out of a 
broadband network was viewed as potentially diminishing Ireland’s attractiveness as a 
location for investment (ISI, 1996); (NSD, 1997); (ISA, 1998); (Forfas, 1998); 
(Forfas, 1999), (Forfas, 2002).
The Act establishing Telecom Eireann placed on the company an obligation to 
serve the “social needs of the country for efficient telecommunications services”. But, 
as Roddy Flynn noted (1998), social obligations were never enforced with any great 
rigour and the company was allowed to follow a commercial agenda from the outset. 
As early as 1988, the then chairman, Michael Smurfit, was describing privatisation as 
a matter of when, not if (Flynn, 1998: 260 -  261). The company was privatised in 
1999. Irish politics since the 1980s have come under the increasing influence of neo­
liberal economic policies, which favour a rolling back of state involvement in the 
economy. Semi-state bodies such as Aer Lingus, Aer Rianta, ESB and CIE have all, at
1 Telecom  E ireann changed its nam e to E ircom  in 1999
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some time, been considered for privatisation. But, by 2002, Telecom Eireann was the 
only semi-state company to have been privatised.
It operated a monopoly in the Irish telecommunications market which began to be 
broken only in 1993, when Esat Telecom secured a licence to compete in the 
provision of long distance telephone services. Under European Union directives, the 
Irish telecommunications market had to be deregulated by 1998. One of the 
considerations influencing the decision to privatise Telecom Eireann was to allow it 
compete more freely in the new, open market. (In preparation for deregulation, the 
government appointed the country’s first independent telecommunications regulator 
in 1997.) The statutory status of the company was such that a Dail vote was necessary 
to permit privatisation. The Postal and Telecommunications (Amendment) Bill 1998 
was put before the Dail and approved in early 1999, which allowed the public offering 
of Telecom Eireann shares in July 1999.
The company changed its name to Eircom in September of the same year. At the 
time, it was trying to expand into foreign markets, including Britain, and wanted an 
international corporate identity. By 2002, it had retreated from foreign markets and 
was consolidating its business around the domestic market.
Eircom expanded beyond its core fixed-line telephony business in two directions: 
mobile telecommunications and digital media (content, applications, technology, 
delivery).
It established a mobile phone subsidiary, Eircell, in 1985. At a shareholders 
meeting in 2001, Eircell was separated from Eircom and sold to British company 
Vodafone (www.eircom.ie, viewed 15 May 2002).
In April 2001, declining revenues from the core telephony business forced a 
restructuring of the company. The chief executive officer, Alfie Kane, announced a 
reversal of company policy of the previous few years: instead of aggressive 
investment in digital media (technology, applications, content), the company would 
disengage almost totally from digital media and would not seek to invest in it in the 
future. He said Eircom was no longer willing to be a digital media “venture capitalist” 
(The Irish Times, 10 April 2001). Future investment, he stated, would be targeted at 
projects that would increase the profitability of the core fixed-line business. The 
company had built up a wide-ranging portfolio of investment in digital media 
ventures, but the majority of these had been failures, resulting in substantial financial 
losses. (Local Ireland, for example, closed owing Eircom euro5.7 million.) It closed
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Rondomondo, with the loss of 35 jobs, in June 2001. And it disengaged from a 
number of digital media projects it had invested in. It merged its two ISPs, Indigo and 
Eircom.net, into its fixed-line business in an attempt to reduce costs.
The company abandoned plans to offer a range of television and digital media 
content across a planned digital subscriber line (DSL) technology, and would instead 
concentrate on offering a high-speed Internet technology (Eircom high-speed). It also 
announced a delay to the roll-out of the DSL technology, until March 2002. It claimed 
that the reason behind the elimination of the television project was regulatory, 
because the telecommunications regulator, Etaine Doyle, had not granted it a licence 
for the transmission of television signals down telephone lines. Other 
telecommunications companies have considered the possibility of delivering content 
in this way. British company BT still had, in 2001, an active interest in delivering 
television content across its network, but industry analysts were sceptical about the 
costs involved and the upgrades required to the network to carry television signals 
(New Media Markets, 9 November 2001).
Eircom had placed a book value of euro 125 million on its digital media assets, but 
revised the figure downwards in light of the closures, failed investments and 
restructuring. The restructuring programme reduced the number of people employed 
in digital media from 530 to 330.
(By 2002, all three qualitative case-studies for this thesis had repositioned 
themselves closer to their core competencies: Eircom to its fixed-line business; the 
Irish Times Group reduced investment in its online subsidiary when the core business 
encountered financial difficulties; and Pure Communications returned to the core 
competencies of its founders, advertising and marketing.)
Eircom’s portfolio of digital media investments:
1: Rondomondo: despite public perception, it was not a wholly owned subsidiary but 
a business unit within Eircom. It was launched in July 1999 and closed in June 2001.
2: Indigo Group: a wholly owned Internet service provider, which was integrated 
into the company’s other ISP service, Eircom.net, under the restructuring plan.
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3: Nua: this was the leading light among the early Irish digital media content 
companies. Fortune magazine in the United States named it as one of the top ten web 
development companies in the world. Eircom held a 20% stake when it closed in 
April 2001.
4: Local Ireland: Nua, and its chairman Gerry McGovern, was heavily involved in 
the Local Ireland project, which attempted to build a portal website of information on 
Ireland in general, and establish a network of websites maintained by local 
communities to provide information about their own areas. Eircom held an 86% stake 
in the project, and lost euro5.7 million when it closed.
5: Golden Pages: a web directory of Irish businesses, based on the print directory of 
the same name. Eircom owned 63% of it, which was later sold.
6: Accuris: originally a joint venture by Eircom and Dutch telecommunications 
company KPN. It was in 2002 wholly owned by Eircom. It provided 
telecommunications software solutions to fixed line and mobile phones, and to 
Internet service providers.
7: Flexicom: it provided card payment solutions. Eircom held a 30% stake, which 
was later sold.
8: Beacon Integrated Solutions: a consulting firm for business systems. Eircom 
owned a 49% stake in it.
9: Onemade: an online arts and crafts auction website, in which Eircom had a 20% 
share. It was based in the US, but planned to expand into Britain and Ireland. The 
expansion never happened, but Eircom would have had a 50% share in the British and 
Irish operation.
10: Broadcom: an information technology and telecommunications research 
company, in which Eircom had a 45% holding.
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11: Viasec: provided Internet security solutions. Eircom had a 30% stake, and lost £3 
million when it closed.
(Source: The Sunday Business Post, 21 January 2001) 
8.3: Background to Rondomondo
Rondomondo was not Eircom’s first involvement in the creation of digital media 
content, but it represented the culmination of the company’s efforts to move from 
being a deliverer of content to also being a producer. Since 1994, Eircom had steadily 
added content strands to its ISP Eircom.net (or Telecom Internet, as it was known 
before the company changed its name). In July 1999, the same month the parent 
company was privatised, these content strands were separated from Eircom.net and 
were brought together in Rondomondo, a dedicated business unit that was to be the 
new media publishing division of Eircom. (Press reports, and even some official 
Eircom documentation, mistakenly referred to it as a wholly owned subsidiary.) 
Management for both Eircom and the newly formed Rondomondo outlined their 
intention to turn the business unit into one of the leading content producers in Ireland. 
The head of Rondomondo, Barry O’Neill, said: “This move is the culmination of 
three years of planning. Rondomondo will build brands and content that will 
transcend the limitations of print, tv and internet, leading to dynamic convergent 
titles, applicable to all media” (www.roiidomondo.com/rondomondo-launch.htmK 
viewed on 8 June 2000).
The original concept for Rondomondo was that it would develop content across a 
number of platforms, for both new media and old, The Internet was its main 
publishing outlet, but it also supplied content to mobile phones, and was developing 
content for interactive television. As part of the Fuse FM consortium, it applied -  
unsuccessfully -  for a radio licence. It also planned to develop content for new media 
devices as they diffused into popular use. This model of multiple platform content has 
been employed by a number of companies, but the more successful of them have 
tended to emerge from a solid base in content creation, or have had a previously 
established presence in the traditional media -  television or print -  before they began 
spreading the delivery of content across multiple platforms. Sky Sports, in Britain, 
broadcasts its sports content across satellite and digital television, and refashions this 
content for delivery across its website and through WAP mobile phones and SMS text
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messaging. Ireland.com follows a similar plan, by refashioning its core newspaper 
content for publication on the web. It also delivers news content across WAP and 
SMS. Both organisations have an established, branded content product from which to 
base their delivery to other platforms. Rondomondo had no such pedigree.
Rondomondo described itself as being “about the things people see and do with 
digital technology, not with the technology itself’ iwww.rondomondo. com, 8 June 
2000). Despite this self-perception, it held a technology-driven vision of content 
creation. The company concentrated on installing high-end technology, an 
infrastructure on which to produce ambitious, sophisticated content. But its content 
strategy was often pinned on flawed determinist assumptions that have been critiqued 
elsewhere in the thesis. For example, Mark Tarbatt, sales and advertising manager, 
said: “To put it simply, Rondomondo is taking advantage of the rapid convergence of 
data and telecoms. Now comes the third dimension, which is media. This convergence 
has created products that need to be filled with contenf (Author’s italics) 
(www.interactive-aveinie.ie/intothenet/issue8/articles/digital media.htm. viewed 21 
January 2002). Publications manager Emma Kavanagh outlined the company’s 
strategy of “filling gaps” created by the new media technologies. The chief operations 
officer, Aoibheann Gibbons, noted the importance of installing an infrastructure 
capable of ‘driving’ the content production. She said: “You had people with soft IT 
skills endeavouring to create products that needed to be managed through traditional 
software development and management processes...not just people being creative 
together” (Gibbons, Rondomondo, 2002).
It would be unsafe to assume a general trend from two particular examples, but it 
is important to note the following. Ireland.com, which emerged from a traditional 
media company, has always been guided by people who have experience in media 
content creation, even if their background has been primarily in the traditional media. 
But Rondomondo, emerging from a technology company, appointed as its head Barry 
O’Neill, who had no previous experience in media content. His background lay in the 
technology of digital media. He said: “I have no creative background whatsoever. I 
am not an artist. I am not a designer. And I ’m not a writer.” However, despite this, he 
claimed: “I know good writing when I see it. And I know what a good concept is 
when I see it” (Dot.ie: Ireland on the Net, June 2000: 21). This is a common trend 
among technology companies -  the belief that they will have an intuitive knowledge 
and understanding of good content and content creation processes. Their relative
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failure in the industry suggests they are assuming too much, and that content has 
proven harder to crack than they had anticipated. However, Eircom realised that 
content competencies themselves were not intuitive, and through Rondomondo, it 
implemented a strategy to identify the competencies -  journalistic, production and 
technical -  that were lacking within the organisation and to bring in people with the 
appropriate experience.
Similar to Ireland.com, Rondomondo was established because Eircom’s 
management hierarchy believed that future revenues from the core business (fixed- 
line telephony) would diminish, and digital media content offered the potential to 
compensate. Mobile telecommunications were regarded as the main threat to the 
fixed-line business. (However, at the time, Eircom still owned a mobile subsidiary.) 
With this rationale for funding the Rondomondo venture, it is ironic that falling 
revenues from the core business persuaded Eircom management to close it. Eircom 
implemented cost cutting measures because it could no longer, through telephony 
revenues, afford to absorb the losses incurred by its various digital media ventures. In 
April o f 2001, it announced a rationalisation and restructuring of its digital media 
interests. The following statement of closure was released on the Rondomondo 
website:
“(09.04.01) As you may be aware, Eircom issued a statement today regarding 
the future strategic direction for the company. As a result o f this restructuring, 
Rondomondo is to discontinue all operations (with the exception o f the Doras 
Directory) by June 30th 2001. All customers and suppliers are being notified 
o f this decision and Rondomondo will enter a transition period whereby the 
team will work with customers and suppliers to ensure a smooth ‘winding 
down ’ o f operations. ”
An early hypothesis when work began on this thesis in October 1999 was that 
technology companies, lacking a background and tradition in content creation, would 
be more likely to fail in the digital media content industry than traditional media 
companies. Industrial trends suggested it was more difficult to master the content 
creation competencies of digital media than the technical competencies. Traditional 
media companies, as seen in the qualitative study of The Irish Times and Ireland.com, 
have certain advantages: not only have they built up content competencies through
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their core businesses, they also in many cases have an established brand of content. 
They go to the web with a reputation, such as The New York Times had. This 
hypothesis, three years on, holds up as being generally accurate, even if a trend has 
emerged for traditional media companies to also begin retreating from digital media 
content. This is partly because of economic circumstances not directly related to 
digital media. A general economic slowdown, especially in the technology sector, has 
led to declining advertising revenues across all media - print, television, radio and 
digital media. No traditional media company in Ireland that invested in digital media 
content had by 2002 made a profit from it, and in the drive to cut costs generally, 
digital media ventures are either being sacrificed or scaled down. RTE, in 2001, was 
projecting a loss of £20million unless cost cutting measures were implemented across 
all areas of its organisation. In tighter economic times, digital media was regarded as 
peripheral to the organisation’s core responsibility as a public service broadcaster in 
television and radio. The budget for RTE’s website was cut. A senior RTE online 
journalist, who wished to remain anonymous, said: “They’re stripping the site of 
content, and concentrating only on the things that make money, such as text that they 
sell to DOL [Digifone Online, the website of a telecommunications company, which 
became 02 in 2001], There’s no public service agenda, and there’s nothing 
imaginative being done.” A number of RTE online journalists left the organisation 
because of the tightening of editorial projects; RTE was also seeking redundancies 
from a number of those who remained. The journalist believed that, with fewer people 
working on the website, it would be impossible to create original, imaginative 
content. He said that once the cost cuts had been implemented fully, the RTE website 
would consist purely of content that had been generated in other areas of the 
organisation, such as the newsroom, and for other media, television and radio. 
Ireland.com also reduced its staff and, consequently, its ability to generate original 
content for the website. The website was stripped of some of its ancillary websites, or 
they were updated with fresh content less frequently. It began to focus more on the 
core news competencies of The Irish Times and the breaking news service, and as a 
measure to reduce losses, moved to a subscription model for content and email 
services.
Similar to the situations at RTE Online and Ireland.com, Rondomondo’s fortunes 
depended largely on those of the larger parent organisation. The climate at Eircom in
2001 -  falling telephony revenues, falling shareprice and intense criticism from
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members of the public who had invested in the company and lost money -  did not 
favour it continuing to subsidise a loss-making venture that was peripheral to its core 
business. Publications manager Emma Kavanagh said: “Rondomondo was one of the 
higher profile Eircom subsidiaries -  even the profile, the age, the type of person who 
worked there was completely different to anything Eircom had before. So in a way I 
think it was easier for them to get rid of us” (Kavanagh, Rondomondo, 2002). Chief 
operations officer Aoibheann Gibbons claimed that prominent people in Eircom’s 
higher management did not favour digital media in general, and content in particular, 
and pushed hard for the elimination of non-core activities.
However, according to a senior production employee, Rondomondo more than 
justified its continued existence, both in terms of the content innovations it was 
developing and the revenues it was generating. He said: “The main reason we’re gone 
is that they [Eircom] wanted to sell the company and we were a development centre, 
and on the books, we weren’t worth as much as the copper [the technology].” (This is 
another instance of how technology and applications are perceived as a safer 
investment than content.) Rondomondo’s innovative model was based on a mix of 
conservative content strands that would generate a steady income and more radical 
content innovations, which were more likely to fail but had potential to generate large 
revenues if they succeeded. Eircom established Rondomondo as a content 
development centre, but failed to appreciate that the development of content 
innovations is risk-laden -  with more failures than successes -  and time-consuming. 
Immediate returns are rare. Longevity was cited by the chief operations officer as 
fundamental to making content viable. She said that, on her appointment to 
Rondomondo six months after it was launched, she undertook a strategic review of the 
business, with the aim of developing a portfolio of content products that would mature 
over a number of years. Lundvall, writing about industrial innovation, claims: 
“Certain technology areas can only be developed into commercial success by agents 
who operate with a long-term perspective, while others might be easier to exploit with 
a short-term horizon” (Lundvall, 1998: 4). The publications manager also stressed the 
importance of being allowed time to let the content products mature and consolidate. 
She said: “The idea was always that it was a five year development plan, and I don’t 
know if they [Eircom] always fully understood everything we did...Eircom could 
understand the visible stuff that we did.” She added: “We were pitching, because 
Eircom didn’t really know what they wanted” (Kavanagh, Rondomondo, 2002). The
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‘visible stuff Rondomondo produced was the more conservative content strands, 
mainly the publications. The more developmental innovations -  which, as it was 
established as a development centre, should have been Rondomondo’s core activity -  
remained hidden within the organisation and often did not translate into final 
(tangible) innovations. The publications manager said: “For the first six, maybe nine, 
months it was honeymoon to a certain extent. It was very much research and 
development. We were given free reign, and it was ideas, ideas, ideas, what can we 
do, how can we do it. We had this amazing stuff [technology], and we were given free 
reign creatively and implementation-wise as well” (Kavanagh, Rondomondo, 2002).
However, creative and implementation freedom applied only to projects that were 
approved by the business development team for further development, and projects had 
to be delivered within budget. All investment (in equipment, people, projects) was 
assessed and evaluated, and as time passed and Eircom’s finances deteriorated, the 
evaluation of projects became, as a former employee said, “quite stringent”. Budgets 
were an early difficulty for Rondomondo. Despite the launch publicity, and the 
promise of substantial financial backing, Rondomondo wasn’t actually registered 
within the Eircom organisation for budgets. The chief operations officer said that 
negotiating with Eircom officials “took a lot of energy”. She added: “Turning 
something like a publicly stated endorsement of a venture into actual cash within a 
corporation is a task” (Gibbons, Rondomondo, 2002). The budgets, when secured, 
were significant, but were allocated conservatively. She argued that the business unit 
didn’t “burn” as much of Eircom’s money as was publicly perceived. These 
negotiations also represented the juncture at which the majority of the interaction 
between the Eircom and Rondomondo organisations took place: the level of Eircom 
financial controllers and Rondomondo management.
In the early days of the company, former employees claimed that beyond broad, 
vague visions, they didn’t really know what the purpose of the company was or what 
was expected of them by Eircom. The publications manager claimed that it wasn’t 
until January 2001 that staff had a definite idea of what Rondomondo was and where 
its key interests in content production lay. But only three months later, April 2001, 
Eircom announced the decision to close it. Also, the decision to close it was taken by 
Eircom management, whose expertise lay in the technology of telecommunications 
and who had no direct involvement in content production at Rondomondo.
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Despite Rondomondo’s public pronouncements that it would deliver innovative 
content titles, development was conducted within quite conservative economic 
constraints. The chief operations officer, who negotiated budgets with Eircom and 
was influential in allocating them within Rondomondo, assessed project proposals on 
three base criteria: cost, viability, return.
This is consistent with the wider trend of companies espousing the radical 
innovative potential of ICTs, but marrying innovation to a conservative set of 
economic criteria (Preston, 2001). This echoes the attitude of the venture capital 
industry (see chapter five, section six), in which project proposals have to pass one 
basic test before they will be granted funding for further development -  are they 
realistic? The production employee said: “You had financial controllers who were 
running a big company [Eircom], and they didn’t care about nice colours [in this 
context, the interviewee meant content projects with limited commercial potential] -  
was it realistic?”
Rondomondo, once early funding difficulties had been settled, was granted an 
annual budget. Although Eircom allowed Rondomondo a high level of autonomy, the 
annual budget set the parameter in which the organisation functioned and 
development took place. Within the organisation, the business development team 
acted, financially, as a brake on or accelerator to innovation. (Again, important 
decisions about digital media content innovation were often taken by people who had 
little understanding of or experience in digital media content: overall control was 
divorced from production and experience.) Because of the costs involved in content 
production, project proposals were often granted or denied funding for further 
development on the basis of early demos and testers. After initial market research, a 
project would be allowed some development and demonstration time, but would have 
to justify itself to the business development team at an early stage. The production 
employee said: “If you had five or six people on the wages they were on, working on 
something for a couple of weeks, it soon added up.”
Unlike Iveland.com and Pure Communications, which concentrated on developing 
further a core content innovation, Rondomondo had numerous projects in production 
or development for numerous actors: itself, its parent organisation, on commission 
basis for external actors, and in co-production with external actors2. It had a steady
2 M y interview ees w ere happy to talk  about developm ent projects that w ere know n publicly and were 
visible, such as the online m agazines and the E -T V  project. However, because o f  confidentiality
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income from advertising on its content websites, syndication of its news-service, and 
the hire of its studio, but the more radical innovations in development -  the 
innovations regarded as offering the highest potential for profit -  failed to ignite. 
Some of these projects were pure development, were never produced as final 
innovations and offered no return on development costs. Although not an exact match, 
it was a close equivalent to the R&D of an industrial innovator that never yields a 
final innovation (which would be the more traditional example from the systems of 
innovation literature).
According to the production employee, “Development was what could really hit 
[profitability].” He added: “We’d develop five or six things over five or six weeks. 
Two of them would get the go ahead. The others would be put away, and then in 
another six months we’d come back and do another version of it.” The revised 
version, of course, would not be guaranteed approval, and an approved project would 
not be guaranteed to turn a profit. This also shows how innovation at Rondomondo 
was not a linear process. It was spread over time, according to when resources 
(content, production, technical) were available and could be allocated to it. The brief 
for development was to take a project from the conceptual stage and turn it into a 
commercial reality. Each project had different needs, so development required the 
accumulation of competencies, knowledge and infrastructures (technical, production 
and content) that would be flexible enough to adapt. Pools of people with technical, 
production and content competencies were established. People were drawn from these 
and assigned to projects as required. One of the few solid ambitions Eircom held for 
Rondomondo was that it would create infrastructures to supply content (self­
generated, commissioned and licenced) to its planned interactive television service. 
This project, despite the heavy development resources sunk into it at both Eircom and 
Rondomondo, never went beyond the conceptual and developmental stage, because 
Eircom failed to roll-out the necessary infrastructure to deliver it on a wider, public 
scale. Also, Eircom was not granted the necessary licences by the telecommunications 
regulator.
Tensions existed between Eircom management and Rondomondo management 
over the direction of projects. Rondomondo management regarded the unit as outward 
facing, capable of generating revenues in the external marketplace, whereas Eircom
agreem ents in  their redundancy packages, they were less com fortable in  giving specific details on in- 
house or privately com m issioned projects.
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wanted it to serve internal needs (such as the interactive television project). Justifying 
external deals to Eircom management was, according to the chief operations manager, 
a “struggle all the way through our genesis”. Eircom placed certain restrictions on 
external dealings: content could not be supplied to another telecommunications 
company, which in a small domestic marketplace narrowed the unit’s base of 
potential clients. Also, not all of the internal content needs of the overall Eircom 
organisation were serviced by Rondomondo. Eircell managed its content websites 
independently, although Rondomondo did supply content to its mobile WAP service. 
Like the public promise of budgets, Eircom’s private perception of Rondomondo was 
at odds with its public pronouncements that the unit was intended to become a leading 
producer of digital media content in Ireland. The chief operations officer said: 
“Outside seemed to be something that was marketed very strongly initially and then 
never delivered” (Gibbons, Rondomondo, 2002).
Many of the problems experienced by Rondomondo were similar to those in the 
digital media publishing division of Microsoft, another technology company that 
unsuccessfully tried to break into the digital media content industry in the early to 
mid-1990s. After mounting substantial losses, it too retreated to its core competencies, 
software applications development. But by 2002, it again had committed substantial 
investment to the content industry: it entered the games console market, as a producer 
of both hardware (the console) and content (interactive games). But early sales figures 
suggested the Microsoft X-Box console was struggling against the more popular Sony 
Playstation 2. Aphra Kerr found that Microsoft’s efforts to become a content creator 
were undermined by the core culture within the company, which understood software 
development but had a flawed, misdirected notion of what was required for content 
production (Kerr, 1999). Fred Moody, too, noted the clash of cultures between 
technology and content in Microsoft in the early-1990s, and how each side 
misunderstood and disregarded the other (Moody, 1996).
When establishing the unit, Eircom outlined its expectations of it in broad visions, 
with few specifics. One employee spoke of the company as being given an initial 
honeymoon period of six to nine months “to find out what it was”, where its key 
content interests lay, and how best to structure its organisation. In October 2000, 
fifteen months after it was launched, and following completion of the strategic review, 
Rondomondo announced it was restructuring its organisation around four business 
strands. Three of them were to develop and produce content, and the fourth was to
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generate revenue from content. They were title publishing (Muse, Pushie), advertising 
sales (on its content websites), syndication services (to supply content to outside 
actors, such as the Internet search company Yahoo!), and digital studio production. 
(Similar to The Yard, Rondomondo had high-end video and audio production and 
post-production facilities, to fit with Eircom’s early plans to position itself as a 
producer and deliverer of interactive television and broadband Internet content.) 
Rondomondo’s chief executive officer, Barry O’Neill, said: “We have invested 
heavily in the infrastructure, the team and the technology, to evolve an organisation 
that is braced to capitalise on present, new and emerging mediums and platforms” 
(www.rondomondo.com/news_business_041 OOP.html viewed on 19 October 2000). 
The unit had, to this point, been accumulating competencies and knowledge, and 
building the infrastructures deemed necessary (such as equipping the studio) for 
fifteen months. In particular, the infrastructures were regarded as crucial, and an 
emphasis was placed on content delivery being “back-end driven”. The unit invested 
heavily in a content management system, as did Ireland.com, to facilitate the 
processes it was establishing for content production across a number of platforms. 
The four strands were to produce the product portfolio that was regarded as necessary 
to stabilise Rondomondo as a long-term and flexible producer of digital media 
content.
8.3.1: Title publishing:
Rondomondo’s most prominent external publications were online. Like the Enter CD- 
ROM artefact, they were new media artefacts that tried to frame themselves in the 
language of the old, as magazines. The difficulties of applying old media labels to 
new media artefacts were discussed in chapter seven. The editorial structure to 
produce the online magazines was similar to the conventional editorial structures of 
print magazines: weekly editorial meetings to discuss the forthcoming issue, with the 
editor assigning markings. Rondomondo employed only four journalists on contracts, 
and dipped into a pool of freelancers to produce most of the copy. After copy was 
submitted, it was sub-edited, re-written as deemed appropriate for the web, and posted 
live with the publication on a specific day each week.
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Muse: Muse was launched in 1997 by Eircom.net, but was absorbed into 
Rondomondo in 1999. It was the most successful of Rondomondo’s publications: as 
an online music magazine, it had a focused theme and an identifiable target audience. 
It also received the greatest promotion of the Rondomondo titles, with the Muse brand 
sponsoring music events and concerts, and kiosks being placed in music shops, which 
provided customers with free access to the magazine. It could also afford high-profile 
music writers, including John Kelly and Donal Dineen, who had established 
themselves in television and radio. Although Muse was not created by Rondomondo, 
it was the first of its titles to undergo a revamp, in October 1999. The redesigned 
magazine included a new look, a searchable archive, and audio clips from various 
artists.
Even though its editorial structure was traditional, Muse incorporated technology, 
especially in its design and publication, that was unfamiliar to the journalists. In the 
early months, they also had difficulty understanding the concept of an online 
magazine. The editor, Jim Carroll, wrote the following in its last edition: “When Muse 
started, few knew what it was about -  and that includes the bulk of the writers and 
certainly the editor. We...launched it on a wing, a prayer and a load of techie stuff 
which still doesn’t make sense. It took a few months for all working parties to get 
their head around the idea of a weekly online music magazine” (www.muse.ie. 23 
May 2001).
Doras: Doras was established in 1996 by Eircom.net, and was later brought under the 
control of Rondomondo. It was the only entity to remain active after Rondomondo 
closed. Although content elements were added to Doras during Rondomondo’s 
tenure, such as Doras News and Doras Movies, they had been stripped away by 2002, 
and the website had returned to its core activity of being a directory of Irish websites. 
At its peak, Doras received 800,000 page impressions per month, and had over
25,000 websites archived. In May 2000, Rondomondo signed a deal with Internet 
search company Yahoo! to provide directory listings of Irish websites to the Yahoo! 
Britain and Ireland website. (No monies were exchanged. It was a co-branding 
agreement.) Under the deal, searches for Irish information through the Yahoo! search 
engine would generate links to the Doras directory. Rondomondo also provided 
content to the Yahoo! website, including forty Irish related news, sport and 
entertainment stories each day. The deal ended with the closure of Rondomondo.
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Directories were related to Eircom’s core business of telecommunications (telephone 
directories), and the company produced a successful online directory from its 
GoldenPages subsidiary, which it later sold. The news and sports content for Doras 
was generated by journalists in Independent Network News (INN), which was a news 
service for independent and local radio stations in Ireland. Publications manager 
Emma Kavanagh claimed that INN was a good choice to supply news content, 
because radio writing was similar to web writing, short and lively, and required only 
light editing before publication on the web. The implications of publishing content 
generated originally for another medium is discussed in detail in the chapter on 
lreland.com. Business news was supplied by Business and Finance magazine. Their 
stories required heavier editing, because in their original print form they were too long 
and detailed for the rolling news web-service of Rondomondo.
Doras reviewed each website it listed on its directory. The model it was working 
towards was as follows: once a critical number of websites had been listed and 
usership traffic had reached a certain volume, a listing on Doras would become a 
valuable asset to a website. Doras, at this juncture, would have become an 
authoritative online directory, and users would be directed only to websites within its 
archives. Therefore, according to the principal of the model, publishers would be 
willing to pay for a review and listing. This model was in the process of being 
implemented when Rondomondo was closed -  it was eventually implemented by 
Eircom.net.
Freelancers reviewed each website against a set of criteria: aesthetics, content, 
functionality. Doras expanded quickly, to the point where it was putting too much 
strain on the human resources in Rondomondo. The job of maintaining Doras and 
reviewing additional websites was outsourced to a company called Webbusters, but 
Rondomondo retained responsibility for the business development of the site.
Aphra Kerr (1999) notes the difficulties a major multinational company, 
specialising in the development of software applications, had in producing digital 
media content for its website. After amounting substantial losses, the company 
changed its business plan and turned its website into a portal site to other companies’ 
content. On a smaller scale, Eircom did the same when it announced the closure of 
Rondomondo. It ceased publication of its online magazines, but retained the Doras 
Directory, which as a directory of Irish websites was, essentially, a portal to other 
companies’ content.
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Pushie: Pushie evolved out of Doras. Doras, a directory of Irish websites, contained 
a sub-directory of international websites called Global Doras. Publications manager 
Emma Kavanagh believed that the editorial tone of Global Doras was different to that 
of Doras, and she proposed to establish it as a separate website and to add content 
strands to it. Her proposal was accepted by the business development team, and 
Global Doras, retitled Pushie, was launched in September 2000. Rondomondo 
described it as a “lifestyle and popculture” magazine, targeted at college students and 
twenty year-olds in Ireland and abroad (www.rondomondo.com/pubs.htm, viewed on 
19 October 2000). In addition to the international directory, the magazine had five 
main sections, or content channels as they were called.
People contained interviews with celebrities and music groups.
Planet contained articles on the environment, architecture, design and travel
Plastic was a consumer section, describing products that its target audience might like 
to buy.
Play was a leisure and lifestyle section.
Propaganda was a current affairs section.
The editorial structures in place to produce Pushie were similar to those in place 
to produce Muse.
Cumasc: Cumasc was launched in 1997 and was taken into the Rondomondo stable in 
1999. It was a daily magazine and was produced in co-operation with organisations 
such as Radio Na Gaeltachta, Foinse, Gael-linn, Glor na nGael and Feile. It had 
sections for news, sport, opinion and arts, and had an online discussion forum.
Of the four strands, title publishing was the least profitable, and was described by 
the chief operations officer as “the one we were carrying all along”. Advertising on 
the websites did not match the costs of production, and she predicted that for a future 
website to achieve profitability it would require a strong content brand funded by a
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transactional model with the user, possibly a subscription fee. However, title 
publishing was retained for the ancillary benefits it passed onto the unit. First, through 
interactive learning, it deepened the unit’s competencies, knowledge and 
infrastructures for content production. Second, it was Rondomondo’s main external 
publication arm, and helped maintain a public profile. Third, the content could be re­
purposed for clients, such as Eircell, which took Pushie’s content for its WAP service, 
with the aim of reaching a younger audience. The infrastructures required for title 
publishing could be employed on other projects. The content management system was 
first tested on Pushie. The chief operations officer said Pushie paid for itself by 
keeping the content management system project on schedule. Title publishing was the 
only strand of Rondomondo that published content direct to the public, yet it was the 
least profitable strand of the unit.
8.3.2: Broadband Studio: Similar to The Yard, which carried out audio and video 
work for Enter and Ireland.com, Rondomondo installed a broadband studio capable of 
high-end video and audio production and post-production. Eircom, through 
Rondomondo, was trying to position itself to produce and deliver content to 
interactive television and broadband Internet. It used the studio not only to develop its 
own content, but also for co-production projects, and the production of commissioned 
content. (Unlike the majority of content innovators in my quantitative study, 
Rondomondo produced both commissioned and uncommissioned content.) The 
studio, which was operated by a team of technical professionals whose previous 
experience was in television (RTE, TnaG, TV3), was based around a digital vision 
mixer. JVC broadcast cameras filmed images, which the mixer could separate from 
the camera signal, and allow the studio engineers to add background generated by 
computer graphics.
A senior production manager, who was involved in setting up and equipping the 
studio, claimed it was rarely idle, and was a central element of the future direction 
that content development was to take at Rondomondo, had it been allowed by Eircom 
to complete its five-year development cycle. One of the projects developed in the 
studio but never produced as a final innovation was E-TV (Eircom Television), which 
would have delivered interactive television content across the telephone network. As 
stated earlier, the E-TV project was eliminated as part of the company’s digital media 
restructuring. But before this, it highlighted one of the advantages of being a content
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innovator within a larger organisation: Rondomondo could undertake large-scale in- 
house tests, using Eircom employees. Four hundred Eircom employees took part in 
the E-TV test. They were given set-top boxes, which allowed them to choose 
programmes, videos, connect to the Internet and use email. Rondomondo recorded 
their consumption patterns and preferences3, and adjusted its content strategy 
according to the emerging trends. If video on demand, for instance, was proving a 
popular feature, Rondomondo would increase the volume of content available on it. 
Like Ireland.com, it hadn’t accumulated substantial audio and video competencies, 
and the more significant content pieces would have been outsourced to external 
actors. The back-end infrastructure for interactive television was complex and 
required heavy investment, and Eircom was no longer prepared to commit funding to 
it. Under the model devised for E-TV, Rondomondo would produce smaller pieces of 
content: larger pieces -  such as half hour videos and full-hour dramas -  would be 
outsourced, depending on the costs involved and the resources required for 
production.
The studio was primarily installed as part of the content infrastructure for 
Eircom’s broadband channels (and, Rondomondo management intended, to produce 
commissioned content for other broadband companies), but it never achieved its 
objective because Eircom continually pushed back the roll-out of the necessary 
broadband network. This highlights Eircom’s influence in maintaining and installing 
the technological infrastructure necessary for the delivery of content in the Irish 
industry and, in certain cases, to undertake innovation. Its delay to the roll-out of the 
broadband network not only affected content development at Rondomondo but also at 
other companies in the industry. Rondomondo applied a substantial portion of its 
resources to developing content for a technological infrastructure that wasn’t 
delivered by the parent organisation. Eircom also claimed regulatory constraints were 
behind the decision to drop the project. (Chapter three discusses how the regulatory
3 The production em ployee further outlined the advantages o f Rondom ondo being  part o f the E ircom  
organisation  w hen he said: “It w as an excellent position for developing, because you w ere p art o f  the 
largest ISP in  the country, 200,000 users on your own ISP. So you could see w hat was going on. People 
w ould  say: ‘O h that w ill never work, and that w ill never happen. ’ Y ou could see it happening, and you 
knew  it w asn ’t  ju s t a  shot in  the dark.” The projects approved fo r further developm ent w eren’t selected 
on  an  arbitrary basis, but on  the back o f  inform ation such as usership patterns, as well as by 
com m ercial criteria set by the business developm ent team. However, this fell m ore so into the 
quantitative tradition o f  m onitoring usership and consum ption patterns, a m ethod w hich was also used 
by Ireland.com .
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layer of the system of innovation stimulates and supports, but can also inhibit, 
innovation.)
The E-TV project further illustrated how innovation at Rondomondo was not 
linear, and that it could take different directions depending on industrial trends or 
financial circumstances at any given time. The production employee said: “I’d say a 
product like the E-TV one -  we were only working on it two or three days a week, 
and then other work would be due, and it might be three months before you’d go 
again -  building it up and up and up, and then at a point you might be able to do 
more.”
The studio also showed the small-scale of the overall media industry in Ireland, 
and how Rondomondo, despite its public commitment to becoming a leading content 
creator and publisher, was perceived as being outside the loop. People from traditional 
broadcasters would come to the studio to perform early development on projects. The 
production employee explained: “There were people coming in from national 
broadcasters with demo ideas that they didn’t want to do in their own studios. 
Because we were outside the city centre production area, we could do quiet projects. 
Within the six-rooms that were the production facility, we could develop something, 
and nobody would know about it, and it was inside an Eircom building. It wasn’t 
within one of the production houses where word might leak out. There were a couple 
of things in the press, and you’d remember them developing that idea. A lot of it was 
self-financed, to hold onto more copyright.” Confidentiality was an important 
consideration for the content projects and innovations in development at Rondomondo
-  under the terms of their employment, employees could not divulge information on 
any project to any outside party until it had been publicly launched. The importance 
of secrecy to protect innovations in development, and the procedures and 
scientific/technical competencies necessary to produce them, are discussed in chapter 
three. Also discussed is the importance of patents to protect innovative efforts, 
although patents usually cover industrial innovations, which are the main focus of the 
academic literature. Copyright, and the accompanying legal penalties for plagiarising 
another company’s work, is a more common protection for content innovations.
Former employees, as part of their redundancy contracts, had to sign 
confidentiality agreements. (One employee said the confidentiality clause took up 
four of the contract’s six pages.) This is consistent with the findings of research into 
the organisational structures and clustering of digital media firms in America and
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Canada (Brail and Gertler, 1999; Pavlik, 1999; Scott, 1998; Cooke, 2002). Philip 
Cooke writes: “Interviewees reported little interfirm information sharing, a 
competitive ethic, and low-trust relationships, i.e. between firms of similar size and 
with similar or complementary assets. Informal knowhow sharing occurs between 
individuals rather than firms. Confidentiality clauses and secrecy on bid prices are 
normal even though there are few competitors for contracts” (Cooke, 2002: 298).
8.3.3: Syndication. Rondomondo wanted not only to create content for its own titles, 
but also to produce content that could be sold on to other organisations. Along with 
commissioned projects and advertising, syndication was one of the conservative 
strands of the company regarded as necessary to supply a steady income. The chief 
operations officer described syndication as “a valuable and valid bread and butter 
occupation, and a growing revenue source”. Rondomondo offered syndicated content, 
usually text, in the following areas: news, business, sport, entertainment, share prices, 
weather, cinema listings, movie reviews and horoscopes. (Many of the areas 
overlapped with content offered by Ireland.com.) The main customer for 
Rondomondo’s syndicated content was Eircell, the mobile phone subsidiary of its 
parent company Eircom. Rondomondo supplied SMS and WAP content to Eircell. 
(As an indication of how loosely integrated Rondomondo was into the overall Eircom 
organisation, it had to submit a tender to supply WAP content to Eircell. Ireland.com 
took over the task in 2001, after Rondomondo closed. Eircell also contracted outside 
companies to produce content, such as media advertisements, that could have been 
handled within Rondomondo.) Its most significant external client was Internet search 
company Yahoo!, on a co-branding, non-monetary basis. In May 2000, Rondomondo 
signed a deal to supply news, sport and entertainment content to Yahoo!’s website for 
Britain and Ireland. Much of the news content was generated by journalists at INN, 
refashioned from radio content, and at Business and Finance magazine, refashioned 
from print magazine content, allowing Rondomondo to avail of the competencies of 
two dedicated news organisations. As outlined earlier, Rondomondo journalists edited 
the raw copy to suit the requirements of the syndication service. The syndication 
service was pitched to potential clients by promising them that it would attract further 
customers to their websites, and would increase the likelyhood of them returning. 
Rondomondo also promised that the content would be tailored to suit the audience 
profile of the particular website.
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Ireland.com also used the syndication model, sending out content that had been 
generated within The Irish Times Group. The Group contained the necessary 
journalistic competencies and information gathering infrastructures and routines to 
produce content for the areas of Ireland.com's syndication service: news, business, 
entertainment, sport. Eircom and Rondomondo didn’t. So in Rondomondo’s 
syndication model, it acted as an intermediary between the original producer of the 
content and the client who bought it. This model reduced the investment necessary in 
people and infrastructures, and granted the unit immediate access to well-developed 
competencies and infrastructures in external organisations.
8.3.4: Advertising network
Rondomondo had seventeen individual content websites in its portfolio4, which it 
described as Ireland’s largest network of advertising websites. According to internal 
Rondomondo figures, the network at its peak recorded 10 million page impressions 
per month, and carried 60% of the advertising on Irish websites. However, the Irish 
online advertising industry in 2001 amount to only 1% (£6million) of total advertising 
spend across all media (www.newmedialine.ie. viewed 4 March 2002). Industrial 
trends suggest that this was not large enough to sustain a model of advertising funded 
content websites. This thesis has already discussed the importance of advertising as a 
source of funding for the industry, and how the presence or absence of advertising 
funding can act as a brake on or an accelerator to innovation. Through the qualitative 
case-studies of Ireland.com and, in particular, Pure Communications, I note how the 
advertising layer of the system of innovation can influence the final form of a content 
innovation. Neither of these innovators were viable on the advertising revenues they 
raised. Enter, which relied also on cover-price, lost advertisers when it transferred to 
Britain. Ireland.com wasn’t sustainable on an advertising model and implemented a 
subscription model in 2002. Research for the COMTEC research centre at Dublin 
City University suggests that this trend carries through to the international digital 
media content industry, with many content websites moving towards, or revisiting, the 
subscription model (COMTEC, 2002). Rondomondo had also planned a subscription
4 The portfolio o f  websites was as follows: w w w .eircom .net. w w w .indieo.ie. 
w w w .softw areireland.com . w w w .electricnew s.net, w w w .doras.ie. w w w .pushie.ie. w w w .cum asc.ie.
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model for audio and video content delivered across interactive television and 
broadband Internet, but didn’t survive long enough to implement it, or to move 
beyond the development stage of producing such content.
Rondomondo was one of the earlier Irish content innovators to, in part, rely on the 
advertising model. It also offered to create the advertisements displayed on its 
websites. It offered to build online advertising campaigns for its customers across its 
network. Initially, the advertising network consisted of the websites in title 
publications, but a strategic review concluded that it had limited revenue potential, so 
the network expanded its reach, both internally and externally: to Eircom websites 
that had high external traffic figures, and to external websites such as Online.ie.
Research for COMTEC suggests that advertisers are reluctant to commit large 
budgets to online advertising, something which the industry seemed by 2002 to have 
accepted, as indicated by the shift towards subscription models. Rondomondo was 
aware of this in 1999, but was confident of overcoming the problem. Mark Tarbett, 
marketing and advertising manager, said: “As the Irish online spend grows, there is a 
greater expectation from website owners that their properties should start to deliver 
revenues, either from advertising and sponsorships or from transactions. This is 
happening fast, and I believe the key to delivering on this expectation is to convince 
the advertising agencies and brand owners about the benefits of investing their 
budgets in this medium.” iwww.interactive-avenue.ie/intothenet/issue8/articles/diqital 
media.htm. viewed 21 January 2002).
However, from my observations of the Rondomondo websites, I believe the 
advertising pattern resembled that at Ireland.com\ the heaviest advertiser on the 
content websites was the parent organisation. Eircom advertised on Rondomondo 
websites to promote its ISP services; The Irish Times advertised on Ireland.com to 
promote the newspaper, and Ireland.com advertised on itself to promote the content 
and services buried within the website.
w w w .eb id .ie .w w w .cbg .ie . w w w .online.ie. w w w.irion.ie. w w w .irishabroad.ie. w w w .goldenpages.ie. 
w w w .sbpost.ie. w w w .inuse.ie. w w w .ticketm aster.ie. w w w.ptv.ie.
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8.5: Organisational structure and competencies
The organisational structure of Eircom and Rondomondo resembled that of The Irish 
Times Group and Ireland.com: a large, rigid organisation supporting a smaller, 
flexible one, and encountering difficulty integrating it into the overall organisation. 
Complicating matters at Eircom was Rondomondo’s distance from the core business 
and traditions of the parent company. Publications manager Emma Kavanagh said the 
output of Rondomondo, the practices within it, and the type of people who worked 
there were unlike anything Eircom had experienced before. She believed Eircom 
didn’t fully know what it wanted from Rondomondo or fully understand what the unit 
was trying to achieve as a development centre. The chief operations officer echoed the 
sentiment, saying Eircom’s understanding of content was quite poor. It was a cultural 
attitude within the company, she said, and she wouldn’t have ascribed it “to any one 
individual”. The distance from the core business would become important when 
Eircom’s revenues began to decline. In a restructuring plan designed to refocus the 
company’s attention and resources on the core business, cutting away peripheral, loss- 
making ventures was regarded as a justifiable and, indeed, necessary move. In 
contrast, Ireland.com was close to the core news business of The Irish Times Group, 
so rather than eliminate the loss-making subsidiary, the Group scaled-down the 
venture and implemented a subscription model to try to raise revenues.
Eircom was a large organisation, highly unionised, and with rigid demarcation 
between the different departments. Rondomondo, in contrast, was a smaller, fluid 
organisation, in which employees worked on a wide variety of projects, using a wide 
range of competencies. However, the unit was careful not to over multi-task, and 
employed freelancers and external companies with specialised competencies, 
depending on what was required for a particular project. Publications manager Emma 
Kavanagh said: “A new customer meant a new challenge, a new project meant a new 
challenge, and you adapted accordingly” (Kavanagh, Rondomondo, 2002). One 
instance of the organisation adapting to meet a client’s needs was the WAP content 
for Eircell, which had to be supplied on a rolling 24-hour basis, so the shift schedules 
of journalists had to be changed. The production employee said that he didn’t work 
fixed hours, but made himself available as and when projects required his input. He 
noted that this clashed with the dominant work culture within Eircom, which tended
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to have fixed nine to five hours, and work outside this timeframe was considered 
overtime.
Rondomondo was equipped with high-end production and computer equipment, 
so technology was rarely regarded as a check to innovation. However, a lack of 
people competencies was a hindrance, especially in the first six months of the unit’s 
operation, when it was still trying to acquire and accumulate competencies that 
weren’t already within the Eircom organisation: content, production, technical. One of 
the criteria for developing a project was based on an assessment of the competencies 
required for production: did Rondomondo have them in-house, could they be 
developed or brought in-house, or did it have access to them through commissioning 
outside actors. Former employees acknowledged that content competencies had to be 
nurtured over time, and technical and production competencies had to be updated as 
new technologies emerged. Rondomondo tried to keep the competency base within 
the organisation ahead of those of competitors, or formed linkages with outside actors 
to supply competencies lacking within the organisation. The informal networks of 
employee’s were important in this respect. Emma Kavanagh said: “We were so highly 
skilled, people knew people who had the skills” (Kavanagh, Rondomondo, 2002).
The management at Rondomondo was open to employee suggestions for project 
proposals, and established formal procedures through which employees at all levels 
could submit ideas. The proposal would undergo the routine procedure of assessment, 
and if approved for development, the employee would receive a percentage of future 
profits. Few such proposals were successful, however. An interviewee claimed he was 
aware of only one proposal that was approved for further development. But the act of 
consulting employees suggests that the organisational structure in Rondomondo was 
closer to the organic model of organisational theorising, in which workers are not 
constrained in rigid routines, are allowed an intellectual and creative input into the 
development of innovations, and have room within the organisation to satisfy their 
“self-actualisation” needs (Mangham, 1979: 9). As stated earlier, once a project had 
been approved, Rondomondo was allowed editorial independence. One employee 
claimed she felt “involved” with most of the projects she worked on, which would go 
against the machine or, to a lesser extent, the systems approach to organisational 
theorising, in which employees follow fixed routines in the production of innovations 
and they feel the final output is a thing apart from or alien to them.
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The accumulation, through acquisition and development, of competencies and the 
refinement of production and technical infrastructures illustrates how learning is a 
central element of content innovation. The employees stressed how content 
competencies were refined -  writing, filming, editing -  and how technical and 
production competencies were updated continuously, as new technologies emerged. 
Rondomondo tried hard to keep its competency base, at a minimum, on a par with 
other companies in the industry and, where possible, ahead. And, through linkages 
with outside actors, the company had access to competencies that were lacking within 
the organisation.
The ethos in Rondomondo regarded the company as being pioneering, especially 
within the Irish industry. Because the industry is at such an early stage of its 
emergence, there are no traditional models to follow, so models, procedures and 
organisational structures were improvised and implemented quickly. Publications 
manager Emma Kavanagh said: “We were thinking on our feet. The whole industry 
was thinking on its feet” (Kavanagh, Rondomondo, 2002). However, Rondomondo 
was influenced by trends in the wider industry, adopting (and adapting) styles of 
innovation and business models that were in use at other content companies. Adapting 
to changes in the external commercial and technical environment is a trait of the 
organic model of organisational structuring, which this thesis argues is most relevant 
to digital media content companies in a newly emerging industry. Kanavanagh added: 
“There were all these trends, and you set them as much as you followed them.” The 
design of webpages -  minimalist, for quick downloading -  and the content models -  
syndication model, adapted to compensate for the lack of journalistic competencies 
within the Eircom and Rondomondo organisations -  were evident in other content 
organisations in the industry. As outlined earlier, content innovation is a social and 
cumulative process, influenced by what has gone before and what is being done in the 
present, and Rondomondo was influenced by this. Innovation styles diffuse within the 
industry.
8.6: Conclusions
The aim of this chapter is to provide a qualitative study of a digital media content 
venture that emerged out of a technical company. The larger technical company had a 
deep influence on Rondomondo: the tension between servicing internal needs and
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seeking external opportunities, the negotiations over budgets, the lack of direction 
from Eircom, and Eircom’s failure to deliver the broadband infrastructure for the E- 
TV project. The competencies, knowledge and infrastructures on all levels 
accumulated quickly at Rondomondo, yet were stripped away when it was closed. 
Many of the people involved with the unit moved to other digital media content 
companies, and so retained their competencies and knowledge within the industry. 
However, some of the knowledge, and in particular the infrastructures, were lost and 
demonstrates how the accumulation of competencies, knowledge and infrastructures 
within an industrial system of innovation is not a linear process.
A hypothesis of this thesis is that technology companies will experience 
difficulties in the industry, and people within Eircom acknowledged that it had a poor 
understanding of content. It highlights the importance, within a system, of linkages to 
external organisations, particularly as much of Rondomondo’s content was produced 
externally and re-branded. Lacking the elaborate content production infrastructures of 
Ireland.com, the unit also had a more technology driven vision of the process. But in 
creating infrastructures, it also demonstrates how innovation proceeds through 
interactive learning, as evidenced by the re-organisation of the unit into four business 
strands after fifteen months. However, like the other two qualitative case-studies, it 
had difficulties generating revenues from digital media content, and so was eliminated 
when the parent organisation consolidated around the core business.
Chapter 9: Conclusions
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The literature review, particularly on systems of innovation, argues that industries are 
subject to the most rapid changes when they are young, before the market matures, 
before a small number of companies gain monopoly status, and before the industry 
locks into technical standards or procedures. The Irish digital media content industry 
was at such a stage when my research began in 1999, and to a large degree still was 
by the time my research concluded in 2002. The profile of the industry changed, as 
new companies were established and others closed. New technologies were emerging, 
particularly delivery platforms, and companies had to respond to this changing 
environment. My case-study companies echoed some of the debates and uncertainties 
in the wider industry between 1999 and 2002. Would audio and video become an 
integral element of digital media content? What new competencies would companies 
and individuals have to learn to create such content? Would companies have to re­
structure? When would they have access to broadband infrastructures that would 
allow for the delivery of audio and video content? This thesis has attempted to 
document the changes in the general industry, the changes in individual companies, 
and how the changing international and national economic environment affected both 
the industry and my case-study companies.
The changes in the industry provided rich material for this thesis to study, but 
they also changed the kind of industry I ended up studying. My research began in 
1999, in a time of national economic boom and investment. It concluded in 2002, in a 
time of economic slowdown and investment cuts. If, during the three years of my 
study, the national economy had continued along a trajectory of boom and investment, 
the digital media content industry in 2002 could have been quite different. More new 
companies could have entered the industry, offering new innovative possibilities. 
Companies that closed could have continued in business and continued to innovate. If 
the national economic slowdown hadn’t hit the revenues of Eircom’s core telephony 
business, it could have maintained its investment in Rondomondo and allowed some 
of its developmental activities to turn to actual content products or services. If the
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national economic slowdown hadn’t hit Irish Times Group advertising revenues, it 
could have maintained investment in Ireland com and allowed it to implement plans 
to offer audio and video content.
This is merely speculation on an alternative way the industry could have 
developed during my three year’s research. The national economy did not continue on 
a trajectory of boom and investment, and neither did the Irish digital media content 
industry. My study had to adjust accordingly. This provided me with an opportunity 
to examine how a young industry responded to unfavourable conditions (which 
companies survived, how business models were re-assessed, the types of content that 
continued to be produced), but it also created difficulties. One case-study company 
was closed, another ceased production of digital media content, so I could not trace 
their development and progress through the full three year period of my research. 
Content that the case-study companies were planning (E-TV at Rondomondo, audio 
and video at Ireland.com) never came to fruition, so I couldn’t analyse the 
competencies or infrastructures used to produce the content, or the success of the 
business models they would have implemented,
These contingencies have affected the research outcomes, but they also have 
affirmed one of the central arguments of this thesis: the development of an industry 
and the processes of innovation are uncertain. There are many influences on the 
development of the industry and on content innovation, and they operate at macro, 
meso, and micro-levels. Companies appropriate digital media technologies in certain 
ways, and the content they produce and deliver through them is influenced by social 
and cultural factors, particularly by the local (national) context in which they operate. 
This undermines technology-centred assumptions that innovation is a linear, 
predictable process, and technology is an autonomous agent for change.
The unpredictability of the development of the industry, and of the innovation 
process, was one of the challenges -  and, indeed, attractions -  of conducting a real­
time study. In 1999 I did not know what shape the industry would be in by 2002. And 
if I were to commence another three year study now, I could not confidently predict 
the shape of the industry in 2005. The thesis sought to gain an understanding of how 
the digital media content industry and content innovations within it developed over a 
specific period of time (1999-2002), but not to create the basis of predicting future 
development. Because uncertainty is a fundamental element of an industry’s 
development and of innovation, any attempts at prediction have to be tentative. The
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value of my research lies in contributing to a fuller understanding of the complex, 
multi-level processes surrounding innovation in this emergent industry.
9.1: Relevance of the conceptual framework and re-evaluation of theory
9.1.1: Overview o f the conceptual framework
I developed and applied a tight conceptual framework to study the industry’s 
development at macro, meso and micro-levels. This multi-level approach was 
necessary to gain a sense of all the influences acting on the industry and on the 
conduct of innovation within it. Although the conceptual framework has limitations -  
outlined in previous chapters as well as the present one -  it offers a more nuanced 
alternative to the notion of technology-driven, closed, linear industrial development 
and innovation that informs much academic, governmental and industrial discourses 
surrounding digital media.
I have distanced my conceptual framework from the determinist connotations of 
the theories that inform it: technological determinism, social shaping theory and 
systems of innovation. The multitude of influences on the industry’s development and 
on the innovation process conflict with assumptions of a single or small number of 
determining forces. Also, determination would assume that innovators know, in 
advance, all possible outcomes to the innovation process, that they make rational 
choices according to principles of efficiency, and that all factors influencing the 
innovation process are within the control of the innovator. My empirical research 
suggests the opposite: that all influential factors are not within the control of the 
innovator, and development decisions and choices are, often, not based on criteria of 
rationality and efficiency but on necessity and opportunism. And far from innovators 
knowing all possible outcomes to the innovation process, the initial ‘vision’ of a 
content innovation often differs greatly from its final form. Many alternative 
established conceptual frameworks either neglect such uncertainty in the innovation 
process (technological determinism), or fail to emphasise the importance of social and 
cultural factors (systems of innovation), or place too heavy an emphasis on innovation 
through rational choices and principles of efficiency (social shaping theory).
However, each theory has the potential to compensate for the weaknesses of the 
others, and a selective synthesis offers a conceptual framework that is flexible enough
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to be applied at three levels: first, a macro-level, schematic account of Ireland’s NSI 
and the historical, political, economic and cultural influences on it. This is to set the 
context in which the content industry is emerging, and in which individual companies 
operate. The national context can influence how digital media technologies are 
appropriated (Williams and Slack, 1999; Williams, Slack and Stewart, 2000); it can 
also influence the content that is produced and delivered through them. This level of 
study is intended to create an awareness of the macro-level influences on the industry, 
companies, and content.
Second, the meso-level quantitative study examines the emergence of the industry 
over three years. The study, although focusing on companies, is mindful of the 
importance of the institutional and organisational set-up, and how the macro-level 
performance of the international and national economies affected the content industry, 
Third, the micro-level research is sensitive to how innovation within companies is 
uncertain and subject to many influences: that companies depend on linkages to 
external actors, must accumulate competencies, infrastructures and knowledge, and 
are open to macro and meso-level influences. These factors greatly influence the final 
form of a content innovation, Only a conceptual framework that rejects determinist, 
linear assumptions, and stresses the importance of social and cultural factors, can be 
sensitive to the full scope of influences on the emerging industry and on content 
innovations,
9.1.2: The systems o f innovation concept re-evaluated
The systems of innovation concept is a key pillar of my conceptual framework, 
particularly as it can be applied at the three levels of research interest: macro, meso 
and micro. The national system of innovation (NSI) concept provides a useful 
framework in which to examine the emerging industry. Each NSI has particular 
qualities and characteristics, and although they are not determinants of innovation, 
they do influence it. NSIs can show similarities, but no two are exactly the same, and 
neither therefore are the particular influences they exert on innovators. I applied the 
concept to set the environment that is particular to Irish content companies -  Irish 
political and economic characteristics, social and cultural values, language, and 
geographical location on the periphery of Europe.
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However, the environment is not homogenous. The same set of influences do not 
apply to each company active within an NSI. Much depends on the location, size and 
sector of the company. Within an NSI, regional, sectoral and industrial systems and 
clusters can set the immediate environment of influences on innovators. These 
influences can be different to those on companies in other regions or sectors in an 
NSI, or to those on companies in similar sectors in other national systems.
The NSI concept, in this thesis, moves beyond the assumption that innovators are 
exposed to a relatively homogenous set of influences. In the literature, the concept 
sometimes suffers from a related assumption that the ‘territory’ of the system is 
uniform. However, in certain regions or cities, the localised environment for 
innovators can be quite different from the broad national one. The main geographical 
emphasis of my research is on Dublin, not least because the majority of Irish digital 
media content companies are located there. Content companies located in and near 
Dublin have access to the country’s most well-developed institutional support and 
technical infrastructures, and the largest base of clients and employees. This 
establishes a particular local environment which isn’t spread evenly across the whole 
country.
It is important to stress, also, that systems of innovation -  at national, sectoral or 
industrial level -  should not be regarded as closed systems operating exclusively 
within rigidly defined parameters or borders (e.g., the 26 counties of the Republic of 
Ireland). Systems of innovation are fluid, not static, with strong linkages into and out 
of the system.
Although the set-up of an NSI can influence companies, their activities cannot 
entirely be explained within this framework. Particularly in a small NSI, the domestic 
market encourages companies to align themselves with actors outside the system and 
to seek export markets. The literature review addresses the problem of where the 
parameters of a system should be set. In chapter three, I criticise the NSI literature for 
relying too heavily on a spatial concept of a nation. A spatial concept is consistent 
with the general trend in the literature to emphasise material resources (such as 
territory) over cultural and social influences. Imposing borders as the parameters of 
innovative activity is too rigid. It distorts the fluid workings of a national system. 
Nelson, for instance, argues that because of external linkages it is difficult to isolate a 
nation as an object for study (Nelson, 1993).
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The system of innovation concept, however, remains useful for setting the 
context in which an innovator operates. But, when setting the parameters, it is 
necessary to conceptualise them as being porous, allowing a flow of linkages into and 
out of the system. Digital media content -  as an emerging industry and industrial 
system of innovation -  cannot be explained within a self-contained context, without 
reference to the wider NSI and, on a higher level, an international system of 
innovation. Foreign companies are prominent in the industry -  and mostly export out 
of Ireland -  and Irish companies seek markets, competencies and strategic partners 
abroad. It is necessary to note the various flows in and out of the system for a fuller 
representation of how the industry is emerging and innovators innovate.
9.2: Themes emanating from the macro and meso-level research
9.2.1: Overview o f macro and meso-level research
The development of the content industry is an open process, subject to many 
influences on many levels. Clearly, however, it is impossible to document every 
influence, especially the more subtle influences, and so the research tends to focus on 
the main influences.
The macro-level influences relate to the historical, political, economic and cultural 
characteristics of the NSI. These include the late extensive industrialisation of the 
country, the development o f an open economy dependent on foreign investment, and 
social and cultural values, which can be reflected in digital media content.
The slowdown of the Irish economy filtered through to the content industry, 
which contracted between 2001 and 2002. Although the contraction of the industry 
wasn’t directly proportional to the slowdown of the economy, it suggests that the 
industry is not insulated from trends in the macro-NSI. Also, the contraction traced by 
my quantitative study doesn’t conform to linear conceptions of the emergence of new 
industries, but is closer to Schumpeter’s waves of growths and contractions. The 
slowdown of the economy was a major factor in changing the trajectory of the 
industry and, therefore, the results of my research. Companies closed, or scaled-down 
investment, or cancelled content projects. The slowdown also cut the opportunistic 
investment of many non-digital media content companies, which had previously 
perceived the new medium as being potentially lucrative. The most prominent Irish
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example was telecommunications company Eircom, which cut investment to digital 
media content to re-focus on its core telephony business. Even traditional media 
companies such as The Irish Times Group cut investment to digital media when the 
core business was in difficulty. The slowdown tested many companies’ commitment 
to digital media content, and showed that, essentially, many of them regarded it as 
peripheral and expendable. A finding of my quantitative study was that, by 2002, the 
industry had consolidated around fewer but larger companies. It had also consolidated 
around companies whose core activity was digital media content. This was in contrast 
to the situation in the mid to late -1990s, when telecommunications, software and 
traditional media companies were investing heavily in digital media content. But these 
companies pulling out of content, or reducing their investment in it, reduced the 
sources of investment available to the digital media content industry.
Meso-level influences include the support offered by the institutional layer of a 
system of innovation. Such support is important, because institutions (and, more 
generally, services industries) can facilitate and act as agents for innovation (Metcalfe 
and Miles, 1999; Andersen et al, 2000; Miles and Miozzo, 2002). In Ireland, the 
institutional support offered to technology and software industries tends to be greater 
than that offered to content. Industrial profiles by state agencies tend to group content 
companies with technology and software companies. This thesis argues that content 
innovation is different to technological innovation or software development, and 
requires different knowledge, competencies, infrastructures, business models and, 
therefore, different institutional support. However, there appears to be a growing 
acknowledgement by state agencies, particularly Enterprise Ireland, that content is a 
distinct industry within the digital sector.
The venture capital layer of the industrial system has the potential to act as an 
accelerator to innovation, but venture capitalists display a greater willingness to fund 
hardware or software projects over content, because hardware and software are 
regarded as solid, tangible investments (Enterprise Ireland/Digital Dividends, 2001). 
A survey by the IDA and Forbairt indicates that the most common source of funding 
for core-digital media content companies is founder’s personal funds. This tends to be 
small amounts of money, so the companies tend to be small-scale and not radically 
innovative (IDA/Forbairt, 1999). The bigger, better funded digital media content 
ventures tend to emerge from larger, non-digital media organisations that can fund the 
ventures with profits from their core businesses, without the necessity for venture
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capital investment. However, since the general economic slowdown, fewer non-digital 
media organisations have been willing to commit investment to digital media content. 
This, in addition to the venture capitalists’ attitude, is squeezing tighter the sources o f 
investment available to digital media companies. An economic upturn could help 
soften the attitude towards investing in digital media content, but that depends on 
many international and national macro-level factors. The industry could also re-attract 
investment if  content companies begin to produce sustained profits; however, this is 
made more difficult by a lack o f initial investment and venture capital and by 
companies trying to generate revenue and profit from a market economy in 
slowdown. A lthough this is speculation on future developments, and cannot be 
verified here, it does show the far reach the macro-level economic slowdown has had 
on the content industry.
9.2.2: Evaluating the emergence o f  the industry
The systems o f innovation literature argues that the profiles o f industries are in 
constant flux, as innovators prosper and consolidate or fail and close, or as the 
institutional set-up matures or withers. M uch o f  the momentum to the innovation 
process is generated not by co-operative dynamics between actors but by frictional, 
competitive dynamics. Knowledge, competencies and infrastructures can be lost to a 
system o f innovation when unsuccessful innovators close. In the same vein, new 
knowledge, competencies and infrastructures can be brought into the system by new 
innovators, or developed further by established innovators.
M y research indicates that new companies entered the industry between 1999 and
2002 (and were usually established in Dublin, which further concentrated the cluster 
in the city and increased the centralisation o f the industrial system o f  innovation). 
However, over the three years o f my study, a greater number o f companies closed. 
The Rondom ondo case-study offers an insight into the elaborate knowledge, 
competencies and infrastructures that can be lost when an innovator closes (although 
competencies can circulate around the industry as people gain employment in other 
companies). There w ere instances o f  smaller digital media content companies being 
taken over by (absorbed into) larger organisations. Although there were fewer 
companies active in the industry by 2002, they were larger. Industries tend to  emerge 
along the following pattern: in the early stages, when barriers to entry are low,
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industries are characterised by many small companies, which are the main arenas o f 
innovative activity. As the industries mature, innovation is concentrated in fewer but 
larger companies, often with monopolistic power. There are tentative, early traces that 
the digital media content industry is emerging along a similar pattern. Although, three 
years is too short a timefram e to test how applicable such a pattern o f  emergence is to 
the content industry, and further research will be required in this area.
I note in chapter five that at the end o f the three year’s research the industry was 
comprised o f  fewer but larger firms. Failure is inherent in systems o f innovation, 
particularly in newly emerging systems. This was compounded by the general 
slowdown o f the Irish economy. My research into the industry began in 1999, in a 
time o f  growth and optimism. It concluded in 2002, in a time o f  slowdown and 
pessimism, w ith failure widespread in the industry. The general economic slowdown 
was partly responsible, at it was for failure in other industries and sectors, but there 
were reasons particular to the newly emerging digital media content industry.
N ew  industries are characterised by a large number o f start-ups, which are 
vulnerable to swift closure. Unlike media industries such as broadcasting, there are no 
regulatory controls or licences limiting market entry to the digital media industry. 
Thus, a large number o f companies were able to enter this emergent and -  in 
comparison to  traditional media markets -  still small industry. There is a higher 
potential for companies to be edged out in the competitive process.
M edia markets are not static, although mature media markets tend to have greater 
stability, either through regulation or the long-established workings o f the market. 
Less regulated media markets consolidate around leaders over time. For example, the 
daily newspaper market in Ireland has had a stable core for decades. Although new 
titles appear occasionally, they rarely threaten the position o f the Irish Independent 
and The Irish Times. In the first half o f the 20th century, when the Irish newspaper 
industry was first beginning to reach a wide, national audience, it was characterised 
by a high number o f short-lived titles (Horgan, 2001).
Established, traditional leaders have yet to significantly emerge in the digital 
media content market. Although there are certain market leaders, e.g. Ireland.com , 
there is a sense that the ground is still up for grabs, which encourages new 
com petitors and start-ups and increases the likely number o f failures. (For example, 
Rondomondo offered a breaking news service that was similar to Ireland .com 's.) A  
glut o f digital media companies tend to enter areas that show potential for success.
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In addition, this thesis argues that digital media has yet to firmly establish a 
dominant role within the media spectrum. Traditional media remain dominant as 
providers o f  news, entertainment and informational content. My research shows little 
indication that digital media is about to assume dominance in these areas. Digital 
media tends to  be complementary not competitive to traditional media. And instead o f 
ceding position to digital media, traditional media organisations -  The Irish Times 
Group, RTE -  are more inclined to scale down their digital media operations if  the 
overall organisation is in financial difficulty. The majority o f  audiences remain with 
the traditional media, as does the majority o f advertising spend. In this situation, the 
economics o f  content production do not favour digital media. Content production 
costs remain relatively the same regardless o f  the size o f  audience it reaches or the 
amount o f  advertising revenue it attracts. Media markets with access to wider 
audiences and higher advertising revenues will benefit; the costs o f  production will be 
a greater burden on media markets with smaller audiences and less advertising 
revenues, as seems to be the case with digital media.
M uch o f  the failure in the industry centres also on the small size o f the domestic 
market and the difficulty o f  finding export markets for Irish content. The early 
enthusiasm for digital media content was based largely on the frail assumption that 
the Irish D iaspora would be receptive to Irish content, and that this in turn could be 
translated into revenues. The assumption was that the Diaspora’s appetite for Irish 
content could be satisfied in ways not possible with the traditional media.
This didn’t give sufficient importance to the fact that the Irish D isapora could 
have assimilated the values and norms o f its emigrant culture, to the extent that 
Irishness is an em igrant’s secondary or lower cultural identity. This is particularly so 
for those who were born outside Ireland, or have been living outside the country for 
many years. It undermines the assumption that the Diaspora will, on a significant 
scale, be receptive to Irish content. Most o f the content strategies for reaching the 
Diasporic m arket are based on providing news, tourist information, history and 
entertainment content, rooted in Irish social and cultural values. But other forms o f 
content have had greater success in export markets. Certainly, in the Irish context, 
utilitarian informational or educational content, such as Smartforce’s training 
artefacts, have enjoyed greater prominence in export markets than media and 
entertainment content. This could prove an appealing avenue for exporting content.
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Also, this avenue isn’t as readily available to traditional media. The difficulties o f 
exporting content out o f Ireland has a long history in the traditional media, 
particularly in television, as evidenced by R T E ’s involvement in the failed Tara TV 
station in Britain, and the general failure o f RTE to export Irish programming to 
foreign television markets. This highlights that the Irish Diaspora cannot be assumed 
to represent a relatively homogenous market receptive to  Irish content. They may 
have internalised the cultural values o f their emigrant society, which could lessen the 
appeal and importance to them of Irish content.
The companies selected for my qualitative case-studies produced media and 
entertainment content, and were reliant mainly on the domestic market. Enter  failed in 
a foreign market. Rondomondo supplied news content to Yahoo! in the UK, but on a 
co-branding, non-payment basis. And in Ireland.com  the balance o f  traffic had shifted 
over the years so that most o f  it was coming from inside Ireland. O f the three case- 
studies, Ireland.com  was the most successful at exporting content, even if  it failed to 
achieve profitability.
To properly examine the problems o f  export, future research will need a 
sophisticated conceptualisation o f  content, to distinguish between media (news, 
current affairs) and entertainment content and  utilitarian informational content (such 
as inform ation supplied to professionals and industry, and educational training 
artefacts). This thesis, examining the emergence o f the industry, has a broad 
conceptualisation o f content; future research could benefit from a sharper distinction.
9.3: Themes emanating from the micro-level research
9.3.1: Overview o f  m icro-level research
M y three case-study companies have three different origins -  a traditional media 
company, a telecom munications company, and a start-up company. They share 
characteristics and display differences. This thesis does not argue that the three case- 
studies are necessarily representative o f all companies from similar origins within the 
industry, so any general points drawn from these particular examples must be 
regarded as tentative.
As noted, the slowdown o f the Irish economy was a significant macro-influence 
on the case-studies. In particular, the slowdown affected the core, non-digital media
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businesses o f  the parent companies o f  two o f  the three case-studies. Falling revenues 
from Eircom ’s core fixed-line telephony business motivated management to 
restructure the company and eliminate non-core activities, including digital media 
content production at Rondomondo. Similar circumstances -  falling revenues, 
particularly from advertising -  forced a restructuring o f  The Irish Times Group, which 
could no longer afford to absorb the losses accumulated by Ireland.com. Investment 
in the website was reduced, staff numbers were cut, and it was moved to a 
subscription model to try to raise revenues.
E n te r’s  demise was not related to the slowdown o f the economy, but to another 
macro-factor: the small size o f the domestic market, which Pure Communications 
tried to break out o f  and failed.
The background o f the companies had a strong influence on content production 
within them. Ireland.com  carried the traditions o f The Irish Times. Rondomondo 
emerged out o f  a telecommunications company whose management didn’t really 
understand or have a commitment to content. Rondomondo had to spend time 
developing its content interests and building brands o f  content. The start-up company, 
Pure Communications, suffered from not having the support (financial, 
organisational) o f a larger, non-digital media organisation behind it.
At the micro-level, there was a multi-layered, frictional dynamic to content 
production in each o f  the companies, as actors from different parts o f  the 
organisations sought to influence the content. The production and delivery 
technologies and infrastructures imposed limitations on what could be achieved. 
Frequently, advertising considerations forced compromises on the wishes o f the 
editorial team. M anagem ent also imposed restrictions, and w ork was carried out 
w ithin budgetary constraints, which usually were set by people not directly involved 
in content production.
The three qualitative case-studies had formed linkages to external actors, to avail 
o f com petencies and infrastructures they lacked internally. Furthermore, Rondomondo 
and Ireland.com  supplied competencies and infrastructures to external companies, 
either through syndication, or in Rondom ondo’s case, developing content for external 
actors and hiring out its facilities. This deepened Ire land, corn’s and Rondom ondo’s 
overall integration into the industry, because they both supplied competencies and 
infrastructures to other companies, and depended on other companies for 
com petencies and infrastructures they lacked internally.
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The contraction o f  the industry between 2001 and 2002, and the decline in fortunes o f 
my three qualitative case-studies, suggests a trend o f companies struggling to generate 
revenues from digital media content. In 1999, the dominant business models were 
based on supplying content across a number o f  platforms, possibly on a syndication 
basis, and funding websites through advertising. This approach was taken by 
lreland.com  and Rondomondo.
Syndication, although lucrative, did not generate sufficient revenues to sustain the 
organisations. Advertising was an important consideration for all three qualitative 
case-studies. But in line w ith an industry-wide trend, the three o f  them had difficulty 
generating sufficient advertising revenues to sustain content production. Ireland.com  
moved from advertising to a subscription model. The chief operations officer o f 
Rondomondo was skeptical o f  advertising’s ability to deliver substantial revenues, 
and she envisaged implementing a subscription model for access to future content. 
And Enter  was designed largely with the aim o f incorporating a high volum e o f 
advertising content, although its creators also envisaged a subscription model for 
future online content. Each company regarded the success o f  a subscription model as 
depending on establishing premium brands o f content, or possessing exclusive, 
quality content (such as the Financial Times does for the business community), for 
which people would be willing to pay online.
Advertising is a weak foundation for a digital media business model. The 
COMTEC study indicates that digital media ranks lowest o f  the media forms in 
priority for companies allocating adverting budgets, and is the first medium to have 
budgets withdrawn or cut in times o f economic pressure (COMTEC, 2002).
By 2001, all three case-study companies had accepted that their current business 
models w eren’t w orking and w ouldn’t work in the long term, and all were positioning 
them selves for a subscription model. From my analysis o f the three case-studies, I 
argue that a successful subscription model seems to be based on three broad criteria: 
the supply o f  content, the ability to deliver it, and a ‘locked-in’ or loyal customer 
base. A  com pany’s subscription model would be more likely to work if  it was strong 
on all three criteria at the same time. The case-study companies were strong in up to
9.3.2: Overview and evaluation o f business models
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two criteria, but none w ere strong in all three. Ireland.com  was closest to achieving all 
three criteria.
Rondomondo management believed its content -  mostly text -  wouldn’t entice 
people to pay a subscription fee. It was trying to put in place an infrastructure to 
produce high quality audio and video content, an ambition that pushed the intensive 
development and testing o f  the E-TV project. Rondomondo was in a unique position 
in the Irish industry, because it was part o f the company responsible for rolling out the 
delivery infrastructure for content. Eircom had thousands o f  people on its own ISP, 
which in turn allowed Rondomondo to view broad quantitative figures on usage 
trends. Despite liberalisation o f  the Irish telecommunications market, these customers 
were to a large degree locked into Eircom for access to Internet and telephone 
services. Rondomondo management believed this could be used as leverage to lock-in 
a customer-base to its content services. This was the business model in theory. 
Rondomondo was closed before it could be applied in practice.
However, even w hen Rondomondo was at the height o f its development activities, 
Eircom had failed to rollout, countrywide, a broadband infrastructure that would have 
been capable o f  delivering high quality audio and video. Also, the content production 
infrastructure within Rondomondo was loosely constructed. Because it lacked the 
necessary delivery infrastructure for E-TV, Rondomondo couldn’t move from 
development to implementation. Therefore, it hadn’t defined specific audio and video 
content projects or programmes. The intention, when E-TV was established and 
running, was to  produce smaller pieces o f content in-house and outsource large 
pieces. Once it had a delivery infrastructure at its disposal, and had moved from 
development to implementation, it would have commissioned external companies to 
produce specific content projects and programmes.
According to the three broad criteria, Rondomondo fared poorly. It had a loosely 
developed content production infrastructure; its own parent organisation had failed to 
roll out the necessary broadband (delivery) infrastructure; and it was working to  the 
spurious assumption that customers locked into Eircom ’s ISP could be leveraged to 
subscribe to Rondom ondo content. M edia organisations such as AOL/Time W arner 
aggressively prom ote their online content on their traditional media channels. Eircom 
assumed that it could promote content to users subscribed to  its ISP. But there were 
no indications that this approach would have worked, or any evidence from other ISP 
companies that it does work.
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Pure Communications was stronger on the content production criteria. It had, 
since the first edition o f the CD-ROM, an infrastructure in place to produce audio and 
video content. This infrastructure remained in place for the life-span o f the Irish 
edition o f  the CD-ROM. But Pure Communications was weak in access to a delivery 
infrastructure. The model o f  delivering revenue by charging a purchase price for the 
CD-ROM  was intended to be short-term. The longer term model was to move online 
and charge subscription when broadband allowed for the delivery o f  high definition 
audio and video. But here, like Rondomondo, Pure Communications w as restrained 
by the lack o f a widespread broadband infrastructure, and so had to continue 
delivering its content on CD-ROM  format. Pure Communications had no customer 
base locked-in. One o f  its key early objectives was to build a loyal customer base in 
Ireland, anticipating that it would transfer online after the rollout o f broadband. Enter 
moved into the British market with a broadly similar objective -  build a loyal 
customer-base which would later transfer online. It abandoned the small customer 
base it had built up in Ireland and didn’t survive long enough to  build one in Britain. 
Enter  was in difficulty w ith respect to two o f the three criteria: it lacked its preferred 
delivery infrastructure and had no locked-in customer base.
Ireland.com  fared best on the three criteria. The Irish Times provided it with 
quality, branded content. Irelaird.com  developed an efficient content production 
infrastructure o f its own, which provided breaking news to compliment Irish Times 
news. It could re-purpose content depending on the intended delivery platform (WAP, 
SMS). It fared best in suitability o f  the available delivery infrastructure. Its content 
output was predominantly text, which could be delivered w ith ease across current 
Internet delivery infrastructures. Although it had ambitions to integrate audio and 
video content into the website (and, therefore, could have encountered the same 
delivery problem s as Rondomondo and Enter), there was no suggestion that this 
would have over-shadowed The Irish Times content. The redundancies announced in 
late 20 0 1 and im plem ented in early 2002 reduced the number o f  people working for 
the newspaper and the website, and the associated cost-cuttings removed the possible 
integration o f  audio and video content. But the website would have remained 
predominantly text-based. Indeed, regardless o f funding, enthusiasm for audio and 
video on the website had dampened by the time I renewed contact in 2002. Whereas 
traditional broadcasters such as RTE had expertise in producing audio and video 
content, The Irish Times Group had little. RTE had the capacity to produce a greater
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volume and variety o f audio and video content, and had an entire news organisation 
dedicated to producing immediate audio and video news. The Irish Times Group did 
not, and the traditional core competencies o f  the newspaper could not be used as a 
means to leverage Ireland.com  into audio and video web-content, as had been 
possible with text-based web-content. In producing audio and video content, 
Ireland.com  would have been competing against the core competencies o f  a 
traditional broadcaster, but with less expertise, a less well-developed production 
infrastructure, and with no tradition or brand o f  being a producer o f  audio and video. 
Therefore, Ireland.com  retreated, and staked the w ebsite’s future on The Irish Times 
G roup’s core competency: the provision o f text-based news.
During my research placement in 2001, occasional references were made to the 
business model o f  the website -  free access, funded by advertising. Advertising 
revenues had dipped since 2000 , but even w hen they were at their peak, they w eren’t 
sufficient to lift the website to profitability. In 2001, Ireland.com  management 
recognised that the website would have to move to a model based on paid access. The 
financial difficulties o f The Irish Times Group accelerated the implementation o f a 
subscription model. Its success was predicated largely on the reputation o f the news 
service -  Irish  Times and breaking news -  and o f  the user base the website had built 
up since 1994. Ireland.com  had no locked-in user base. Although no other website 
had access to  Irish Times content, Irish news content was readily available for free 
elsewhere on the web. Ireland.com  was relying on reputation and loyalty rather than 
lock-in -  that the w ebsite’s reputation for quality would persuade people to pay for 
access instead o f  seeking free news content on other websites. As a free service, 
Ireland.com  had a leading position; it had no guarantee o f maintaining that position as 
a paid service. Loyalty to  a brand o f  content is difficult to quantify. W hen I renewed 
contact in mid-2002, the subscription model had been active for several months. It 
had built a base o f  8,500 to 9,000 subscribers, but Ireland.com  w ouldn’t reveal how 
many subscribers were needed to turn the website to profitability. Overall traffic 
through the website had dropped.
Because the qualitative case-studies concentrated on media and entertainment 
content, the main business models were based on generating profits from a public 
audience, or through delivering a public audience to advertisers. In broad principle, 
these are the models used by the traditional media. But the traditional mass media
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attract higher audiences and advertising revenues, and are in a better position to mark 
a profit above the cost o f content production.
The Internet is increasingly being run on commercialised terms. This may reflect 
a change in the way people browse (surf) the Internet, as the culture o f  free access to 
content and services diminishes. Content provided through subscription could 
influence the early consumption habits that have been emerging. Users could become 
more discriminating and selective, based on the assumption that, as more websites 
turn to subscription, users will have a limited ability to pay. Websites could become 
more like channels o f  content, with users selecting and paying for a limited number o f 
the websites most relevant to their interests and needs. This could restrict or reduce 
the web as a source o f  content, although this would not be relevant to not-for-profit 
inform ation -  academic, for example -  or e-government services.
The re-structuring o f  the digital media content industry and its business models 
will probably have wide implications, and could be a valuable arena o f  future 
research. The re-assessment and re-structuring o f business models were at an early 
stage when the empirical research informing this thesis was completed. W hen I 
renewed contact in 20 0 2 , Ireland.com  did not yet know whether its subscription 
model would succeed. Further research will be required as the fuller consequences o f 
the DotCom and technology downturns take hold and new models have been 
im plem ented over a longer period, more feasible for study.
9.3.3: Evaluating the accumidation o f  competencies, infrastructures and knowledge
Each o f  my case-study companies produced content that, over time, became more 
sophisticated and complex, as they implemented new ideas and features, or began 
developing content for new delivery platforms. Therefore, the content competencies, 
technical infrastructures and knowledge (o f business models, production procedures, 
industrial trends and markets) needed to produce the content also become more 
complex. The case-study companies developed and accumulated these competencies, 
infrastructures and knowledge in a model similar to Lundvall’s conception o f 
innovation through interactive learning (Lundvall, 1992). His conception o f  learning 
by doing, using and interacting is particularly relevant to my four phase model o f 
Ireland.com ’s  development. At each stage, the experience gained through developing 
and using the website informed the next phase o f development. Further development
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required the accumulation o f further competencies, infrastructures and knowledge, but 
within the constraints o f  budgets, resources (human), and capacities o f  production and 
delivery technologies.
Accumulation is gradual and linked to the increasing complexity o f  an 
organisation’s content output. Companies accumulate either through acquisition 
(hiring people, taking over companies), in-house development (training people, 
updating their skills, building the necessary technical infrastructures), or gaining 
access through forming linkages to external actors.
Competencies, knowledge and infrastructures in companies go through constant 
change, as new technologies are appropriated, as people leave, and as companies 
follow or set trends or ‘styles’ o f content in the industry. An innovating industry is 
associated with a developing and thickening institutional set-up. So too an innovating 
content company is associated with a developing organisational structure, which 
includes an accumulation o f competencies, knowledge and infrastructures.
In all three qualitative case-studies, informal networks were important in securing 
competencies, particularly for content. M any o f the core competencies o f  digital 
media are quite similar to core competencies in the traditional media: writing, filming, 
editing, design. However, the competencies are not carried over from the traditional 
media unchanged. The Ireland.com  case-study noted the struggle to adapt the house- 
style o f  newspaper writing to web writing. Competencies were being adapted to better 
suit digital media; they developed over time and through people’s experience o f 
working with digital media content. The case-studies stressed how they improved 
content artefacts through the experience gained from working on them, and 
im plem enting new ideas, elements and features. This experience had to  be nurtured 
over time. The case-studies tried to retain within the organisation people who had 
built up these competencies. Pure Communications continued to employ the people 
who had the experience o f  working on Enter after it ceased production o f the CD- 
ROM. However, Ireland.com  lost through redundancies people who had built up 
experience o f  w orking on the website.
The means o f  bringing people into the organisations often relied on informal 
networks or personal contacts, as it does in the traditional media industry. Blurring the 
situation at Rondom ondo and Ireland.com  was the use o f freelances, which gave the 
companies access to competencies without formally integrating the people into the 
organisations. Commissioning freelances in the media is traditionally an informal
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process, depending on how reliable the freelancers are and if  they are available. 
(M any freelance for more than one media organisation, so there can be a cross-over o f 
the media they work for: print to web.) The number o f freelances active within an 
organisation fluctuates, depending on the budget for hiring them, the available 
freelances, and the amount o f  w ork that needs to be done or shifts available.
A lthough each case-study company had tried to accumulate a base o f  content 
competencies, some o f these competencies -  and knowledge and experience o f how 
content production proceeded in the organisation -  were invested in people who were 
not formally employed by the organisation and were free to work in other media 
organisations.
This is an indication o f how competencies circulate around media industries, both 
traditional and new. Although competency accumulation was evident in all three case- 
studies, this base was not stable. In all industries and companies, people move jobs, 
return to education, or retire, so the base o f competencies and experience fluctuates. 
But it seems especially fluid in content production, with a large percentage o f  content 
employees not formally (contractually) employed by the company. In the case-studies, 
there was a hierachy. The editors, deputy editors, chief sub-editors, or senior film and 
production engineers were most likely to be permanent or contracted staff. These 
people had the longest service in the organisations, the most experience o f  developing 
content, and their judgem ent carried most weight in the further development o f 
content innovations. They had a role in the routine production o f  content -  for 
example, the production o f  news content on a daily basis for Ireland.com  -  but were 
also charged with the overall task o f developing ideas for new elements and assessing 
their potential and feasibility. And although senior people could leave the 
organisations, this represented the stable core o f content competency and experience 
in all three case-studies.
In newly emerging industries, age and experience can diminish as the basis o f 
authority within companies, with technical knowledge often the key to  advancement. 
Burns and Stalker, writing about the organisation and management o f companies in 
young industries, argue that in traditional companies “to be older meant that one was 
more effective and better qualified. But in the new situation o f technical and 
commercial change, this basis o f  authority has become invalidated” (Burns and 
Stalker, 1979: xvii). There was some basis for this in the structures o f  my three case- 
study companies. People at senior levels did tend to have more experience and be
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older than those at lower levels, but they had less experience and were younger than 
people in equivalent positions in traditional media organisations. Also, because senior 
people in my case-study companies tended to be relatively young (no one had yet 
reached their forties), they maintained comparable levels o f  technical and content 
knowledge to younger people at lower levels o f the organisation.
However, at lower levels, reporters, sub-editors and film and production 
engineers were likely to be freelance, and to work for more than one media 
organisation. Some freelances worked regular hours or shifts, others worked 
infrequently, but all had in common that they were not contractually employed. 
Freelances were most likely to  be assigned the routine tasks o f producing content and 
had little input into the overall development o f a content innovation. They tended to 
be younger, have spent less time in the organisations, and have less experience in 
content production. But they served important functions, and produced a large volume 
o f  content for lreland.com  and Rondomondo. The situation in Rondomondo was 
complicated because, in addition to  in-house freelances, it received content from an 
external m edia organisation. Pure Communications was a smaller organisation, and 
the editor produced the majority o f the content, although a freelance was hired to 
cover sports content. The base o f technical competencies in all three organisations 
was more stable. Technical staff tended to be hired on a contractual basis.
Lundvall’s conception o f  competency accumulation implies a greater degree o f  
stability than is the case in most organisations. This is particularly so when dealing 
with production and innovation that is not subject to  standardised scientific and 
technical knowledge and competencies. Content competencies are linked to the 
personalities, judgem ent and experience o f people. Although certain standards and 
practices can maintain consistency o f  content production within an organisation, there 
is flexibility for individual styles to emerge in writing, filming and editing. The 
profile o f  the people in an organisation affects content production.
W hen applying the concept o f accumulation, a degree o f  flexibility has to be 
incorporated into the model. Lundvall’s model implies an upward accumulation. The 
case-studies show that this is not always so: Rondomondo closed, and its contribution 
to the industry was lost. Pure Communications shifted its activities away from digital 
media content, and the experience and competencies it had accumulated were no 
longer being contributed to the industry. Experience and competencies can be lost to 
an active innovator, such as Ireland.com, through cost-cuttings and redundancies. But
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even w ithout such measures, the base o f -  in particular -  content competencies is not 
stable. In content organisations there can be a relatively stable core o f content 
competencies at senior levels supplemented by a fluctuating layer o f  freelances. As 
these freelances can, and often do, work for more than one media organisation, it adds 
to the circulation o f competencies around the industry, and to how styles and practices 
o f  content production can informally diffuse from organisation to organisation. None 
o f the freelances I encountered at Ireland.com  had also worked for Rondomondo or 
Pure Communications, but the Irish industry is small and the possibility o f freelances 
working for tw o or more companies is high. The organisations o f  the case-studies 
were small and flexible. The greatest degree o f flexibility was on the content side, 
especially in non-contracted freelances.
9.3.4: Em erging m anagement styles o f  digital media content companies
The management system o f the three case-study companies conformed closest to the 
organic model proposed by Burns and Stalker (Burns and Stalker, 1961; 1979; 1994) 
Organic systems are characteristic o f  industries that are subject to rapid change, and 
organisations must be flexible enough to adapt to changes and face unfamiliar 
situations. The digital media content industry, being young, was subject to change, 
with new technologies, market trends and styles o f content developing over a 
relatively short period o f  time. This changing environment, as Burns and Stalker 
would have called it, required flexibility o f the case-study companies. They each had 
weak levels o f  demarcation, and employees, to a higher level than in bureaucratised 
organisations, had inputs into decision making processes and shared a general sense 
o f responsibility for the performance o f  the company and the quality o f  its content 
output. These are characteristics o f the organic model, but the companies were not a 
pure embodiment o f it. A solid layer o f bureaucracy underpinned the companies, 
particularly in administrative areas, and although demarcation w asn’t rigid, it w asn’t 
fluid either. Editors, designers, sub-editors, and journalists had roles that they 
generally fulfilled. However, in two o f the case-studies, Rondomondo and 
Ireland.com, demarcation w asn’t as precisely adhered to as it was in their larger 
parent companies, which had higher levels o f  bureaucracy and conformed closer to 
Burns and Stalker’s mechanistic model.
291
Burns and Stalker have tw o ideal models: an organic system for companies in a 
changing environment, and a mechanistic one for relatively stable conditions. 
M echanistic systems have high levels o f  bureaucracy and demarcation and cannot 
adapt easily to  change. Burns and Stalker propose that any model that falls between 
their ideal is dysfunctional, because it hinders the organisation from achieving its 
goals. M y case-study companies, although closest to the organic model, also had 
elements o f  the mechanistic model, and so fell between. The case-study companies 
encountered a number o f difficulties as they tried to establish themselves in the 
market, but their organisational structures did not hinder their innovative activities. 
Contrary to Burns and Stalker’s argument, an organisational structure between 
organic and mechanistic can affirm innovation and not always be dysfunctional to it.
There was common ground in the management approach taken by each case- 
study company, although certain elements o f management were context specific: The 
Irish Times Group, as a media organisation, was responding to  the possibilities and 
challenges o f the Internet and associated delivery platforms. Eircom, through 
Rondomondo, was trying to create advantages from controlling the delivery 
infrastructure for digital media content, as a means o f leveraging itself into a strong 
position as a content creator. And Pure Communications had a specific product that it 
hoped would create a niche while the market remained receptive to new types o f 
products. The origin o f  each venture affected the overall management style.
Pure Communications was a start-up. The management o f the company came up 
with the idea o f  Enter , and developed it from a concept to an actual product. The 
com pany’s resources w ere channelled towards promoting Enter  and stabilising it 
within the market. The management answered to no higher authority in the company: 
there were no additional layers o f management, distant from digital media content but 
with the power to make decisions that could affect production. Pure Communications 
management had control over the design o f the CD-ROM and its overall 
development. The management made the decision to expand into a foreign market and 
change the focus o f  the CD-ROM. Pure Communications had the smallest 
organisation o f the three case-studies and the least amount o f  demarcation. 
M anagem ent was not a layer separated from content production.
Rondomondo was part o f  a telecommunications company which had no tradition 
o f  content creation. The organisation was bigger and the layers o f  management more 
elaborate than in Pure Communications. There was a layer o f  management within the
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Rondomondo organisation itself, and an additional layer external to Rondomondo but 
within Eircom. This was the main point at which Rondomondo and Eircom interacted. 
There was a lot o f friction between Rondomondo management and Eircom 
management, and employees were aware o f it. Although Rondomondo negotiated 
with Eircom  for budgets, Eircom effectively set the budgets within which 
Rondomondo worked and therefore set the broad parameters o f  its technical 
infrastructure, staffing and innovative activities. Eircom management issued 
directives that Rondomondo tried to resist, in some cases successfully, in other cases 
not. Rondomondo was prevented from supplying content to other telecommunications 
companies. Eircom wanted Rondomondo to service internal company needs; 
however, Rondomondo wanted to exploit external markets.
M anagem ent and employees at Rondomondo accepted that Eircom didn’t really 
understand content, didn’t know what it wanted from Rondomondo, and didn’t 
appreciate the developmental w ork at Rondomondo. This perpetuated the feeling that 
Eircom  regarded Rondomondo as peripheral to its activities and not fully integrated 
into the overall organisation o f the company. The operations officer argued that 
influential people in Eircom  were against content development, and this was known 
while Rondomondo was still active. Lucy Jung noted in her study o f the BBC online 
how its management deflected criticism o f the online service and fostered a strong 
sense o f  creative purpose (Jung, 2001). Eircom ’s disregard for content seeped into the 
Rondomondo organisation, and the attitude from interviewees seemed to be that they 
had created quality content that wasn’t appreciated. The public and private messages 
from  Eircom management were mixed: publicly it backed Rondomondo to become a 
leader in the content industry, but privately wanted it to concentrate on servicing 
internal needs.
Ireland.corn’s  activities were closer to the core activities o f The Irish Times 
Group than Rondom ondo’s were to Eircom ’s. This was regarded as important in 
preserving lreland.com  when, in a similar financial situation, Rondomondo was 
closed. M uch o f Ire land .com 's content was created, first, for the newspaper, then re­
published in a lightly-edited form on the web. Ireland.com  was allowed relative 
autonomy in its breaking-news section, provided it did not scoop a story intended for 
the next morning’s newspaper. Ireland.com  and The Irish Times Group management 
had less interaction than w as evident between Rondomondo and Eircom. The Irish
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Times Group set overall budgets and levels o f  investment, but allowed Ireland.com  a 
high degree o f  freedom to manage its finances.
However, Ireland.com  management was less successful than that o f the BBC 
Online at fostering a culture o f  purpose and belonging within the overall organisation. 
On several occasions during my research placement, journalists referred to the low 
regard senior Irish Times management and editors had for the website. Ireland.com  
journalists had lower pay, contract status and benefits than Irish Times journalists. An 
Ireland.com  journalist was present at the daily Irish Times editorial meetings, but did 
not sit at the main desk w ith the newspaper editors and was regarded more as an 
observer than an active participant. The underlying belief in Ireland.com  was that 
senior Group management tolerated more than appreciated the website. The most 
obvious instance o f Ireland.com  having to respond to the directives o f Group 
management was in implementing the subscription model.
Like Rondomondo, Ireland.com  suffered from being a small, peripheral element 
o f  a bigger organisation. But it was closer to the core business o f The Irish Times 
Group and the disregard for its activities was less than that experienced by 
Rondomondo at Eircom.
W ith so many factors influencing the emergence o f the industry -  and as a mark 
o f  the industry being at an early stage o f its industry life-cycle -  the management o f 
the three case-studies fostered organisational structures that were small-scale and 
flexible and could respond to change. The origins o f the companies didn’t have a 
noticeable influence on their organisational structures, but a tension did arise between 
them and the larger, rigid non-digital media organisations o f The Irish Times Group 
and Eircom. This was particularly so with Eircom, which was a highly demarcated 
telecom m unications company, and had difficulty incorporating a smaller, flexible 
digital media organisation.
9.3.5: Im port o f  new (media) codes, grammars and conventions
Because the qualitative case-studies were based on the creation o f  media and 
entertainment content, I examined the emerging grammars, codes and conventions o f
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content production. Also, my research explored how content artefacts were framed, 
conceptualised and implemented, and how they borrowed and adapted from previous 
forms o f media. The discussion on the import o f codes, grammars and conventions 
was restricted, because my main focus was on the wider development o f the digital 
m edia content industry. There is need and ample scope for future research to fully 
articulate the process o f importing and adapting mature media codes, grammars and 
conventions to new media, and to theorise the patterns and practices that are 
becoming the distinct characteristics o f digital media.
The thesis provides some initial insights -  in particular, on the proclivity o f 
developers to refer back to and frame new media in terms o f  the old. Earlier studies 
suggest that new technologies frame themselves in terms o f older technologies. But as 
the new technologies mature, they refashion old techniques that don’t work in the new 
setting, and begin to display their own distinct qualities (Marvin, 1988). My research 
suggests that a similar pattern is true o f digital media. Originally, innovators frame 
digital media content in term s o f  the traditional media, until the medium begins to 
mature and innovators accept that traditional media references and practices don’t 
always fit easily w ith digital media. In each o f my qualitative case-studies, there was 
an instance o f  digital media content being framed in term s o f the traditional media: 
The Irish Times on the Web as an online newspaper (although, by 2002, the term 
online newspaper had been discarded by Ireland.com ), Enter as a CD-ROM 
magazine, and Rondom ondo’s various online magazines.
There was a progressive awareness among the three case-studies that simply 
grafting traditional media structures and production competencies onto digital media 
w asn’t beneficial. In particular, Ireland.com  was slowly, and at times against the 
w ishes o f the Group management, trying to adapt Irish Times writing house-style to a 
less formal, shorter style. Complicating the process was that the website republished 
Irish Times content, and therefore had to retain a high level o f ‘style’ consistency with 
The Irish Times.
Two o f the qualitative case-studies -Irela iid . com  and Rondomondo -  were trying 
to exploit the growing possibilities o f mobile communications devices, especially 
mobilephones. But their content ambitions were inhibited by the display limitations o f 
the platform. M obilephones, for both SMS text messaging and WAP, are a highly 
restricted medium. An SMS message can accommodate only a few lines o f  text, and 
W AP stories in Ireland.com  are restricted to 90 words. In 2002, WAP and SMS could
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not easily accommodate images, and the typographical possibilities w ere limited. Not 
only did this restrict the form and quantity o f the content, but also the types o f  content 
that could be delivered in such a condensed manner. Both Rondomondo and 
Ireland.com  offered narrow bands o f content to mobile communications devices: 
news content, weather, sports news, entertainment news and cinema listings.
9.4: Implications for methodology and future research
Deeper research into the emerging codes, grammars, and conventions will require 
qualitative methodologies. The research should be conducted in real-time (participant 
observation), and contact tim e with the case-studies should be for a longer period than 
was possible in my research. One o f the problems o f researching an emerging industry 
is that start-up companies tend to be particularly vulnerable to  closure. Future 
research, perhaps building on the conceptual framework established in this thesis, 
could benefit from the tendency o f  innovators to stabilise as markets mature.
Future research should clearly distinguish between media and entertainment 
content and utilitarian informational content. Linked to this should be a study o f how 
the language o f  digital media evolves and gains common usage and specific 
associations with digital media. The Enter case-study shows the difficulties o f using 
old media references to frame a new media artefact.
The research must draw further on media studies to complement what I have 
taken from systems o f innovation and social shaping o f technology perspective, to 
offer an elaborate conceptualisation and theorisation o f  digital media and its 
aesthetics.
In studying the emergence o f the industry, the thesis necessarily takes a general 
approach to content. Future research must be sensitive to the platform for which the 
content is being created -  the web, PDA, mobile communications devices, interactive 
games (and the narrative conventions that are developing within them). Particular 
codes, grammars and conventions are emerging for each platform. A  sharper focus on 
them  will benefit not only production research but also consumption research, because 
the technological form through which content is consumed affects the user’s 
perception. For example, cinema is different to television. In cinemas, films are 
presented as self-contained narratives, whereas television is a continuous flow o f 
images (Flew and M cElhinney, 2002).
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As argued earlier, future research should have a sharper distinction between 
media and entertainment content and utilitarian informational content. An element o f 
this should be a focused examination o f  the business models o f informational content, 
which is likely to be supplied from organisation to organisation, or directly to 
professionals to allow them to function, and not to a general audience.
9.5: Concluding remarks
It is difficult to develop a conceptual framework that is sensitive to all the facets o f 
the industry’s emergence, but yet could offer a coherent analysis o f  it. Technology- 
driven, linear accounts o f emergence appear reductive in comparison to my 
conceptual framework, and create a one-dimensional, uni-directional conception o f 
what is a multi-dimensional, multi-directional process. To gain a fuller sense o f  the 
process, the conceptual framework has to work at macro, meso and micro-levels. 
Research that is restricted to macro and meso-levels -  and based upon crude 
quantitative statistics -  could not provide a full account o f  the multi-layered 
emergence o f  the industry. Neither could research restricted to micro-level inquiry. 
Future research must incorporate a multi-layered conception o f the industry.
This research has sought to provide a fuller understanding o f how the digital 
media content industry and innovations within it are emerging. Three years is a short 
timeframe to examine the industry, especially at an early stage o f  its emergence, when 
industry profiles, knowledge, competencies, infrastructures and innovations are 
subject to rapid change. The trends and characteristics uncovered by my work may 
change or fade away as the industry reaches a higher level o f maturity. This is the 
meritable fate o f  a ‘real-tim e’ study o f industrial innovation processes. Further 
research, over a longer period o f  time, will be necessary to examine the industry as it 
matures and forms more established patterns o f innovation, output, revenues, 
competency, and knowledge.
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